FRANCE, NATO, AND THE US

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010062-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 62
• Publication Date: March 15, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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France, NATO, and the US
Summary
Since he took office in 1958, De Gaulle has
sought to alter the nature of the Atlantic alliance.
He aims to reduce the dominant position of the US
within the alliance and to gain for France and the
other European members a greater ability to act in-
dependently of the US both in and out of the North
Atlantic Treaty area. Because he holds that the
"integrated" military structure which has grown up
under the treaty is the principal vehicle for US
domination, he has centered his attack on that struc-
ture. He has been unable, however, to gain the sup-
port of the other principal European members of the
alliance, and has heretofore limited himself to a
series of pronouncements and minor unilateral French
withdrawals.
Within the last week he has announced a series
of measures that will in effect break the last French
ties with the alliance military structure, although
not with the alliance itself. He has announced "con-
ditions" which will make it impossible for the US and
Canada to maintain their forces and bases in France.
He has proclaimed his intention to withdraw all French
forces from commitment to NATO and French officers
from NATO commands. He has specified that French
forces in Germany, too,.will no longer have NATJ
associations but will, nevertheless, remain in Germany
under other legal provisions.
De Gaulle's goal in these withdrawals has not
been simply to cut French ties with NATO, but to set
in process a chain of events which will alter the
nature of the alliance, To this end, he has called
for bilateral arrangements on continuing cooperation
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between French and other forces, He has also sug-
gested that agreements for the use of French facili-
ties in wartime could be worked out,and--possibly in
hopes he could induce the US and Canada to talk--he
has left open the time schedule for the withdrawal of
their forces from France.
There appears little doubt that De Gaulle can
and will carry out his announced unilateral actions.
Legally, the US/Canadian forces and the NATO head-
quarters can be ousted from France a year after the
pertinent treaty provisions are denounced. The with-
drawal of French forces from NATO can be legally ac-
complished at any time, De Gazelle's domestic political
opponents are unlikely to be able to stop him, and the
extent of their opposition will be moderated by the
differences that exist among them and by De Gazelle's
announced intention to continue French participation
in the North Atlantic Treaty. Whether or not he will
be able to accomplish his larger purpose and replace
the present organizational structure with a broad
multilateral treaty and a series of bilateral operating
,agreements will depend, in large measure, on the firm-
ness of US leadership. Most of the other European
members have already demonstrated a reluctance to
press France to the point of complete exclusion. Thus
the US will be faced with the task of heading off bi=
lateral arrangements which may seem innocuous and which
may be beneficial to the country involved, but which
will create piecemeal the kind of alliance France wants.
Background
1. De Gazelle's view of France's place in Europe
and the world was manifest in the difficult demands he
placed on his allies during World War II. Since his
return to power in 1958, he has consistently held that
changes in France, in Europe, and in the world balance
of power demand changes in the structure and function-
ing of the alliance system which was created at a time
when US strength was overwhelming. De Gazelle's devo-
tion to French "independence" has world-wide ramifica-
tions, but in Europe it has taken as its principal goal
the reduction of US influence.
2. De Gaulle sees the Atlantic alliance, and
particularly the military organization which has been
created under the North Atlantic Treaty, as the major
vehicle for continued US'.influence in Europe. He
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equates the "integration" of that organization with
"subordination" to the US because he feels that "in-
tegration" creates military dependence on the US
which in turn creates political dependence. He un-
doubtedly views West Germany's reluctance to weaken
the US military guarantee and devote itself fully to
the France-German treaty as an example of how this
works in practice,
3. Shortly after assuming power in 1958, De
Gaulle proposed the establishment of a tripartite
directorate for NATO composed of the US, the UK, and
France. He objective was to enlarge the French role
in the formulation of Western policy not only in the
area of NATO responsibility but around the world. He
hoped that by playing the role of "European" repre-
sentative on the tripartite body, he could also re-
inforce French preeminence in Western Europe.
4. Unable to gain acceptance of this arrangement,
he has concentrated on the unilateral withdrawal of
French forces from the alliance and maintained a con-
sistent opposition to alliance efforts to move toward
increased integration. He has avoided any formal dip-
lomatic presentation of his desires for alliance re-
form since the abortive 1958 venture because he realized
how unfavorably this would be received, He has fre-
quently indicated, however, what the nature of such a
new relationship should be. In 1959, in his first of-
ficial press conference as president of France, De
Gaulle warned that cooperation, not integration, must
become the cornerstone of the alliance. In 1960, he
made clear that France must be "...sole mistress of
her resources and her territory." In 1902, he said
that greatly changed world conditions made changes
necessary in a "certain military organization, NATO."
In 1963, he noted that while the alliance was indis-
pensable so long as a Soviet threat existed, an evo-
lution was beginning in the Communist bloc which might
one day obviate the present need for an alliance, In
1964, he said that Paris rejected all systems which
kept France under the "hegemony of a certain country."
In 1965, he specified that French "subordination" in
NATO under the guise of integration must cease not
later than 1969. In February 1966, he said that all
foreign military elements in France must be under the
jurisdiction of French authorities.
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5. At the same time, De Gaulle has taken a
series of steps designed to free France of the inte-
grated alliance structure and indirectly to weaken
the structure itself. In 1959, he placed the French
Mediterranean fleet under national command, In sub-
sequent years, Paris excluded most of French terri-
tory from NATO's integrated air defense and refused
to restore to NATO control three divisions removed
from Europe for use in Algeria. France has withdrawn
the bulk of its Atlantic fleet from NATO, and has
withdrawn its representatives from NATO naval com-
mands. Since 1965 Paris has refused to participate
in any NATO exercises which did not conform to French
strategic views.
6. In addition to the public warnings and the
progressive disengagement:~of French troops, high
French officials have privately indicated over the
past year that a further major disengagement was
coming and that it would affect not only French
forces in NATO, but also foreign forces and bases
The Current Moves
?. The present French moves stand against this
background of warnings and previous withdrawals, On
7 March De Gaulle sent a handwritten letter to Presi-
dent Johnson. Its essential features included a
statement that France wished to remain a member of
the North Atlantic Treaty, but that the organization
which had grown up under the treaty was no longer
justified. De Gaulle said that France therefore
wished to cut its ties with that organization and to
end the presence of foreign forces in France not
under French command. The letter gave no indication
when these moves would be begun or would have to be
completed. Within the next two days similar handwritten
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letters were dispatched to Prime Minister Wilson,
Chancellor Erhard, Prime Minister Pearson, and Presi-
dent Saragat. Each of these made essentially the
same points, although each gave special attention to
the particular interest of the recipient. The letter
to Erhard, for instance, emphasized the French desire
to maintain its forces in Germany although they would
no longer be committed to NATO. Paris subsequently
sent similar letters to the lesser alliance members.
8. On 12 March, France released to the public
the text of an explanatory memorandum it had sent
to all 14 other alliance members. This memorandum
sought to justify the French action, and gave notice
that French forces would be withdrawn from NATO com-
mitment and that NATO headquarters would have to leave
France. No time schedule for these withdrawals was
mentioned, and France left the way open for discus-
sions of "the necessary liaison which might have to
be set up between the French command and the NATO
commands."
9. In sections added to the version of the mem-
orandum sent to the US and Canada, France also speci-
fied that it would reassume complete sovereignty over
French territory and that it could no longer accept
the thesis that "foreign units, installations or bases
in France are answerable in any way to any other but
the French authorities." France was described as
willing to study "the practical consequences which
arise from this" with the US and Canada, and to reach
an agreement on US and Canadian use of French facili-
ties "in case of a conflict in which both countries
would participate." In a sentence added to the West
German memorandum, France said it was also willing to
discuss the facilities granted to German forces in
France.
10. Allied reaction to the De Gaulle letters,
the substance of which has been rather fully exchanged
among the various capitals, has been guarded. Although
there was considerable warning of the nature and timing
of the move by De Gaulle, all of the other 14 NATO mem-
bers agreed that the alliance should wait for De Gaulle
to propose before reacting. The one joint move under-
taken by the other 14 since the De Gaulle letters has
been a meeting of the NATO permanent representatives
in Paris on 11 .March to formulate a joint public state-
ment. This meeting, initiated by the UK and supported
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by the US, considered a UK-drafted statement. How-
ever, for a variety of national reasons, at least a
half dozen of the participants were unable to accept
the British. draft. Rather than issue a statement that
did not have at least nearly unanimous support, a
further meeting was called for later this week, by
which time the perm~nment representatives hope to have
instructions which would allow them to accept a
watered-down version of the British draft. Despite
these difficulties and 'the fact that the Scandinavian
countries, Portugal, and Canada have serious political
problems with the British draft, the release by Paris
of its memorandum may yet encourage the reluctant
allies to react with a public statement of their own.
11, Tn the most general sense, De Gazelle's cur-
rent moves are aimed at demonstrating French indepen-
dence on the world scene and weakening US influence
(thereby raising French influence) in Europe.
12. These moves, however, are also related to
more specific substantive goals. One of these is to
alter the nature of the alliance. De Gaulle would
like to replace the present alliance structure, which
he feels ties France and Europe too closely to US
initiatives unrelated to the treaty area, and which
he feels is overly dominated by the US through its
control of nuclear weapons and its economic might.
By subst~itu~ting a vague promise of common defense
and a series of bilateral treaties negotiated by
states stronger than they were in 1949 for an inte-
grated structure dominated by its strongest member,
De Gaulle feels he can both raise the European voice
in the alliance and free the Europeans of automatic
involvement in US policy moves.
13. De Gaulle nevertheless intends that France
shall remain covered by the North Atlantic Treaty.
He has clearly specified his intention to remain
within the treaty even after 1969, when any member
is free to withdraw unilaterally. He presumably still
welcomes the mutual defense agreements of the treaty
and feels it will be useful domestically to claim
that only an organizational change has been accomplished
without damage to the fundamental ties of the alliance.
Unless bilateral agreements are worked out between
France and NATO covering liaison between French and
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the force withdrawal and the nature of the remaining
ties would be a step toward the kind of alliance France
prefers, and, if successful, would replace the present
NATO commands, however, France will be represented only
on the North Atlantic Council and then not when mili-
tary matters are discussed.
14. De Gaulle proposes in addition 'to maintain
French forces in Germany. France has gone to some
lengths to cite the legal justification for the re-
tention of French forces in Germany even though these
no longer will be committed to NATO. De Gaulle will
be most reluctant to give up the status and power
that derives from being one of the four nations which
have rights and responsibilities deriving from the
occupation of Germany.
Preferences on How His Goals Can be Reached
15. In addition to these substantive goals, De
Gaulle has some rather clear preferences on how they
might be reached, He would like to talk bilaterally
about the withdrawal of US forces. Prior to the cur-
rent exchange of letters, French diplomats sought as-
surances that the US had not completely foreclosed
the possibility of bilateral negotiations. In none
of the subsequent communications--public or private--
has France specified the details of the withdrawal or
indicated a timetable for them. In fact, the memoran-
dum publicized on 12 March clearly called far nego-
tiations on these "modalities." There are two major
reasons for 'this. Most important, bilateral talks on
"integrated" structure with a bilateral structure.
Moreover, bilateral talks could be depicted to the
French public as a simple change in organization and
16. De Gaulle would also like to talk bilaterally
with other nations about new military arrangements.
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He already has specified to the Canadians and Germans
that bilateral talks would now be appropriate. If the
US refused to conduct any but the most necessary talks
on such matters as the disposal of US property in
France, De Gaulle would probably try to split the
others from the US by offering them seemingly moder-
ate terms for what to them may be valuable continuing
agreements. Holding the alliance together under these
circumstances would then become a major problem for
the US.
17. De Gaulle would like to have achieved some
practicial results prior to his June visit to the
Soviet Union. Already, of course,: it seems likely
that the French withdrawal from NATO will be well
under way by June, and a deadline probably will have
been set by France or agreed to by France and the US
for the US withdrawal.
18. In any case, De Gaulle will seek to appear
the offended party. In all of the publicity that has
surrounded the French handling of the situation thus
far, France has sought to portray its position as
reasonable and that of the US as unreasonable. The
essence of this public portrayal has been the line
that France wants to negotiate but its partners do
not. Background briefings stress a word or a nuance
that appears to leave the way open for a reasonable
settlement. Public statements are moderate, although
there are judicious leaks to the press that France is
firm in its intention to carry out its plans.
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Can De Gaulle Achieve his Goals?
19. There appears to be no way of stopping De
Gaulle from cutting France's ties with NATO, ending
the presence of foreign troops in France not under
French command, and retaining his forces in Germany
under non-NATO legal provisions. It is doubtful,
however, that he will be successfu.lin his effort: to.
make a fundamental alteration in the alliance. There
are three basic restraints operating on him: the re-
action of the domestic opposition, the response of
his allies, and the legality of his actions.
20. The domestic opposition probably will make
De Gaulle's action the subject of prolonged contro-
versy, but this will be more a debate than a revolt.
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De Gaulle has conditioned the French public over a
period of years to expect the loosening of French
ties with the alliance. More importantly, Frenchmen
have been led to focus on and accept--at least par-
tially--the idea that "NATO integration" does repre-
sent some form of American hegemony, that a diminished
Soviet threat eliminates the need for a tightly inte-
grated military system, and that "independence" is a
worthwhile goal for France. Moreover, differences
among opposition groups will lessen the impact of
their challenge. It is clear from their initial re-
sponses that opposition leaders will approach the
debate from their own ideological viewpoints and with
their personal political goals in mind. Their argu-
ment that De Gaulle is risking nuclear disaster is
weakened by the fact that De Gaulle has pledged to
remain within the alliance.
21. France's allies can exert little restraint
on De Gaulle in this initial series of moves, pri-
marily because the moves can be made unilaterally and
because their own self-interest in keeping France from
withdrawing completely dictates moderation. Further-
more, unanimous action by 14 nations, each with its
peculiar national political problems, will be difficult
to achieve.
22. From the legal standpoint, De Gaulle has
grounds to carry out his announced plans. There are
five basic bilateral agreements covering US forces in
Francew the Line of Communications Agreement (LOC),
.the Air Base Agreement, the Pipeline Agreement, the
Chateauroux Agreement, and the Headquarters EUCOM
Agreement. These treaties presumably would no longer
apply at the same time that France legally ceases to
be a party 'to the North Atlantic Treaty. Since De
Gaulle has made clear that France will continue to
adhere to the treaty, however, at least for the pres-
ent, the only way that four of the five agreements can
be legally terminated is by mutual consent of the con-
cerned parties. The fifth agreement, the LOC, can be
denounced if agreement on modification is not reached,
a procedure which takes a total of two years.
23. Apart from the North Atlantic Treaty itself,
the three other major multilateral agreements are the
NATO Status of Forces Agreement governing the person-
nel of the allied armed forces, the Ottawa Agreement
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covering the international staffs and member states'
representatives, and the Protocol on the Status of
Military Headquarters governing the rights of mili-
tary personnel assigned to NATO international mili-
tary headquarters or organizations. All three of
these agreements can be terminated one year after
notice of denunciation.
24. The three multilateral agreements are re-
quired for effective protection of personnel assigned
to NATO headquarters and US personnel, so that their
termination would impose unacceptable administrative
restrictions on the operation of those headquarters
and facilities, and probably force their withdrawal
unless new agreements can be consummated. Denuncia-
tion of these agreements appears to be the legal road
which De Gaulle will use to undermine agreements which
have a longer life span.
25. To alter the nature of the alliance itself,
however, De Gaulle must gain the cooperation of at
least his major alliance partners. The chief obstacle
in De Gazelle's path here is the clear determination
of the US to carry on a NATO without France if neces-
sary. At this point, the US appears to have broad
support for this principle, although the allies have
encountered difficulties in devising specific tac-
tics. The US will face a constant battle, however,
to uphold the principle of integration against French
pressure on various NATO members to conclude bilateral
agreements. This is a tactic which France has already
pursued, as evidenced by its attempt to get the
Italians to sign a bilateral agreement on naval coop-
eration,, and one which might be difficult to resist
in the future in view of the separate self-interests
of the various states.
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