AFTERMATH OF THE BERLIN RIOTING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000100240003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 24, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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AFTERMATH OF THE BERLIN RIOTING
GENERAL
The outbreak of rioting in Berlin, with the subsequent
chain reaction of violence throughout East Germany, confronts
the Kremlin with a situation having serious ramifications ex-
tending far beyond the local scene. The new Soviet rulers
find themselves in the grip of violent and fast moving events
stemming from a miscalculation of the effects of the softer
policy initiated by them after the death of Stalin. Although
they appear to have reasserted control in East Germany over
the past week-end, it has been at the cost of revealing to the
world the military basis of their power.as well as the weak-
ness of the puppet East German government.
Moreover, these events will most certainly cause the new
Soviet regime to review its entire present policy. Some of
the German puppets, such as Ulbricht, will probably be made the
scapegoats for the fiasco, and it is likely that its repercus-
sions have reached the Kremlin itself. Moscow must also reckon
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with the possibility, that this unrest may spread eastward into
the other Satellites. In view of the surprising scope of the
violence in East Germany, this possibility may appear less
tenuous to the Kremlin now than it would have without the
hindsight based on the East German developments.
East German cities, The situation throughout the German Demo-
cratic Republic is still fraught with tension. There have been
reports of continued unrest, but the overwhelming show of Soviet
military strength has largely restored order at least on the
surface as of 20 June. Twenty thousand Soviet troops were de-
ployed in East Berlin alone. In addition, the Soviet Air Force
in Germany was grounded, but alerted for action. The GDR
regime has broadcast warnings to the population against further
disturbances. Mass arrests are reported to be in progress,
and the regime has threatened to punish those responsible for
the riots with "an iron fist."
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The government has also announced a series of palliative
economic measures to cope with the situation, but has made no
of Trade and Supply stated that private shops would be re-
political concessions. A 17 June proclamation of the Minister
turned to all former owners who wanted them and credits would
be extended to private enterprise. On 19 June the regime promised
that the output of consumer goods and food would be expanded
at the expense of heavy industrial production. A subsequent
announcement called off a scheduled increase in work norms
and guaranteed the end of electric power cuts in workers'
homes,
increases in pension and social security benefits, low-price
railroad tickets for workers, and improved housing and better
sanitary conditions in factories.
No attempt is being made at mass punishment of the striking
workers. All "honorable workers" who had participated in
the riots at the instigation of "foreign provocateurs" were
promised amnesty if they returned to their jobs. None of these
concessions, however, weakens the base of Soviet power in East
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Germany.
While all of these conciliatory measures have the effect
of slowing up the "socialization" process in East Germany, they
do not spell its end. A 21 June editorial in Neues Deutschland,
official organ of the Socialist Unity Party, pointed out that
improvements answering the "justified demands of the people"
could only come about as more goods were produced. The workers
were exhorted to increase production and fulfill the economic
plans.
REACTION IN WEST GERMANY
West German reaction to the Berlin riots reveals that the
grave threat to the Bonn coalition government posed by the
Soviet conciliatory moves in East Germany has been largely nul-
lified. The immediate West German response to the East German
events has been a widespread demand for unification. The
Grotewohl regime, however, is thoroughly discredited and any
East German measures of conciliation would be looked upon as
a sign of weakness. West German press opinion points to an in-
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creased prestige for the Adenauer government as a result of
prospects for
unity have declined as a result of the East German blood bath.
Chancellor Adenauer, has demanded before a special parliamentary
session that unity be based on five conditions: free elections,
the formation of an all-German government, the solution of all
border problems, and the freedom of the all-German government
to participate in alliances, as well as its freedom to partici-
pate in peace treaty negotiations. Adenauer has received wide
popular acclaim for his stand. It is supported by the West
Berlin SPD-dominated government, and by Erich Ollenhauer, chair-
man of the opposition Social Democratic party. While Ollenhauer
wants the fillies to seize the initiative on four-power negotia-
tions, the Chancellor still seeks to avoid four-power meetings
prior to the September elections in West Germany.
It is unlikely that any responsible West Geri.an leader
with the exception of West Berlin Mayor Reuter will have any
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dealings with the leaders of the present East German regime.
Reuter has indicated that he will shortly initiate an offer to
the Communists for all-Berlin elections.
The urge for unity has been reawakened in West Germany,
but it is conditioned on the question of free ill-German elec-
tions. West Germany will not be swayed from the Adenauer govern-
ment's policy of integration with the West by any lesser con-
cession.
A vague Soviet offer to discuss unity, without specifying
conditions, might nevertheless be favorably entertained by the
West German populace, especially if the East German regime were
re-constituted on an apparently more democratic basis and the
conciliatory measures continued.
Should the USSR offer to discuss free internationally-
supervised elections an Allied refusal to negotiate would alien-
ate many West Germans. In any case, the whole issue will be
surveyed more dispassionately in West Germany after the Septem-
ber elections,
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RAMIFICATIONS IN THE OTHER SATELLITES
A spirit of unrest more.vigorous than has been evidenced
during recent years seems to be gripping the other satellites.
Besides the spectacular outburst in East Germany, Czechoslovakia
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and Rumania have been the scenes of significant increases in
expressions of unrest and dissatisfaction. In Czechoslovakia the
unrest resulted in widespread demonstrations in Prague, Pilzen
and a number of other industrial cities between 1-5 June. In
the remainder of the Satellites stirrings of unrest prevail
but seem to have less focus.
The popular unrest is taking such varied forms as physical
attacks on Communist officials, dissemination of anti-Communist
leaflets, non-cooperation by the peasants and workers, open
defiance by church leaders and escape to the West. Spectacular
examples of the last technique are the escapes to Bornholm of
Polish fliers on 5 March and 20 May, and the defection of the
captain of the Polish ship Batory this week. These actions
have not been inspired by organized indigenous resistance move-
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They are rather the spontaneous reactions of people long under
the Communist yoke - yet who refuse to bow to it.
News of the riots in East Germany spread rapidly throughout
the Satellites, but has not been accompanied by popular demon-
strations or increased security measures. US observers report
that the Czech population has manifested a guilty reaction over
having failed to demonstrate as courageously against the mone-
tary reform as the East Germans did against their government.
The Rumanians reportedly expressed admiration for the East Ger-
man exploits and regretted that their people lack the spirit
for such a demonstration. However, the East German disorders will
undoubtedly add to the mood of restlessness among the Satellite
peoples,
The continuation of the already oppressive controls in the
Satellites, would probably not cause any serious outbreaks of
resistance. This process has been going on for several years and
has produced only local, spontaneous, and easily suppressed re-
sistance. There is no known organized anti-Communist leadership
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in any of the Satellites capable of staging and directing a
nationwide, coordinated demonstration or uprising. Furthermore,
each of the Satellite governments, in contrast to East Germany,
has relatively reliable security troops disposed throughout
the country to handle any uprising or demonstrations. Under
these conditions the Satellite peoples are not as capable of
creating such serious and widespread demonstrations as those
which have occurred in East Germany. Nevertheless, the unrest
prevailing in Eastern Europe which will undoubtedly be given
added impetus by the East German disorders could lead to
spontaneous outbursts and demonstrations.
SOVIET REACTION TO EAST GERMAN RIOTS
To gauge the most probable effects of the violence in
East Germany on Kremlin policies we must examine the apparent
objectives of the Soviet program of relaxation which immediately
preceded the rioting.
Moscow's conciliatory measures in East Germany seemed to
be designed primarily to alleviate conditions which were making
the
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without sacrificing the basic elements of Soviet control. The
previous harsh policy foreshadowed unpleasant alternatives:
either political and economic disaster, or the use of force to
a degree undesirable to the Kremlin because of its adverse ef-
fect on the Communist strategy for Germany. The timing of the
conciliatory gestures suggests that they had a secondary pur-
pose of fanning unity sentiment in Western Germany, thus as-
sisting the Kremlin's campaign to halt West German integration.
These two basic objectives are likely to remain unaltered
by the rioting. The necessity to use military force in order to
maintain Soviet control in the face of the totally unexpected
East German flare up constitutes a serious setback to the "peace"
campaign. Nevertheless, the Kremlin is likely to consider that
its objectives in Germany can still best be attained by relaxing
the mailed fist gradually as the disorders die down, while
continuing its conciliatory tactics based primarily on economic
reforms.
Moscow cannot meet the political demands of the East Ger-
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is no indication that it intends to do this. It may be com-
pelled therefore, to continue to employ force for a prolonged
period, to the detriment of its over-all program in Europe.
Soviet maneuverability with respect to Germany has probably
declined as a result of its naked display of strength. Its
propaganda position, based on fantastic charges of US responsi-
bility for the riots, has been unusually weak. The Kremlin may
be expected, however, to attempt to capitalize on the unity sen-
timent generated in West Germany by the East zone incidents.
Non-communist personalities such as Hermann Kastner of the Liberal
Democratic party, may be given an increasingly prominent role
in the East German puppet regime, in order to give additional
impetus to the unity theme and to placate the populace.
The East German situation confronts the Kremlin with a
dilemma which has no ready solution and may increase in magni-
tude. A Soviet policy of conciliation following the riots in
Germany is likely to be interpreted in Eastern Europe as a sym-
ptom of weakness. The new Kremlin regime, lacking a leader
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with the prestige and experience of Stalin, would seem particu-
larly sensitive to such a possibility. Moscow therefore, might
well fear that the other satellite peoples would conclude that
rebellion would pay off for them too, and act accordingly. There
has been no indication of a Kremlin intention to apply the con-
ciliatory tactics noted in East Germany elsewhere in the satel-
lites. The unexpected turn of events in Germany, moreover, is
certain to impress on Soviet leadership the dangers inherent in
a program of relaxation in a satellite state.
On the other hand, severe repressive measures in East Ger-
many and a withdrawal.of concessions already granted would (1)
heighten German discontent; (2) destroy the propaganda effect
of the original measures and (3) seriously weaken the Soviet
"peace offensive" on one of its most spotlighted stages.
Present indications are that the Kremlin will continue to
make conciliatory economic moves in East Germany without granting
political concessions which would seriously jeopardize its
own position there. Force will be used where necessary to main-
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tain order, but will be relaxed as rapidly as would be con-
sistent with this objective. Moscow will aim, through popular
economic reforms to placate the people, and to restore their
confidence in the regime. The latter will probably be reshuffled
and broadened to include groups subservient to the communists,
but with a greater popular appeal. Unity appeals will be voiced
and reinforced in proportion to the restoration of stability.
They may be supported by a Soviet offer for four-power discussions
of the problem. The Kremlin's maneuverability with regard to
East-West negotiations, however, has received a serious setback
from the East German developments.
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