THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010051-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 51
• Publication Date: May 4, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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OCI No. 0372/66
Copy No.
WEEKLY REPORT
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
4 May 1966
INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE 25X1
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
SECRET
GROUP I
Excluded from ouromoric
downgrading and d-]-ificori-
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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OCI No. 0372/66
Published by the Directorate of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
(28 April - 4 May 1966)
Map, South Vietnam, facing page
Political interest centered around
forthcoming elections (p. 1); Govern-
ment to convene group to draft elec-
tion law (p. 1); No indication of
coup plans for the time being (p. 1);
Buddhists may clash with Directorate
over post-election provisional gov-
ernment (p. 2); Buddhists will not
organize formal party for elections
(p. 2); Non-Buddhist groups may unite
in opposition (p. 2); Economic Situa-
tion. GVN and US officials agree on
procedures to facilitate future im-
ports (p. 3); Import license applica-
tions show sharp rise (p. 3); Rice
prices up but over-all. Saigon retail
index remains steady (p. 3); Exchange
rates are given (p. 4)e
Enemy-initiated activity increases
(p. 5); Weekly statistics are given
(p. 5); Friendly operations in I, II,
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Map, Transportation Routes, facing page 8
C. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT 9
National cadre center begins special-
ized training (p. 9); Pacification
effort hindered by country's economic
difficulties (p. 9); Revitalization
and reform planned for local govern-
ments (p. 9); Chieu Hoi returnees
show second consecutive significant
decrease (p. 10); Recent psywar op-
erations are reviewed (p. 10).
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC 11
Premier's report to DRV National
Assembly included frank discussion
of difficulties caused by US bombing
(p. 11); Pham Van Dong also claimed
the North had successfully challenged
US military power (p. 11); Chinese
Communists flatly deny Soviet charges
of hampering DRV aid shipments (p. 11);
Foreign Ministry statement provides
first detailed information on quantity
of Soviet military goods transiting
China (p. 12); Chinese rebuttal attests
to effectiveness of Soviet charges
(p. 12).
and IV corps areas are recapitulated
(p. 5); Large enemy supply cache
seized in III Corps (p. 6); Seven
B-52 missions are flown (p. 6); Re-
sults of tactical sorties are sum-
marized (p. 6); MARKET TIME continues
junk surveillance (p. 7); I Corps
reports most Communist incidents
(p. 7); VC battalion attacks in III
Corps (p. 8); Many small-scale at-
tacks occur in IV Corps (p. 8);
Status changes are given for trans-
portation routes (p. 8).
Page
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Page
GVN foreign minister comments on
Senator Mansfield's Vietnam peace
proposals (p. 13); Sihanouk an-
nounces Cambodia will sign "peace-
ful coexistence" agreement with
DRV and NFLSV (p. 13); US troops
return fire over Cambodian border
(p. 13); Initial shipment of West
German medical supplies arrives in.
Saigon (p. 13).
ANNEX: South Vietnam Battle Statistics--
Personnel Losses (Weekly)
South Vietnam Battle Statistics--
Incidents and Attacks (Weekly)
South Vietnam Battle Statistics--
Personnel Losses (Monthly)
South Vietnam Battle Statistics--
VC Incidents (Monthly)
South Vietnam Battle Statistics--
Weapons Losses (Monthly)
Table 20 Viet, Cong Incidents
(The Weekly Report on the Situation in South Vietnam is
based on contributions from CIA, DIA, and INR; it is
edited and published by CIA without final coordination.)
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THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
Political developments during the week con-
tinued to center around the forthcoming elections
for a constitutional convention. Peripheral demon-
strations and minor incidents of violence, however,
helped to maintain a troubled atmosphere.
Friendly military operations decreased during
the week, but enemy-initiated activity showed a
slight rise, with the I Corps continuing to report
the greatest number of Communist incidents.
.EG_J~LITI 11 1 W MMj
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CLING TIN
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SOUTH VIETNAM
CURRENT SITUATION
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1. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
A. POLITICAL SITUATION
1. Political developments during the week con-
tinued to center around the forthcoming elections for
a constitutional convention. Peripheral demonstra-
tions and minor incidents of violence, however, helped
to maintain a troubled atmosphere.
2. Although a government advisory council re-
commended a 100-man committee to draft an election
law, the government plans to convene only a 34-man
group on 5 May to begin the work, Hopefully, the elec-
tion regulations will, be formulated by the end of the
month, which will allow the government the 90-day
period necessary for the mechanical organization of
the elections themselves. However, now that the
pressure of Buddhist and antigovernment demonstra-
tions has ceased, there may be an inclination among
some government officials to delay the election date.
Indicative of this trend was a remark made by Premier
Ky to newsmen on 3 May to the effect that the govern-
ment would try to hold elections by October--a month
later than had been indicated in the government
decree of 14 April.
3. Despite a flurry of coup rumors last weekend
that were evidently touched off by the dismissal of
police director Lieu, current reporting indicates
that various factions within the military government
have no plans to engineer an internal coup for the
time being. In. regard to re-establishing government
authority in central 'Vietnam, I Corps commander
General Dinh has continued to utilize a conciliatory
approach and to rely upon Buddhist cooperation to
restore at least superficial order, Internal strife
among Nationalist Party ( NQDD) elements in I Corps,
however, has resulted recently in individual acts of
violence in Da Nang, Catholic demonstrations opposing
the struggle force are also continuing in the Da Nang
area and near Saigon. A final factor that could
cause further friction is the attempt by the incoming
national police director, Colonel Nguyen Ngoc Loan,
to install police officials in I Corps who are more
responsive to Saigon. In particular, Loan has apparently
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countermanded General Dinh's recent appointment of
a new regional police director.
4. Thus far, the Buddhists have voiced no ob-
jections to the government's 34-man election law
drafting committee, and have shown little concern
over general election methods, However, they ap-
pear to be on a direct collision course with the
military regime regarding the provisional. govern-
ment that will function in the interim between
elections for a constitutional convention and the
actual adoption and implementation of the constitu-
tion itself--a period that could stretch out to
nearly a year. The Buddhists, in accordance with
the recommendations of the National Political Congress
that met in Saigon last month, maintain that the
elected constitutional convention should name the
provisional government, while Premier Ky and other
current government officials appear determined to
maintain their primacy instead,
5. Conversations during the week between US
Embassy officials and various Buddhist leaders indi-
cate that the Buddhists do not plan to organize a
formal party for the forthcoming elections, nor do
they plan to put forth any actual candidates them-
selves. Instead, loca.l. committees will be estab-
lished to back the "best candidates," regardless of
their party or rel.ig.ious affiliation. Various
Buddhists have also suggested that the candidates
be elected on a provincial rather than a population
basis, and that the constitutional convention should
consist of between 100 and 1.50 representatives. Few
details concerning the constitution itself were dis-
cussed by the Buddhists, although they probably will
favor some sort of parliamentary system. The de-
cision not to establish an overt political party
reflects the past Buddhist tendency to maneuver freely
behind the scenes with only minimal responsibilities,
and will also make it difficult for other groups to
organize against them.
6. The non-Buddhist groups that hope to influence
the outcome of the upcoming elections show signs of
attempting to unite against the Buddhists. The Catholics
and the VNQDD were the most vociferous, especially in
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I Corps and around Saigon, where they held rallies
and demonstrations espousing anti-Communist, pro-
American military, and--in some cases--anti - Tri
Quang themes. At this time, however, there is
little cohesion among the various groups. Some
coalitions have been discussed privately between
non-Buddhist leaders and with US officials, but
the degree of public receptivity has not been
determined.
7. On 29 April a high-level meeting was held
in Saigon between Vietnamese and US economic offi-
cials. As a result of this meeting, Minister Thanh
agreed to release an additional $42 million in for-
eign exchange for GVN-financed imports in May and
June, and announced that a directive had been issued
on new procedures for goods imported under the com-
modity import program. USAID has worked closely
with GVN Ministry of Economy Officials in writing
a directive to establish a quarterly consolidation
of import applications and to force importers to go
through Office of Small Business procedures to a
greater extent than heretofore. These procedures
entail much stricter price checks. As a result of
this GVN action, USAID agreed to release a large
block of funds ($108 million) so that licensing can
be resumed at a normal pace during the second quarter.
8. The rate of license applications for GVN-
financed imports rose to 277 daily during 18-23 April.,
compared with a daily rate of only 100 during 1-8
April and 172 during 9-16 April. Importers were
attempting to beat the 30 April deadline for license
applications under the $58.4-million GVN foreign-
exchange release announced on 7 March for March-April
import licensing. Actual licensing of GVN-financed
imports, which was negligible during March, amounted
to $21.3 million during the :first three weeks of
April,
9. The index of Saigon retail prices was generally
unchanged from last week. Rice prices, however, con-
tinued to rise and the price of the average grade
reached a new retail high of 920 piasters per 100
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kilograms. It appears that Minister Thanh's policy
of selling government rice at low prices in Saigon
has not been entirely successful. Although the
Ministry of Economy is selling at low prices to re-
tailers in Saigon, these retailers report a con-
siderable lag in the delivery of this rice. More-
over, by exerting control over the rice brought to
Saigon by convoy, the Ministry of Economy has re-
duced the flow of rice to the open market where
dealers from surrounding provinces purchase large
amounts of rice outside of the ministry's sales
program. With demand remaining constant, this re-
duction in the supply of rice has resulted in higher
prices on the open market.
10.. In the Saigon free market, the price of US
$10 bills rose one piaster per dollar to a 1966 high
of 173, or close to the 1965 high of 175. The price
of $10 MPC (scrip) also rose by one piaster per
dollar to 119. On the other hand, both the piaster-
dollar cross rate in Hong Kong and the price of gold
fell by one piaster per dollar to 152 and 245, re-
spectively.
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1. Enemy-initiated activity increased during
the week ending 30 April.
2. During this period there were 790 Communist-
initiated incidents compared to the previous week's
765. There were 33 attacks (three large scale) and
527 acts of terrorism compared to the previously re-
ported 20 and 570, respectively. The kill ratio
favored free world forces 1.7 to 1 compared to the
week before's recomputed 5.33 to 1. Viet Cong losses
for the period were 456 killed and 98 captured. Viet-
namese casualties for the period were 227 killed, 613
wounded, and 29 missing or captured--a total of 869
compared to the previous week's 368. US losses for
the week were 70 killed and 589 wounded and three
captured--a total of 662 compared to last week's 582.
Free world forces lost two killed and 11 wounded (all
ROK). The South Vietnamese lost 192 weapons (three
crew served) while the Viet Cong lost 168 weapons
(one crew served).
MIA/
KIA WIA CAPTURED CA
TOTAL
SUALTIES
US 70 589
ARVN 227 613
29
869
THIRD COUNTRY 2 11
13
VIET CONG/PAVN 456
98
554
GVN/Allied Activities
3. Friendly large- and small-unit operations,
as well as corresponding enemy contacts, decreased
during the week.
4. In. I Corps, US Marine elements conducting
Operation GEORGIA in Quang Nam Province inflicted
losses of 93 killed and 21 captured on. the Viet Cong
while sustaining losses of seven killed and 74 wounded.
5. Combined Operation FILLMORE (rice-harvest
security) being conducted by elements of the US 101st
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Airborne Division. and the ROK Capital Division. in
Phu Yen Province of II Corps continues. Friendly
forces have lost 16 killed and 105 wounded while
inflicting losses of 193 killed and 44 captured on
the enemy,
6. In Tay Ninh Province of III Corps, the
forces conducting combined US/ARVN Operation BIRMING-
HAM/AN DAN 79/66 successfully seized a large enemy
supply cache. The units seized 1,364 tons of rice,
185.5 tons of salt, 6,800 uniforms plus several
thousand sets of other clothing, and destroyed 27
base camps. Ninety-three Viet Con.g have been killed
and ten. captured. Friendly forces have lost 42
killed and 175 wounded.
7. Elements of the ARVN 21st Division terminated
a three-day search-an.d-destroy operation in Chuon.g
Thien Province, IV Corps. Friendly units lost 29
killed and 138 wounded while reportedly killing 247
Viet Cong.
8. Free world forces conducted 104 battalion-
size or larger operations during the week, 49 of
them achieving contact--32 GVN, 14 US, one ROK, and
two combined. There were 26,065 small-unit opera-
ttions, including 3,584 conducted by US forces and
478 by free world forces. Of the 154 that achieved
contact with the enemy, 98 were conducted by US
units and two by free world forces.
9. Seven B-52 Stratofortress missions util-
izing 54 aircraft were flown during the week ending
1 May. The target areas were in the South Vietnamese
provinces of Tay Nin.h, Quang Ngai, and Quang Tin,
10. On 25 April, a total of 15 aircraft (LOW
STOOP III and IV) supported ground search-and-destroy
Operation BIRMINGHAM in Tay Nin.h Province. On 28
April in Quang Tin Province, a total of 18 aircraft
(SPUR TIP I, II, and III) struck Viet Cong troops
that were considered a threat to the Tien. Phuoc
Special Forces Camp; no ground follow-up was sched-
uled. On. 29 April, three aircraft (SNAP CAP II)
made a harassing attack in Quan.g Ngai Province against
a reported enemy base and supply point near the Tra
Bong Special Forces Camp; no ground follow-up was
scheduled. On 30 April, three aircraft (FINE SAND
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III) made a harassing attack in Quang Nam Province
against a reported Viet Cong training camp. No
ground follow-up was scheduled; however, ground
search-an.d-destroy Operation GEORGIA is in this
area. On I May, 15 aircraft (LOCK BOX IV) attacked
a suspected ammunition storage area in Tay Ninh
Province; no ground follow-up was scheduled.
11. During the period 22-28 April, a total of
2,455 tactical air strikes and armed reconnaissance
sorties were flown by US Navy, Air Force, and Marine
aircraft. VNAF aircraft flew a portion of the armed
reconnaissance sorties. The cumulative results of
these strikes as reported by pilots included the de-
struction, of 2,015 structures, 38 bunkers, 47 sam-
pans, 5 trenches, 213 huts, 49'riverboats, 7 AW
positions, 5 storage areas, 3 trucks, and 1 radio
station. Damage was reported to 1,263 structures,
5 bridges, 4 bunkers, 32 sampans, 223 huts, 9 river-
boats, 14 AW positions, and 4 trucks. There were a
total of 92 secondary explosions.
12. On 23 April, an A-4 Skyhawk was downed by
probable ground fire approximately 80 nautical miles
south-southeast of Saigon. The pilot ejected and
was rescued,
13. Forces conducting Operation. MARKET TIME
searched 5,319 junks and 23,736 people. Of these,
two junks and 66 people were detained. During the
week, a US Coast Guard cutter was briefly fired on
by a Cambodian PT boat off the northwestern tip of
Phu Quoc Island, IV Corps. No damage or casualties
resulted.
Communist Activity
1.4. I Corps continues to lead all other areas
in incidents, especially terrorism and antiaircraft
fire. The density of enemy units in the northern
provinces probably has caused greater demands on.
the people for support. To ensure that the required
support is rendered, in view of friendly activity in
the area, the enemy has probably reverted to an in-
creased terrorism campaign. Other activity in the
area consisted of a mortar attack on the Hue airfield
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in Thua Thien Province on 24 April,
railway and high-
way sabotage, and harassing attacks
curity elements and installations.
on friendly se-
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CURRENT OPERATIONAL STATUS OF MAJOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND COASTAL RAILROAD
U NG
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Interpro in
Rt
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QUANG
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Section of operable railroad
Section of inoperable road
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15. No significant Communist activity occurred
in II Corps during the week. The continued low in-
cident rate is probably an, attempt by the enemy to
avoid any act that might draw together the dissident
political forces in this area.
16. In Phuoc Tuy Province of III Corps, an at-
tack on. a New Life Hamlet by an estimated Viet Cong
battalion. on. 26 April and the simultaneous mortaring
of a nearby post, resulted in friendly casualties
of 40 killed and 18 wounded, with 21 weapons and two
radios also lost. Enemy losses were one killed and
one captured. Other activity consisted of small-scale
attacks and harassing fire on. friendly installations.
17. The greatest number of small-scale attacks
occurred in. IV Corps. Activity in the area continues
to be limited to guerrilla-type, small-unit operations
in comparison to the enemy activity in the northern
corps areas. Although the enemy in IV Corps main-
tains the capability to mass large units whenever
such an. action would be advantageous, the lack of
cover in. the area and a continued ability to main-
tain influence through terrorism and small-unit ac-
tions indicates that the Communists will probably
continue operating in the present manner, massing
only when the advantages of such a move greatly over-
shadow the disadvantages.
18. Changes in lines of communication status
consist of the opening of National Route 1 in Binh
Dinh Province (except the portion, south of Qui Nhon.)
and in. Khanh Hoa Province. Route 14 is closed in.
Binh Long Province. An. extended portion. of the na-
tional railroad has been. reopened between. Ca Na,
Nin.h Thuan Province, and Ninh Hoa, Khanh Hoa Prov-
ince.
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1. Training for the specialized members (civil
affairs, census /grievance, and new life development)
of the revolutionary development cadre groups began
on 25 April at -the National Cadre Training Center.
This class, the first to receive such training under
the revised program, will number about 1,500 persons;
some 3,200 cadres are programmed for specialist
training in the next class.
2. The pacification effort is suffering from
the effects of economic difficulties that seem to
be hampering general progress throughout the country.
Construction prices, due to inflation, are rising in
some cases beyond the 1966 budget estimates of the
program. To counteract the rising prices, the prov-
inces have been authorized to use the reserve funds
of the Revolutionary Development Ministry and to
negotiate contracts directly with "able and trust-
worthy contractors" in. cases where no bids at all
for construction projects have been received.
3< On the basis of agreements reached at the
Honolulu Conference substantial GVN/US planning is
under way to revitalize village and hamlet govern-
ments, Reforms include the election of six-member
village councils--possibly by 29 May, the date set
for the election. of one third of the provincial
councils, Each elected village council would then
select a council chairman and also a village chief,
who up to now has been appointed by the province
chief. The US has agreed to support a wage increase
for village and hamlet officials to bring their
salaries in line with those received by the cadre
groups working in their areas.
4. The corps and district civil. administrative
apparatus has also been reviewed and will be the
object of certain reforms, The corps commanders,
who are also the official government delegates for
civil administration, will. be granted more latitude
in controlling administrative personnel and in
shifting funds within their regions. Three adminis-
trative bureaus, instead of the present five, will
deal with military and political affairs, administration
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and finance, and economic and social welfare. Pro-
posed changes in the district apparatus include the
establishment of an advisory council made up of the
chairmen of the various village councils. Moreover,
consideration is being given to the possible replace-
ment of the district deputy for security--now a mili-
tary officer--by a civilian.
Returnees (Chieu Hoi)
5. For the second consecutive week, the total
number of defectors from the Viet Cong decreased
significantly. Only 285 persons rallied during the
week ending 22 April, apparently a result of the con-
tinuing political instability in the northern prov-
inces and the lack of military activity. US Mission
officials point out, however, that definite improve-
ments in the program have been realized since last
fall, and that high-level GVN officials have demon-
strated more support since 1 January 1966.
6. Psychological operations before and after
major military contacts have contributed heavily to
the successful inducement of Vietnamese Communists
and sympathizers to rally to the government. Millions
of Chieu Hoi leaflets, safe conduct passes, and maps
bearing instructions on how to rally have been
dropped on known and suspected infiltration routes
and in-country Viet Cong positions, often in con-
junction with B-52 strikes. In the central highlands,
leaflets written in tribal languages are being
dropped. Moreover, day and night aerial. broadcasts
are being undertaken to heighten the enemy's anxieties,
these broadcasts serve as a useful, though technically
difficult, means of warning villagers of impending
air strikes in their area.
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II, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC
1. The full text of Premier Pham Van Dong's
report to last month's National Assembly meeting,
which became available this week, indicated that the
premier not only delivered a pep talk to the assembled
delegates but also engaged in a relatively frank dis-
cussion of the difficulties caused by the US bombing
raids. Dong admitted that the North Vietnamese had
been forced to mobilize large segments of the popula-
tion to keep transportation routes open and to
strengthen both civil defense and antiaircraft de-
fenses. The premier also confessed that the alloca-
tion of manpower resources to meet wartime priorities
had been a real problem. The premier claimed, however,
that this effort had paid off, and that the monthly
average of tonnage moved had increased in 1966 over
the last few months of 1965.
2. While cautioning against possible further US
escalation of the war, Dong also struck an optimistic
note by claiming that the Vietnamese had successfully
challenged US military power during the past year,
especially in the air. This same theme of optimism
dominated a flood of DRV propaganda celebrating the
alleged shootdown of the 1,000th US aircraft over
North Vietnam on 29 April, a claim that is roughly
four times the actual number of US losses. A Nhan
Dan editorial occasioned by the shoot-down claim
asserted that everywhere in the country people had
made contributions to the fight, and that the militia
and self-defense forces had demonstrated "many new
capabilities and were playing an important role."
One of the new capabilities mentioned by Nhan Dan was
the ability to use ground-to-air missiles; hefirst
public admission by the DRV that there are SAMs in the
North Vietnamese arsenal.
3. The Chinese Communists bitterly assailed
Soviet policy on Vietnam this week and flatly denied
recent Soviet charges that Peking has hampered Soviet
military shipments to the DRV. Speaking at a 30 April
mass rally in Peking honoring a visiting high-level
Albanian delegation, Premier Chou En-tai disparaged
Soviet aid to Hanoi as meager in quantity and inferior
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in quality. He also berated the present Soviet leader-
ship in the harshest terms for "sham anti-imperialism"
and for collaboration with the US.
4. Chou's remarks were followed up on 3 May with
a Foreign Ministry statement designed to undercut So-
viet claims of "all out" support for Vietnam and of
Chinese obstructionism in the transport of military aid
shipments to the DRV. The statement provided the first
detailed information on the amount of Soviet military
assistance transiting China for the DRV. It asserted
that Communist China transported 43,000 tons of Soviet
military supplies to North Vietnam in 1965, a figure
close to intelligence estimates of the actual tonnage
moved. In addition, the statement claimed that during
the first quarter of 1966 the USSR used only one third
of the 1,730 rail cars Communist China had agreed to
make available for military deliveries, and that such
goods as were sent by the Soviets had been moved on
by the Chinese "with priority, at a high speed, and
free of charge."
5. Despite Chinese protestations, however, evi-
dence indicates that Peking has placed onerous re-
strictions on overland deliveries. Although the
restrictions are unlikely to have limited the quantity
or types of weapons supplied by the USSR to North
Vietnam, they have slowed down the pace of deliveries,
6. This outpouring of Chinese invective betrays
Peking's discomfiture over the effectiveness of the
recent Soviet charges, Moreover, it probably also
reflects Peking's sensitivity to the Soviet success
in its call for, "unity" at the 23rd CPSU congress
last March.
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On. 26 April, the semi-official Vietnam Press
Agency carried the BBC interview of GVN Foreign Min-
ister Tran. Van. Do. In reply to a question referring
to Senator Mansfield's recent proposals on Vietnam,
Do stated that "we must all attempt to apply good
will in order to help restore peace, but it is also
necessary that our enemies, first and foremost,
should have will for peace." Do noted that Senator
Mansfield's apparent allusion to the Viet Cong as
one of the "certain essential elements" in the Viet-
namese situation showed "considerable generosity of
spirit" toward an organization that "is only a propa-
ganda instrument of Han.oi."
B. CAMBODIA
1. In a public speech on 24 April, Prince
Sihanouk stated that the DRV, Cambodia, and the
NFLSV have decided with Cambodia to sign "solemn
agreements shortly at a summit meeting which would
establish a definite basis for a peaceful coexistence
between. our two countries."
2. A US military spokesman in Saigon announced
on 3 May that on 30 April a battalion of the US lst
Infantry Division operating on the eastern. bank of
the Gal Bac River in Tay Ninh Province received
mortar and small-arms fire from the Cambodian side
of the border and that the American commander then
directed artillery fire on the gun positions. The
US Embassy in Saigon recommends that a US protest
be lodged with the Cambodian Government.
Eight tons of medical supplies from the Federal
Republic of Germany arrived in Saigon on 29 April.
This is the first shipment of the 1,500 tons of
medical supplies (valued at $4,375,000) offered by
Germany.
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Available
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 SOUTHppYJ T egAITWs/o5;%TbTQ79T00826A000600010051-3
WEEKLY REPORT23 APRIL-3OAPRIL 1966
Total Personnel Losses SECRET
(Killed in Action, Captured or Missing in Action, excluding Wounded in Action)
3,500
!_ IIII I lil3!!i!!!1
2,500
Viet Cong/PAVN I i
MAY ! JUNE LJ lLYJ AUG SEPT _(._.OCT OVj DEC JAN FE MAR
US Combat Casualties in Vietnam
(including North Vietnam)
I Fatalities I Non-fatal Wounds i Captured I Missing
Cumulative, 1961-1964
Cumulative, 1965
Cumulative, 1966 to date
TOTAL
20 Killed in action J Missing or Captured in action 1 Wounded in action
255
1365
1532
3152
1524
6110
9365
16999
12
136
53
201
APR I MAY IJUNE I JULY I AUG I SEPT I OCT I NOV I DEC I JAN 1 F ?FMAR 1A9
Total Friendly Forces Personnel Losses
(US/GVN/Other Free World)
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 SOUTH 'y1E1cNcA?91r IlIOO IMSTItgDP79T00826A000600010051-3
WEEKLY REPORT 23APRIL- 3O APRIL 1966
Viet Cong Incidents
ized attacks
r) attacks only
G DEPT OCT
NOV
DE
C
JA
N
F
EB
M
AR
AP
R
Weapons Losses
I
III
-
::eE
9E~E?
i9Ee
ee~E
e
EE
E.aE i
R:
99
H
.~:?
:::
:
fE
~
?
E
E
:
g.
N
APR
MAY
JU
NE JU
LY
A
U
G
SE
PT
OCT
NO
V I D
EC SAN
FE
D
M
AR AP
R
Viet Cong Attacks
Company and battalion s
- - - Battalion sized (and large
SECRET
62105
APR I MAY l JUNE I JULY AU
1 i 1' ~1f1''' f f
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Terrorism Sabotage
Propaganda
192
168
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SECRET
South Vietnamese and Viet Cong Casualties and
Weapons Losses: 1962 - 30 April 1966
25X1
Viet
Cong
Time Inci-
Killed
in
Action
Wounded
in Captured
Action or Missing
Total
Casualties
Weapons
Losses
Period dents
GVN VC
GVN VC
GVN VC
GVN
VC
GVN
VC
1962
1825
299
1294
475
212
116
390
890
1896
-
-
Jan
1963
927
453
1754
908
318
102
379
1463
2451
457
683
1964
1770
343
1223
913
-
555
240
1811
1463
917
532
1965
2206
904
2203
1938
-
471
565
3313
2768
1700
711
1966
3914
747
2648
1557
-
450
588
2754
3236
935
979
1962
1460
244
1205
300
316
124
353
668
1874
-
-
Feb
1963
788
379
1082
656
303
82
292
1117
1677
253
399
1964
2078
374
1055
916
-
303
289
1593
1344
708
471
1965
1982
880
1564
1840
-
1394
309
4114
1873
2454
620
1966
3100
1015
4727
2095
-
477
508
3587
5235
1076
1219
1962
1961
523
1456
737
551
140
523
1400
2530
-
-
Mar
1963
1282
410
1443
851
368
66
222
1327
2033
467
367
1964
2160
439
1456
1249
-
345
531
2033
1987
814
532
1965
2056
751
2022
1633
-
720
394
3104
2416
1442
698
1966
3670
938
5685
1961
-
466
604
3365
6289
1393
1632
1962
1933
387
1596
532
292
151
415
1070
2303
-
-
Apr
1963
1331
506
1660
878
256
96
388
1440
2304
797
468
1964
2284
594
1671
1584
-
398
245
2576
1916
990
424
1965
1860
591
1909
1650
-
232
529
2473
2438
757
973
1966
323S
573
2818
1522
-
121
483
2216
3301
594
829
1962
1825
390
1756
S09
352
94
524
993
2632
-
-
May
1963
1208
435
1895
889
295
94
695
1418
2885
463
564
1964
2143
458
1135
987
-
202
242
1647
1377
723
281
1965
2263
1049
1975
2143
-
873
548
4065
2523
1701
831
1962
1477
325
1666
613
413
77
441
1015
2520
-
-
Jun
1963
1311
389
1863
772
310
90
437
1251
2609
580
394
1964
2062
494
1005
1145
-
313
230
1952
1235
713
387
1965
2597
1211
2208
1920
-
1260
189
4391
2397
2387
793
1962
1564
384
1544
686
424
21.2
542
1282
2510
-
-
Jul
1963
1368
529
1918
1071
372
306
387
1906
2677
663
374
1964
3045
900
1427
1812
-
510
219
3222
1646
1889
447
1965
2520
1160
2980
1591
-
540
580
3425
3560
1375
882
25X1
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SECRET
25X1
Time
Viet
Cong
Inci-
Killed
in
Action
Wounded
in
Action
Captured
or Missing
Total
Casualties
Weapons
Losses
Period
dents
GVN
VC
GVN
VC
GVN VC
GVN
VC
GVN
VC
1962
1642
377
2271
626
367
63
669
1066
3307
Aug
1963
1349
411
1685
804
237
352
482
1567
2404
637
428
1964
2580
721
1449
1612
478
282
2811
1731
1106
619
1965
2498
808
3624
1945
287
606
3040
4230
705
1074
1962
1375
419
2218
646
365
59
446
1124
3029
Sep
1963
1763
672
1982
1155
234
566
347
2393
2563
878
389
1964
3091
819
1187
1759
737
230
3315
1417
1465
525
1965
2473
655
3485
1724
266
838
2645
4323
778
838
1962
1357
365
1967
619
286
64
373
1048
2626
Oct
1963
1422
428
1520
989
244
398
236
1815
2000
753
330
1964
2827
739
1617
1583
693
576
3015
2193
1510
482
1965
3330
961
3874
241.6
225
660
3602
4534
762
1013
1962
1311
410
1982
834
368
92
561
1336
2911
Nov
1963
3182
664
2333
1554
373
665
252
2883
2958
1595
455
1964
1982
574
1747
1404
-
410
570
2388
2317
1104
515
1965
3638
1034
5516
2056
-
520
592
3610
6108
1126
2164
1962
1346
294
2203
618
289
78
463
990
2955
Dec
1963
1921
389
1440
961
191.
320
190
1670
1821
724
546
1964
2504
1002
1813
2053
-
1092
503
4147
2316
2111
666
1965
4106
1239
4076
2262
-
926
516
4427
4592
1728
1158
Composite Annual Totals
Time
VC
Inci-
KIA
WIA
Captured
or Missing
Total
Casualties
Weapons
Losses
Period
dents
GVN
VC G
VN
VC
GVN
VC
GVN
VC
GVN
VC
1962
19076
4417
21158 7
195
4235
1270
5700
12882
31093
5195
4049*
1963
17852
5665
20575 11
488
3501
3137
4307
20290
28383
8267
5397
1964
28526
7457
16785 17
017
-
6036
4157
30510
20942
14055
5881
1965
31529
11243
35436 23
118
7848
6326
42209
41762
16915
11755
**l966
13919
3273
15878 7
135
1514
2183
11922
18061
3998
4659
*Monthly data unavailable for 1962 Weapons Losses.
**Through 30 April 1966
25X1
I
INEGRET
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SECRET
L: I
2. Viet Conn Incidents: 1962 - 30 April 1966
F
1
I
Time
Viet Cong
S
mal1.-
Propa-1
Anti-
Period
Incidents
S
cale I
Co.
Size
Total 1
Terr
orism
Sabotage I
ganda
Aircraft
1962
1825
528
21
0
549 8
39
180
257
-
Jan
1963
927
242
3
2
252 4
47
49
179
-
1964
1770
218
2
3
223 12
44
129
174
-
1965
2206
57
5
1
63 14
89
272
170
212
1966
3914
42
23
5
70 24
90
312
299
743
1962
1460
480
20
0
500 6
13
137
210
-
Feb
1963
788
181
13
1
195 4
33
69
91
-
1964
2078
211
3
3
217 13
39
210
271
-
1965
1982
73
6
3
82 14
11.
267
91
131
1966
3100
50
10
9
69 18
29
201
172
829
1962
1961
561
27
0
588 6
60
290
423
-
Mar
1963
1282
333
11
0
344 6
53
131
1S4
-
1964
2160
198
4
1
203 16
32
158
167
-
1965
2056
80
3
3
86 14
76
240
90
164
1966
3670
32
10
10
52 23
32
212
154
920
1962
1933
470
27
0
497 10
24
220
192
-
Apr
1963
1331
371
9
3
383 6
88
105
155
-
1964
2284
211
6
3
2.20 17
38
169
157
-
1965
1860
38
1
4
43 14
07
149
96
165
*1966
3235
61
7
9
77 22
38
252
110
513
1962
1825
490
28
0
528 8
92
154
251
-
May
1963
1208
344
13
0
357 6
08
93
150
-
1964
2143
170
3
2
175 4
18
217
140
193
1965
2263
40
7
11
58 15
58
365
115
170
1962
1477
339
23
0
362 7
36
157
222
-
Jun
1963
1311
398
11
1
410 6
52
107
142
-
1964
2062
128
10
2
140 13
90
176
162
194
1965
2597
62
1
6
69 17
84
469
103
172
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A T T A C K S
Time
Period
Viet Cong
Incidents
mall-
Scale
Co. Size
BN. Size
FTotal
Terrorism
Sabotage
Propa-
ganda
Anti-
Aircraft
1962
1564
437
10
448
735
158
223
Jul
1963
1368
398-
8
407
698
80
183
1964
3045
166
12
185
2132
286
224
218
1965
2520
42
0
48
1706
400
154
212
1962
1642
368
10
0
378
885
146
233
-
Aug
1963
1349
356
11
1
368
647
113
221
-
1964
2580
107
3
3
113
1775
315
173
204
1965
2498
38
9
5
52
1597
349
200
300
1962
1375
382
9
0
391
624
178
182
-
1963
1763
483
17
3
503
889
164
207
-
1964
3091
110
4
4
118
1938
482
178
375
1965
2473
19
7
5
31
1530
278
185
449
1962
1357
406
12
1
419
583
189
166
-
Oct
1963
1422
359
6
0
365
802
105
150
-
1964
2827
75
2
6
83
1790
480
197
277
1965
3330
24
8
12
44
1969
415
198
704
1962
1311
411
7
3
421
614
144
132
-
Nov
1963
3182
631
11
3
645
1990
269
278
-
1964
1982
57
2
1
60
1391
247
109
175
1965
3638
26
16
10
52
2234
486
255
611
1962
1346
375
8
1
384
670
107
185
-
Dec
1963
1921
2S8
3
0
261
1298
ill
251
-
1964
2504
81
9
6
96
1719
318
128
243
1965
4106
32
18
7
57
2572
442
317-
718
1962
19076
5247
Co
6
mpos
ite Annual
212
Totals
5465
8875
2060
2676
No Data
1963
17852
4354
15
121
4490
9805
1396
2161
No Data
1964
28526
1732
41
60
1833
19556
3178
2080
1879
1965
31529
531
73
81
685
20730
4132
1974
4008
*1966
13919
185
50
33
268
8934
977
735
3005
*Through 30 April 1966
SECRET
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