THE USSR REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010031-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: August 4, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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The USSR
Secret
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RP ASU 77-021
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 Approved For Release
4 August 1977
CONTENTS
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The Central Committee Apparatus: Trend
Toward Promotion from Within. . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Soviet Commercial Visitor Highlights:
January-June 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
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The Central Committee Apparatus: Trend Toward
Promotion From Within
The Central Committee apparatus is the support staff
of the party Secretariat. It helps to administer the
party's affairs, including personnel assignments, and to
check on the implementation of party decisions. Stalin
and Khrushchev used their control over appointments to
the Central Committee staff to strengthen their influence
in the party apparatus as a whole. Under General Secre-
tary Brezhnev, however, once Khruschev's proteges had
been purged from the central apparatus, a majority of
appointments to its top posts have been based on qualifi-
cations and experience rather than on personal patronage,
with preference for staff members of the Central Commit-
tee departments.
There are 22 departments in the Central Committee
apparatus. Each department has a chief, a first deputy
chief, numerous deputy chiefs, and large staffs. Seventy-
eight people are at present publicly identified as chief,
first deputy chief, or deputy chief of a Central Commit-
tee department. Over half of these were promoted from
within the department with which they are identified.
The others were brought into the department, the majority
having worked in an area that qualified them to perform
the department's functions. A. N. Frolov, for example,
had government experience as a deputy minister of the
food industry prior to his appointment as a deputy chief
of the Light and Food Industry Department. Others, like
G. S. Pavlov, administrator of the Administration of Af-
fairs, worked in the Central Committee apparatus in some
other job before appointment to the department.
Of the 78 identified senior officials of the Central
Committee apparatus, 27 were appointed to their jobs from
positions outside the department. Two had been working
elsewhere in the Central Committee apparatus and 10 in
the government, while 15 were party secretaries in the
regional apparatus prior to their appointment.
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Eighteen department chiefs have been publicly iden-
tified. Seven were promoted from within the department
for which they became chief, and 11 were recruited from
? o
t
id
u
s
e. Of these, eight had prior party experience and
three had worked in similar jobs for the government.
Appointments to the post of first deputy chief have
been even more strongly based on qualifications and ex-
perience. Of the 16 first deputy chiefs that have been
publicly identified, 14 were promoted from within the
department and two were brought in to the apparatus from
the government. It seems likely that the first deputy
chief, even more than the chief or the deputy chiefs, pro-
vides the experience needed to maintain continuity in
the work of each department.
There are 45 publicly identified deputy chiefs.*
Twenty rose from within the department and 15 were first
brought into the department as a deputy chief. Of these
15, 10 came from the party apparatus and five from the
government apparatus. It would appear, then, that re-
cruitment from outside into the higher levels of the
Central Committee staff is most often accomplished at the
level of deputy chief.
These statistics establish a pattern of bureaucratic
promotion from within the departments that will probably
continue to be followed so long as Brezhnev remains Gen-
eral Secretary. His successor in that office, however,
may find it necessary to appoint numerous proteges to the
top positions in the Central Committee apparatus if he
We have no information on the previous job ex-
perience of 10 of the deputy chiefs.
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Soviet Commercial Visitor Highlights: January-June 1977
Day-to-day US-Soviet commercial relations during
the first 6 months of 1977 appeared somewhat strained.
Although about 544 Soviet commercial visits to the US
were authorized, only slightly less than the 559 for the
same period in 1976, some dis ffection with the progress
of negotiations was evident.
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Information is still lacking on how well the Soviets
have been able to assimilate and diffuEe the technolo-
gies they purchase from Western countries. Most of the
Soviet commercial visitors during the first half of the
year were here to inspect and receive documents, undergo
industrial training, or otherwise take part in negotia-
tions. That fact may reflect a growing Soviet awareness
that the benefits of acquiring US technology are propor-
tional to the amount of training and management knowhow
they acquire. The predominance of such visits also sug-
gests that the Soviets are initiating few new projects
that show a serious intent to make immediate investment,
but are interested rather in access to information that
is available.
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The Soviet currency crisis continues, with deals
falling through because of lack of funds. The Soviets
are placing heavy emphasis on whatever might bring in
hard currency in any amounts: Several delegations were
here to peddle copyrights, licenses, patents, Olympic
stamps and coins, and postcards. Litsenzintorg, the
Soviet all-union agency that handles the export and im-
port of patents, was represented at the Chicago World
Fair of Technology Exchange in February by a deputy
chairman, Boris Kurakin. In the past, Litsenzintorg has
been a good barometer of Soviet intentions to buy or sell
technology. Two other representatives, one also a deputy
chairman, visited several US companies in March. Vladimir
Gorbunov, a department chairman of the USSR Chamber of
Commerce and Industry, attended a meeting of the American
Association of Corporate Patent Counsels. High-level
Soviet commercial visitors during the first half of 1977
were few:
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In keeping with the Party's announced intentions to
improve the quality of the average Soviet citizen's life,
many Soviet commercial visitors were seeking the where-
withal to produce cons,imPr Aman; +-; oc
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Negotiations seem to be characterized by more so-
phistication and less enthusiasm on the part of US nego-
tiators and by deteriorating hopes of a much improved
economic atmosphere on the part of the Soviets. The
emotional assertion by Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade
Patolichev during his June visit to the US that the
Soviet Union could do without US technology reveals
mounting frustration over the lack of most favored
nation status and may portend stepped-up efforts by the
Soviets to acquire needed technology from other Western
countries and Japan. In addition, monies for new Soviet
investment and business ventures abroad were reported
frozen as of March 1, 1977. A recent excuse offered by
the Soviets is that the availability of funds for the
civilian sector during the second half of the year
awaits the outcome of the SALT talks. 25X1
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