MBFR: PERSPECTIVES ON VERIFICATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002500150006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 15, 2003
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 1, 1977
• Content Type: PAPER

Approved For Release 2003/1 OW.Fd -RDP81 B00401 R002500150006-6
MBFR: PERSPECTIVES ON VFRIFIC,-.TI3N
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- This paper points out that, although the lestern allies
have not developed a comprehensive verification
pLo oh~s l for MBFR, the thrust of the current ,Vestern
a-roach (to limit Soviet tanks and manpower)wiTl be
d t to verify if agreement were reached. I
rom e moni oring viewpoint,
wriac wi e required is a system for on-site inspection -
to which both Soviets and West erma_ns currently object'.
- As is the case in SALT, intelligence in monitoring MBFR
will look for violations of the agreement; policy makers
will decide i. violations have in fact occured. Thus,
the verifiabili ty of any MBFR treaty will be directly
related _ttretit pro~ons (language regarding
inspection.
- NOTE: there is a useful ghaphic at the end of the
text which illustrates the monitoring problem-
where detectability would be high, and where low.
Para III (pages 4-s) contains an interesting
discussion of the problem of detecta ility and
confi ence in m.~ni orin~.
age 10 describes the situation regarding the
sharing of. US intelligence with N aTO allies, an
important consideration when public confidence
in an MBFR agreement is considered.
Confidence in an MBFR a reemaht will be increased
i on-site inspection is negotiated The current
thrust of the Vestern allies approach does not
facilitate the conclusion of such a desiderata.
SECRET
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I. Verification has not been a central issue in
the MBFR negotiations. This is partly because
we have not yet come close to any agreement
with the East on reductions, but also because
the Western Allies have not been able to de-
velop a comprehensive verification proposal.
A. The subject of MBFR has been studied
extensively, however, and several points
have emerged.
1. One is that an MBFR agreement along
the lines proposed by the West in
Vienna--that is, one limiting Soviet
manpower and tanks--would be difficult
to verify.
P~