THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A001800020004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 25, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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OCI No. 0634/65
Copy No. 098
WEEKLY REPORT
IA, DOS Declassification/Release Instructions on File
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
25 August 1965
INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE
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SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
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 Approved Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T2A001800020004-7
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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OCI No. 0634/65
Published by the Directorate of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
(19 August - 25 August 1965)
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
Map, South Vietnam, following page
I. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
A. POLITICAL SITUATION
Overall political climate marked by
weak spots and potential hazards
(p. 1); Student criticism becoming
more vocal (p. 1); Hue meetings
culminate in "Student Struggle
Committee" (p. 1); Manpower-mobili-
zation decree main cause of dis-
content (p. 2); Tri Quang continues
basic hostility to present regime
(p. 2); Indications of Vietnamese
sensitivity in relationships with
US (p. 3); Price indexes remain
relatively steady (p. 3); VC impair
vegetable shipments (p. 4); US,
GVN reach monetary conversion
agreement (p. 4); Rubber exports
decline for quarter (p. 5).
Page
B. MILITARY SITUATION 6
Only one major VC attack (p. 6);
-i-
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Page
C.
Significant US and GVN successes
(p. 6); Activity and personnel
statistics (p. 6);'Road and rail
interdiction continues (p. 7);
Review of events in corps areas
(p. 7); Casualty statistics (p. 8).
RURAL RECONSTRUCTION
Attitude of hopelessness arising
in I Corps area (p. 9); Situation
remains constant in III Corps
(p. 9); Hoa Hao influence grows
in IV Corps provinces (p. 9); Chieu
Hoi returnees reach near-record
9
level (p.. 10); More Khmer dissidents
rally to government (p. 10); Psywar
operations increasingly successful
(p. 10)i
II.
THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS
11
III.
Ky and party visit Taiwan,
Thailand (p. 11); GRC announces
greater aid for GVN (p. 11);
Thais agree to closer relations,
increased aid (p. 11); Ky plans fur-
ther visits (p. 12); French show
interest in greater contact (p. 12);
Australian public support grows for
Vietnam commitment (p. 12); Scandina-
vian foreign ministers criticize
US bombing, Communist intransi-
gence (p. 13).
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC
14
Six new SAM sites discovered (p. 14);
Navy fighter destroyed by SAM
(p. 14); Revetments noted at Lang
Son Airfield (p. 14);
-ii-
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; Hanoi
shows concern for possible loss of
support (p. 16); DRV delegation
visiting French Communists (p. 16);
VC request medical supplies from
Red Cross (p. 17); Shelepin pledges
full Soviet support for North Viet-
nam (p. 17).
ANNEX 1. SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS
2. US COMBAT CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM
Page
(The Weekly Report on the Situation in South
Vietnam is based on contributions from CIA, DIA,
and INR; it is edited and published by CIA without
final coordination. A fully coordinated Monthly
report is disseminated on the first Friday of
every month.)
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THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
Student opposition to the present military regime has
become more vocal. Although still in a nascent stage, this
opposition could develop into a serious problem for the Ky
government. An ominous aspect is the apparent tie-in of
militant Buddhist elements, under Tri Quang's leadership,
with the student agitation. Tri Quang, who has remained
in Saigon away from the center of student discontent in his
normal habitat of Hue, and is not involving himself directly
in this situation, continues privately to criticize the central
government as being inefficient and unpopular.
A student "struggle committee' If this week in Hue
has issued a demand for early elections and a return to
civilian government. Student agitators have seized on the
government's recent mobilization decree, since modified, to
charge that the military is seeking to gain control over in-
tellectuals. Military Directory General Thieu, rather than
Premier Ky, is emerging as the principal target of both the
students and Tri Quang. The student protests have some
overtones of anti-American sentiment, and the issue is
susceptible to exploitation by Viet Cong and pro-neutralist ele-
ments.
Premier Ky, who returned this week from a round of
apparently satisfying talks in Taiwan and Thailand dealing
with general anti-Communist cooperation, has since been
meeting with the other military leaders to discuss the
student problem. Ky has exhibited great satisfaction over
the US Marine victory against the Viet Cong near Chu Lai,
but this operation has served to point up underlying sensi-
tivity on the sovereignty issue on the part of other Vietnam-
ese generals.
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August thus far has been a bad month for the Viet
Cong; their recorded losses include 3,306 casualties,
936 military returnees, and 825 weapons. The three-
week casualty totals already exceed previous comparable
monthly totals of the war. Viet Cong capabilities for
interdiction, sabotage, terrorism, propaganda, harass-
ment, small attacks, and infiltration have not been im-
paired.
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I. THE SITUATION WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM
A. POLITICAL SITUATION
1. In contrast to some encouraging developments
in the military situation, the political climate in
South Vietnam continues to be marked by weak spots
and potential hazards. In particular, student criti-
cism of the military government is becoming more
vocal, especially in the acutely sensitive Hue area.
Organized student opposition, as such, is in no
more than a rudimentary stage; only very limited
numbers of students have participated in the various
meetings and peaceful demonstrations held to date,
and the general public--thus far at least--has re-
mained detached. However, aside from inherent op-
portunities for Viet Cong exploitation, an acute
threat to long-range government stability exists
in the increasingly obvious tie-in of militant Bud-
dhist elements with student critics. Whether
formidable student opposition develops will depend
essentially on the government's dexterity in handling
the issues'involved and, at the same time, on the
strategy and intent of the Buddhist leadership,
which remains obscure.
2. A series of student meetings held in Hue
last week end culminated in the formation of a so-
called "Hue and Thua Thien Youth, Student, and Pupil
Struggle Committee," opposing the present military
regime in favor of a legally elected government.
A manifesto issued by the committee accused the
military of establishing a dictatorship under the
"inefficient and dogmatic leadership" of Directory
chairman General Thieu, who was singled out as the
chief offender rather than Premier Ky. Anti-Ameri-
can overtones are also present in the student pro-
tests; there have been scattered references to na-
tional soverignty being violated by "foreigners"
and to the US replacing the French as a "colonial
power."
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3. The main focus of student discontent
presently is fixed on the manpower-mobilization
decree issued recently by the defense ministry,
which has since been modified. The original de-
cree, which apparently was released prematurely
without full cabinet sanction, provided that all
persons between the ages of 28 and 37 holding a
baccalaureate diploma or an equivalent degree were
liable to :enrollment in reserve officers school.
As amended on 23 August, the decree now provides
for a gradual rather than a wholesale call-up of
"indispensable" civil servants and technicians--
probably including university professors--and for
their return after training to their respective
departments. Although this modification may dis-
sipate some of the unrest created by the original
order, critics probably will cite it as an example
of government irresoluteness.
4. Student accusations that the military is
using mobilization as an excuse to fetter intel-
lectuals reflect similar charges leveled in private
by Buddhist leader Tri Quang. In a recent conversa-
tion with US officials, Tri Quang maintained that
the mobilization order--even as amended--will
generate opposition from all quarters that could
result in toppling the government. He claimed
that opposition to the decree had taken on the
nature of opposition to Diem, in that discontent
was general. Although typically taking pains to
dissociate himself from direct complicity in the
current student agitation, Tri Quang continues to
manifest a basic hostility to the present regime.
5. General Ky, who returned on 22 August
from a brief visit to Bangkok, is currently meet-
ing in Dalat with other military leaders to dis-
cuss the student problem. Some impetus to these
discussions has undoubtedly been given by the
presentation in Saigon on 25 August of a list of
student demands on the government. Unlike the Hue
student protests, these demands did not call for
elections to replace the present government, but
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did charge US involvement in Vietnamese affairs,
and urged that Communist China be bombed to bring
an end to the war.
6. The recent US Marine victory against the
1st Viet Cong Regiment just south of Chu Lai has
clearly boosted Premier Ky?s confidence in the
war effort, but has also served to print up Viet-
namese sensitivity on the issue of sovereignty.
Some disparaging remarks heard from Vietnamese
generals concerning this operation apparently re-
flected pique over the great amount of publicity
given the US Marines. General Westmoreland has
indicated that in the future all possible efforts
will be made to include Vietnamese elements in
the early stages of any large operation so that
they can share the credit.
7. The underlying problem of Vietnamese
sensitivity over evolving relationships with the
US is also pointed up by a just
received of strong protests mace ear er this
month by northern commander General Nguyen Chanh
Thi, who accused the US of taking unilateral mili-
tary actions in his I Corps area. At the time,
Thi's complaints were met with indifference by
other members of the national military leadership,
and Thi is reported to have stalked from the meet-
ing. Thi, a "loner," has been identified in various
reports as biding his time for a move to power in
Saigon. Although firm evidence is lacking of such
plotting by Thi, his xenophobic attitude has con-
tributed to speculation by observers as to his
ultimate designs.
Economic Situation
8. Prices in Vietnam registered no sharp
movements last week. The retail price index
edged up by just 0.6 percent, and ample supplies
of medium quality rice held its price stable and
contributed to a decline in the price of a higher
grade. Rice supplies in the central provinces
should be adequately met for the next three months
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in view of the impending arrival at Da Nang of
22,000 metric tons of PL 480 rice and a coastal
lift of 3,200 metric tons per month. Wholesale
prices of United States-financed imports have
been recently rising, however, and are now 3.4
percent higher than a month ago, and 6.4 percent
above official levels.
9. The Mission has reported another example
of Viet Cong impairment of the economy. Vegetable
shipments coming into Saigon are far below normal
(around 20 percent of previous levels) as a re-
sult of VC harassment of the Saigon/Dalat road.
Higher costs of shipment due to the necessity of
back-packing produce across road breaks, and VC
taxes, reported to be around 330 piasters per
ton, are likely to keep prices up and hold down
demand in Saigon.
10. The Mission reports final agreement with
the GVN in negotiations for a new piaster-dollar
conversion rate for foreign personnel in South
Vietnam. The purpose of the new rate is to divert
a large volume of dollar conversions out of the
black market into legal channels. An estimated
$50 million per year was being lost by the GVN
through black market operations. The proposed
new rate of 118 piasters per dollar compares
with the present accommodation rate of 73 piasters
per dollar and a current black market rate of
about 130.
11. The Mission hopes to restrict the op-
portunity for illegal dollar conversions by in-
stitution of a military payment certificate (MPC)
system for US personnel in South Vietnam. The .
GVN is planning to establish a limited free mar-
ket at the new rate for certain invisible (service)
transactions and to liberalize import regulations
to reduce the demand for illegal dollars. The
Mission hopes to initiate the new system on 31 Au-
gust.
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12. South Vietnam's rubber exports declined
markedly during the 2nd quarter of 1965 as a re-
sult of growing insecurity and transportation
difficulties in plantation areas. Rubber export
licensing for the 2nd quarter decreased by 30
percent compared to the same period in 1964.
Rubber exports of 71,600 metric tons-($33 million)
accounted for almost 70 percent of South Vietnam's
exports in 1964; rubber exports for 1965 are ex-
pected to be less than 60,000 metric tons.
Rubber production has declined as the
result of military action in Phuoc Long and Tay
Ninh provinces. Three plantations in Phuoc Long
were abandoned as the result of air strikes dur-
ing the Dong Xoai battle in June, and other plan-
tations in the area are operating at reduced ef-
ficiency because plantation workers have fled.
A plantation in Tay Ninh Province was abandoned
in early July following a VC attack. Approximately
ten percent of the plantation area, representing
production of 6,000 to 7,000 tons of rubber, has
been affected by these actions. Production
through April had been comparable to 1964 pro-
duction, but production in May dropped to 5,000
tons, compared to May 1964 production of 6,100
tons.
13. Transportation has also been a critical
problem for the plantations since rubber must
be shipped to Saigon, and food, petroleum and
medicines for the plantations must be brought in.
The GVN supplies periodic armed convoys for these
purposes, and a tax payment to the VC can ap-
parently guarantee security for additional trans-
port. The rubber plantations have long been vul-
nerable to VC pressure, and some plantation owners
admit paying taxes regularly to the VC. The pay-
ment of these taxes, the increasing cost of plan-
tation needs, especially rice, and a recent workers'
demand for wage increases have had an adverse im-
pact on the profits of rubber plantations. The
Plantation Owners' Association has been seeking to
reduce GVN taxes on rubber exports, and it is pos-
sible that some plantations are holding back on ex-
ports in anticipation of favorable government action
on this proposal. BACKGROUND USE ONLY
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B. MILITARY SITUATION
1. The balance of military success favored
the GVN this past week. The major Viet Cong ac-
tivity was a two-battalion attack on the Dak Sut
district headquarters and CIDG camp in Kontum
Province.in which elements of the 101st PAVN
Regiment are believed to have participated. There
were ten other attacks of lesser importance during
the period. Overall Viet Cong activity declined
from 642 incidents last week to 486 during this
week. Sabotage and propaganda incidents remained
about the same, attacks increased slightly, and
terrorism and AA fire dropped considerably., In-
terdiction of lines of communication continued
high.
2. For the second consecutive week, friendly
forces had the better tactical results, scoring
significant successes in areas held by the Viet
Cong. In Quang Tri Province, the ARVN 1st Divi-
sion drove deep to clear and hold 225 square kilo-
meters of Viet Cong - controlled territory along
the Quang Tri River. The action producing the
most damage to the Viet Cong was Operation
STARLITE by the US Marines in the Van Tuong
peninsula just south of the Chu Lai airbase.
This operation reacted rapidly to good intelli-
gence and achieved complete surprise of the 1st
Viet Cong Regiment. The operation employed am-
phibious, heliborne, and ground elements to en-
circle Viet Cong positions and seal escape routes.
Heavy naval, air, and artillery bombardment plus
persistent ground actions forced the Viet Cong
into the open from their elaborate defensive posi-
tions. As a result of Operation STARLITE, the
1st Viet Cong Regiment is not now considered to
be an effective fighting force.
3. Government large-scale: (battalion size and
larger) operations increased to 103 from 77 with
a corresponding increase, to 48 from 38, in Viet
Cong contacts. This did not hold true for small-
scale actions; however; these declined to 20,532
from 22,047 and resulted in 131 contacts compared
-6-
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to the 155 of last week. Weapons losses dropped
significantly this week (160 to 45), and casualties
dropped by 100, mostly in the KIA and MIA categories.
4. Sea, river, CIDG, and psywar operations
continued as usual with no unusually significant
results.
5. During July, RVNAF assigned strength,in-
creased by 11,600 despite a decline of more than
4,300 in the Popular Force (PF). Overall recruit-
ing, however, continued to be successful, and con-
scription enforcement is increasingly effective.
As of 31 July the audited strengths of RVNAF
were: Regular Force 274,446; Regional Force
111,256; Popular Force 144,669; total 630,371.
The increase in Regular Force strength reflects
the almost completed integration of the Coastal
Force into the regular Vietnam Navy. The continued
decline in PF strength is attributed by MACV to
inadequate recruiting results and desertions,.
primarily in I, II, and III CTZs.
6. Sabotage acts against the road network
increased from 13 to 16, and the threat of ambush
persists. Friendly military traffic must be
heavily escorted on most roads in I, II, and III
CTZs. Sabotage has effectively closed several
roads during the week; Route 1 is closed in
southern Quang Ngai and Binh Thuan provinces, and
Route 19 is passable only to the east of Pieiku
city. All other roads into the highlands--
Routes 7, 14, 20, and 21-are interdicted. Inter-
provincial Routes 10 in Hau Nghia Province, 1 in
Phuoc Long Province, 17 in Kien Giang Province,
and 40 in Phong Dinh Province are closed.
7. The railroad is partially functioning in
Long Khanh, Binh Thuan, Khanh Hoa, Tuyen Due, Ninh
Thuan, Thua Thien, and Quang Tri provinces. Seven
of the ten railroad sabotage incidents occurred in
II CTZ.
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8. Viet Cong activity in I CTZ declined, but
the pattern of activity continued as usual, with
continued emphasis upon isolating population
centers. In II CTZ the major Viet Cong action
was the. attack at Dak But: the district head-
quarters and CIDG camp were completely destroyed.._
Viet Cong activity in III CTZ decreased for the,
second tonsocutive week; there was no change in
the status of lines of communication. In the
Capital Military Region, the Viet Cong again,
applied pressure on the Hop Tac area, and two
company-size attacks were conducted near Saigon-
Cholon. The National Police also were the target
of Viet Cong action: on four separate occasions
the Viet Cong successfully harassed them and in-
flicted casualties. Activity in IV CTZ decreased
across the board. The Viet Cong have sustained
heavy casualties in this zone in recent weeks.
9. Total RVN casualties for the week were 634
(down from 738). These consisted of 120 KIA, 495
WIA, and 19 MIA compared to 214, 430, and 94 re-
spectively for last week. Weapons losses totaled
45 (42 individual and three crew-served) compared
to last week's 160 (155 individual and five crew-
served).
10. Viet Cong personnel losses were down
slightly from last week's 1,478 (1,330 KIA and
148 captured). This week's figures are 1,244
(1,009 KIA and 235 captured). In addition, they
lost 318 weapons (311 individual, and seven crew-
served); last week these were 321 (314 individual
and seven crew-served). The Viet Cong KIA figure--
1,009--is the second highest weekly total of the
war.
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C. RURAL RECONSTRUCTION
1. USOM regional directors, in their July re-
port, observe that the worsening military situation
in the I Corps area is inducing a clearly dis-
cernible attitude of hopelessness among the pro-
vincial officials. First Corps commander General
Thi continues to replace officials whom he dis-
trusts, regardless of their demonstrated abilities,
with those of demonstrated loyalty. Province
chiefs in this northern region tend to blame
shortcomings in provincial administration on a
lack of support from Saigon, a view that reflects
Thi's own outlook.
2. The general view of the III Corps area
is that with the exception of Hau Nghia Province
the situation is fairly constant. The only large-
scale Viet Cong action in this corps area during
July was in Phuoc Long Province. Viet Cong acti-
vity against communications lines has continued,
as have acts of terrorism against the populace.
In Hau Nghia Province, the GVN is gradually with-
drawing from outlying areas, with the Communists
filling the voids. Two demonstrations, possibly
Viet Cong inspired, were conducted to protest the
indiscriminate government use of artillery fire.
3. The security situation in IV Corps remains
generally static, although there has been an increase
in road minings and other harassing actions by the
Communists. Several province chiefs were replaced
in July. One such change, in Chuong Thien Province,
indicates the growing influence of the Hoa Hao
sect in the delta region. The Hoa Hao comprise
only about one percent of the population in Chuong
Thien Province, but they control the recently
elected provincial council and now have an aggres-
sive Hoa Hao province chief. In Phong Dinh Prov-
ince, authority was recently granted to recruit
1,500 Hoa Hao into the Regional Forces--and a simi-
lar move is reportedly now under way in Chuong
Thien Province.
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4. According to GVN Chieu Hoi officials, a
total of 2,697 persons returned to government con-
trol during the period 14-21 August. Of this
total, 155 were military, 58 were political cadres,
2,483 were civilians, and there was one draft
dodger or deserter. Thirty-five weapons and 54
grenades were turned in. Although this week's
total is higher than the 2,375 individuals who
returned to GVN control last week, there were 367
fewer in the important military category.
5. In Chau Dac Province, 82 more Khmer
dissidents rallied to the government from their
safehaven in the Seven Mountains region of the
province. Altogether, some 771 members of this
minority group have come over to the government
this month under the pressure of military action
and through psychological warfare efforts.
6. Armed propaganda units, associated with
the Chieu Hoi program, are proving to be so success-
ful that 11 more companies are being planned for
1966. Province chiefs have especially welcomed
these units and have expressed their desire to
use more of them. Each of the propaganda units
is composed of two sections of 36 men and two
officers, all r.alliera. Training consists of con-
centrated propaganda courses and intensive para-
military instruction. A total of 663 men have
been recruited, and 12 companies are either op-
erational or in formation at the present time.
7. There are some indications from IV Corps
that the 'psychological warfare efforts are caus-
ing the Viet Cong some concern. The Communists
reportedly are holding'mass meetings in villages
to warn the inhabitants that anyone found picking
up government leaflets may be shot. The Viet
Cong are also telling the people that the govern-
ment tortures Chieu Hoi returnees. The govern-
ment has initiated counter-propaganda efforts in
some villages to combat these Viet Cong efforts.
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II.
A. GVN VISITS TO ASIAN COUNTRIES
1. The GVN delegation led by Premier Nguyen
Cao Ky and including Foreign Minister Tran Van Do
and Minister of War General Nguyen Huu Co con-
cluded its visit to Taiwan on 19 August, and arrived
in Bangkok on 20 August. The visits took place at
the initiative of the GVN and were designed partly
to further Premier Ky's concept of an alliance of
Asian anti-Communist states, as well as to develop
greater coordination and cooperation among these
states and obtain more assistance for the GVN.
2. The joint GVN/GRC communique, issued at the
conclusion of the Taiwan visit, denounced Chinese
Communist ambitions as the source of all troubles
in Asia and especially in Southeast Asia, and called
for the removal of the Communist threat. The com-
munique also stated that the GRC was increasing its
technical and material assistance to South Vietnam
and was "prepared to respond to other requests for
assistance from the GVN as a contribution to the
struggle against the common enemy." The latter
reference could be construed to suggest that the
Nationalist Chinese would be willing to provide
combat forces for South Vietnam. On his return to
Saigon, Premier Ky told the press that President
Chiang Kai-Shek had offered troops if the GVN
needed and requested them, but press sources stated
that the government was not likely to accept the
GRC..offer.
3. Ky's visit to Bangkok of 20-22 August was
apparently devoted mainly to political and economic
matters. Ky had several meetings with Prime Minister
Thanom Kittikachon and Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman.
At a dinner given by Prime Minister Thanom, Ky called
for a regional organization of like-minded Asian
states "with a view to mutual assistance and support"
in order to "achieve more effective cooperation."
The final joint GVN-Thai communique stated that the
two states had "agreed to do what they can to develop
closer relations" but made no reference to a more
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formal arrangement. The communique also stated
that the Thai Government had agreed to train
Vietnamese pilots in Thailand and to increase
the number of medical units in Vietnam. The
Thai Government is also reported to have decided
in principle to supply the GVN with two Thai-owned
LST's to assist in offloading operations. The
Thai have already indicated that they are in no
position to supply combat troops to South Vietnam.
4. Prime Minister Ky told reporters in Bangkok
that he plans to visit the Philippines, Malaysia,
Singapore, and the Republic of Korea in the near
future. However, Macario Peralta, Secretary of
National Defense of the Philippines, told an
American observer that it was not desirable for
Ky to visit the Philippines until after the
Philippine presidential election of 9 November.
B. FRANCE
1. In.a recent conversation with an Embassy
officer in Saigon, French Consul General Lambroschini
stated strongly and directly his desire for closer
contact. Lambroschini stated that he believed
France would one day be called upon to play a great
role in Vietnam, no matter how the current conflict
was resolved, both at any peace conference and in
the post-settlement period. He also noted the GVN
had been cooperative since the breaking of diplomatic
relations and that Foreign Minister Tran Van Do had
specifically authorized the French to continue to
use its Embassy building and secure radio communica-
tions equipment.
2. Several Quai officials have recently gone
out of their way to express enthusiastically their
personal view that a turning point may have been
reached in Vietnam as a result of the US Marines'
.success at Chu Lai. One official stated he hoped
that the United States would not harden its attitude
toward negotiations after military success.
C. AUSTRALIA
The August Gallup Poll showed a marked increase
in public support for the Australian commitment to
South Vietnam as compared to the May survey. In
August, 59 percent of the respondents indicated that
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the government was right in sending 800 Australian
troops to fight in South Vietnam, as compared to
52 percent in May. This increased support for
Australian (and American) policy occurred during
a period of concerted opposition by a diversity
of individuals and groups.
D. SCANDINAVIAN NATIONS
1. As a result of growing pressures, both
the Swedish and Norwegian foreign ministers have
recently made statements criticizing United States
bombing of North Vietnam which they fear may
broaden the conflict. Swedish Prime Minister Tage
Erlander has supported these criticisms. Norwegian
Foreign Minister Lange called for a "pause" in
United States air strikes for "the express purpose
of seeking peace negotiations," as he doubted that
the political objective which the United. States
sought to achieve through the bombings would be
realized.
2. At the same time, both the Swedish and
Norwegian foreign ministers have also criticized
the Communists, including Communist China and the
USSR, for their apparent unwillingness to enter
into negotiations without prior US withdrawal from
Vietnam. Norwegian Foreign Minister Lange stated
that he considered the United States presence in
South Vietnam as necessary to the security of Asia
and other parts of the world.
3. However, the final communique of the Scan-
dinavian foreign ministers meeting of 20 August
(customarily held before the opening of the United
Nations General Assembly session) was relatively
innocuous, expressing deep concern over the danger-
ous situation in Vietnam and appealing to the parties
involved to avoid steps that might widen the conflict
and urging them to meet at the negotiating table with-
out prior conditions.
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NORTH VIETNAM : SURFACE -TO-AIR MISSILE SITES
0
SAC KAN
N a
Cham
.oc
THAI
GUVENO
Tien Yen
e
Ban Na
*Sam
0
QUANG YEN
0
eThai
Binh
Possible lac`` ~} C ? Confirmed
involved in 24`uar o Tentatively
m
Hon Gay
A
Cam Poe Port
F-f ~`~`#ai 2 s)n) 48458
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III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC
A. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. Six new, fixed surface-to-air missile (SAM)
sites, numbers 11 through 16, were disclosed this
week. Analysis of 21 August photography revealed
the first three: site 11 is situated about 15 miles
southwest of Hanoi, site 12 is about 20 miles west
of Hanoi, and site 13 is about 38 miles south of
the DRV capital. Preliminary field analysis of
high-level photography of 24 and 25 August revealed
the presence of sites 14 through 16. Site 14 is
situated approximately seven miles east of Hanoi,
and sites 15 and 16 are 12 miles to the west. Only
site 16 appears operational. The presence of this
new batch of SAM sites suggests that the DRV is
endeavoring to saturate its capital region with
defensive missile installations to insure maximum.
protection from possible US?air strikes.
2. A US navy F4B Phantom fighter was shot
down by a SAM on 24 August while on an-armed recon-
naissance mission in the vicinity of the Thanh Hoa
bridge. Preliminary information based on debrief-
ings of other pilots in the area at the time of the
shootdown suggests that the missile was fired from
an as yet undetected site somewhere southeast of
site 13. Armed reconnaissance aircraft have been
flying almost daily missions in the Thanh Hoa area
for a number of weeks now. It is likely that the
missile equipment used in this shootdown had been
moved into this area in anticipation of just such
a target.
3. Photography of 17 August revealed revetment
construction at Lang Son Airfield, some nine miles
from the Chinese border. Lang Son is the seventh
North Vietnamese airfield at which revetments of
various sizes, many with jet exhaust slits, have
been or are being constructed. The primary purpose
of this work is probably to provide the North
Vietnamese Air Force with suitable dispersal and
recovery facilities for use at some future date.
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4. Hanoi also evinced concern this week over
the possible loss of leftist support throughout
the world as a result of its repeated rejection of
third-party proposals to end the Vietnam war. A
20 August "Observer" commentary in the North
Vietnamese Army journal, broadcast internationally
by Hanoi radio, sought to counter this loss by
spelling out what Hanoi considers necessary for
mediation to be effective. The article asserted
that if anyone wants to act as a mediator, "he
cannot put the US aggressor on a par with the
victims of aggression, i.e., the Viet Cong and
the North Vietnamese. Potential mediators, the
commentary advised, should not "recommend that
both sides show less intransigence" but should
work to "compel" the US to stop its "aggression."
5. As long as US aggression continues, the
article declares, the Vietnamese are "resolved to
resist." Hanoi and the Viet Cong usually say
they are determined to resist "as long as the US
aggressors remain in Vietnam." The 20 August
article thus contains an implicit suggestion that
a unilateral cease-fire by the US, not necessarily
accompanied by a withdrawal of US troops, might
provide the basis for starting negotiations.
6. In a move perhaps tied to the recent DRV
effort to gain increased international backing
for its position on the war in Vietnam, Hanoi
announced on 23 August that a high-level North
Vietnamese delegation headed by politburo member
Le Due Tho would arrive in Paris on 25 August
in response to an invitation from the central
committee of the French Communist Party (FCP)d
Prior to this, the US Embassy in Paris had been
informed by Director Manac'h of the Asian Affairs
Office of the French Foreign Ministry that his
government had granted 15-day visas to a 12-man
DRV delegation.
7. This will be the first high-level North
Vietnamese delegation to visit a free world
country. In addition to consulting with the FCP,
the delegation will probably seek to line up
support from other West European Communist parties
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for Hanoi's position on the war. Le Due Tho
has considerable experience in dealing with Euro-
pean Communist parties, and has been touring
East European countries after attending the
Rumanian party congress from 24 July to 2 August.
8. During the week, the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) received a
request from the Viet Cong for medical supplies.
The request was transmitted through the British
Red Cross Society, apparently on the basis of
the British Cochairmanship of.the Geneva accords
and because the Viet Cong "Red Cross" is not a
member of the ICRC. The committee has made
contributions of 50,000 Swiss francs each to the
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Red Cross socie-
ties "for help to the victims of the war." It
is the policy of the Red Cross to aid victims
of war and disaster irrespective of political
affiliation.
USSR
9. While in North Korea for the 20th anni-
versary of the liberation of the DARK, Soviet
party presidium member Shelepin asserted that
the US "faced cruel disappointment" and "inevit-
able defeat" in Vietnam. In a speech on 18 August
during his tour of North Korea, the Soviet official
again pledged Moscow"s determination to provide the
DRV with "all necessary" defensive assistance, and
asserted the USSR's "full support" for the North
Vietnamese position regarding a Vietnam settlement.
Shelepin reiterated the Soviet line stressing the
need for "unity and cohesion" of all socialist
countries in order to ensure a successful struggle
against imperialism.
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SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS, 1965
SECRET WEEKLY REPORT
l
Through fli?
444
JAN I FEB I MAR I APR I MAY I JUNE
*WOUNDED NOT INCLUDED, SUCH FIGURES UNAVAILABLE ON VIET CONG
PERSONNEL LOSSES (KILLED IN ACTION, MISSING IN ACTION, CAPTURED)
GOVERNMENT
VIET CONG
GOVERNMENT
VIET CONG
VIET CONG ACTIVITIES
LI PROPAGANDA ANTIAIRCRAFT FIRE
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300
US COMBAT CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM
INCLUDING NORTH VIETNAM
~- Fatalities
Fatalities Non-fatal
--- Non-fatal Wounds
Wounds
C
umulative, 1961 - 1964
255
1524
C
umulative, 1965 to date
306
1500
T
otal 561 3024
(Figures do not include 44 carried as missing
or 18 carried as captured,)
T
hrough
16
Au ust
L
E
'
II
I
-- Company and battalion sized attacks
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26 August 1965
OCI No. 0634/65A
Copy No.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of the Publication,
The Situation in..South Vietnam,
Weekly Report -MT-'I5. U934/65)
SUBJECT : -Replacement Page
Please substitute the attached page
for the final page in the 25 August 1965
Weekly Report.
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US COMBAT CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM
INCLUDING NORTH VIETNAM
Non-fatal
' -- Non-fatal Wounds
Fatalities
Wounds
Fatalities
C
umulative, 1961 - 1964
255
1524
C
umulative, 1965 to date
363
1573
Total
618
3097
(Figures do not include 44 carried as missing
or 18 carried as captured.)
hro
ugh 23
Augus
If
`
~
57
AUG I SEPT. I
NOV I DEC
Company and battalion sized attacks
--- Battalion sized attacks only
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