SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002100120002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 6, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
2~pfF~ JEJ1TE
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
Secret
November 6, 1975
No. 0773/75
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL.,. - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11662, exemption category:
11158(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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ORCON
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
November 6, 1975
Bre:.hnev Mends Political Fences Before
the Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soviets Keep Sakharov Waiting. . . . . . . . . . 4
ANNEX: US-Soviet Relations
September 12 - November 6. . . . . . . . 7
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On October 3 Brezhnev received the President
of Portugal although he did not attend a reception
in honor of the visiting statesman. A few days
later he met a high-level East German delegation at
the airport and participated fully in activities
involving the East Germans. On the 7th, he signed
the new USSR-GDR Friendship Treaty and spoke at a
celebration marking the 250th anniversary of the
USSR Academy of Sciences. Talks with Syrian Presi-
dent Asad, Hungarian Premier Lazar, and Vietnamese
First Secretary Le Duan rounded out the General
Secretary's rather full schedule of public activi-
ties involving domestic affairs and the international
movement in October.
Brezhnev's major detente-related activity this
fall was the summit with French President Giscard.
The meeting was marred by political differences
and the cancellation of talks between Brezhnev and
Giscard on October 15, allegedly because the. Soviet
leader was ill. During the first reception for the
French President, Brezhnev endorsed detente but
raised some eyebrows when he included a blunt phrase
on the ideological struggle. According to a Tass
broadcast, Brezhnev stated that the relaxation of
international tensions "by no means eliminates the
struggle of ideas." This is the standard Soviet
position, but Brezhnev has not used the phrase in a
public address in at least the last four years.
?m ere nave also been reports that he was respond-
ing to complaints from the French Communist Party
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Brezhnev Mends Political Fences Before the Congress
Setbacks in foreign policy, the poor per-
formance of Soviet agriculture, and poor health have
had a negative impact on the political position of
General Secretary Brezhnev during the last year.
The erosion of his position has been reflected in
some loss of confidence in his tenure among mid-
level Soviet officials, and there have been reports
that he has been criticized for paying too much at-
tention to detente with the West to the detriment
of the international communist movement and Soviet
domestic affairs. Some of the criticism may reflect
the normal political maneuvering associated with
pre-Congress build-up, and there is no evidence of
a serious political challenge to Brezhnev's leader-
ship. Nevertheless, his publicly announced activi-
ties since his return from vacation in late August
suggest that he is taking prudent steps to stake
out a more balanced position by concentrating on
those areas that he had been accused of scanting.
In mid-September, for example, he received
Konstantin Zarodov, author of a hard-line article
on tactics for foreign communist parties. The
article was orthodox Marxism-Leninism and caused
considerable controversy in the West concerning
its implications for inter-communist party relations
and even for detente. There was no ostensible
reason for the meeting which only served to as-
sociate Brezhnev more clearly with a militant in-
terpretation of party doctrine, a field he normally
leaves to Suslov. Later that month Brezhnev did
receive the Apollo-Soyuz crew, a meeting he could
hardly pass up, but balanced it when he received
veterans of the Stakhanovite movement, a doctri-
naire form of labor competition much favored by
Stalin in the 1930s.
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concerning the level of cordiality in Soviet-French
summitry.
The summit was noteworthy in that it was not
followed by a resolution from the Politburo, the
Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR
Council of TZinisters approving the meeting and
Brezhnev's activities. The French-Soviet summits
in 1974 and the Wilson-Brezhnev summit in February
1975 were followed by a resolution "fully and com-
pletely" approving Brezhnev's activities and the
results of the meeting. The latest summit has been
the subject of laudatory articles in the press, but
the Soviet ruling bodies have not so far given it
their imprimatur.
Equally striking in the foreign policy field
was the failure of these i.-bodies to approve speci-
fically of the Helsinki summit and Brezhnev's
activities there. The ruling bodieG have "assessed
highly" Brezhnev's contribution to CSCE and approved
his speech there, but "full and complete approval"
has not been reported in the press.
Brezhnev's health may be responsible for his
limited contacts with Western statesmen this fall,
but his active performance in other areas suggests
that political consi_deratLons were an important
factor. In trying to balance his public image and
mute criticism from conservative elements in the
Soviet Union, Brezhne-- h,s been responding as a
shrewd tactician to mend political fences at a
time when plans arc. bein.! laid to set the Soviet
Union's course for the next five years. (SECRET
NOFORN/ORCON)
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Soviets Keep Sakharov Waiting
Nobel Peace Prize winner Andrey Sakharov has had
no official answer yet to his October 20 application
for an assured round trip to Olso, the only condition
on which he says he would go. Meanwhile, his wife
has reportedly obtained an extension of her Soviet re-
entry visa until December 20. The extension will en-
able Mrs. Sakharov, who was originally scheduled to
return home at the end of October after eye surgery
in Italy, to go to Oslo for the December 10 award
ceremony. She may be planning to attend whether or
not her husband is permitted to go; in the event he
is not, she may hope to accept the prize in his name.
The Kremlin, in dealing with Sakharov's trouble-
some case, probably has not yet made a final choice
among several options. These appear to be to:
--Let Sakharov go with assurances that he can
return, i.e., granting his wish.
--Let him go with an explicit statement that
he may not return, i.e., expel him.
--Let him go without assurances one way or
the other on a return, i.e., allow both
Sakharov and the Kremlin to delay decision
on a return, with concomitant reciprocal
risks.
--Refuse to let him travel abroad.
In making its decision, the regime will weigh
several factors. Granting Sakharov's preference for
a round trip would significantly enhance the morale
and the stature of Soviet dissidents at home and
abroad. But it could also result in a favorable
Western press and give the regime's post-Helsinki
image a welcome boost.
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A fiat denial of Sakharov's application would
have precisely the opposite effect on the dissidents
at home and on the Soviet image abroad.
The two other options--explicit or implicit
expulsion--run head on into Sakharov's refusal to
leave the USSR under such circumstances and might
require the same kind of heavy-handedness that accom-
panied the expulsion of Solzhenitsyn in February 1974.
Sakharov, however, might be induced into voluntarily
leaving for good if his wife is not permitted to
return. While there is now no sign that she will be
barred, the action of extending her visa through the
award ceremony enhances the Kremlin's ability to con-
sider this course.
The public campaign against Sakharov and the
Nobel Committee's award has not yet reached a stage
that would either rule out or point to any of the
available courses of action. The campaign's weight
and orchestration suggest, however, that Sakharov's
chances of a round trip to Oslo are rapidly dimming.
The condemnatory statement signed last week by
72 members of the Academy of Sciences could presage
regime pressure on the academy to expel Sakharov.
Although most of the academy's leadership is among
the signatories, only some 28 percent of the voting
members signed. This is short of the majority
needed for election or expulsion which, moreover,
are conducted by secret ballot. The academy, how-
ever, is slated to elect a new president and governing
organs soon, and it has recently appeared more
vulnerable to a variety of regime pressures. One
effect of this could be to accede to the party's
wish, for Sakharov's expulsion should it be strongly
pressed.
The academy's statement may be followed by
similar condemnatory declarations from other Soviet
organizations and possibly by a "spontaneous" letter-
writing campaign designed to give the impression
November 6, 1975
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of popular indignation. Signals such as the recent
speculation in an Australian newspaper by charismatic
Soviet journalist Viktor Louis that Sakharov will not
be let out because of his knowledge of the Soviet
nuclear program may be an indication of the preferences
of some elements in the Soviet establishment. (CON-
FIDENTIAL)
November 6, 1975
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ANNEX: US-Soviet Relations
September 12 - November 6
Amid indications that Soviet relations with the
US are undergoing more than routine scrutiny in the
USSR, Moscow's public assessments of bilateral pro-
gress and prospects have remained in recent weeks uni-
formly optimistic. Soviet commentators have main-
tained a high level of criticism of specific US prob-
lems and policies, notably on defense issues, but
continue to praise the accomplishments of detente.
In the typically florid words of one Izvestia com-
mentator in October, "the constructive, reasonable
course established in relations between the USSR and
the USA bears ever new fruit," despite all efforts
by the adversaries of relaxation.
Many detente-spawned enterprises are in fact
progressing routinely. Within the past six weeks
several bilateral planning and review sessions have
been held, including, inter alia, the fourth annual
meeting of the joint commission on scientific and
technical cooperation (Moscow), the sixth meeting
of the US-Soviet Trade and Economic Council (Washing-
ton), and the seventh session of the SALT-related
Standing Consultative Commission (Geneva).
The reciprocal tours of the US and Soviet
Apollo-Soyuz crews in September and October were
among the bilateral events most widely and favorably
covered by the Soviet media in recent weeks.
Reflecting an eagerness to dispel doubts or
perhaps to disarm current and potential critics of
Brezhnev's US policy, Moscow remains quick to seize
on administration statements in behalf of detente,
giving them heavy coverage in Soviet domestic media.
An Izvestia commentator noted in mid-October, for ex-
ample, that Secretary Kissinger had "actually criti-
cized the view of adversaries of international co-
operation." Conversely, less favorable or qualifying
remarks often go unreported.
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Soviet press coverage of the shifts in Washing-
ton this week has been essentially reportorial but,
by judiciously quoting American commentaries, the
message is being conveyed to Soviet audiences that
the changes are likely to be favorable for the USSR.
_izvestia spoke of Secretary Schlesinger's "well-
known differences" with Kissinger, "particularly on
the question of detente and the strategic arms talks."
It also noted differences between Schlesinger and
Congressional advocates of reduced military spending.
The Soviets have been careful to note the Presi-
dent's statement that Secretary Kissinger would con-
tinue to play the dominant role in US foreign policy.
The Soviets evidently took in stride Secretary
Kissinger's October trip to Peking, probably con-
soling themselves with the estimate that Washington's
continued policy of detente with the USSR and the
frailty and disarray in China's leadership would
preclude rapid developments inimical to Soviet in-
terests. Commentary on the event, while betraying
Soviet nervousness, was marked by studied unconcern.
Radio Moscow's international observers roundtable on
October 26 carried the conclusion that "nothing new
occurred in the bilateral relationship between the
US and the PRC." Moscow implied that Secretary Kis-
singer had been unswayed by Mao's attacks on the USSR
and efforts to undermine detente. The Soviet broad-
cast cited American press reports to the effect that
"regarding detente, differences existed and remain
between Peking and Washington."
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko assessed the
favorable "turnabout" in relations with the US in
an article in the September issue of the party
theoretical journal Kommunist. The article, part of
a foreign policy survey probably prepared as a prelude
to party congress deliberations, predicts that the
detente course will be ratified at the congress, and
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expresses satisfaction with the "dominant trend" in
US-Soviet relations. Gromyko added the familiar
caveat, however, that in the US there are "complex
social currents and influential forces hostile to
cooperation with the Soviet Union." He specifically
endorsed bilateral summitry, predicting that Brezh-
nev's coming visit to Washington would be "another
major milestone."
Gromyko's ten-day visit to New York and Washing-
ton in late September was the occasion for high-level
exchanges on troublesome issues such as the Middle
East and SALT. In assessing his trip for the Soviet
public, Gromyko adopted a low-key approach, charac-
terizing the visit as "useful," and noting that both
sides had endorsed a continuation of the improved
relations of recent years. He acknowledged, however,
that problems remain.
One such problem, Soviet unhappiness with the
US role in the recent Sinai disengagement agreement,
persists, although Moscow appears for the moment
resigned to watching the US play out its hand in the
hope that the problems of the area will eventually
require that the USSR be dealt back in. Recognizing
their present reduced influence with the Arabs, the
Soviets probably have little expectation that an in-
trusive role at this time would produce results com-
mensurate with the risk of damage to their US policy.
Gromyko has specifically denied that the Soviets are
engaged in any campaign against the new agreement.
Another delicate area of bilateral interest is
arms control, a subject in which Moscow repeatedly
professes interest. On October 10 the chief Soviet
SALT negotiator said that the Soviet leadership would
soon be turning to SALT decisions after a period of
preoccupation with other matters. In Geneva, mean-
while, the sides continue to make slow progress on
peripheral issues with the possibility of complete
agreement in 1975 by no means assured.
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Slow progress is also being made at the Thres-
hold Test Ban/Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (TTB/PNE)
negotiations in Moscow. Movement toward a joint
draft treaty and protocol on information exchange
has been hindered by a Soviet reluctance to reach
agreement on explicit provisions as opposed to gen-
eral principles. The Soviets have been particularly
uncomfortable about the verification provisions of a
PNE agreement, especially the issue of observer ac-
cess and procedures.
Continuing the recent practice of leadership
meetings with influential US politicians of both
parties, Premier Kosygin, on October 2, met for over
two hours with presidential candidate Sargent Shriver.
Kosygin expressed optimism about the future of bi-
lateral relations and, lapsing into his usual pre-
occupation with economic issues, said the Soviet Union
hoped within five years to raise the level of trade
with the US to two billion dollars annually, excluding
grain sales. A Pravda article on October 12, pre-
dicted with satisfaction that bilateral trade this
year will exceed 1.7 billion dollars (evidently in-
cluding at least some part of the grain turnover).
Soviet reaction to the bilateral grain agreement
signed in Moscow on October 20 has been predictably
subdued. Moscow has not publicized the terms of the
arrangement, nor even acknowledged to the general
public its existence. A Leningrad propagandist did,
however, mention the agreement in a public lecture
on October 26, characterizing it in favorable terms.
The dismal Soviet harvest left Moscow with no
reasonable alternative to meeting US demands for a
less spasmodic approach to international grain pur-
chases. Nevertheless, the negotiations were prolonged
and the parallel talks on oil sales to the US are
evidently proving difficult.
In an administrative move involving Soviet pol-
icy toward the US, Georgiy Korniyenko, chief of the
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foreign ministry's US department, was elevated in
October to the rank of deputy foreign minister.
Korniyenko has told a US official that he will con-
tinue to deal exclusively with US-Soviet matters;
another Soviet official has interpreted Korniyenko's
promotion as indicative of the growing importance
Moscow attaches to relations with Washington. V. S.
Semenov, head of the Soviet SALT delegation and a
fellow deputy foreign minister, has recently charac-
terized Korniyenko as a man "strong in battle."
Semenov has implied that Korniyenko's strength
is currently being enlisted in defense of Brezhnev's
policy of improved relations with the US. In recent
conversations with American officials, Semenov and
other less senior, Soviet spokesmen have alluded to
serious differences over policy, including Moscow's
US policy within the Soviet leadership. Semenov,
for example, attested to earlier disagreement over
the SALT I accords and conveyed the clear impression
that skeptics of detente were again a serious prob-
lem for Brezhnev and his political allies, among
whom he listed Politburo members Kirilenko, Andropov,
and Kulakov.
In late October, another Soviet official, an
attache in Washington, expressed concern about Brezh-
nev's physical and political well-being. He claimed
that Politburo "hard liners" were making it very dif-
ficult for him.
These proffered glimpses of controversy among
the Soviet leadership are highly unusual, although
perhaps more for being tendered at all than for their
content. The motive for the revelations apparently
lies in the hope that the US might be induced to make
concessions on SALT in order to strengthen Brezhnev's
hand against less congenial forces in the Kremlin.
While this is not an unprecedented Soviet negotiating
tactic, even at SALT, other fragmentary reporting
on the General Secretary's physical and political
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health suggests that he and his detente helmsmanship
may now be particularly vulnerable to setbacks in
US-Soviet relations. It does not necessarily follow,
however, that Soviet detente policy is as dependent on
Brezhnev as he is on it. (SECRET NOFORN/ORCON)
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Secret
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