SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001900260001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 10, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Top Secret
NOFORN
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5uIr----7U Hour
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
A
Top Secret
Handle via COMINT Channels 72
October 10, 1975
Sc No. 00523/75
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
? 5B(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
October 10, 1975
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Sakharov Adds to Kremlin's Woes. . . . . . . . . 2
French President Arrives in Romania Tomorrow . . 6
French President to Moscow . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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Yugoslavs React Cautiously to Soviet
Protest of Bijedic Banquet in Peking . . . . . 9
CEMA Summit Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
East Europeans Say Situation Along
Sino-Soviet Border Calm. . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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Sakharov Adds to Kremlin's Woes
The already sizable headache presented the So-
viet regime by leading dissident spokesman, phys-
icist Andrey Sakharov--who on October 9 was awarded
the 1975 Nobel Peace Prize--may soon grow even worse.
This spring, Sakharov lent his name to the organizers
of a blue-ribbon, international tribunal on the status
of human rights in the Soviet Union; the conclave,
which has been almost a year in the planning, is
slated to be held in Copenhagen October 17-19.
In Moscow, a Foreign Ministry official report-
edly declined Western press requests for comment on
Sakharov's Nobel award. As a possible harbinger of
a campaign to come, a Tass English-language commentary
on October 10 attacked the Nobel Committee's "polit-
ical gesture" saying it was designed to "kindle the
anti-Soviet campaign and impede the easing of inter-
national tension." It called Sakharov a man who has
"put himself in a position of an anti-patriot and an
opponent of peaceful coexistence." Sakharov, mean-
while, told Western reporters that he views the prize
as beneficial to the cause of human rights in the
USSR, but he hopes the Kremlin will not see it as a
"challenge."
The Soviet regime has not commented directly
on the Copenhagen tribunal, even while Tass has re-
played for foreign consumption some of the more
derisive comment by Western leftist media on the
Sakharov hearing. Tass focused on questioning
Sakharov's "humanist" credentials and on dark hints
about the sources of the meeting's financial backing.
The Sakharov hearing will take place at Christians-
borg Palace, the seat of the Danish parliament. It
is sponsored by the Council of Eastern Exiles, a
Danish organization of many years' standing, composed
of emigres from Eastern Europe and the Baltic states.
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The sponsors have also succeeded in bringing together
an "Honorary Committee of Protectors of Andrey Sakharov,"
consisting of over a dozen prominent, Western public
figures as well as leading exiles from the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe. Exiled Soviet author
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn--who has already congratulated
Sakharov on his Nobel award--is among those invited
to attend the conclave, but it is not clear whether
he, or all those on the honorary committee, will be
present.
If the hearing follows early plans, it will cover
the entire range of human rights violations in the USSR,
from religious oppression to curbs on freedom of move-
ment. Its main focus, however, will be on receiving
testimony from survivors of Soviet prisons, labor
camps, and psychiatric hospitals on the "violations
of international standards of human rights" in these
institutions. The sponsors have solicited testimony,
oral and written, from "any person able to give it."
Several prominent Soviet exiles, including Andrey
Sinyavsky and Solzhenitsyn's colleague, Vladimir
Maksimov, are expected to testify.
In explaining earlier this year the use of
Sakharov's name for the hearing, one of the leading
organizers said that Sakharov alone among 250 million
Soviet citizens is able to speak freely. Sakharov's
prominence at home and abroad, and his record of public
appeals on behalf of the very causes the hearing in-
tends to examine, made him an obvious and early choice.
There is no evidence that the sponsors of the meeting
knew beforehand that Sakharov was considered for the
Nobel Peace Prize. Dissidents in Moscow close to
Sakharov have already said that the Nobel award was
totally unexpected. The award, just a week before
the opening of the Copenhagen hearing, will clearly
attract added international attention to its proceedings.
The explosion of Sakharov's name into the world's
headlines will also revive and intensify speculation
about his own future. Dissident sources say that al-
though he does not wish to abandon the many causes he
October 10, 1975
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has embraced in the USSR by leaving for good, his re-
ported ill health and fears that his wife who is re-
cuperating from eye surgery in Italy may not be per-
mitted to return home could force Sakharov to think
of emigrating. Sakharov has said that he would go
to Oslo to accept his prize if Soviet authorities
gave him permission.
The Soviet regime itself has for some time shown
signs of debating the pros and cons of allowing a man
of Sakharov's stature to emigrate if he chooses--or
making him stay. This dilemma will become more pain-
ful with the publicity surrounding Sakharov's Nobel
award and with the expected international pressure
on the Kremlin to allow him to go to Oslo. Soviet
leaders will clearly bear in mind the parallel of
Solzhenitsyn, who won the Nobel Literature prize in
1970 but declined to go to Stockholm unless assured
he could return to the USSR. The affair ended with
his expulsion in February 1974. In the four inter-
vening years Solzhenitsyn's name stayed prominently
in the headlines, and tarred the Soviet image abroad.
Sakharov's gradual slide into dissident activities
during the 1960s resulted in his being slowly cut off
from his work in the Soviet nuclear program. He was
finally fired and his security clearance lifted shortly
after the June 1968 publication in the West of his
renowned essay, "Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual
Freedom." Since May 1969 he has held a relatively low
ranking job as part-time senior researcher at the
Lebedev Institute of Physics in Moscow.
Sakharov has remained a member of the Soviet
Academy of Sciences throughout his travails. He even
attended the opening in Moscow of the Academy's 250th
anniversary celebrations on October 7 and listened to
General Secretary Brezhnev's keynote address. Sakharov's
contacts there with numerous, visiting, Western scien-
tists will increase the magnitude of the problem he
poses to the regime.
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Although Sakharov has agreed to the use of his
name at the Copenhagen meeting, his concern about
further jeopardizing his wife's chances to return home
and his probable desire not to appear to capitalize
too much too soon on the publicity stemming from the
Nobel award may mute the message he is expected to
send.
Sakharov's past public statements suggest that
he rests his hope for domestic improvement in the
sphere of human rights in the USSR on pressure from
Western media, governments, statesmen, and major
international organizations. Sakharov appears less
convinced of the influence of exile groups, whose
frequent, internecine problems, he believes, vitiate
their effectiveness. Internal problems and disagree-
ments among various exile groups in Western Europe
reportedly were the main reasons for the postponement
of the Copenhagen hearing from the original target
date in early spring to October this year.
Much of the internal discord among exiles ap-
pears rooted in a conflict of generations: between
those emigres of long standing who totally reject the
Soviet system, and those more recently arrived who
tend to look more favorably on the idea of evolutionary
reform. One notable exception to the latter is, of
course, Solzhenitsyn, who apparently has found the
more conservative emigres sympathetic to his author-
itarian,. nationalistic and religious vision of Russia's
non-communist future. Early this month, Solzhenitsyn
sent a message to one such exile group, expounding
his views and calling emigre unity behind them "the
last hope of this continent." The strongly democratic,
soberly reformist Sakharov has never subscribed to
this outlook, and has thus been able to reach a
wider Western audience as a spokesman for human rights
in the USSR. This contrast between Solzhenitsyn and
Sakharov is a further measure of the Kremlin's prob-
lem in dealing with the dissident physicist. (CON-
FIDENTIAL)
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French President Arrives in Romania Tomorrow
French President Giscard d'Estaing will start a
four-day visit to Bucharest on October 11 before
going on to Moscow next Tuesday.
His visit will repay President Ceausescu's trip
to Paris in 1970. Since then, few high-level French
officials visited Bucharest. Instead, Paris has
stressed improving its ties elsewhere in East Europe,
particularly with the Poles and Soviets. Giscard
may hope to smooth over some ruffled feelings in
Bucharest, where officials often point with pride to
the common Latin heritage of the French and Romanian
peoples.
Ceausescu and company will seek to expand eco-
nomic ties with the French. In particular, Bucharest
is anxious to encourage joint economic enterprises
in Romania such as one set up last December for the
production of medical equipment.
On the political side, the Romanians will un-
doubtedly press for expressions of mutual interest in
the preservation of national independence and sover-
eignty in the spirit of the Helsinki summit. Bucharest
is also likely to voice its concern over military blocs
and the need for general disarmament. The Romanians
may use the occasion to reiterate the need to establish
a de-nuclearized zone in the Balkans. (CONFIDENTIAL)
October 10, 1975
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French President to Moscow
French President Giscard d'Estaing arrives in
the Soviet Union on Tuesday to begin the latest in
a series of routine summit visits. There are few
substantive reasons for negotiations at this level
and the,main purpose of the trip seems to be to
preserve appearances of a "special relationship"
between France and the USSR. Soviet ability to fill
time and space with platitudes will be severely taxed,
and it appears that the French have given up even the
pretense. Much of Giscard's four-day stay will be
devoted to protocol functions and tourism.
The Soviets will probably seek general French
endorsement of the European security conference and
of detente. The French, in contrast, are more in-
terested in specifics.
The Soviets may try to win French support for
their disarmament proposals and make another attempt
to draw the French into the European force reduction
talks. There is no indication, however, that the
French will reverse their decision not to participate.
Some economic matters are also likely to be dis-
cussed. A Soviet diplomat in Paris expects Moscow's
unfavorable balance of trade to be a topic. General
agreements on cooperation in the production of civilian
aircraft and Soviet oil sales to France may emerge.
As has become customary before Franco-Soviet
summits, a French Communist Party delegation held
consultations in Moscow two weeks ago. (SECRET NOFORN/
ORCON)
October 10, 1975
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Yugoslavs React Cautiously to Soviet
Protest of Bijedic Banquet in Peking
Yugoslav media have not yet reported that all
Soviet bloc ambassadors except Romania walked out on
a speech that Premier Bijedic's Chinese host gave at
a banquet in Peking. (Staff Notes, October 7.)
Only Milika Sundic, Radio Zagreb's well-informed
reporter, has even touched on potential problems
with Moscow arising from Bijedic's precedent-setting
visit to China. In a commentary on Thursday, he summed
up the visit in generally favorable terms, but em-
phasized that well-known Yugoslav-Chinese differences
have not been erased. He asserted that Belgrade's
relationship with Peking is completely proper--i.e.,
not anti-Soviet in its essence--and is no business
of third countries.
Definitive propaganda guidelines on the inci-
dent may not be laid down until after Bijedic returns
home in about 10 days. In the meantime, the US em-
bassy in Belgrade reports that Soviet diplomats on
Tuesday expressed their anger over Chinese "entrap-
ment" of Yugoslavia into an anti-Soviet action.
October 10, 1975
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CEMA Summit Preparations
Party secretaries from the nine CEMA countries
met in Moscow on Thursday and Friday to finish work
on a document to be released at the CEMA summit
later this year,
similar meeting in ear Ty ep
out language on the most controversial issues.
A Soviet diplomat has asserted that the Romanians,
who apparently caused the most problems, had "agreed
in principle" on wording for the summit document dur-
ing talks with Soviet party secretary Katushev in
Bucharest last week. The Soviet acknowledged, how-
ever, that a considerable number of "details" were
still unresolved.
Even if agreement is reached on language for a
communique or a "basic" document spelling out future
integration tasks, some fundamental differences on
economic integration within CEMA will remain. (CON-
FIDENTIAL)
October 10, 1975
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East Europeans Say Situation
Along Sino-Soviet Border Calm
The Soviets are using their East European, al-
lies to get out the word that Moscow is doing its
best to avoid aggravating tensions along the Sino-
Soviet border.
Moscow last month played host to a group of East
European journalists for a rare tour along both the
riverine and land border between the USSR and China.
The last such tour took place in late 1970. Since
the first week in September two Hungarian journalists
and one Polish journalist, in relating their experi-
ence to home audiences, have emphasized that Moscow
is bending over backward to avoid serious border
problems.
One broadcast maintains, for example, that So-
viet border guards have been expressly ordered not
to throw cigarette butts on China's side of the
border because the Chinese once complained about such
violations of their territory. The same article
maintains that Soviet troops are kept well away from
the border, that the Soviets are careful to conduct
reconnaissance activity away from the border area,
and that Soviet border guard posts in the Far East
are no different than those anywhere else in the
Communist world--i.e., the border guards are equipped
only with small arms and tracking dogs. The broad-
cast contrasts Moscow's alleged restraint with the
shows of hostility on the Chinese side, where Chi-
nese villages resemble camps of the "Roman legions."
One broadcast conceded that the situation along
the border is "not natural," but says explicitly
that the level of tension is nowhere near that of
1969.
The Soviets have not yet replayed the broad-
casts and we do not know whether other East Euro-
peans were actually shown the border areas. One
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possibility, however, is that the trip was designed
to reassure the East Europeans that conflict with
China is not anticipated. This could be tied in with
the recently signed Soviet - East Germany treaty,
which--in contrast to the 1964 treaty--contains a
clause that implies the East Germans have an obli-
gation to help the USSR in the event of conflict
with China. The new treaty probably will become the
model for Soviet treaties with other East European
countries.
Another possibility is that the articles are
intended as a signal to the Chinese that despite the
Soviets' current propaganda offensive against Peking,
the continuing stalemate in the border talks, and
the failure of the two sides--for the first time in
20 years--to hold the annual river navigation talks,
Moscow does not want to fan tensions along the border,
and Moscow has publicly expressed concern that the
chance of a Chinese-initiated incident increases with
the rise of political tensions in China.
If an incident does occur, the broadcasts help
lay the groundwork for a USSR claim that it was the
injured party. Moscow may see some additional need
for such spadework now, in view of its public asser-
tions that the chance of a Chinese-initiated inci-
dent increases with the rise of political tensions
in China.
There is also a far-out hypothesis that the So-
viets are playing up their interest in a quiet Sino-
Soviet border to cover some plan of their own to
instigate trouble. We think this is still highly
unlikely for many reasons, including the fact that
Moscow knows that Mao would use any such incident
further to solidify China's anti-Soviet course.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
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October 10, 1975
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