WORKING NOTES ON US DELEGATION SESSION OF GUAM CONFERENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000500060098-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 98
• Publication Date: March 21, 1967
• Content Type: MFR

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT Working Notes on US Delegation Session
of Guam Conference
TIME 1030-1415, 21 March 1967
PLACE Conference Room, COMNAV/Marianas
Headquarters Building
PARTICIPANTS: US Delegation only. All US officials
attending the joint session were this ?e,
plus some others whose names'I did not
record.
THE PRESIDENT opened the meeting by giving a brief
resum- of the 20 March joint session. "Yester-
day," he observed, we had heard the Vietnamese
report on their efforts and progress. "Today,"
we would take stock of our own efforts. THE
PRESIDENT then asked General Westmoreland to give
a report on the US military effort.
General Westmoreland opened by noting that 70 percent
of South Vietnam was covered by jungle or by marsh-
land. Eighty percent of the South Vietnamese
people lived on 40 percent of the country's ter-
ritory, and 40 percent of the country's territory
was virtually unpopulated. All of this meant the
guerrilla enemy had many places to hide and was
able to operate in a terrain environment advanta-
geous to him.
General Westmoreland also noted that the eastern
part of Laos, particularly the eastern part of the
so-called "panhandle," was de facto North Vietnamese
territory through which Hanoi could move troops
and supplies at will. By land through Laos and
across the so-called demilitarized zone, which
was no longer demilitarized, and by sea along the
coast, Hanoi was infiltrating men into the South
at a rate of about 7,000 a month.
The Vietnamese-Cambodian border, undefended and
ill-defined in many places, provided the Communists
with other advantages, including ready availability
of secure santuary from which they could sally
forth to harass our forces.
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Hanoi, despite the Communists' mounting problems,
is still confident of victory, still confident
that the Communists can wear down the Free World's
will to continue the fight.
General Westmoreland then sketched the Communists'
over-all command structure, noting that operational
control of Communist military activity in South
Vietnam's two northernmost provinces (Quang Tri
and Thua Thien) was exercised directly from North
Vietnam's Military Region IV headquarters in Vinh,
North Vietnam.*
General Westmoreland reviewed the many problems
facing Free World forces including that of opera-
tional security. He noted that the enemy has in-
filtrated South Vietnamese ranks on both the mili-
tary and civilian side to such an extent that it
is difficult to keep the Communists unaware of
any operational planning or information passed
to our Vietnamese allies.
General Westmoreland stressed that the enemy's
target was not terrain but people, and that he
had the bulk of his forces concentrated in South
Vietnam's populated areas.
General Westmoreland then reviewed the enemy's
order of battle and present troop deposition, and
the deposition of allied forces made to counter
various Communist threats. He noted that the
enemy presently had an eleven division force and
estimated that the Communists were striving to
achieve a twelve division force structure.**
*Genera es more and actually said Military Region
III, but this was a slip of the tongue.
**General Wheeler (with whom I rode back from Guam)
and I both feel that the eleven division figure was
another unintentional slip of the tongue. Both MACV
and the Washington intelligence community presently
credit the Communists with nine headquarters com-
plexes in or near South Vietnam capable of controlling
division-sized operations.
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In his review of Communist troop depositions,
General Westmoreland noted that the Communists
had seventy-seven base areas in South Vietnam,
three in Cambodia, and seven in Laos. The Laotian
bases are marginally accessible by ground op-
erations and could be struck by air. The Cam-
bodian bases are not accessible because of politi-
cal considerations. Several times during his
presentation, General Westmoreland directed at-
tention to the fact that two Communist divisions
are presently located in Cambodia in secure
sanctuaryfrom which they could sally forth and
from where they pose a constant threat against
which we have to deploy.
General Westmoreland explained the importance
of these base areas in Communist strategy and the
success Free World forces have had in base clearing
operations. He also pointed out the complexity
and difficulty of such operations, noting Com-
munist mastery of camouflage and concealment
practices, and the extensive use the Communists
made of well-hidden tunnel complexes. By way
of illustration, he noted that in Operation
JUNCTION CITY (which is presently in train) we
have run across what was obviously the headquar-
ters of a major COSVN propaganda unit located in
a tunnel. This particular tunnel complex
included rooms at least half the size of that in
which the Guam conference was being held. In
one such room, US forces had recently discovered
a complete underground broadcasting station.
General Westmoreland then made a corps by corps
review of the current situation. He stated we
were making progress in the Mekong delta. There
are 91 districts in the delta (i.e., in :[V Corps);
we were making progress in 45, standing still in
42, and losing ground in four (one district in
Kien Hoa Province, one in Vinh Binh and two in
Sa Dec), There were three South Vietnamese Army
divisions in the delta, two of which'(the 21st and
the 7th) were very good and--by Vietnamese stand-
ards--well led.
The III Corps region is the heartland of South
Vietnam and is consequently the area where General
Westmoreland had placed the greatest concentration
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of US troops. There were serious problems in
III Corps, an area in which the enemy had also
concentrated great efforts. The three South
Vietnamese divisions located in that corps were
the poorest in the South Vietnamese Army. To
bolster Vietnamese efforts, General Westmoreland
was deploying US troops in Gia Dinh and Long An
provinces to protect Saigon and to improve secu-
rity in the immediate vicinity of the capital.
General Westmoreland said he was also placing
US troops (elements of the 9th Division) in
Dinh Tuong Province, where their initial efforts
had been both good and effective.*
To meet the Communist threat, new tactics were
constantly being devised. For example, General
Westmoreland planned to use a "floating brigade"
in the Communist stronghold of War Zone C. This
brigade would be supplied by parachutes and heli-
copters, and would keep constantly on the move to
harass the Communists and deny them the use of
this key base area.
General Westmoreland then reviewed II Corps and
his problems in keeping an adequate screen to
protect against incursions by the Communist forces
presently located in Cambodia.
General Westmoreland used Quang Ngai Province
as a concrete illustration of the problems in I
Corps. He cited an example of the damage caused
by four Communist regiments located in that area,
and explained how it could take a full allied
division operating in that area for a year to
clean it out.
After his detailed review of the situation, Gen-
eral Westmoreland summarized the over-all picture,
noting progress and achievement but making the
point that unless military pressure causes the
*Dinh Tuong is actually in IV Corps, but General
Westmoreland discussed it in the context of his III
Corps operations intended to protect the southern
approaches to Saigon.
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Viet Cong to crumble and Hanoi to stop its support
of southern insurgency, the war in Vietnam could
go on indefinitely.
THE PRESIDENT asked General Westmoreland whether he
though the Communists accurately reported their
own defeats and losses and hence whether Hanoi
had a true picture of the situation in South
Vietnam..
General Westmoreland replied that in their reports up
`-" the chain' n of command, the Communists greatly exag-
gerated their successes and the casualties they
inflicted on allied forces.*
Returning to the subject of infiltration, General
Westmoreland called attention again to the impor-
tance of Communist movement through Laos and sug-
gested the outlines of a plan that would involve
recruiting and training tribal elements native
to that area (Khas) as forces that could operate
in the area and interdict Communist infiltrators.
THE PRESIDENT then initiated a brief discussion of
bombing pauses and asked General Westmoreland's
opinion about their consequences. General
Westmoreland wholeheartedly supported the politi-
cal wisdom of the pauses ordered to date, but
explained the advantage the Communists took of
any suspension in the allied aerial interdiction
campaign. After some gentle, skillful questioning
by the President, General Westmoreland did admit
that he hoped these pauses would not become a
habit.
THE PRESIDENT thanked General Westmoreland for his
fine survey and asked Admiral Sharp to give a
report on the aerial campaign against North Viet-
nam.
*My notes are sketchy here bVA I believe the point
General Westmoreland was making was that the Communists
report their own losses with reasonable accuracy but
greatly inflate their claims of damage inflicted on
allied forces, thus presenting a distorted view of the
situation.
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1 71
Admiral Sharp made a brief summary review during which
he nbt-e'ff his belief that our bombing campaign had
been successful in light of its limited objectives.
It had not stopped infiltration, but no one had
ever thought it would. It had made Communist
infiltration immensely more difficult and costly
for the Communists and also exerted a constant
pressure on the North Vietnamese regime.
Admiral Sharp then asked two of his aides (Marine
Corps Brigadier General Hutchinson and a Navy
commander whose name I did not catch) to present
detailed briefings on CINCPAC operational pro-
posals with respect to aerial bombardment and
mining operations.
General Hutchins outlined an extension of the ROLLING
ITJ operation involving six target systems
in North Vietnam:
(1) transportation
(2) military complexes
(3) petroleum storage and
distribution facilities
(4) war supporting industries
(5) electrical power
(6) port complexes at Haiphong,
Hon Gay, and Cam Pha
(Because of the sensitivity of the subject
matter I specifically did not take detailed
notes on the projected taFg- /The JCS
can almost certainly provide copies of the
briefing folders handed the President,
Secretary McNamara, and Secretary Rus1c.7
I do recall that the total proposal was
presented in the context of an April-
October 1967 time frame, involved seven
target packages, and a total of 59 targets.
It was estimated that the execution of this
program would entail 1,715 civilian casual-
ties.in the DRV and-the loss of 82 US aircraft.)
General Hutchinson then outlined the MIG threat
in North Vietnam, the general problems caused by
North Vietnamese air defense capabilities and a
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proposal to cope with these threats. (Again,
because of the sensitivity of the subject and its
lack of relevance to CIA programs, I specifically
did not take detailed notes.)
The Navy Commander then reviewed mining operations
wFi-c ave a ready been executed and offered a plan
for mining the harbors of Haiphong, Hon Gay and
Cam Pha. (Once more, I specifically avoided taking
detailed notes on this sensitive topic which in-
volved matters outside of CIA's concern.)
THE PRESIDENT then turned to Ambassador Lodge for a
report on civil activities in Vietnam, particularly
in the field of nation-building and pacification.
Ambassador Lodge observed that because of the lateness
oT_tTe our he would discuss only the topic of
elections and then ask two of his colleagues
(Mr. MacDonald and General Humphreys) for short
briefings on the important topics of land reform
and civilian casualties.
Ambassador Lodge briefly reviewed the four elec-
tions coming up in the near future: the village and
hamlet councils to be elected in early May, the
presidential election tentatively scheduled for
3 September, the upper legislative house (Senate)
election scheduled for 4 September, and the lower
legislative house (Assembly) scheduled for one
month after that.
THE PRESIDENT noted that this was not the same schedule
a rime Minister Ky had presented the previous
day.
Ambassador Lodge acknowledged this and pointed out that
Ky may ha ev been over-optimistic. The schedule
just outlined (according to US Embassy's best
information) was the one presently being planned.
Ambassador Lodge emphasized the importance of this
electoral process and the course of constitutional
development presently in train. He explained the
role and influence of Vietnam's military estab-
lishment in present South Vietnamese politics ,
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and estimated that if the military could agreed
on a single candidate, most likely Ky or Thieu,
that candidate would probably win. He gave a
frank assessment of both Ky and Thieu, and con-
cluded by expressing his belief that the US
Government could live and work with either one
and should not interfere in the contest now dis-
creetly being waged for the support of the mili-
tary establishment. Ambassador Lodge pointed
out that the constitution drafting process could
never have gone so smoothly or been completed
so quickly had Ky and Thieu not both genuinely
supported the process. Ky's ability to wave the
"coonskin constitution" at Guam was a real tri-
umph for Vietnam's present leadership and a
profoundly significant indicator of progress.
THE PRESIDENT asked if there were no civilians capable
of e ni g serious contenders for the presidency in
Vietnam.
Ambassador Lodge explained that the course of recent
Vietnamese history had produced a breed of polit-
icians trained in the techniques of plot and con-
spiracy but ill-suited by background or experience
to provide positive political leadership. Ambas-
sador Lodge noted that Tran Van Huong and Pham
Khac Suu were probably the two leading civilian
figures, but explained that neither was likely
to win a national election, and that neither
would make a particularly good president, especi-
ally Suu.
General Taylor endorsed Ambassador Lodge's assessment
of uu. (Someone--I am not sure who, but I think
Secretary Rusk--asked whether the Constituent
Assembly had brought forth any new leadership.)
Ambassador Lodge replied that it had produced some
po 'ent a Ty promising figures but no one presently
capable of winning the office of president.
Secretary Rusk (I think) asked about Dr. Phan Quang
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Ambassador Lodge replied that Dan had a certain measure
o political skill and some following, and had
performed quite credibly in recent months, but was
not really presidential timber.
Ambassador Lodge then summarized the course of the
electoral and constitutional process, stressed its
importance, and the significance of the progress
the GVN was making in this vital area. He then
asked Mr. MacDonald to give a brief summary of
current activity in the field of land reform.
Secretary Rusk interrupted to call everyone's attention
o he great sensitivity of the just-completed
discussion about possible Vietnamese presidential
candidates and the names that had been brought up.
The Secretary underlined the importance of pro-
tecting the secrecy of the fact that such a dis-
cussion was held by the American delegation. Mr.
MacDonald (USAID Director) then gave a short re-
sum6 of current progress and problems in the field
of land reform.
THE PRESIDENT expressed his belief in the great impor-
ance o this issue, noting the universal appeal
of land ownership and the deep emotions it arouses.
THE PRESIDENT asked if more use could not be made
of photographs obtained from aerial reconnaissance,
photographs which could be given to individual
farmers with the borders of their land outlined
on the picture. THE PRESIDENT cited examples from
his own experience in the early days of the New
Deal which showed the impact such photographs
could have.
Mr. Komer noted that the technical resources for providing
such a photographic service existed and volunteered
General Momyer's assets. (General Momyer smiled
but did not comment,.)
General Humphreys (USAID Medical Director) made a short
presen a ion on the topic of civilian casualties,
outlining that was being done to minimize the
hardship of war on the civilian population but
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noting the difficulty in acquiring valid statistics.
He called attention to the fact that--despite press
comment and resulting public impressions to the
contrary--much of the suffering in Vietnam, in-
cluding burns, was not war-caused or necessarily
war-related.
After this final presentation, the PRESIDENT made
a few concluding remarks pulling the conference
together and laying renewed stress on the central
importance of making progress in the political,
nation-building sphere as well as in the military
struggle.
* * * * * * * * * *
Cautionary Comment: The above resume of the 21 March
session was reconstructed from a series of quite sketchy
notes. These notes were taken for the private and ex-
clusive use of Mr. Helms and myself to assist us in
guiding Agency programs in a manner that would support
the President's objectives and policies. The notes
were never intended to serve as a basis for a complete
reconstruction of the proceedings. These notes were
incomplete and hence the above resume is also incomplete,
though to the best of my knowledge and belief it reflects
accurately what was said on the points covered.
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
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