THE PRE-ELECTION CLIMATE IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010073-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 73
• Publication Date: March 17, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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O ' ,Ir). 0T93/66
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C;E MEMORANDUM
?R. - 1~,!:CTJON CIJMATE IN THE DOMTNTCAN REPUBLIC
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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OCI No. 0793/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
16 March 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Pre-Election Climate in the Dominican Republic
1. With the resolution of the protracted crisis
over command-level changes in the military, a rela-
tive calm has been established. Garcia Godoy has
moved publicly to repair his relations with the mili-
tary, and the new minister of defense, General Perez,
has sacked one officer for partisan political activity.
The country's basic social and political problems re-
main unsolved, however, and a new period of turbulence
seems certain to accompany preparations for the elec-
tions.
The Campaign Gets Under Way
2. The provisional government, through its recent
public actions, has begun to lay the groundwork for
choosing a new four-year administration on 1 June.
Arrangements are under way to register voters, and the
number of pro-Bosch civil servants is being reduced to
alter the partisan character of provincial and local
governments.
.3. Any number.of';fottuitous developmgn.ts,.howgver,
could jeopardize the elections. Deep political passions
could easily magnify small incidents between the left
and the security services into major confrontations. The
assassination of leading political figures is an ever-
present possibility. The rebel military are a thrdn in
the flesh to the regular military. The return of Caamano
or a graceless exploitation of the anniversary of the
outbreak of revolution on 24 April could easily trigger
violence. The general lawlessness characteristic of Domin-
ican society has become a graver problem since. the revolu-
tion.. The,,disruption of public order is particularly serious
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now because of the widespread availability of arms
and the lack of effective law enforcement. Inter-
American Peace Force (IAPF) troops might have to be
drawn in to maintain order in Santo Domingo during
the campaign.
4. Bosch and his followers have charged that
a systematic campaign of intimidation has been direc-
ted at them by the military and civilian r.ightwingers,
and that "hundreds" of members of the Dominican Revo-
lutionary Party (PRD) have been killed. Although the
PRD really has cause for concern, these charges are
greatly exaggerated. The sporadic acts of terrorism
that have occurred against PRD members appear to be
the work of a small number of right-wing extremists
operating independently of each other.
5. Extreme leftists may also try to prevent
the elections. Some already have threatened to do
so, but most of them seem to be waiting for Bosch's
decision on his candidacy--probably expecting to lend
him covert support if he runs.
6. At the present time, it appears that the
President is intent on going through with the elections
and leaving office on 30 June. It is possible that
he may change his mind if he decides that conditions
for an orderly transfer of power do not exist or
that the elections will result in increased bitterness
and hostility. Before taking office he felt a two-
year term would be desirable, and during recent weeks
he has mused about extending the life of the pro-
visional regime. Although Garcia Godoy has thought
about the possibility of standing as a compromise
candidate, he is probably discouraged by the legal
and political obstacles that would have to be over-
come. The Institutional Act itself rules out the
candidancy of anyone serving in the provisional
government. His recent references to the desirability
of having a candidate who would not arouse antagonisms
and could continue the provisional government's work
of reconciliation may stem from some behind-the-scenes
activity that could eventuate in the formation of a
new political movement, possibly involving the "San-
tiago group" of businessmen.
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7. Free balloting has not been the traditional
method of apportioning political power in the Do-
minican Republic. Indeed, the elections of 1962
constituted the first truly free referendum in the
history of the country. When the Inter-American
Peace Force, leaves, the Dominican military will
once again become the final arbiters of political
life. Despite the tumult over command changes
under the provisional. regime, no basic changes have
been effected, The military still consider them-
selves an elite group not entirely responsible to
civil authority.
The Candidates
8. Joaquin Balaguer has been the one predictable
element in, the Dominican, political. spectrum. The Re-
formist Party (PR) leader consistently has urged
holding elections on 1 June--chiefly because he is
confident of winning. His party began preparing for.
the campaign almost; immediately after his return to
the Dominican Republic last June.
9. Balaguer, who held the presidency for a
brief span immediately before and after the death
of Trujillo, has stressed that he is the candidate
of moderation and order. At the same time he has
advocated a program of moderate reform--a platform
designed to catch the vote of the conservative rural
population.
10. However, the mercurial Bosch remains the
key to the development of the campaign, and possibly
to the future stability of the Dominican Republic.
So far, he has refused to commit himself on his
candidacy--on the grounds that terrorism and, violence
preclude valid elections and that in any case the
military will not respect their outcome. He has
left himself considerable room to maneuver, and his
final decision may be a month or so away, In the
meantime, his PRD is preparing for the campaign.
Bosch probably is attempting to judge whether he
can win and take office if he does win. At the pres-
ent time he would seem to be leaning to the conclusion
that this is unlikely.
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11. Bosch's penchant for doing the unpredictable
and keeping those closest to him in the dark about
his real intentions makes it difficult to forecast
his actions. His plans are further obscured by an
almost paranoic concern with personal security that
has caused him to shut himself off from normal Do-
minican life.
12. There are likely to be strong pressures on
Bosch to avoid having the PRD sit out the election.
Many of the party's politicians think their electoral
chances are good and do not relish the prospect of
a four-year patronage drought. If Bosch does stay
on the sidelines, there is a strong possibility that
he will lose his influence over the "constionalist"
movement to someone like Caamano.
13. Instead of boycotting the elections, Bosch
may be seeking to delay the balloting until a more
propitious time. O late, he has hinted that elections
should be postponed, and that he would welcome an
IAPF pledge to assure his security or a US guarantee
to protect his regime in office. He has also pro-
posed that he, Bonnelly,and Balaguer agree on a new
provisional president to rule for one year.
14. The several minor candidates and movements
that have emerged complicate the electoral picture,
but have not really cut into the strengths of Bosch
and Balaguer. The most significant of these groups
has been Rafael Bonnelly's "third force"--a coalition
of minor parties. Bonnelly, president of the Council
of State that ruled during 1962, is generally regarded
as a conservative and an example of "thwarted ambi-
tion," according to the embassy. He may be more in-
terested in using his candidacy to obtain patronage
from Balaguer than in actually running for office.
15. On the left, the increasingly militant Revolu-
tionary Social Christian Party (PRSC) has split with
the PRD over strategy and tactics, but there is a
good chance it will support Bosch in return for politi-
cal favors. Hector Aristy feels that his nascent or-
ganization, the 24th of April Movement, should support
Bosch now in return for patronage which will build up
the party for the future. Aristy is counting on
Caamano to return and give a boost to the 24th of April
Movement, possibly by running for the vice presidency
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on the PRD ticket. The PRSC and 24th of April
Movement will become more significant if Bosch
does decide to boycott the race, since either one
could hoist the banner of "constitutionalism"
against Balaguer. Without Bosch, however, a
Balaguer victory would seem a foregone conclusion.
16. A Bosch-Balaguer contest in which Bosch
employed his undisputed talents as a campaigner could
go either way. Although Balaguer is thought to have
the edge now, Bosch has several potential advantages.
Among these are his skill as a campaigner, his appeal
to the country's urban have-nots and youth, his con-
trol of an important segment of the country's public
administration--including the vital sugar corporation
--and his acceptability to important labor unions.
17. The fiercer the competition, the greater
the likelihood that the winner will be accepted as
the country's legitimate leader. If Bosch does not
run and no suitable substitute figure, such as Caamano,
emerges, Balaguer will be vulnerable to the charge
that he is a puppet, imposed on the country and not
deserving of allegiance. In such a contingency, the
Communists and associated extreme leftists will find
willing allies among the non-Communist left.
18. If Bosch or a candidate of the left is
elected, a military coup is likely to occur in short
order. Its timing would be more dependent on the
disposition of the Inter-American Peace Force and the
OAS mission, which have been the real sources of
stability for the last seven months, than on 'the
actions of a leftist regime itself. Balaguer would be
much better able than Bosch to get along with the mili-
tary, but even the moderate reforms he advocates prob-
ably would cause some dissatisfaction.
19. In addition to the military, the elected
regime will face a host of other problems--such as
widespread unemployment, extreme poverty, low sugar
prices and high production costs, an imbalance in in-
ternational payments, and increasing inflationary pres-
sures.
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