CUMULATION OF THE STRUCTURAL DISPROPORTIONS IN SOVIET ECONOMY

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CUMULATION of the STRUCTURAL DISPROPORTIONS
Summary. Inadequate development.of agriculture,?tansportation,
and energy supply in comparison with industry and
national income In the USSR is under discussion. The
Soviet response dO structural disbalance and Soviet
need'the Western economic assistance is considered.
About Author. Born in Moscow 1935. Graduated Moscow Plekhanov
National Economy Institute 1958. Worked as a
researcher in Institutes of Economy and of the
World Socialist System (COlI'CON), Academy of
Sciences of the USSR. Participated. in Soviet
dissident movement (letter against Siniavsky-
Daniel trial was published in the West). After
signing the letter against Ginzburg -- Galanskov
trial dismissed from the Academy. Worked as an
economic adviser , computer center, Moscow
Institute of Engineering Bconommios0 Arrived
in Israel June 1971.
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CUMULATION OF THE STRUCTURAL DISPROPORTIONS IN SOVIET ECONOMY
[Article by V. Meniker, Russian, pp 1-15]
It is widely known that the national economy of communist countries
is weaker than noncommunist economies at approximately the same historical-
economic level. This is confirmed by the most fleeting comparisons of the
CEMA and the European Economic Community, the U.S., and USSR, Czechoslovakia
and Belgium, Romania and Venezuela, North and South Korea, and the like.
Many of those, however, who consider communism a "purely Russian" or "purely
Slavic" phenomenon often directly or indirectly propound the idea that it
merely catalyzed the long standing shortcomings of the people of countries
presently under communist domination: Lack of initiative, laziness, dis-
order in the work, inability to keep one's work, lack of concern for tomor-
row, and so on. The popularity of Berdyayev's idea about the imminent link
of communism with the Russian national character, and the dissemination of
leftist and radical leftist theories further distorts the reasoning of a
sober-minded person. The average (and not only the average) person, lost
in the world of the technical and moral revolution seeks a quiet refuge and,
involuntarily confuses the concept of anarchy with concepts of ideological,
political and economic pluralism. At the same time it would not be bad at
all to limit anarchy, if everyone could only be hardworking, responsible,
and prudent.
At the same time observations of communists, their social organiza-
tions, and state institutes indicate that with all the national intellectual,
and institutional differences the communists, individuals and organizations,
reveal a striking similarity in the most general and important behavioral
features: neglect of facts in the name of theory, neglect of means in the
name of the goal, neglect of the present in the name of the future. There
are common features in the economic characters of these countries as well.
These features are predetermined by the community of the economic doctrine
of communism.
The behavioristic reflection of the communist doctrine in economics
consists of a neglect of consumption in the name of production, while in-
side production it consists of a neglect of ancillary branches, the infra-
structure, in the name of the production of the final product. This is
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understandable. Other conditions being equal it is much more difficult to
manipulate production and economic life which involves the participation of
millions of people, hundreds of thousands of cells of society, than it is
to manipulate the distribution of a state product which is already obtained
and concentrated. Concern for auxiliary branches, for the infrastructure
complicates the production process, puts it to a significant degree under
the will of the lower steps of the economic hierarchy. In addition develop-
ment of the infrastructure detracts funds from the production of the final
product thereby hindering the possibility of manipulating the mass of labor
already embodied in such a product. It is true that subsequently a developed
infrastructure can increase the amount of the product or diminish its losses.
The center of gravity of the communist doctrine of economics, however, rests
on the fact that sacrifice and delay of the present in the name of the future
are only permissible in the sphere of consumption, while the product is re-
quired immediately, right away.
The practical implementation of this doctrine was promoted by the
backwardness of economic and technical reasoning in the USSR connected with
the overall historical backwardness of the country, the communist ideological
monotheism, and lack of personnel aggravated by the destruction and banish-
ment of the best of them as well as by the insufficient training of new work-
ers and arbitrariness in economic practice. Monstrously illiterate thoughts
concerning the correlation of demand and supply, commodity production, ex-
change, and the like, expressed by Stalin in his last works merely constitute
an authoritative indoctrination of the ideas of theoreticians and practition-
ers of the State Planning Commission and the Institute of Economics of the
USSR Academy of Sciences no matter how they deny these thoughts after the
demise of the "leading figure" of economic science.
The combination of the authoritative doctrine and backward reasoning
brought to life the sadly famous system of planning which, being extremely
centralized and detailed, has nothing in common with observation of the har-
monious development of the economic system. The main principle in the plan
of soviet enterprises and territories is the output of gross production.
Applying R. Stone's well known scheme* to the Soviet economy it is
possible to reveal a number of reasons for the possible structural lack of
balance in this economy as a system of theory, facts, and structures (fig. 1).
* R. Stone's work Modeling of Economic System was published in a transla-
tion by the author of this article in the Soviet magazine Ekonomika i
Matematicheskiye Metody (Economics and Mathematical Methods), 1965, Vol 1,
Nos 2-3, pages 363-390. As far as I know this work was not published in
full in the English language and was written especially for the indicated
magazine. Only the part containing a description of the "Rocket" model of
the British economy was included in a number of works by Stone, including
the series of publications by University of Cambridge, Dept. of Applied
Economics, A Program-for Growth, L., Chapman and Hall, 1962-1964.
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Let us recall that according to this scheme an economic model 3 is
created through the combination of theory 1 and facts 2. Formation of eco-
nomic policy 4 is based on consideration of the possibilities of the economy
reflected by model 3 in combination with goals 5 which are determined by
policy. Plan 7 is formed on the basis of economic policy 4 and the exist-
ing methods of economic management 6. In the course of the practical reali-
zation of the plan 7 with consideration of current events 8 in the economic
life, economic experience 9 is formed which must modify the adopted theory
1 through feedback channels (shown on the drawing with a dotted line) along
with tiw oiift i:t,u1-ed goals 5, ari well as, the existing methods of economic
management 6, which were earlier adopted as the most effective. The cited
scheme actually has many more feedbacks. The critical path calculated in
terms of the SRM theory (critical path method) in the economic system de-
signed to take into account the actual situation, passes along the fact -
model - economic - policy - plan path (2 - 3 - 4 - 7), whereas in the com-
munist economy it passes along the path theory - goals - plan (1 - 5 - 7)
depicted in fig. l by a dotted line.
Figure 1, System of links between elements of economic theory and practice.
Key: 1.. Theory 4. Economic policy 7. Plan
2. Facts 5. Goals 8. Current events
.3. Economic model 6. Existing methods 9. Economic experience
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Prolonged neglect of real economic categories has its results. The
lag of the infrastructure aggravated by the destruction of an important part
of the infrastructure, agriculture during the years of collectivization,
which is natural for the Soviet economy of the initial five-year plans (just
as it is for any backward but swiftly developing economy) became a constant
factor inhibiting the growth of the Soviet economy and welfare of the popu-
lation of the USSR.
Examination of several statistical aggregates officially published in
the USSR indicates that the lack of infrastructural balance in the Soviet
economy has intensified in the last several years.
One of the main and direct causes of the disproportional development-
decline of the effectiveness of investments (capital investments) has been
covered in the Soviet press with alarm for a long time. Let us compare the
dynamics of capital investments and the intoduction of fixed capital (table
1).
The table indicates that fixed capital (capital values) increased in
volume much slower than expenditures on their creation. At the same time
it is necessary to take into consideration that the statistics of capital
investments cited, for instance, in the collection Narodnoye Khozyaystvo
SSSR (National. Economy of the USSR) bears a formal budgetary and not a
realistically economic character. It does not include such important ele-
ments of capital expenditures as expenditures on the large part of design
work, on reforestation, on the formation and improvement of the basic herd
(without young cattle), on the acquisition of equipment for operation of
administrative,, educational, and medical establishments, or on geological-
prospecting operations, not connected with construction.*
In Table 1 the comparison of dynamics is carried out with lag of one
five-year plan. In the last three five-year plans, however,.this shift proved
to be insufficient. That is why at the present time departures are made with
increasing frequency in the USSR from the investment, effectiveness coeffi-
cient equal to 0.2 in accordance with the "typical method" of the State Plan-
ning Commission and the Institute of Economics (1962), with a shift to co-
efficients of 0.169 and even 0.15. This evidences a slowing down of the
time periods and accumulation of reserves of uncompleted construction. Table
2 contains eloquent Soviet data on this.
* In part this substantially lowers the production cost of petroleum for
Soviet petroleum extracting enterprises. This production cost does not even
include expenditures on industrial drilling. Official calculations include
only comparatively small expenditures on the pumping of petroleum from the
ground. Actually petroleum costs much more than is possible to.judge by
the prices at which it is introduced in the Soviet economy and on the world
market.
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Table 1. Investments and Introduction of Fixed Capital in the Postwar Five-
Year Plans (with consideration of the five-year lag) by State and Cooperative
Enterprises and Organizations (without kolkhozes).
Billions of rubles
Growth rate %
Invest-
ment
Introduction
of fixed
capital
Introduction.
Invest- of fixed
ment capital
4th Five-year plan
[1946-1950]
40.5
35.3
100.0 -
5th Five-year plan
[1951-1955]
77.8
68.3
192.1 100.0
6th Five-year plan
[1956-1960]
142.2
130.8
351.1 191.5
7th Five-year plan
[1961-1965]
217.2
203.2
536.3~ 297.5
8th Five-year plan
[1966-1970]
312.0
285.4
770.4 417.9
Source: Narodnoye Khozyaystvo SSR v 1970 g. (National Economy of the USSR
in 1970) pp 471, 478 and author's calculations.
The decrease in the volume of uncompleted construction by comparison
with investments in 1970 is explained very prosaically -- that was the last
year of the five-year plan when it was necessary to urgently report on the
regularly occurring great achievements. Already in 1972, according to
Kosygin, the volume of uncompleted construction rose to 70 billion rubles,
which amounted to around 76 percent of the amount of investments for that
year.*
Table 2. Uncompleted Construction in State Cooperative Enterprises and
Organizations (at the end of the year)
Billions of rubles In percent of the volume
of annual investments
.1965
29.6
69
1966
32.5
71
1967
35.8
72
1968
41.8
77
1969
48.6
80
1970
52.5
73
Source: Narodnoye Khozyaystvo SSR v 1970 g. (National Economy of the' USSR
in 1970), page 490.
For the purpose of this analysis it appeared useful to examine the
correlation of,indexes of the dynamics of the following major economic ag-
gregates: national income (or, for a number of noncommunist countries)
Planovoye Khozyaystvo (Planned Economy), No 11, 1972, p 5. Vestnik
Statistiki (Statistical Herald), No 8, 1972, p 94,.
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industry, agriculture, railway transport and consumption of power resources
(in term of the coal equivalent) on the basis of coefficients used in the
publication World Energy Supply. Table 3 shows the percentage of growth in
industrial production per one percent of increase in the national income (of
,GDR) in certain developed countrie$ during the entire postwar period, in the
60's and after 1965.
Table 3. Percentage of Increase in the Volume of Industrial Production per
One Percent of Increase in the National Income of a.Number of States
Entire post-
1960-
1965-
war period
-1970
-1970
USSR
1.31
1.35
1.32
USA
0.63
1.32
1.35
Canada
1.43
1.38
1.30
Japan
1.48
1.29
1.32
France
1.23
0.78
0.85
FRG
0.38
1.05
1.10
Italy
2.07
1.35
1.36
Sweden
0.31
1.55
1.57
England
0.20
1.06
1.06
Source: Calculated on the basis of national statistics of the countries,
as well as according to Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1970.
Table 3 indicates that in the USSR the growth. rates of industry in
all three periods outstripped the growth of national income. Such phenomenon
was observed in other countries as well. There, however, this was a spon-
taneous process often connected with the process of postwar restoration,
which slowed down after its completion. In the USSR this was a purposeful
policy connected with the social product race which was already mentioned.
Development of the Soviet economy and especially industry is corrected very
poorly with the growth rate in the welfare of the population. According to
unpublished data of workers in the Central Economic-l4athematical Institute
and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR
Academy of Sciences branches producing the means of production (key indus-
tries) in the Soviet Union work for each other by 74 percent, whereas in the
U.S. this comes'to only 47 percent.
A particularly serious infrastructural defect of the Soviet economy
is the lag in agriculture. In no industrial country with a developed agri-
culture did the correlation of the growth rates of the national income, in-
dustry, and agriculture form as poorly for the agrarian sector as in the
USSR. Table 4 indicates that agriculture is lagging;in the. USSR at a grow-
ing rate behind industry and this lag is growing faster than in other coun-
tries.
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Table 4. Percent of Increase in Agricultural Production per Percent of Rise
in the-National Income and Percent'of Growth in Industrial Production in the
USSR
USA
Canada
Japan
France
FRG
Italy
Sweden
England
USSR and Other Countries
Per percent of increase in
Per percent of increase in
national income (or)
industrial production
Postwar
period
1960-1970 1965-1970 Postwar
period
1960-1970
1965-1970
0.17
0.40
0.40
0.13
0.25
0.28
0.15
0.27
0.28
0.24
0.20
0.21
0.41
0.70
0.49
0.28
0.56
0.36
0.21
0.25
0.22
0.15
0.20
0.20
0.21
0.41
0.36
0.17
0.55
0.46
0.06
0.10
0.31
0.15
0.10
0.31
0.36
0.60
0.52
0.17
0.47
0.38
0.32
0.06
0.04
0.09
0.04
0.03
0.12
1.10
1101
0.56
1.07
0.96
In the Soviet Union with its vast spaces a big role is played by
transportation. Unfortunately it was impossible to make a-comparison be-
tween states with regard to transportation similar to the one made in Table
4 for agriculture, since information is not published, in other countries
pertaining to freight traffic involving all types of transportation in a'
single index. As far as railway shipments are concerned it is quite natural
that the USSR outstrips other countries by a considerable margin for the
world tendency consists of the development of non railway types of trans-
portation (Table 5).
The table indicates that development of railway transportation in the
USSR also lagged farther behind industrial development than in a number of
other countries. The lag in the development of motor transportation, which
was progressing rapidly throughout the world, was also superimposed on this
defect. Motor transportation consolidated' direct links between producers
and consumers. 'Soviet researchers, however, write much about the weakness
of such links. 'Indirect data, however indicate the fact that existing scales
in the development of railway transportation are inadequate for Soviet econ-
omy. It must be noted that the specific share of all. forms of transportation
in the formation of national income in the USSR lags behind all countries
taken by us for-comparison (See below, Table 8). Data cited by us in one
of our other works* indicate that around one-fifth of. all freight in the USSR
is transported between Soviet republics, and during the decade between 1960
and 1970 the share of inter-republic shipments showed a slight increase.
"Socio-Economic. Potential of Soviet Internal Diaspora: General Approach"
(to be published).
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Table 5. Percentage of Increase in Freight Traffic in Railway Transport per
Percent of Rise in the National Income and per Percent of Increase'in Indus-
USSR
USA
Canada
Japan
France
FRG
Italy
Sweden
trial Production in the USSR and Other Countries
Per percent of rise in Per percent of increase in
the national income (or industrial production
GDR)
Postwar 1960-1970
_period
1965-1970 Postwar
period
1960-1970
1965-1970
,
0.88
1.19
1.11 0.67
0.27
0.30
0.25
0.80
0.72 0.39
0.60
0.53
0.80
1.00
0.98 0.55
0.78
0.75
1.05
0.10
0.04 0.77
0.08
0.06
1.22
0.33
0.27 1.00
0.42
0.31
0.28
0.34
0.36 0.75
0.30
0.31
0.35
0.01
0.14 0.17
0.01
0.10
0.27
0.94
0.93 0.85
0.61
0.59
*Railway freight traffic declined steadily.
Source: Same as for Table 3.
The point is that development of national regions in the USSR was not
only the result of natural internal processes, but also a consequence of a
thought out policy guiding this development along a path of the creation of
a mutually dependent economy which was often to the detriment of real eco-
nomic needs of 'the country. In part the increase in the share of interrepub-
lic shipments in the overall freight traffic could have taken place only on
the basis of bulk cargoes, that is raw material (it accounts for more than
four-fifths of"the entire volume of shipments). This, in turn means that
the regions of extraction and. processing of raw materials, i.e., the producers
and consumers, were moved further from each other. The same is indicated
by the increase in the distance of shipments of the most important types of
raw materials and all freight in general by rail in the USSR during the same
decade (Table 6).
The state of the fuel and energy balance causes particular concern
among Soviet planning organs. Contrary to the logical scheme of economic
development, which presumes that the growth in the consumption of energy
resources must~'outstrip the development of the economy as a whole, a reverse
picture is observed in the USSR (Table 7).
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Table 6, Increase in the Average Distance of Shipment of a Ton of Bulk
Cargo During 1960-1970 (Kilometers).
1960
1970
Increase (7.)
All freight
798
861
107.9
Coal
681
692
101.6
Coke
617
707
114.6
Ferrous metals
1,163
1,357
116.7
Lumber
1,387
1,647
118.7
Ore
552
690
125.0
Mineral building materials
364
434
119.2
Source: Narodnoye Khozya_ystvo SSSR v 1970 g., page 432 and the author's
calculations.
Table 7. Percentage in the Rise of Consumption of Energy Resources per
Percent of Increase in the National Income and per Percent of Rise in In-
USSR
USA
Canada
Japan
France
FRG
Italy
Sweden
England
dustrial Production in the USSR and Other Countries
.Per percent of increase in Per percent of rise in
the national income (or GDR) industrial production
Postwar
period
1960-1970
Postwar
1965-1970
period
1960 - 1970
1965-1970
0.36
0.57
0.53 0.24
0.43
0.40
0.23
0.94
1.01 0.37
0.71
0.75
0.54
1.47
1.42 0.37
1.09
1.10
0.64
1.04
1.05 0.43
0.82
0.79
0.40
0.92
0.90 0.25
1.15
1.06
..0.22
0.80
0.79 0.57
0.74
0.72
1.10
2.14
2.11 0.60
1.58
1.55
0.21
1.37
1.60 0.55
0.87
1.01
0.06
0.43
0.37 0.33
0.41
0.35
Source: The same as for Table 3 and also calculations on the basis of
publication "World Energy Supply."
The deficit of energy resources in the Soviet economy is explained
by three reasons: their overall shortage, disproportions in the fuel-energy
.balance, and increased energy consumption capacity of the economic structure
as a whole.
The shortage of energy resources along with inadequate development of
fuel extracting branches are also explained by the exhaustion of the sources
of energy carriers in the main industrial regions and by the necessity of
shifting energy, production to the east, which requires vast funds for in-
vestments in the fuel branches themselves and in the capacities for shifting
the energy carriers (ground transportation, pipelines, electric power trans-
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Disproportions in the fuel-energy balance are brought about by a great
expenditure of certain energy carriers for the production of others. Accord-
ing to our evaluation made on the basis of interbranch balances of the USSR
in 1959 and 1966, the situation in this sphere is certainly not improving.
In 1959 around 36 percent of the expenditures in the fuel-energy branches
did not yield a final effect, remaining in the same branches. In 1966 this
share rose to 42 percent. The amount of energy spent on the transfer of
some energy carriers into others is nearing to 50 percent of the overall
volume of energy resources. This is explained not only by the development
of heat and electric power generation but also by the inadequate development
of all types of transportation, mentioned above, which are becoming the prin-
cipal consumers of energy carriers in the advanced countries (Motor, water,
and air transport). Information on the losses of energy are almost entirely
absent from Soviet statistics with the exception of information about the
constantly growing losses of electric power in the networks*. The numerous
reports in the Soviet press regarding the burning of by-product gas in flares
because of the lack of possibilities for its trapping and utilization, and
about the crushing of coal during shipment, and the like, however, indicate
the existence of great losses of energy carriers that have already been ob-
tained.
At the same time the structure of the Soviet economy itself requires
increased expenditures of energy resources as compared with developed non-
communist countries. Despite tumultuous growth of industry and the lag of
agriculture, the USSR, if it is possible to express it in this way, remains
the most agrarian of the industrial countries in the world. Table 8 cites
an approximate evaluation of the structure of the formed national income in
the USSR and in certain developed non-communist countries during 1960-1969
converted to the MBS system (for greater comparability). With all the reser-
vations regarding statistical accuracy of calculations it is possible to
assert that the share of agriculture in the formation of national income in
the USSR is much higher than in the countries taken for comparison, while
the share of transportation and trade is lower.
Assuming that data in Table 8 are sufficiently reliable we attempted
to evaluate, on the basis of 1959 and 1966 balances, the comparative energy
intensiveness of comparable units of production of various branches of the
national economy of the USSR (again on the basis of the same coefficients
for conversion into reference fuel as those indicated below). The calcula-
tion confirmed the generally accepted opinion in the-USSR concerning the
significant conversion into reference fuel as those indicated above). The
calculations confirmed the generally accepted opinion in the USSR concerning
the significant non-labor expenditures on agricultural production (the labor
input of kolkhoz members, in accordance with the Soviet economic doctrine
does not cost anything). The obtained results are cited in the upper part
of Table 9.
* See Narodnoye Khozyaystvo SSSR v 1970 g., page 172`.
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Table 8. Structure of the Formation of National-Income of the USSR and
Certain Non-Communist Countries Converted to the MBS System (Evaluation)
National
Income
Con-
Trans-
Agricul-
ture
Industry
struc-
tion
Trade
portation Other
and com- branches
munication
USSR
100
22
52
6
6
USA
100
5
50
8
27
10
Canada
100
9
48
9
19
15
Japan
100
14
46
9
20
11
France
100
10
55
13
15
7
FRG
100
6
58
10
18
8
Italy
100
15
.47
11
19
8
Sweden
100
7
44
12
27
10
England
100
5
57
10
16
12
Source:
Calculated according to Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics
1970, Vol 2, pp 46-73.
Table 9. Evaluation of the Power Intensiveness of a Unit of Production in
Branches of the National Economy of the USSR and Other Countries.
.Entire Agri- Industry Construc- Trade Trans-
economy culture tion portation Other
and com- branches
munication
USSR-1959 .100.22 119.3 100.0 90.9 88.2 116.0 59.8
1966 99.14 124.8 100.0 72.6 100.4 122.1 94.6
USA 9.6.18
Canada 102.04
Japan 98.75
France 97.59
FRG 96.92
Italy 98.40
Sweden 9`6.20
England 97.58
Note: Calculations for the USSR were made on the basis of data of inter-
branch balances of 1959 and 1966 (published in Na.rodnpye Khozyaystvo SSSR
in 1960 and 1968, correspondingly). Calculations for other countries were
carried out on the basis of structures cited in Table 8, compared to average
indexes for the USSR in 1959 and 1966.
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Table 9 indicates that for purely structural reasons the. Soviet econ-
omy is in need of a relatively greater amount of energy resources than the
economies of other developed countries (by approximately three to five per-
cent). It is difficult to judge the direction which the change in this
index is following by the interbranch balance, particularly as a result of
fluctuations in agricultural production.
Summarizing the results of the analysis of infrastructural dispropor-
tions connected with the correlation of the dynamics of national income, in-
dustrial production, agriculture, transportation, and power consumption in
the USSR it is possible to reach the following conclusions.
1. Industrial development in the USSR significantly outstrips the
growth of national income and development of other branches forming national
income.
2. Participation of agriculture in the formation of national income
is decreasing and the decrease in its share in the national income is taking
place faster than in other advanced countries with a developed agrarian sec-
tor. Nevertheless the role of agriculture in the Soviet economy is still
very great.
3. In the development of railway transport the USSR outdistances the
developed non-communist countries. However, data are lacking for a compari-
son of the dynamics of all forms of transport. Indirect information permits
one to assume that even with such high tempos, the vast area of the USSR,
the shift of raw material extraction to the east and the break between pro-
ducers and manufacturers cause Soviet transport to be the obstacle in the
development of the economy.
4. The. fuel-power problem forms the weakest link in the Soviet eco-
nomic structure. It may be assumed that their influence is felt in all
spheres of the economy including agriculture and transport. The reasons
for these difficulties lie in an overall shortage of energy carriers, sig-
nificant expenditures of some energy carriers on the production of others,
and increased energy intensiveness of the Soviet economy by comparison with
other industrial economies.
5... The Soviet political-economic system reacts to its structural de-
fects with a considerable delay. The accumulation of these defects, however,
makes it necessary to undertake certain measures. Periodic disruptions con-
.stitute a prod in this direction particularly in agriculture, which under
different circumstances might not be as catastrophic (for example, with
organized transportation and a sufficient supply of duel even with poor
weather conditions, it would be possible to decrease harvest losses by a
significant degree).
Approved For Release 2001/11/1162: CIA-RDP75B0038OR000200100089-6
 ,,Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000200100089-6
6. Soviet authorities have already demonstrated their readiness to
seek aid in the West in the field of infrastructure. Inasmuch as vast amount
of funds is required even for an insignificant smoothing out of infrastruc-
tural defects that have intensified in the USSR economy, along with serious
technical transformations and long periods of time, it is possible to assume
that involvement of the Soviet Union in economic links with the West and its
interest in such contacts will be unprecedented in relations of the West with,
the;USSR over the past 40 years.
Approved For Release 2001/11j1 ~ j CIA-RDP75B00380R000200100089-6
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