REVISED AGENDA AND DISCUSSION PAPER FOR PRC MEETING ON RHODESIA, APRIL 12, 1979

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002000050002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 81
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 11, 1979
• Content Type: MF

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DCI Briefing Notes
RHODESIA
I. Elections. Mid-April. Case-Javits determination.
II. GOR making all out effort for big show. Will be portrayed as
compliance with western terms for black rule and will lobby
hard for recognition and lifting sanctions. Preparations
extensive.
A. Police and military leaves cancelled and reservists called up.
Military force of 75,000.
B. Assisted byabout 10,000 ex-guerrillas and local recruits
of black coleaders Muzorewa and Sithole.
C. ZAPU and ZANU committed to disruption. 10,000 guerrillas
inside. Thousands more before election. Intimidate voters
stage incidents. Rhodesians likely strike again at bases in
Mozambique and Zambia.
D. Whites, vote 10 April; blacks ,vote during a 5 day period after
12 April. Security forces rotated from one military district
to another to provide maximum security.
III. Rhodesians hope for 60% turnout. Pressure. Say is valid if only
20% of blacks vote. Will directly elect 72 blacks and 20 whites;
8 whites indirectly. Separate districts and rolls for white and
black members.
A. Most likely victor is Muzorewa. Should win more than 1/2 of
72 black seats. Sithole has lost ground. Less than 1/3 of votes.
B. Despite results, Whites will control military, police, judiciary
and civil service. Smith's Rhodesian Frait Party is unopposed.
Uncertain what role Smith will play.
C. Most whites not enthused but saying Let's try it. In January
emigration reduced to about 1,000/mo.
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IV. Election will not end war, nor will government win widespread
recognition. Question is will accession of black government,
albeit one with limited powers, alter the power balance.
A. By itself answer is no. But election can't be looked at as an
isolated event. Must be viewed as part of complex equation.
- Deepening Mugabe-Nkomo rift.
- Dissention in ZIPRA ranks. Nkomo political decline.
- Hardening South African attitude. Throwing weight behind
int. settlement
- Growing western support for internal settlement. US Congress
and Thatcher.
V. These factors account for growing confidence by white Rhodesians.
Risk is that it will also harden their attitude and reduce chances
of a political deal among blacks that could lead toward an eventual
solution.
VI. Muzorewa will move to strengthen ?relations with whites, establish
control in countryside, and induce defections from ZAPU and ZANU.
Will probably also try to split Patriotic Front even further.
A. A Shona-based alliance between Muzorewa's party and Mugabe's
ZANU. About 75% of blacks are Shona. Has already approached
Mugabe about joining government.
B. Muzorews and Nkomo could cut a deal. While different tribes,
white resistance to Nkomo alliance less than Mugabe.
C. Many obstacles to both these deals; biggest impulse comes from
mutual fear by Mugabe and Nkomo that other will cut a deal first.
D. Neither of above alignments would tip balance sufficiently to
end fighting, but could change complexion of war from one of
equilibrium with prospect of growing strength on guerrilla
side to one of momentum for internal solution.
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VII. Election will create hard choices for the External Players.
A. Front line states will continue to support guerrillas, but
intensification of fighting could force Kaunda and Machel
to accept open-ended commitment to Soviet and Cuban presence.
Don't want. They also face prospects of supporting rivals
in civil war. Thus, must support a deal under appropriate
circumstances.
B. Soviets presently backing Nkomo. Risk alienating Nyerere
and Machel who also want Mugabe supported. If Nkomo cuts
a deal with Muzorewa they have to choose between ZAPU and
white allies or to shift to ZANU. If support both groups
they retain credentials with Front Line states, buy risk
becoming involved in civil war.
VIII. Even larger dilemma faces US and UK:
A. Western recognition and the lifting of economic sanctions would:
1. Strengthen the position of the new government. There would be
greater white resolve to support the black-led government and
more willingness among whites in the military to defend it.
Government could attract significant number of defectors from
guerrilla forces.
2. Improve the chances of stemming Rhodesia's economic decline.
Worldwide demand is increasing for many goods produced by the
Rhodesians such as copper, chrome, and gold.
3. Provoke a serious erosion in the "special relationship" that
the US has fostered with black African leaders -- particularly
Nyerere, Kaunda, and Obasanjo. They would conclude that the
Anglo-American Plan for Rhodesia was dead and would come under
increased pressure to seek a military solution in Rhodesia.
4. If the US and the UK pushed for the inclusion of ZANU and ZAPU
in the new government, this might appease some of the African
leaders. A call for the adoption of a new constitution
providing for a quicker transition to black majority rule
and approved by all Rhodesians -- not just the whites -- also
might dispell some of the anger. This option, however, still
would risk a major escalation of Soviet and Cuban involvement
on the side of whatever guerrilla group is excluded from the
government.
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B. If West opts against recognition and lifting sanctions and
continues to press negotiated settlement involving all parties
to the dispute:
1. The internal government's ability to take hold would be
weakened. Emigration probably would increase. White
extremist attitudes gain currency and last ditch military
stand becomes only alternative. Deals between blacks
more unlikely.
2. The Front line states and Nigeria would continue to support
the Anglo-American efforts toward a political settlement.
They would regard the election merely as one step in a
process that eventually will involve the guerrillas in a
negotiated settlement.
3. But Soviet and Cuban involvement with the guerrilla forces
and in the host states would still increase.
IX. In sum:
A. Everybody confident now -- Whites, ZAPU, ZANU. Pre-election
struggle will provide test of military strength. Elections
could shift center of gravity .slightly away from guerrillas
if Whites maintain security.
B. Once in power, Muzorewa is likely to make overtures to either
Mugabe or Nkomo, but we doubt at this point that the white
leaders will show sufficient flexibility to allow Muzorewa
to cut a deal attractive enough to bring either guerrilla leader
into the internal settlement. He may, however, be able to induce
significant defections. A successful all parties conference or
agreement to hold UN supervised elections are not in the cards.
C. Short-term prospects are for a continuing stalemate, particularly
if South Africa opts to commit its resources in support of the
new government of national unity.
D. Over the long run, time probably is on the side of the guerrilla
forces. The continuing struggle will provide expanding opportunities
for the Soviets and the Cubans and prove costly for the West.
Even if whites collapse after prolonged struggle, we anticipate
turmoil as blacks compete for power.
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RHODESIA: ELECTION TIMETABLE
10 April White Rhodesians vote for at least 4 of 20 directly-elected
white members of the House of Assembly.
17-21 April White and black Rhodesians vote for the 72 black members
of the House. Hours for the fixed polling stations are from
7 to 7. Hours for the mobile polling stations are from
7 to 3.
18 April The white Rhodesian Front Party caucuses to select at least
16 nominees for the 8 indirectly-elected white seats in House.
23 April Counting of votes for 72 black and 20 white seats begins.
26 April Whites meet, if necessary, in an electoral college to
pare down list of whdVe nominees for indirectly elected
seats to 16.
27 April Electoral results announced by this date.
7 May The newly elected black and white House members elect 8
white members to House, bringing the total House membership
to 100.
15 May Nominations for 10 black and 10 white Senators are solicated
by nomination court.
17 May Council of Chiefs elect 5 Shona and 5 Ndebele chiefs to
the Senate.
23 May White House members elect 10 whites to the Senate; black
House members elect 10 blacks to the Senate.
Parliament is disolved.
The new parliament is formed and the Speakers of the House
and the Senate are elected.
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* Parliament puts forward nominations and elects a
"non-executive" President.
* President appoints a Prime Minister and a cabinet acting
on the advice of the Prime Minister.
4 Date not set.
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RHODESIAN PARTY SYMBOLS
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United African National Council
President, Bishop Abel Muzorewa
Zimbabwe African National
Union - Sithole
President, Rev. Ndabaningi
Sithole
Zimbabwe United People's Organization United National Federal Party
410President, Chief Jeremiah Chirau
President, Chief Kayisa Ndiweni
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RHODESIA
Problems of corruption, fraud, and statistical manipulation:
Given the importance of the election to the internal government
and the unstable security situation in many rural areas, some electoral
irregularities can be expected. We doubt, however, that there will be
any large scale fals?ification of the results.
--The election will be supervised by a serious and competent group
of civil servants who are said to be doing what they can to preserve
the fairness of the vote.
--Nevertheless, government pressure to produce a large turnout
and particularly voter intimidation by the black parties and
their auxiliary forces which are already taking place, are
in themselves irregularities. Others, such as the counterfeiting
of the ballots and the busing of supporters to different voting
districts, could also take place, but probably on a limited scale.
--Each voter's hand will be dipped in a colorless liquid that will
remain detectable undera machine for one to two weeks. This will
not prevent electoral officials from looking the other way if it
benefits their party to do so, but monitoring procedures will
probably be strict enough to avoid widespread abuse.
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RHODESIA
International Recognition of New Rhodesian Government
To our knowledge, no state is planning--or even seriously considering--
recognizing the new Rhodesian government to be elected later this month.
--Some states, such as South Africa, Malawi, Gabon, Ivory Coast,
and Zaire, might decide to establish diplomatic relations if
and when the new government demonstrates a capability to govern
and looks like it might survive.
--Many of these states, and others such as Botswana and Zambia,
will continue to trade with the Rhodesians.
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Rhodesia: Economic Situation and Outlook
I. The economy, a source of strength to the government
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of Prime Minister Ian Smith during most of the
period since independence, has deteriorated in
the past three years.
A. The contraction in national output that began
in 1975 shows no signs of halting.
1. Reduction in output in the last three
years has been around 15 percent.
2. Real GNP decline in 1978 probably equalled
1977's seven percent rate.
3. GNP will undoubtedly continue to slide
in 1979.
B. The economic slump largely reflects:
1. increasing burden of defense -- defense
spending has nearly tripled in the last
three years,
2. erosion of the middle class market by
white emigration,
3. waning business confidence due to persistent
guerrilla activity and hiOly uncertain
political prospects, and
4. weak international demand for Rhodesian
products, in part related to *economic
sanctions.
ER M 79-10213
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How the blacks come to power and how they treat
white economic interests wiil, of course, have a
decisive influence on the country's future and
will determine whether the economy suffers a
prccipitious decline or whether a turnaround can
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A. A worst-case scenario would involve the departure
of most Rhodesian whites accompanied by large-
scale civil war.
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1. This would create chaotic economic conditions
similar to those of post-independent Angola
and Mozambique.
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2. Whichever guerrilla faction emerged as the
winner of the civil war probably would
adopt disruptive economic socialization
policies, particularly in farming areas
once reserved for whites.
B. From an economic point of view, the best path
to black majority rule would be along the
lines of the Kenya model in which enough
whites remain to assure a stable economic
environment.
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1. A smooth transition accompanied by quick
improvement in the country's security
situation and international standing
would probably reverse the economy'o
decline; even then they will need
amounts of financial assistance.
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Rho&?.sia: Enforcement cf:Lanctions
I. Weak international demand for Rhodesian raw
materials, in part because of economic sanctions,
has contributed to Rhodesia's economic decline
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A. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the impact
of economic sanctions was mitigated by strong
world demand and by
Africa and Portugal
of Rhodesian goods.
B. As world demand
the 1973/74 oil
probably caused
proportionately.
the willingness of
South
to facilitate the flow
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slumped in the aftermath of
price hikes, the sanctions
Rhodesia to suffer dis-
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1. Rhodesian mining output dropped 8 percent
during 1974-78 as many firms in developed
countries turned to alternative suppliers
of chromium, nickel, copper, tin, and
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2. Chromium exports also were hard hit by:
a. the loss of the lucrative US market,
which accounted for 25 percent of
chrome sales prior to the March 1977
repeal of the Byrd Amendment, and
FR M 79-10213
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b. a new metallurgical process (argon-
oxygen decarburiEation, or 7=) which
reduced the cost competitiveness of
high-grade Rhodesian ores in the
production of stainless steel.
Sanctions enforcement is far from airtight:
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willing
to pay profitable fees to South African, Swiss,
and other middlemen, Rhodesia apparently still 25X1
has little trouble in selling and shipping exports.
A. South African businesses, which have substantial
investment in Rhodesia, undoubtedly provide
the principal conduits for Rhodesian trade.
B. All overseas Rhodesian trade is transported
over road or rail connections with South
Africa.
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III. The current strengthening trend in international
markets should result in increased demand for
some of Rhodesia's minerals. 25X1
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A. US stainless steel producers reportedly have
exceo.flod their AOD capacity and are-turning
to older electric furnaces that require high-
grade ferrochrome produced from ores that
are available principally from Rhodesia and
USSR.
B. Copper prices are up about 60 percent over
last year's average price to about $1 per
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C. Record gold prices ($240-$250 a troy ounce)
have pushed earnings from gold exports to
well over $100 million a year.
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IV. Despite the sanctions, Rhodesia continues to get
adequate petroleum supplies.
A. Rhodesia meets its requirements either by
purchasing products from South African re-
fineries or by importing from third countries
through South African ports.
B. The increases in international oil prices since
the Iranian political crisis have spurred
Salisbury to raise retail gasoline prices by
almost 30 percent to over $1.30 a US gallon;
Rhodesia already has gasoline rationing.
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Zambia: Food Situation and Dependence
on Rhodesian Rail Outlet
I. Zambia has been hard hit by the drought in
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Southern Africa.
A. The government -- perhaps optimistically --
is predicting that this year's maize harvest
will equal only one-half of annual domestic
consumption.
B. To cover the shortfall of this dietary stable,
Zambia expects to import 350,000-400,000
metric tons.
1. This will place added financial strains on
Zambia, which is already short of foreign
exchange.
2. Possible suppliers of maize include:
a. South Africa.
Facing a poor
harvest itself, South Africa has
turned down a Zambian bid for white
maize, which is preferred for human
consumption, but has offered yellow
maize.
b. Rhodesia. Although haiwests will be
down this year, Salisbury probably
would not refuse a Zambian request.
For political reasons Zambia would
ask Rhodesian assistance only as a
last resort.
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c. Kenya. Harvests are aood and Nairobi
may be able to suplolv some of Zambia's
needs.
d.
The EEC, Mexico, and the-US. Some
Western diplomats have expressed the
opinion that Zambia will wait until
the food situation reaches "disaster
proportions" and appeal to Western
governments for emergency relief.
Of landlocked Zambies four export/import routes,
the Rhodesian rail outlet to, efficiently run South
African ports is the most expeditious.
A. The Tazara
plagued by
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B. The "Great
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(ranzam) railroad to Tanzania is
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inefficiency, derailments, strikes, and
East Road," a rail and road route
to Mozambique, is limited by congested ports
and slow turnaround times.
C. The Benguela railroad to Angola has been
closed since 1975.
III. Closure of the Rhodesian route would cause a sharp
drop in Zambian copper exports and would reduce its
ability to import food.
A. The Rhodesian route is targetted. to handle
1,000 tons of copper exports per day.
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B. Now used principally to handle imports of
fertilizer and coal the route would be
needed to handle grain imports from out-
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IV. Because.of its importance, Zambia is concerned
that:
A. Rhodesia may close the route to bring economic
pressure on Lusaka.
B. Rhodesian guerrillas (mainly ZAPU) may
interdict the line.
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23 March 1979
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF THE RHODESIAN
DURING THE APRIL
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Army
SECURITY
ELECTION
6,000
12,000
FORCES
Regulars
Active Duty Reservists
Total Army
18,000
Air Force
1,500
Police and Paramilitary
i'
Regular Police
8,000
Reserve Police
35,000
Guard Force
6,000
Paramilitary Guard Units
5,000
Dad's Army (50-59 year olds
mobilized for security duty
during the election)
1,000
Total Police and Paramilitary
55,000
Auxilaries
Loyal to Sithole
2,000
Loyal to Muzorewa
8,000
Total Auxilaries
10,000
TOTAL FORCES
84,500
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30 March 1979
RHODESIAN EQUIPMENT INVENTORY
(as of 30 March 1979)
Ground Forces
Tanks none
Armored vehicles (Ratels, Elands, Ferret) 60
Artillery (25 pounders, 5.5 inch guns) 24
Anti-aircraft artillery none
Surface-to-air missiles none
Air Forces
Bombers (Canberra)
Fighters
Hunter
Vampire
Counter-insurgency
4-5
10
11
0-2 14
SF-260 12
Trainers (SF-260) 12-22
Transports
DC-3
Islander
Helicopters
12
6
AB-205 8-11
Alouette II/III 42
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GUERRILLA EQUIPMENT INVENTORIES
- SA-7 surface-to-air missile
- 60mm mortars
- 82mm mortars
- 122mm manportable, single-tube
rockets
- 8-10 82mm recoilless rifles
- RPG-2/7 anti-tank weapons
- 14.5mm anti-aircraft machine guns
- a variety of Soviet small arms
- may have some light field artillery
pieces
ZANU
- may have a few SA-7 surface-to-air
missiles
- 60mm mortars
- 82mm mortars
- 120mm mortars (a few)
- 122mm manportable, single-tube rockets
- B-10 82mm recoilless rifles
- PRG-2/7 anti-tank weapons
- 14.5mm anti-aircraft machine guns
.- a variety of Communist-bloc small arms
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23 March 1979
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF THE ZIMBABWE AFRICAN PEOPLE'S UNION
AS OF MID-MARCH
In Rhodesia
2,500
2,800
200
7,000
2,000
12,500
Other Trained
Hq, Staff, Training
Support Camps
In Botswana
Holding Camps
Total
Under Training
7,500
In Zambia
Mulungushi - 5,500
From Angola- 2,000
In Ethiopia
500-1,000
In Angola
2,000
Elsewhere
1,000
Total
11,000
Available for Training
In Zambia
8,000
In Botswana
9,000
Total
17,000
TOTAL
42,500
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23 March 1979
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF THE ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION
AS OF MID-MARCH.
In Rhodesia
Other Trained Personnel
Under Training
8,000
7,000
Tanzania 3,000
Libya 500
Ethiopia & elsewhere 2,500
Total
Available for Training
6,000
10,000
TOTAL 31,000
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MEMORANDUM
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2 April 1979
SUBJECT: South African Arms Potentially Available for Rhodesia
I. South Africa has the strongest military force in sub-
Saharan Africa and a wide variety of modern weapons and
military equipment.
A. We estimate the
the following:
army equipment inventory includes
280 tanks
2,000 other armored combat vehicles
160
Centurions
1,200
Eland armored cars
100
Shermans
230
Ferret scout cars
20
comets
280
Saracen APCs
100
Ratels armored vehicles
200
light personnel carriers
200 artillery pieces
48 Sexton 25 pounders
132 25-pounder howitzers
25 3.5 inch guns
unk
unk
unk
antitank weapons
3.5 inch rocket launchers
Entac missiles
SS-11 missiles
B. We estimate the
following:
5 light bombers
Canberras
This
Strategic
addressed
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mortars
unk 81 mm mortars
423 3-inch mortars
unk 60 mm mortars
100 air defense artillery
16 3.7 inch ADA
24 40 mm Bofors
60 35 mm Oerlikons
Air Force inventory includes the
32 all-weather fighters
16 Mirage III
memorandum was prepared in the Office of
Research. Queries and comments mry be
to
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51 fighter-bombers
30 Mirage Fl
16 Mirage III
5 Buccanner
76 transports
43 C-47s
9 Transalls
7 C-130s
17 others
385 trainers
229 Impalas
126 T-6s
30 others
25 reconnaissance
7 Mirage III
18 Piaggio
53 transport helicopters
39 Pumas
14 Super Frelon
94 utility helicopters
90 Alouette Ills
4 Alouette IIs
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NIO WORKING PAPER FOR PRC 11 April 1979
SOUTH AFRICA-US Relations
1 The short puff of South African good will toward the US that followed
Secretary Vance's visit to Pretoria last fall appears to have vanished
and the South African government is reverting to the anti-American
posturing that marked the 1977 parliamentary election campaign.
--Prime Minister Botha believes that South Africa was deceived in
the development of the UN Secretary General's report on Namibia
and the government is currently making public attacks on US UN
Ambassador McHenry. The South Africans probably genuinely feel
they have been diddled, but they also may find that adopting
this attitude is a convenient excuse for further stalling on
the Namibian negotiations.
--The anti-US pronouncements may also be part of internal political
maneuvering by Prime Minister Botha's government to heal the
party rifts caused by the revelations of the Information Department
scandal. The onus would be ,off the government to some extent if
the underhanded dealings of South Africa in the US could be
justified as necessary evils to combat a hostile United States.
--Some of the rekindled animosity may also stem from South Africa's
successful management of its current oil crisis. The long
dreaded spector of sanctions may seem less frightening now that
the country is actually coping with the effects of a massive oil
cutoff.
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2. The South African government is reviving the Southern African
regional cooperation policies of both the Verwoerd and Vorster eras.
The Prime Minister talks of non-alignment and a "wall of steel"
(presumably South African military might) around a group of states
that is to include Rhodesia and Namibia. In readjusting its
foreign policy, South Africa is again making clear to the outside
world that it is pivotal to progress in the area.
3. While publicly rejecting the West, South Africans still hanker for
Western acceptance and they have not given up hope of being taken
back into the fold. In this context they view the prospect of the
election of a conservative government in the UK as working to
their advantage. They continue to feel that, despite what they
perceive as negative results in much of their dealings with the
US government, South Africa has a wide sympathetic audience in the
United States whose opinions are not reflected in current US policy.
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NIO WORKING PAPER FOR PRC 11 April 1979
SOUTH AFRICA: Policy Toward Rhodesia
1. South Africa's basic aim in Rhodesia is to encourage the establishment
of a stable, peaceful majority-ruled government that will gain
international acceptance and will cooperate--rather than merely
coexist--with South Africa, partidularly with respect to Pretoria's
overall design for an eventual Southern African regional economic
and military alliance.
--South Africa will at least continue, and probably increase,
its economic and military support to Rhodesia through the
period of the elections and the establishment of the Government
of National Unity in the hope that the GNU will take hold and
gain some form of international acceptance that will end sanctions,
brighten the economic outlook, and bolster white morale enough
to keep the white infrastructure intact.
2. Pretoria has successfully played a waiting game in its long dealings
with Rhodesian independence machinations. Having come this far, the
South Africans may not necessarily see the GNU as the final independence
government in Rhodesia.
--An "all parties settlement" that would include the Patriotic
Front and thus stop the guerrilla warfare would be more in
South Africa's best interests. The risk of increased Soviet
and Cuban intervention would also be decreased.
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--South Africa could view the coming election and the establishment
of the GNU as steps in an ongoing process to secure a permanently
workable government in Rhodesia, particularly if the process
continued to ensure white tenure.
3.. Pretoria does not appear to have formulated any plans toward Rhodesia
in the event of a GNU collapse, beyond those to evacuate whites if
law and order breaks down.
--For now South Africa feels that the GNU is the best bet in
working toward stability in Rhodesia, and it would see no
advantage in weakening the new government's chances of survival.
--Although South Africa will not give immediate diplomatic recognition
to the GNU, it will not withdraw the South African support that
will be needed to keep the new Rhodesian government afloat.
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DCI PRC Briefing 9 April 1979
I. Is a Muzorewa-Mugabe Alliance in the Cards?
A. Probably not, at least over the short term.
--Bishop Muzorewa would prefer to see ZANU's leaders return
to Rhodesia and participate in the political process under
the terms of the new constitution. Muzorewa's recent feelers
to ZANU probably have been motivated less by a desire to
seek an alliance than to draw Mugabe's support among the
Shonas to himself.
--The Bishop is playing the divide-and-conquer tactics that have
characterized Rhodesian politics since the days of Cecil Rhodes
and that have been practised so ably by Ian Smith. These tactics
are based on the premise that you destroy your opponent by
undercutting his support rather than by directly confronting him.
B. From Mugabe's standpoint, the April election will not change
anything--except the political positions of the players with whom
a settlement will ultimately have to be reached.
--Mugabe will not be interested in participating in the post-election
political process because he rejects the legitimacy of the con-
stitution on which it will be based.
--So long as time seems to be working on the side of his
Mugabe will see no need to make an accommodation
with the new government.
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--Mugabe will probably stick to this position unless the
new government not only takes hold but also is able to
attract large numbers of ZANU guerrillas to its side.
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DCI PRC Briefing 9 April 1979
I. How Would Nyerere Respond to a Muzorewa-Mugabe Deal?
A. Although Nyerere is currently well-disposed toward the U.S.
Government because of its role as intermediary with Kenya
during the Uganda conflict, he is not likely to agree to an
American proposal encouraging a Muzorewa-Mugabe alliance.
--In his eyes that would legitimize a black-led government
in Salisbury which is only an extension of the sresent
white-dominated regime.
--Although Nyerere's personal sympathies probably lie
with Mugabe, he remains committed to the Patriotic Front
in that he believes both ZANU and ZAPU must be accommodated
in any settlement if civil war in Rhodesia is to be avoided.
B. Nyerere apparently has concluded that white dominance in
Rhodesia willAive w#1,ATIL112111IELIspand to work
for a deal between Muzorewa and Mugabe would weaken Mugabe's
position--Nyerere would have to accept such an arrangement if
it were presented to him by Mugabe as an accomplished fact.
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DCI PRC Briefing 9 April 1979
I. How Would Nyerere Respond to a Call for UN-Supervised Elections
in Rhodesia?
A. Nyerere initially would be cool to such a proposal and would
wonder why the US was moving away from the Anglo-American
Plan and toward what he would perceive as an overly-complicated
approach to a settlement.
--He would not agree to UN-supervised elections on the basis
of the present constitution.
--He would not take the lead in encouraging the Patriotic
Front and the other frontline presidents to accept negotiations
or UN-supervised elections, partly because he believes the
US and UK would be unable to convince the Salisbury government
to participate and partly because of his m6re immediate
concern with Uganda.
--He probably would go along with UN-supervised elections--the
Namibian model--if negotiations between the Patriotic Front
and the government in Salisbury resulted in new ground
rules for an election.
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DCI PRC BRIEFING 9 April 1979
I. Would Bishop Abel Muzorewa be receptive to a US call for UN-sponsored
elections and negotiations with the Patrotic Front?
A. Muzorewa, at least over short term, would not be receptive
to such a call.
--If, as now seems likely, Muzorewa emerges from the election
as the head of the new government, his primary concerns
will be consolidating his leadership, winning international
acceptance of the election, and improving his government's
military position. He is considering offering an amnesty
to attract guerrillas to return to Rhodesia.
--Although he might invite some prominent guerrilla leaders
to participate in the new government, we doubt he would
seriously consider entering into negotiations involving
any redistribution of power in Salisbury.
B. Muzorewa told US Ambassador Low late last month that after the
April election there would be no point in holding further
elections.
--Although he said he would not categorically reject the idea
of UN-sponsored elections, he is unlikely to consider this
option unless forced to by military pressures.
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DCI PRC Briefing 9 April 1979
I. Nkomo's Prospects Over the Longer Term
A.
Nkomo's reputation has slipped badly.
--Once he was regarded by the international and African
communities and by Rhodesian whites as the father of
Rhodesian nationalism. As such, his political position
transcended his minority Ndebele ethnic base, and he was
the logical nationalist with whom to reach a settlement.
--In recent months, Joshua Nkomo's stature has diminished
as ZANU leader Robert Mugabe's has increased.
--Revelation last fall of his secret talks with Prime
Minister Smith seriously damaged Nkomo's credibility
as a nationalist leader who would resist a settlement
on Smith's terms.
--The subsequent shooting down of two Rhodesian civilian
airliners by ZAPU guerrillas has made an accommodation
between Nkomo and the Salisbury regime much more difficult.
--Nkomo faces the prospect of a further deterioration in
his position because the Ndebeles, who make up only 18
percent of the country's black population, will have
to find other leaders to represent them in the new government
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if they are to protect their interests.
B. Nevertheless, ZAPU continues to expand in terms of numbers
and the military support Nkomo is receiving from the Soviet
Union and Cuba strelhens his demands to be included in any
political settlement.
--Thus a new international initiative would significantly
help to revive his political fortunes.
--Any future role for him in Rhodesia, however, is likely
to be as an Ndebele politician rather than as a national leader
who stands above ethnic ties.
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DCI PRC Briefing 9 April 1979
I. What progress has the transitional government made in areas of geniune
concern to blacks?
A. Our information on this subject is rather spotty, but
thus far change appears to be slow.
The repeal of laws allowing racial discrimination
(e.g., in public accommodations, schools, hospitals,
and land ownership) has not been followed up with
any meaningful social changes.
Although valuable white farm land can no longer be
reserved exclusively for whites, the government has
yet to provide the means--by arranging substantial
credit--for blacks to buy land. Muzorewa has expressed
an interest in what are alleged to be as many as 10 million
acres of underutilitzed or vacant land for re-distribution
among the blacks, but we do not know much about the quality
of this land or whether Muzorewa's thoughts on the subject
have advanced very far.
Some blacks have moved into residential areas previously
reserved for whites, but most blacks lack the means to
buy or rent in those areas.
A number of blacks are now enrolled in private schools,
but the new multiracial educational system is not
scheduled to go into effect until May. For many years,
however, Rhodesia has had a relatively good record in
providing educational opportunities for talented blacks.
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In the military, the pace of recruitment of blacks
for officer training is accelerating, but this is
essentially a continuation of the policy adopted by the
Smith government prior to the internal settlement.
B. In sum, the government has thus far moved cautiously and
conservatively in implementing changes.
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DCI PRC Briefing 9 April 1979
Namibia: Status and Prospects
(Revised and Updated)
1. South African Prime Minister Botha and his foreign minister met with
Namibian political leaders on 2 April to discuss results of the
New York proximity talks on Namibia in mid-March. (See attachment
for major Namibian political groups.)
--Botha asked the Namibians to decide within a week whether
to accept Western proposals which partially meet South Africa's
objections to the truce arrangements which the UN Secretary
General announced in late February.
--The tenor of Botha's meetings with the Namibians suggests that
he is preparing for further hard bargaining with the Western
sponsors of a Namibia settlement.
--This signals a significant shift from Foreign Minister Roelof Botha's
stance at the New York proximity talks, which implied that South
Africa would soon proceed toward an internal settlement unless the
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UN truce plan were substantially revised to:
-Provide for UN monitoring of SWAPO forces in Angola and
Zambia.
-Exclude any possibility that guerrillas inside Namibia
after a cease-fire could maintain armed bases under UN
monitoring.
3. Consultations among the Namibian political parties are continuing, but
the consensus urged by Prime Minister Botha does not appear likely.
--There is broad agreement that a truce should provide for effective
monitoring of SWAPO guerrilla forces in neighboring countries, and
should not allow SWAPO to maintain bases inside Namibia.
--The basic disagreement is between the members of the Constituent
Assembly, who want to proceed toward independence without a
UN-conducted election, and the other leaders, who hope that
further negotiations will yield adequate truce arrangements.
4. Prime Minister Botha very likely could persuade most of the Namibian
political leaders to back one more round of negotiations, focused
primarily on measures for disarming any SWAPO forces that emerge
inside Namibia after a cease-fire.
--As long as negotiations show progress, the Constituent Assembly
probably can be held to merely planning for eventual independence.
--If negotiations prove fruitless, the other leaders are likely
to feel compelled to participate in an "internal settlement."
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5. SWAPO military commanders probably will continue current efforts to
step up guerrilla infiltrations and small-scale terrorism until
South Africa unreservedly accepts a UN truce plan and the frontline
governments press SWAPO to do likewise.*
--Although SWAPO Vice-President Muyongo pledged at the proximity
talks to cease infiltrations as soon as a cease-fire agreement is
concluded, he parried calls for pre-truce restraint.
--SWAPO President Nujoma and other long-exiled leaders who do not
want to face an election probably will try to disrupt Prime
Minister Botha's temporizing strategy as long as possible.
--Neto and Kaunda may withhold additional support for SWAPO as long
as truce negotiations appear promising, but they are unlikely
to actively restrain SWAPO's cross-border operations until a
cease-fire agreement is concluded.
--Under these conditions, it is unlikely that SWAPO can much extend
the current pattern of guerrilla activity (mostly in Ovamboland,
near the Angolan border), but some small guerrilla bands may
infiltrate white areas and carry out small but politically pro-
vocative attacks.
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--If SWAPO extends its recent strategy of sending some guerrillas--
reportedly newer recruits--farther south with orders to remain
inactive until a cease-fire, many could then appear in areas
where SWAPO has never operated effectively and thereby establish
claims to maintain bases under UN monitoring.
6. The series of South African "lightning strikes" in early March against
SWAPO forward bases (mostly in Angola) was primarily intended to preempt
a surge of guerrilla infiltrations before an anticipated truce took
affect.
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--No significant South African strikes into Angola or Zambia are known
to have occurred since shortly before the New York proximity talks
and the simultaneous start of UN Security Council sessions on the
Angolan protest of recent South African strikes.
--Strikes apparently have been suspended because the immediate military
objective was achieved and because Prime Minister Botha decided to
avoid further provocations while the South Africans were seeking
more favorable truce terms.
--Botha may intend to restrain the military hawks who want to strike
deeper into Angola as long as he believes that restraint will influence
the Western Five--especially the US--toward meeting South Africa's
demands on truce terms.
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--At the same time, Botha probably will take whatever military measures
he considers necessary to prevent any significant increase in
guerrilla activity inside Namibia.
-He probably believes--with good reason--that even a few assassina-
tions of prominent Namibians or other impressive guerrilla
"exploits" would undercut South African influence in Namibia
and exacerbate his government's current domestic embarrassments.
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MAJOR NAMIBIAN POLITICAL GROUPS
COMPOSITION
A South Africa-backed coalition of 11
ethnic-based parties: one white, two
mulatto and eight in black tribal
groups; nonwhite participants are
mostly traditional tribal chiefs.
NAME
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance
(DTA)
South-West Africa People's
Organization
(SWAPO)
Namibian National Front
(NNF)
SWAPO-Democrats
(SWAPO-D)
Action Front for the
Preservation of the
Turnhalle Principles
(AKTUR)
The nationalist organization rec-
ognized by the UN General Assembly
as sole legimate representative of
the Namibian people. Dominated by
the Ovambos, who constitute about
half of the Namibian population.
External wing operates out of Zambia
and Angola. Internal wing has engaged
openly in nonviolent political action.
Loose alliance of one liberal white
and a number of nonwhite political
parties. The Hereros, Namibia's
third-largest black ethnic group,
predominate, but NNF also has some
broad ethnic support.
Formed in mid-1978 by former SWAPO
members who are disaffected with
SWAPO head Sam Nujomas' leadership.
Conservative, predominantly Afrikaner
party. Formerly associated with the
ruling National Party of South Africa.
Note. The Namibian Constituent Assembly, elected last December, has 50
1 each from 3 miniscule parties (2 exclusively white).
CURRENT STATUS
Winning 82 percent of ballots last
December has made DTA fairly confident
that it could defeat SWAPO in UN-run
election, provided discreet but
substantial support from South Africa
continues.
High voter turnout in December (80
percent of registered voters) despite
SWAPO's active boycott has eroded
confidence that it would win UN-run
election. Internal wing is more
willing to face polls than external
leaders.
Quietly boycotted December election.
In an open election, NNF might win
enough seats to play pivotal role
between DTA and SWAPO.
Loosely affiliated with NNF. Quietly
boycotted December election. Although
still embryonic, in an open election
SWAPO-D might attract many Ovambos
who have followed the original SWAPO
internal wing.
Apparently is leading party among
white residents, who constitute only
12 percent of Namibia's population.
Retains some influence in National
Party of South Africa.
members: 41 from DIA, 6 from AKTUR,
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9 April 1979
Angola-Cuba: Some Strains but No New Developments
1. Despite periodic problems between the two countries--signs that the
Angolans are becoming more dissatisfied with the Cubans and indications
that Havana views its military role in Angola as increasingly burdensome--
Cuba has a large stake in supporting the Angolan Government, and Angola
remains basically dependent on Cuban (and Soviet) military and technical
support.
2. Both Luanda and Havana probably would like to see a reduction of
Cuban troop strength in Angola--if conditions were to allow it.
--Neto probably would prefer that the Cubans maintain their present
military strength in Angola--approximatley 20,000 men--and, instead,
reduce the number of civilian technicians there. The performance
of the Cuban civilians has not been satisfactory.
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3. Angola will continue to depend on Cuban troops for both external and
internal security--and for training the Angolan military. The Angolan
Government believes that the recent attacks against guerrilla bases by
Rhodesian and South African forces demonstrate the continued need for
a substantial Cuban military presence.
--Indeed, Angolan officials can claim with some justification that
"the Cuban presence is necessary to preserve Angolan independence."
--If the Namibian problem could be resolved, Neto might be willing
to see some of the Cuban troops withdrawn.
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4.
5.
if an adequate
air defense system is to be established in Angola, the number
of Cuban military personnel may even increase slightly.
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affirm his commitment to socialism.
and Neto continues to
6. Luanda would like to reduce its dependence on Cuba (and the USSR) and
within the last eight months has made an effort to expand its political
and economic ties with the West.
--The Angolans are dissatisfied with the quality of Cuban economic
and technical assistance.
--Neto would like to obtain economic and technical assistance from the
West, including the US. Neto also would like to obtain the
diplomatic and political prestige of having ties with the US.
7. The Neto government is disappointed that no tangible results came
out of the visits to Luanda last year of senior US officials. The
Angolans are determined not to give in on the US condition linking
diplomatic recognition to a reduction of the Cuban military presence
in Angola.
--Inasmuch as the Angolans may believe that the US could influence South
Africa to stop the raids and also put pressure on those governments
that Luanda believes are aiding UNITA, the Neto government's suspicions
of the US may have increased since last fall.
8. If Neto sees his country becoming increasingly beleaguered militarily
from within and without--and Angola's economic and social problems also
continue--the President may step up his verbal attacks against
"imperialist and colonialist" countries that he charges are seeking
to undermine Angola.
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--In the face of continuing adversity, Neto might also become less
cooperative on other southern African issues that involve Namibia,
Rhodesia and the Frontline countries.
9. Despite minor shifts and periodic problems between Angola and its Cuban
benefactor, there is no clear evidence to suggest that a new trend has
developed that would significantly affect the US.
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.? Angola: Western Economic and Technical Assistance
Angola is seeking to expand trade and technical and
economic assistance ties with the West. Since independence
Angola has dramatically increased its trade with Communist
countries and has received substantial economic assistance
from them. Nevertheless, most of Angola's foreign markets
remain in the West and western manpower, capital and
technology are needed if the country hopes to stem its
economic slide. In an attempt to expand its economic
and political contacts with the non-Communist world,
Angola since last summer has:
? Hosted EC Commissioner for Development
Claude Cheyson. 25X1
o Obtained observer status at talks to
renegotiate the Lome Convention -- a trade
and aid agreement linking the EC to over
50 developing countries.
O Discussed economic and technical assistance
with Belgium, France, Holland, Italy, Japan,
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Norway, Portugal,, Spain, West Germany, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.
Accelerated negotiations with foreign oil
companies, mainly American, for offshore
oil exploration and development,
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Despite increased Angolan interest, western
and technical assistance to Angola should remain small
for the forseeable future.
economic
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o Foreign companies and expatriates are un-
likely to return to Angolan until the economic
and security situation shows signs of improving.
Poor living conditions and possibly screening
of political backgrounds by Angolan .and
Portuguese Communist Party officials limit
the number of Angolan expatriates that are
likely to return from Portugal.
o Western countries remain suspicious of
Communist advisers who occupy key positions
in the economic ministeries.
Q Even if political obstacles are overcome
the United States cannot participate in any
international aid consortium until arrearages
on US Export-Import Bank loans are settled.
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MEMORANDUM
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
2 April 1979
25X1
1R002000050002-6
RHODESIA: LOOKING BEYOND THE APRIL ELECTION [1] 25X1
Key Judgments
The election later this month of a black-Zed
government of national unity in Rhodesia will bring
substantial pressure on the US and the UK to recognize
the new government and to lift economic sanctions.
--The Rhodesians will make an all-out effort
to ensure adequate security and a large turnout
for the election.
--Although the Zimbabwe African National Union
and the Zimbabwe African People's Union will
try to disrupt the election, neither guerrilla
group will be able to prevent it from taking
place.
Bishop Aluzorewa is the most likely candidate
to emerge as the head of the new government.
--He will seek to consolidate his position by
strengthening his relationship with the whites,
establishing greater control over the countryside,
and inducing defections from ZANU and ZAPU.
--He may try to split the guerrillas further
by offering to strike a separate deal with
ZANU or ZAPU.
--We doubt, however, that the white leaders will
show enough flexibility to allow Muzorewa to
propose a deal acceptable to either guerrilla
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The election of a new government, coupled with
a continuation of the fighting, will create some hard
choices for those states most closely involved with the
Rhodesian problem.
--The frontline states will continue to support
the guerrillas, but an intensification of the
fighting could force some presidents into an
open-ended commitment to an increased Soviet
and Cuban presence in their countries.
--The frontline states might also have to consider
the possiblity of supporting one guerrilla gro
against the other in the event of a civil war.
If the Soviets and the Cubans continue to favor
ZAPU over ZANV, they risk alienating Tanzania and Mozambique,
who would like to see more support given to ZANU.
--If they agree to support both groups, however,
they could become involved in a civil war.
--If Nkomo makes a separate deal with the Salisbury
government, they might find themselves
to throw their support behind ZANU.
The US and the UK must decide whether to recognize
the newly-elected government and lift economic sanctions.
--A positive decision would strengthen the position
of the new government, but provoke a hostile
reaction from the black Africans.
--A negative decision would undermine the viability
of the new regime, but not deter the Africans
from supporting further efforts to reach a
negotiated settlement.
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PPosr,e3Ts for a successful all-parties conference
or agreemen7 ~n the part of the internal government to
UN-sponsoref". -.Elections are exceedingly dim.
--S-ern prospects are for a continuation
of staZemate, particularly now that South
Afe.: ;las promised to provide substantial
mili=?i and political support to the new
go7,==ent.
--The f:-:-nting certainly will continue, providing
exnar.g opportunities for the Soviets and
the =.:.27,ans..
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The Rhodesian government is making an all-out effort to ensure
adequate security and a large turnout for the election. Government
pressure and intimidation by the black parties and their auxiliary
forces should result in a fairly high turnout. The government estimates
a total black turnout of about 60 percent, with the highest percentage
being urban blacks and blacks living in white farming areas. Over 70
percent of the eligible white voters turned out for the constitutional
referendum last January and at least that many should vote in the election.
All military and police leaves have been cancelled during the
election period and all civilian reservists have been called up to
provide security and to police the polling stations during the election.
We estimate that a manpower pool totaling some 75,000 Rhodesians will be
mobilized. These forces will be assisted by about 10,000 ex-guerrillas
and local recruits who are loyal to internal black leaders Bishop Muzorewa
and Reverend Sithole.
As the election approaches, Rhodesian security forces will intensify
their raids on guerrilla camps and staging areas in Zambia and Mozambique,
and possibly in Angola, Tanzania, and Botswana. (See map on page 2.)
By forcing the guerrillas to relocate their command posts further from
400 the border and to disperse their camps, guerrilla communication links
and supply lines will be lenothened.resulting in an erosion of guerrilla
25X1 capabilities and morale.
Although ZANU and ZAPU are committed to disrupting the election, it
is unlikely either can prevent it from taking place. ZANU and ZAPU now
have at least 10,000 guerrillas inside Rhodesia and several thousand
more guerrillas are to be infiltrated before the election. Both groups
plan to intimidate voters, attack electoral officials and polling stations,
and possibly stage incidents near the polling stations to,diOrap,t the
security forces. Nevertheless, we believe the Rhodesian snattY forces
will be able to maintain sufficient control to proceed with the polling
in most if not all regions of the country. 25)(1
ZAPU is planning major attacks into Rhodesia along its northern
border with Zambia, but we doubt it possesses the necessary command and
control capabilities to launch a major coordinated offensive. The
number of guerrilla attacks on "soft" targets of psychological and
economic importance to the whites, however, is certain to increase.
25X1 The Election Process
White Rhodesians reportedly will go to the polls on 10 April to
elect 20 white members to the House of Assemby. Four of these seats are
contested by independents, but Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front party should
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Principal Military Forces Involved in Rhodesian Conflict*
Gabon
Congo
Brazzaville
*Kinshasa
Cabinda\
(Angola)
4Luanda
Angola
1
ZAPU 2,000
CUBANS 19,000-21,000
SOVIETS, 1,000
Approximately 20 Soviets and
200 Cubans at/vise and train
ZAPII personnel.'
Zaire
/ZAPU 20,000
/CUBANS 65-75
SOVIETS 5-15
Rwanda
* igali
Burundi
Bujuinbura
Zambia
*Lusaka
Namibia
*Windhoek
Walvis Bay /
(S. Al.).1
Atlantic
Ocean
Botswana
ZAPU 200
Gaborone
-\
-
South
Africa
Salisbury*
Rhodesia
*Pretoria
*Nairobi
Kenya
0 8
t\1
\
*Bar
eel;
Salaam
Tanzania
ZANU 3,000
SOVIETS 120
No Soviets are involved
with ZANY.
11/191awi
Lilongwe
ZANU 7,000
CUBANS 850
SOVIETS 250
Most of the Soviet and Cuban
advisers are engaged in
supporting government
defense forces.
Mozambique
e* *Maputo
Swazilatr-,
Maseru
Lesotho
*Totals for ZANY and ZAP!] include trained guerrillas and those under training.
(There are 2,500 ZANY and 500-1,000 ZAP!] guerrillas in Ethiopia
and 500 ZANY guerrillas in Libya under training.)
ZANU 8,000
ZAPU 2,000
Rhodesian Army 18,000
Rhodesian Air Force 1,500
Police, Paramilitary &
Reserves 55,0130
Auxiliaries loyal to
Muzorewa 8,000
Auxiliaries loyal to
Sithole 2,000
OVIGII5J 4-19 OA
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have little difficulty winning all 20 seats. The 72 black members of
the House will be elected sometime after April 12 by both black and
white Rhodesians. The election probably will be held over a five day
period beginning 17 April. Security forces will be rotated from one
region of the country to another--possibly by military district--to ensure
maximum security around the polling stations.
Both the white and black members will be elected directly from
party lists established for each consitutency.* A party must win at
least 10 percent of the vote in a given constituency to qualify for a
seat. Parliamentary seats within each constituency will be allocated
based on the Proportion of votes received by the parties in that constit-
25X1 uency.
25X1
The 72 black and 20 white members of the House then will caucus to
elect 8 additional white members from a list of 16 candidates chosen by
the white members of the present parliament. The Senate will consist
of 10 blacks elected by the 72 black members of the lower house, 10
whites elected by the 28 white members, and 5 Ndebele and 5 Shona chiefs
elected by their tribal counterparts in the Council of Chiefs. Both
houses jointly elect a "constitutional" President who then appoints as
Prime Minister the person "in his discretion, he considers to be best
able to command the support of the majority of the members of the House
of Assembly." The President also appoints the cabinet. actina qn the
advice of the Prime Minister. (See chart on page 4.) I I 25X1
Although the new parliament will be numerically dominated by blacks,
the whites will retain substantial--if not controlling--influence over
the new government. Continued white domination of the military, police,
judiciary, and civil service will be ensured by the constitution, which
establishes criteria such as senior rank, longevity, and "efficl
suitability" for appointment to top positions in these fields. J I 25X1
*Maps of the white and black electoral constituences and the
five military operational areas appear at the end of this memorandum.
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Formation of Government of Zimbabwe Rhodesia
5 Ndebele and
10 Blacks elected by
10 Whites elected
Senate
5 Shona Chiefs
elected by Council
black members of
House
by whites
of Chiefs ar.
.-
Council of Chiefs
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House of
Assembly
72 Blacks elected by
black and white
voters
20 Whites elected
by white voters
Voting Constituencies for Black Assembly Seats
8 Whites elected by
92 other new mem
bers of parliament
from list of 16 white
candidates selected
by the 50 members
of the present
parliament.
Voting Constituencies for White Assembly Seats
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President
Chosen by electoral
college community of
the members of
House and Senate
Prime Minister
Appointed by
President
Cabinet
Selected by
Prime Minister
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Moreover, none of the important clauses in the new constitution can
be amended or deleted without the approval of all 72 black and at least
6 white members of the House of Assembly. These so-called "entrenched"
clauses, which guarantee the whites 28 seats in the House, will remain
in effect for at least 10 years, after which a commission--consisting of
three whites and two blacks--will be established and empowered to recommend
changes. The constitution also states that posts in the cabinet will be
allocated according to each party's strength in the House of Assembly,
thus guaranteeing the whites at least four positions in the new cabinet.
Most whites probably are not enthusiastic about a black-led government
taking power in Rhodesia, but they appear willing to give the new government
a chance. White emmigration dropped considerably this year after a
dramatic rise last fall--peaking at 2,937 net departures in December.
Net departures for January and February totaled only 1,073 and 592
25X1 whites, respectively. 1
25X1 Muzorewa on Top
Bishop Abel Muzorewa should emerge in a strong position of leadership
in the new government of national unity, with his party winning at least
half the black seats in Parliament. (See chart on page 6.) His closest
rival, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, has lost ground in recent months,
and his party probably will win less than a third of the black seats.
Chief Jerimiah Chirau, the other black leader in the internal government,
lacks broad popular support but should pick up a few seats. Chief
Ndiweni, who broke with Chirau last November to form his own Ndebele-
based party, has not developed a strong political base but his party
could win enough seats to gain a post in the cabinet. 1 25X1
Muzorewa hopes to establish more government control over the countryside
by augmenting the size and expanding the role of the auxiliary forces.
He also-hopes to attract more black supporters--including guerrilla
defectors--by offering land and social services. The Bishop is expected
to announce a major amnesty program soon after taking office that would
encourage the guerrillas to return, but not require them to turn in
their arms. The government is hoping that many of these guerrillas
would agree to join the auxiliary forces. 25X1
Muzorewa has already entered into negotiations with the white
leaders, focusing on cooperation between their parties and a possible
modification of some clauses in the new constitution that work to the
disadvantage of the blacks. The Bishop realizes that he will need white
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Probable Distribution of Seats in
New Rhodesian Parliament
Prime Minister Ian Smith
(Rhodesian Front)
Under pressure from some
whites to leave politics, but
so far has resisted. Most if not
all, RF candidates are running
unopposed.
Bishop Abel Muzorewa
(United African
National Council)
Most likely candidate for Prime
Minister but would rather place
himself above partisan politics
and could opt for the Presidency.
Reverend Ndabanings Sithole
(Zimbabwe African National
Union/Sithole)
Broke with ZANU external
organization in 1977. Popularity
appears to be on the decline
inside Rhodesia.
604105
Chief Kayisa Ndiweni
(United National Federal Party)
Broke with Chirau and the
transitional govt. early this
year to form a Ndebele-based
party. Would be a stalking
horse for Nkomo in the election.
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Chief Jerimiah Chirau
(Zimbabwe United
People's Organization)
Genekally considered a "stooge"
of the whites but recently has
taken a more independent position
calling for an all parties conference
before the election and the
disbanding of all auxiliary forces.
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support for his government and wants to meet with the white leaders
before the election to discuss possible ministerial appointments, to
plan future government policies, and to map a joint strategy for obtaining
international recognition for the new government. 1 1 25X1
Once in power, Muzorewa should be able to capitalize on several
trends that have become apparent in recent months, including:
--A deeping political and military rivalry between ZANU
and ZAPU. With the virtual collapse of negotiations for
a political settlement, each group has come increasingly to
perceive the other as a rival in the struggle for control
of a black-ruled Rhodesia.
--Continuing disarray within the ZAPU leadership that has
weakened Nkomo's position internationally and within his
own organization, making it almost impossible for ZAPU
to implement its more grandiose military plans.
--The decline of Nkomo's appeal to whites in Rhodesia
since the downing of two civilian airliners by his guerrillas.
--Growing weariness in Zambia over the economic and political
costs of the guerrilla struggle, which could eventually
lead to a political backlash against President Kaunda.
--Growing support for the internal settlement in the US Congress
and the British Parliament.
--South African promises to provide substantial political and
military support--short of military intervention--to the new
government of national unity.
The South Africans have also said that they no longer would press
Prime Minister Smith to withdraw from politics so long as his presence
does not hinder the new government's chance of success. Prime Minister
Botha has indicated, however, that South Africa will withhold diplomatic
recognition from the new government; we expect Botha to wait until the
new government has won some international acceptance and demonstrated a
25X1 capacity to govern.
These factors account for a growing confidence among whites that
the internal settlement eventually might succeed. A continuation of
these trends could lead to a hardening of white attitudes and a growing
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reluctance to seek a political deal with the guerrillas. Given the
probability that the level of fighting inside Rhodesia will escalate,
however, most whites probably will continue to support efforts to negotiate
a political settlement with the blacks. 25X1
25X1 Possible Realignments
The formation of a black-led government will open the door to more
jockeying among the various players in the Rhodesian situation. Muzorewa,
in particular, probably will try to split the guerrillas further by
seeking a separate alliance with ZANU or ZAPU.
Joshua Nkomo might try to preempt such an alliance by seeking to
make his own deal either with Muzorewa, or with the whites, thus bringing
the Ndebeles and the Shonas into a single government. White Rhodesian
politicians would favor such a coalition because they see Nkomo as a
unifying force and regard Mugabe as too,radical.
The pressure on Mugabe or Nkomo to consider joining forces with the
internal government is likely to mount the more each leader perceives
the other as trying to preempt him in reaching a settlement. Neither of
these realignments, however, would tip the balance of power in Rhodesia
sufficiently to bring an end to the fighting because each excludes a
major participant who could attract enough foreign support to continue
the guerrilla war. Nevertheless, either could change the complexion of
the war from one of equilibrium and growing strength on the uerrilla '
side-to one of strength for the new government in Salisbury.
25X1 Hard Choices Ahead
The election of a government of national unity, coupled with a con-
tinuation of the fighting, will create some hard choices for the parties
involved with the Rhodesian problem. The frontline states will continue
to support the guerrillas, but an intensification of the fighting could
force Presidents Kaunda of Zambia and Machel of Mozambique into an
open-ended commitment to an increased Soviet and Cuban presence in
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Population Distribution in Zimbabwe Rhodesia
POPULATION
Persons per square kilometer
0
o 13 39 65 104
Persons per square mile
Source: 1969 population census
NDAU Selected Shona-speaking group
TONGA Other tribal group
624875 3-79
SENA
?Wankie
Gwelo
Fort
Victoria
?
alawayo SItcpastal ft4 R G
_\__/
VENDA
Bette*,
ETHNIC GROUP
PERCENT OF
BLACK POPULATION
Shona
75
Karanga
25
Zezeru
21
Manyika
11
Ndau
6
Korekore
5
Other
5
Ndebele
14
Kalanga
7
Other (Tonga, Venda, Sena)
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their countries. (See graphic on page 11.) Kaunda has consistently
resisted any augmentation of the Soviet and Cuban role in Zambia, but he
might feel forced to reverse himself if it appeared this was the only
way to resolve the conflict and remove the military threat posed to his
country by the Rhodesians. Machel is less concerned about the Soviet
and Cuban presence, largely because of his ideological commitment to
ZANU, but he probably is anxious to prevent it from endangerin
pragmatic economic ties he has established with South Africa.
25X1
In the hope of minimizing the military spillover into their countries,
Kaunda and Machel might consider urging Nkomo and Mugabe to strike a
separate deal with the government in Salisbury. Such an approach,
however, would risk seriously antagonizing the other frontline states.
The frontline presidents also have to consider the possibility of supporting
rne auerrilla Grout) aaainst the other in a contest for power in Rhodesia.
25X1
25X1 The Soviet and Cuban Role
25X1
The common objective of Moscow and Havana is to secure influence in
a black-ruled Rhodesia, and they have decided that backing ZAPU leader
Nkomo is the best means to that end. The election of a government of
national unity will not force any immediate changes on the Soviets or
the Cubans. The fighting will continue, and they will support the
guerrillas, hoping that the military pressure will bring a settlement
favorable to Nkomo. They will play on African fears of Western recognition
of the new anvernmrnt to maintain the momentum of the military option.
Beyond that, the options available to the Soviets and Cubans have
not fully taken form. They will take their cue from the response of the
Africans to efforts by the new government to entice the guerrilla leaders
to return to Rhodesia. Should Nkomo return, Moscow and Havana probably
would prefer to support him. Even though Nyerere and Machel would dis-
agree, the Soviets would weigh the opportunties to improve their credibility
and influence with Zambia against the belief that any friction with
Tanzania and Mozambique would only be temporary. I 25X1
Nevertheless, Nkomo's return to Rhodesia carries with it the risk
that Nkomo would cut his ties with the Soviets and the Cubans in the
process, thereby leading them to support ZANU. This assumes that ZANU's
military effort does not evaporate as a result of large-scale defections
to the new government. At the present time, Moscow and Havana cannot
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Patriotic
Front
Nyerere, Julius
Patriotic
Front
Mozambique
Nkomo, Joshua
Kaunda, Kenneth
Mugabe, Robert
Machel, Samora
Rhodesia
Sithole, Ndabaningi
Muzorewa, Abel
Smith, Ian
7
1.)
'
Chirau, JS.
United National
Federal Party
Botswana
Ndiweni, Kayisa
South Africa
Khama, Seretse
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support both ZAPU and ZANU because of the rivalry between them and the
potential it holds for an eventual contest between them for power in
25X1 Rhodesia. El
25X1 Pressures on the US and the UK
The newly elected government in Rhodesia will press the US and the
UK to recognize it and lift economic sanctions. It will argue that the
election meets the demands of the US and UK for a transferwer to a
black government on the basis of one man, one vote.
Recognizing the new government and lifting sanctions certainly
would strengthen it. There would be greater white resolve to support
the black-led government and a greater willingness among whites in the
military to defend it. Government prospects for attracting large numbers
of guerrilla defectors could also be enhanced if the economy improved
25X1 sufficiently to allow til l government to improve social services for the
blacks.
The lifting of sanctions would improve the chances of stemming
Rhodesia's economic decline and would provide substantial economic
benefits and give a major psychological boost to the internal regime.
Worldwide demand has been increasing for many anndc nrncuced by the
Rhodesians such as copper, gold, and chrome. I 25X1
At the same time, such a decision would seriously erode the "special
relationship" the US has fostered with black African leaders--particularly
Zambian President Kaunda, Tanzanian President Nyerere, and Nigerian
President Obasanjo. They would conclude that the US and the UK had
chosen to support the "enemy" and thus would come under increasing
pressure from the guerrillas and the Soviets to pursue a military solution
25X1 in Rhodesia. I 1
Such a basic policy shift would also weaken the credibility of
Western support for the UN transitional program for Namibia in the eyes
of both the Africans and the white government in Pretoria. In fact, the
South Africans probably have already interpreted moves to send US observers
to cover the Rhodesian elections as evidence of a general weakening of
US determination to pursue the UN transition program for Namibia, giving
them more room to push a final settlement on their own terms.
25X1
While some African leaders might support lifting sanctions if it
were followed by US and UK efforts to include ZANU or ZAPU in the new
government, the frontline African leaders would be further antagonized
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by such a strategy. A call for a new constitution--providing for a more
rapid transition to full black rule and approved by both blacks and
whites--might dispel some of the frontline president's resentment, but
it would still leave the US and the UK very much in disfavor.
1 25X 1
Faced with a refusal by the US and the UK to lift sanctions, the
internal government would have difficulty taking hold. White emigration
probably would increase as the level of fighting escalated. Whites in
the military would begin to question why they were fighting for a
black-led government that was unable to win external support.
The frontline states and Nigeria would continue to support Anglo-
American efforts toward a political settlement, on the basis that the
election was merely one step in a process that eventually would involve
the guerrillas in a negotiated settlement. They probably would remain
highly skeptical, however, that such efforts would succeed. Meanwhile,
regardless of what the US and the UK choose to do, Soviet and Cuban
involvement with the guerrilla forces--and with their hosts--would
continue to grow. 25X6
25X1
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Constituencies for the Election of 72 Black Members to the
Zimbabwe Rhodesia House of Assembly
624873 3-79
Estimated voters 188,000
Seats
Wankie.
383,500
roe
?
Kariba
419,500
'Bulawayo
191,000
264,500
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?Gatooma
otlue Clue
Beitbridge
188,000
Bindura.
SALISBURY
588,500
Marandellas?
Fort Victoria
?
389,000
?Rusape
Umtatio
403,000
Chipinga
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Constituencies for the Election of 20 White Members to the
Zimbabwe Rhodesia House of Assembly
624872 3-79
Estimated voters 4,360
Seats
.Wankie
3,200
Kariba
4,360
Plumtree
5,700
4,090
4,860
Gwelo.
%joule.
Hartley
?
*Gatooma
Bindura.
''5,030
.Enkeldeorn
3,450
'Fort Victoria
3,690
3,640
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Beitbridge
3,50
parandellas
3,000
?Rusape
Utotali
4,580
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Operational Areas in Zimbabwe Rhodesia
624874 3-79 CIA
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