INDIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000600110009-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2003
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 11, 1966
• Content Type: BRIEF

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11 January 1966
CONGRESSIONAL
BRIEFING
I, India and the leaders of its Congress Party
face a difficult problem in choosing a
successor to Prime Minister Shastri.
A. Home Minister Nanda took over as
caretaker immediately after Shastri's
sudden death in Tashkent, but this is
almost certainly only an interim
solution.
1. Nanda served in a similar capacity
for one week after Nehru died in
1964. He does not have an independent
political base, and there has been
criticism of his performance as a
cabinet minister#.
B. Senior officials of the Congress Party are
to meet this Friday, and there will probably
be a caucus of the party hierarchy in the
next week or so. Technically, the Prime
Minister is chosen by the 540 members of
the Congress Party in both houses of parlia-
ment.
(INDIA-1)
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II. The problem will be to find a successor who is
acceptable to all major factions of the party.
When Nehru died, there were stronger candidates
than Shastri, but they were handicapped in each
case by strong opposition within the party.
A. The leading candidates at present include
Defense Minister Chavan, former Finance
Minister Desai, and Congress Party
President Kamaraj.
1. Desai has a reputation for getting
things done and for incorruptability.
He was a strong candidate when Nehru
died, but was one of those who lost
out because he evoked some strong
opposition. He appears to have been
losing political strength since then.
2. Chavan took over the Defense Ministry
from Krishna Menon in 1962, has built
up the armed forces, and shares the
credit with Shastri for what most
Dndians consider a military victory
over Pakistan last fall.
3. Kamaraj probably has the broadest
support within the party, but his
limited formal education, and inability
to communicate freely in either Hindi
or English, would limit his effectiveness
(INDIA-2)
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as a prime minister. In any case,
Kamaraj has shown a preference for
concentrating on parry affairs and
exerting his influence from behind
the scenes?
B. Among the dark horses who might be picked
as compromise candidates if the leaders
are deadlocked, there are Mrs. Indira
Ghandi, Nehru's only child; Steel Minister
Reddy; and Home Minister Nanda. Reddy is
the likeliest of these.
III. The New Prime Minister will inherit a number
of serious problems.
A. A severe food crisis is in prospect.
Sino-Indian relations remain tense.
Indian-Pakistani hostility will continue
even though the Tashkent agreement for a
troop withdrawal. will probably be honored.
India is unsure whether and when US aid
will be resumed.
B. On top of all this, national elections
are coming early in 1967.
IV. We do not believe, however, that there will be
any significant changes in Indian policy,
domestic or foreign, no matter who is chosen.
(INDIA-3)
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A. The new Prime Minister will be chosen by
just about the same men, acting within the
same frame of reference, as Shastri was
two years ago.
B. All of the candidates, furthermore, are in
substantial agreement on major policies.
C. The difference lies in whether a strong
leader or a weaker compromise choice takes
over. Forcefulness and personal predilections
will play some role in the implementation of
policies.
IV: These are the domestic policies in which we
foresee no early change:
---Priority on defense spending, to build up
forces capable of facing both the Pakistanis
and the Chinese;
---heavy emphasis on bringing about a dramatic
increase in food production; and
---the decision not to produce nuclear weapons
at this time.
A. All of India's major leaders have declared
their opposition to a nuclear weapons program,
and we do not think they will reverse this
policy soon. We continue to believe, however,
that eventually security considerations will
lead India to develop its own nuclear weapons.
tl"IA-4 )
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B. India is committed to a course of moderate
socialism.
1. Some leaders, distressed over India's
poor economic performance, are disposed
as a result to try relying less on
government controls, and more on the
forces of the marketplace.
2. Any such experimenting, hwwever, would
probably come only after the resumption
of large-scale foreign aid, and even then
it would be mainly a matter of emphasis.
V. Foreign policy in particular is not likely to show
much change; the present lines are generally
accepted by most Indians.
A. The Tashkent agreement, Shastri's legacy,
will probably ease relations with Pakistan
for a while, but India will remain unwilling
to make any substantial concessions on Kashmir,
and Pakistan is determined to obtain a settlement
of this dispute.
1. Shastri vigorously resisted Pakistan on
the Kashmir issue, but in general he
favored and worked for an improvement of
relations. Some of his potential successors
may take a harder line.
(INDIA-5)
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2. Pakistan may ease its pressures on
Kashmir for a while to give the new
Indian leader time to get settled, but
in the long run relations will probably
deteriorate again.
B. There is no significant sentiment in the
Congress Party, or in India as a whole, for
any improvement: in relations with Communist
China. New Delhi and Peking will remain
bitter rivals.
C. Conversely, there will probably be no
interruption or change in India's good
relations with the Soviet Union, which
provides large amounts of both economic and
military aid.
D. Any new Prime Minister will be aware of his
country's heavy dependence on the West--and
especially the United States--for aid. We
have been India's chief source of economic
assistance and the desperately needed emergency
food supplies. A new Prime Minister will do
everything he can to maintain and improve good
relations with the United States, and to get
aid resumed, as long as he is not required to
make radical changes in Indian policy toward
Pakistan or the Soviet Union to bring this
about. ###
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