THE RELEASE OF NORTH KOREAN PRISONERS OF WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000100230018-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: June 18, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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r
THE RELEASE OF NORTH KOREA" P,Rt1SONRS OF WAR
The unilateral release of the Ndrth Korean anti-Communist, prisoners
by President Rhee has been cited previously as one possible weapon which
the South Korean government might be expected to use, short of indepen-
dent military action,, to hamper or block a truce, embarrass the United
States, and underline South Korean opposition to an armistice IWWpresent-
ly proposed. Other measures noted heretofore,, and which may yet be
adocted, include South Koreab refusal to signs an armistice, refusal to
withdraw ROK troops from the demilitarized zone, withdrawing South
Korean troops from the UN Command, and/or employing force against
Indian troops,
While the Communists have shown no desire to break oft the truce
them
procee'iinga, this incident presents iddfft with this opportunity if they
desire to do so. Their line will undoubtedly be that Rhee-s action
represents collusion with the UN. They stated in mid-May, when the UN
pro used that all anti-Communist POWs be immediately released, that
such a move would undermine the basis of the talks. This had some
prisoner issue,
logic since, insofar as the talks related to the the
basis of the 3ralks would, in fact,, have been undermined, It is more
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likely, however, that the Communists will not and the negotiations snr
because of
the prisoner release but will, through "righteous indignation,"
and
point up their ability to control their own prieonersi indicate their
cause the agreements to become unworkable.
Rhee's action will undoubtedly cause a drastic lowering of his
prestige among friendly UN nations. It should be remembered that the
UN's 13 May proposal, calling for the release of anti-Communist POT "s
immediately, caused violent reactions among many US. allies and to a
considerable extent brought about revised nroposa1s. Unilatera
action in accomplishing the release may cause even more violent
reactions. in addition, the US will almost certainly be severely
criticized for allowing such a situation to develop in view of the
An alarming by-product of the affiar is that Rhes's orders were
apparently carried out by Maj. Gen. Won Yon-tok, chief of the e'rovost
Marshal General Command, on is a ready tool of ixhee and a political
general without military status except for his personal relationship
on with the proceedings while secretly hoping that con-
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with Rhee. The affair may undermine the prestige of Chief of Staff Paik
who
Sun-*yop, ROK Chief of Staff, whose guards manned the stockades. Palk,has
consistently opposed Rhee's threatened "march to the Yalu; could now be-
come discredited and be replaced by a "political general" like Won who
would not hesitate to order independent military action if Rhea asked for
it. While this latest affr probablrr jdm4ft represents further South Korean
a 'tempts
Mx 4o modify the truce or secure a security pact with the US
21:12r. to an ar stice, Rhee's emotionalism on the question of unifi
cation, coupled with a political general's appointrpent as chief of staff,
it
might brink the northward march closer to reality than t has been here-
tofore.
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