RHODESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000600110008-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2003
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: January 11, 1966
• Content Type: BRIEF

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CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING
11 January 1966
~ ii ' ) 14 .P') RHODES IA.
I. The British Commonwealth opened a confernce in
Lagos, Nigeria, today to discuss the problem
of Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of
independence.
A. British Prime Minister Harold Wilson is
a reluctant delegate to the conference.
B. He expects to be confronted with
renewed pressures from African members of the
Commonwealth to take stronger action against
the break-away government in Rhodesia.
C. Wilson decided to attend the conference
in person, rather than send a lesser government
figure, in order to shore up and thank the
moderates like Nigeria who have gone along
with the measured British response.
D. The conference will not be as hard on
Wilson as London had feared earlier.
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1. For one thing, he will be able to point
to tangible, positive steps since the
last meeting of the Organization of
African Unity, such as the joint
Brit1Eh-US-Canadian oil lift to Zambia.
2. There are also some indications that
the sanctions approach is beginning to
have an effect on the Smith regime in
Rhodesia.
3. Finally, the conference is being
boycotted by Ghana and Tanzania, two
of the strongest advocates of more
radical action--including military
action--against Rhodesia.
E. Wilson's main approach will be to get through
the conference without any further formal
commitment that Britain will not agree to
independence for Rhodesia before majority
rule is an accomplished fact there.
II. Situations in the Republic of South Africa and
in Portuguese Angola and Mozambique are relatively
quiet at present. As a result, Rhodesia is the
focus, for the moment, of the black-against-white
confrontation in Africa.
A. The illegal declaration of independence by
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Rhodesia's white minority has produced
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a great deal of emotionalism and a rare de-
gree of unity among black African states.
B. Thus far, the African states have refrained
from attempting their own direct solutions
of the Rhodesian problem, but are putting
great pressure on Britain to "crush" the
Rhodesian regime.
1. The December 3, 1965 OAU Conference de-
cided, in substance, to pressure Brit-
ain for more effective action against
Rhodesia, rather than call for strong
action by African states.
2. Zambia, which is crucial to any attempt
by Africans to solve the Rhodesian prob-
lem, has so far followed Britain's lead.
It has not offered to accept troops of
other African nations within its borders,
where they could get at Rhodesia. Zambia
has also restrained emigre groups of Rho-
desian Africans who have settled in.Zambia.
3. Zambia is also the only African state
which can hurt Rhodesia economically, but
the Zambians have gone along with the Brit-
ish program, refraining from more extreme
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sanctions. In part, this is because the
Rhodesian reaction could be just as damag-
ing to Zambia.
C. If Britain does not dispose of Rhodesia's
minority white regime soon, some African
states will probably take more direct
action themselves, probably designed to
force British military intervention.
1. Zambia, for instance could stop all
trade with Rhodesia, thus closing down
Zambia's copper production which is
vital to Britain.
2. Zambia could also agree to allow Rho-
desian saboteurs, currently being
trained by an OAU group in Tanzania, to
infiltrate Rhodesia through Zambia.
D. Britain's Prime Minister Wilson has the dif-
ficult job of meeting both African Common-
wealth insistence that Smith be brought down,
and British public opinion, which has grave
reservations about coercing its Rhodesian
"kith and kin" to meet; African demands.
1. London still hopes its economic measures
will induce moderate white Rhodesians to
form an alternative government, which
could call for British support.
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SECRET
2. There are, however, growing indications
that London may be considering that ulti-
mately some form of military intervention
will be necessary to bring down the Smith
regime and preserve some British influence
in Africa.
3. If the illegal Rhodesian regime is de-
feated, Britain will still be pressured
by Africans, in and out of Rhodesia, to
give Rhodesia independence under African
majority rule.
XIII. The black-white confrontation in southern Africa
will probably re-emphasize the radical-moderate
split among African governments.
A. All African governments will continue to de-
mand majority rule, but will probably differ
on the methods of ending white minority rule
in southern Africa.
B. Those favoring attempts at a violent solution
will probably include Tanzania, Egypt, Ghana,
and probably Algeria, who are presently help-
ing insurgent groups from the Portuguese ter-
ritories, Rhodesia, and South Africa.
1. The other African states will continue to
favor less radical methods such as economic
and diplomatic sanctions.
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