THE SOVIET GRAIN SITUATION IN FISCAL YEAR 1974: A PRELIMINARY VIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000030001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 25, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 2, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Economic Research
The Soviet Grain Situation in Fiscal Year 197.1
A Preliminary View
4M 00= lttntw-i -- 0* P I t' 6 tp/qP 734.1
Copy no. I
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The Soviet Grain Situation in Fiscal Year 1974
A Preliminary View
Introduction
1. For the third time in a decade the USSR
has become a major factor in the world market for
wheat and coarse grains. During fiscal year (FY)
1973,1 nchedulod Soviet purchases of 26 million
metric tons of grain will account for more than
one-fifth of world imports of all grains (including
rice). The FY 1973 imports are about three times
as much as the USSR bought in FY 1964 and FY 1966
after similar shortfalls in domestic production.
Moreover, this year, unlike in the earlier yearn,
nearly two-thirds of the purchases ware made in
the United States.
2. because US agricultural programs and poli-
cies must take into account potential grain ex-
ports, the outlook for Soviet grain imports in of
major concern. The purposes of this paper
are to (a) project likely lcvols of Soviet grain
Note: Comments and queries regarding this a car
are welcomed. They may be directed to
of the Office of Economic Researc ,
Code 143, Extension 6576.
1. The fiscal year ends on 30 June of the stated
year.
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production in 1973 on the basis of trends in yields
of individual grains and (b) estimate probable
domestic requirements for grain and provide a
conditional forecast of Soviet grain imports in
PY 1974.
Principal Findings
3. A forecast of Soviet grain production in
1973 was obtained by extrapolating yields based
on trends observed from 1958 to 1971. Under the
most likely pattern of harvested acreage in 1973,
the simple projection of yield trends implies a
point estimate of output of 152/ million tons.
Although the chances are two out of three that
total grain output would lie within a range from
133 million to 172 million tons, there is one
chance in six that the c-gyp will exceed 172 million
tons and one chance in six that it will be less
than 133 million tons. The high degree of uncer-
tainty in the projection of output reflects the
wide fluctuations in yields in the past. Soviet
grain output is perhaps more strongly influenced
by year-to-year changes in growing conditions than
that of any other major world producer.
4. A projection of domestic utilizatior of
grain can bo based on trends in those uses that
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can be estimated with a fair degree of reliability
(food, seed, and industrial uses), on an analysis
of the likely requirement for livestock feed, and
on an allowance for waste and changes in stocks.
The use of grain in FY 1974 for food, seed, and
industrial use is expected to be almost 87 million
tons -- not very different from the levels of
recent years. The demand for grain for livestock
feed on the other hard, will probably increase
between 5 million-10 million tons to a level of 67/
million-72/ million tons. (This range reflects alter-
native strategies in expanding herds in calendar year
1973.) Assuming no change in inventories and a wastage
of 5 million tons, total dourest.., requirements would
amount to 159 million-164 million tons. If, as seems
likely, the USSR is unable to cut its grain exports
in FY 1974 below the FY 1973 level, the Soviet re-
quirement for grain for both domestic uses and export
would be about 165 million-170 million tons.
5. A comparison of the projected supply of grain
under normal weather conditions (152/ million tons)
and the expected demand for grain (165 million-170 million
tons) implies a Soviet need to import about 12/ million-
174 million tons of grain in FY 1974. Should the
USSR attempt to rebuild depleted carryover stocks
of grain, the import requirement would rise accord-
ingly. A crop of less than 140 million tons -- a
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distinct possibility given the wide range of pos-
sible yields -- would probably force the leader-
ship to make painful adjustments in its present
farm and consumer policies.
Conditional Forecast of Grain Production in 1973
6. Forecast yields for 1973 were obtained by
extrapolating from a linear time trend fitted to
reported yields for each of 11 grains and pulses
in the 14 years 1958-71.2
7. Forecasts of production were obtained by
multiplying forecast yields by estimates of the
1973 harvest area. The total harvest area of
121.5 million hectares (see Table 1) includes 22.0
million hectares of winter grains and 99.5 million
hectares of spring grains. The winter grain area
is one of the lowest on record, primarily the re-
sult of a 20% underfulfillment of last fall's
sowing plan. In addition, the lack of snow cover
and below-normal temperatures in the last half of
January probably caused above-average winterkill,
but the USSR will probably offset the winterkill
in part by using less winter grain than usual for
Appendix A sets out the several steps used in
deriving the estimates; Appendix B presents the
regression equations relating yields of the indi-
vidual grains to time.
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Table I
Soviet Grain Area: Actual 1971 and Estimated 19731
Million Hectares of Harvested Area
1971
1973
Total
117.9
121.5
Winter wheat
20.7
16.3
Spring wheat
43.3
45.2
Winter rye
9.5
4.6
Corn
3.3
5.5
Spring barley
20.3
27.0
Winter barley
1.3
1.1
Oats
9.6
10.0
Millet
2.4
Buckwheat
1.8
2.0
Rice
0.4
0.4
Pulses
5.2
6.4
1. The distribution of harvested area, by grain, is not
available for 1972, Thr distribution for 1971, while reflecting
a normal pattern for fall-sown grains, does not show the
major shirt in spring-sown grak.s toward baricy that was first
observed i- 1972. Because of rounding, components may not
add to the totals shown,
spring forage. To recoup losses, the USSR probably
will sow more than 100 million hectares to spring
grains. The announced strategy is to emphasize
barley, corn, and oats -- crops that generally
provide a better yield than spring wheat.
5
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8. The trends in yields and the projected
distribution of harvested area imply a gross grain
crop of 15231 million tons of usable grain in 1973
(see Table 2).3 This forecast, however, is a
USSR: Harvested Area, Yields, and Gross Production of Grain1
Actual 1971
Projected 1973
Harvested
Gross
Harvested
Gross
Area
(Million
Hectares)
Yields
i(Centners
per H_ctare)
Production
(Million
Tnns)
Area
(Million
Hectares)
Yields
(Centners
per Hectare)
Production
(Million
Tons)
Total
117.9
181.2
121.5
188.4
Winter wheat
20.7
23.1
47.8
16.3
22.0
35.9
Spring wheat
43.3
11.8
51.0
45.2
11.6
52.4
Winter rye
9.5
13.5
12.8
4.6
12.8
5.9
Corn
3.3
25.7
8.6
5.5
29.6
16.3
Spring barley
20.3
15.9
32.2
27.0
16.4
44.3
Winter barley
1.3
18.1
2.4
1.1
16.4
1.8
Oats
9.6
15.2
14.7
10.0
15.9
15.9
Millet
2.4
8.5
2.0
3.0
9.4
2.8
Buckwheat
1.8
6.6
1.2
2.0
7.7
1.5
Rice
0.4
36.7
1.4
0.4
39.5
1.6
Pulses
5.2
13.3
6.9
6.4
15.4
9.9
Total net usable
production
148.0
152.6
I.I. eecauso o route nding, components not add to the totals shown.
This isa net output equivalent of the 188/
million tons of gross output estimated in Table 2.
Officially claimed gross production of grain is
known to overstate usable grain because of excess
moisture, trash, handling losses, and suspected
biases in reporting. The average of estimated
discounts from gross output during 1958-71 Js 19%.
This figure is applied to the projection of pro-
duction in 1973.
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point estimate to which a confidence interval must
be attached. The confidence interval was calcu-
lated from estimates of ttie variances of each grain
and the co-variances among grains. Thus the vari-
ations of each individual yield around the trend
forecast were computed, and the forecast variance
was calculated as a weighted sum of the variances
for each grain, taking into account the degree to
which yields of different grains fluctuate to-
gether. The point estimate of production and the
lower and upper bounds at the 68% probability
level for total grain and for bread grains are as
follows:
Forecast
Low
High
Total grain
152.6
133.1
172.1
Bread grain
76.3
64.5
88.1
Wheat
71.5
60.0
83.1
9. The production forecast for 1973, given
"normal" weather and the expected sowing strategy,
exceeds the record harvest of :.50 million tons of
usable grain in 1970. Nevertheless, the poor
harvest of 1972 (I.34 million tons) is within the
calculated confidence .'interval, as is a crop large
enough to satisfy all foreseeable requirements for
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grain. As wide as the range might appear (given
the use of a 63% probability level in deriving the
range of possible forecasts), there remains one
chance in three that the 1973 crop could be either
lower than 133 million tons or higher than 172
million tons.
10. The wide range of uncertainty in projected
output reflects the wide fluctuations in annual
yields. In the late 1960s, 45% of the total grain
area in the USSR and 60% of the total wheat area
was in a 21-oblast area where rainfall is mar-
ginal -- between 10 and 16 inches per year. In-
deed, about three-fourths of the sown area in the
Soviet Union has a climate similar to the Great
Plains states of North Dakota, South Dakota,
Nebraska, Montana, and Wyoming anc3 the F rairie
Provinces of Canada. These North American regions
also have had a long history of wide cyclical
swings in grain yields resulting from variations
in weather conditions. 4
Because o.. differences in farming practices,
the cyclical swings in yields (as measured by the
coefficient of variation) in the comparable area
of the Soviet Union would be larger. Good land
management in analogous areas of North America
demands that 30% or 40% of the cultivated area be
in clean fallow. In the USSR ir, 3.971, only about
12% of cultivated acreage in the areas r.ferred to
were under clean [footnote continued on p.9]
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Outlook for Soviet Demand for Grain
11. Because little information is published on
the utilization of grain in the Soviet Union and
statistics on stocks are closely guarded secrets,
estimates of current consumption and projected
requirement.; can only be approximated. Of the
various uses of grain, the dispositions for seed,
food, and industrial uses can be estimated with a
reasonably high degree of confidence. Estimates
of the grain flowing into the other channels of
utilization -- waste and livestock feed -- and the
change in year-to-year stocks are at best rough
approximations.5 Table 3 provides estimates of
the grain balances for FYs 1971-73 and a tentative
estimate of the demand for grain in FY 1974.
12. On the basis of assessed Soviet requirements
for grain in FY 1974, the demand for food, seed,
and industrial use is expected to come to roughly
86/ million tons, the same as in FY 1973. The
allowance for waste and assumed inventory change
!:allow. (Under the practice of clean a owing
the land is not planted and is cultivated only as
needf-d to suppress weeds. The practice also per-
mite. accumulation of moisture in the soil.)
5. In deriving the residual available for addi-
tions to stocks or livestock feed, an allowance of
3% is used for waste. This waste factor covers
losses after the initial stage of harvesting and
storage.
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USb,.:: Estimates of Grain Supply and Demand
Million Metric Tons
Supply of Grain
Demand for Grain
Net
Production Imports Total Exports
Food, Seed,
and Industrial
Use
Inventory
Waste Change
Livestock
Feed Total
FY 1971
150
3 153 8
85
4'h
1
54'% 153
FY 1972
148
8 156 8
87'
4%
?3'h
59'1 156
FY 1973
134
26 160 6
86'h
5
0
62'h 160
Projected
FY 1974
152'h
12'h' 165. 6
861h
5
0
67'? 165-
17'h 170
72% 170
in FY 1974 also imply no change from the FY 1973
level. Although the USSR is trying to reduce its
exports of grain -- particularly to client states
in Eastern Europe -- it probably will not succeed
in cutting its deliveries below last year's level
of 6 million tons. Indeed, as a result of record
grain crops in Eastern Europe in 1972, the USSR
was able to reduce its grain rxports to Eastern
Europe from 5 million tons in FY 1972 to 3 million
tons in FY 1973. If output should slip in these
countries in FY 1974, the Soviet Union will be
under considerable pressure to supply more than
3 million tons of grain.
13. The upsurge in the use of grain for live-
stock feed, a consequence of the official campaign
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initiated in 1969 to alleviate meat shortages is
the principal cause of the -Soviet grain problem.
Since 1969, requirements of the livestock program
have outstripped the supply of feed grains and
have eroded seriously the USSR's reserve stocks
of wheat. In 1969, an estimated 9 million tons of
wheat were released from government stocks for
feeding livestock in 1970.6 The use of wheat
reserves for livestock feed is believed to have
reduced them to near the level considered vital as
a strategic reserve. Indeed, the major imports of
grain in FY 1972 and FY 1973 indicate that grain
stocks have been drawn down to minimal levels.7
Matching the FY 1973 supply of grain with the
requirement for export, food, seed, industrial use,
and waste leaves a residual for livestock feed of
more than 62 million tons. This magnitude, in turn,
would be three million tons more than the grain
fed to livestock in FY 1972 and 20 million to
In the 1as few years, about 20 million tons
of wheat have been fed to livestock annually.
7. That is, inventories held as buffer stocks to
minimize the effects of harvest shortfalls. In
addition to stocks to cover normal requirements,
some unknown quantity of inventories of grain is
held for strategic purposes to supply the military
forces and the economy in time of extreme emer-
gency. Presumably, at the point when total grain
reserves consist solely of strategic stocks, the
regime will feel compelled to authorize imports.
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25 million tong hitjher than the amount red in
IY 19G8.
14. The demand for grain for Livestock reed ie
thus tha key element :n projecting the total Soviet
demand for grain in 1`Y 19/4, in December the Central
Committee approved livestock goal f. 1973 that
will, maintain overall livestock production of
approximately the 1972 level while permitting a 5%
redu:.Lton in moat output. The emphasis in 1973
will be on rebuilding herds and recovering previous
leveie of productivity. As a ras ult of the bad
harvecst: c,-Z' 1972, inventories of hogs declined and
a downturn in output of milk and meat per animal
occurred in the last half of 1972. The USSR has
made it clear, however, that it still hopes to meet
the ambitious goals for livestock products origi-
nally set for 1975 (see Table 4). Even to come
close to achieving these goals, livestock output
will have to rise dramatically during 1974 and 1975.
Because production from the 1974 crop will, not be
available in volume for feeding livestock until
August-September 1974, the level o' livestock pro-
du,ction in 1974 will (, spend in large part on grain
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*rn i4
W000 ;<
WA vftf 1M''*
1910 foil
0#40t+Wj #^
1r)1 (+ -> t1w",
(tom-ft
WMA411"M low *) .4190 ,'PA 41o a 4 14A ttaA txA
t (i+i111t 61) 4(1 4111 40 m" tip i
euppliee from the 197.1 crop ani ?r i orte in
f"Y 1974.6
15. lb oupport the livestock program, there-
fore, the ')S5 will have to increase the a unt of
grain fed to livestock. We estimate this increase
to be 5 million-10 million tons it. TY 1974. she lower
and of the range aeaut a thati
? Production of non-grain feedatuffs (ei-
lage, hay, pasture, other conrentratea,
etc.) in 1974 will recover from the
drought-affected 1973 level but will
not exceed the average for 1970 and
1971.
? The recent emphasis on increasing the
number of hogs and pou'try, whose
8. Selected non-grain feeds produced in 1974 --
pasture and green chop -- would normally be avail-
able by June-July= other feed" -- oilseed cake And
silage -- would not be available in volume until
September.
13
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'tir ~ ~ ~ {?r~p "~. ~ tl dim
~ y ?-e a ^ _ " _ - , 7 , V i i l rS. tat n .Sia ,:~ -
f ltAifY in ; racy.,p,r, tajin>?ya
.^1 ar Y 4Oa 1*,a'a3' rracvic4 ftp
fa iita c ff j *iarr "g ;rr9 tary? ~?a ~ Qt Q.
? 71 a ~.-1at tw 1 t ta4s, ti!,tr i.h twat aat~
.rqt its caletw3-ar vQ?lt ~~ 3 itv ati~
P" wit;-, ra3ati.4at foot I,'/; will 1Da
o tll y 4 i Q tit ihpt+?-t ..'?+t r*nirj1'+!Dti#t the
year
c up"t otpi of th'p tat4jr= 4ifies the
loot aoau tio" aiova- to the ext4tt.t. thatt
? 7ha S* c3err'2ae in mat s, ,.ytp-ut slated
for 117) is ~-t~'atvttat*d in the first
o ix "htha 3f t?+a j -at t! at hie *e a
iii ~D$t3#;ct339 tai*i.d b1p11fj1;t% of htxf 1p.
17. This a!?au xti4 VOa)ld i*rcvl-de tot a hichar
?vDf 4 l ,r:al of 1i' ?tOr itsv- nt riap throve ut
ry 1974 in t ra'Or to Oust;ion a ft to rapid adVan+e-_ in
output of * at in 1771 and I'w".4
v. in o",er word. nu mats of 1ivept&t.Ck wo-U1d tine
At a r4lta A%tri.' ! U p s t~.r..s 4...1 s -C 1?1' I t -, id
f < ?.+ss ? vt f J+ f L~Wt +rVY~V
require a do:l it a of re than ft in oo~at production
in coMparison with the rt'tapondin" periaJ in 1,72.
This would be t*llOVOA_ by a higher ie +e1 of coat
output in the loot halt of the year.
This interpretation of official o,.ratpgy in re-
gaining the forwards ntun in twat production to
ouppot.ed by th4 figures for industrially processed
at i:# the first two aonti.A of 1972 -- down 199
from the corresponding period in 1972.
14
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in, tiros Che U S#a"R *a sire ?hta for drain adal
to atvout 16-Y tti l l ion- 1 7 bi 1 l ion Con q* t.ho rah*e te-
flectitrtl the aINwc altethativP. In the 11trlik+ ly
event that ptr llrrt.ic3P Would Ire? Prac?ipol ' 112N rei l li.oh
tt"Iq .- the #.oiht a t:iP to with hori.41 w'-at-hot -_
the t38914 would hem to i#tport 12*, mi l l ioni-1 th million
tons Of gtaih to Ot66t its re(rIiretmh'._a fail 1y. it
should be hot 3, rco%ret, that theso ?stit"t.es
allow fot no rQpleni~hs~eht of draiti rePerwest whic?h
are bolie,ed for be h+ihi#+aal now. if, ae p c$s 1ikc1y,
the goviet Union decides to Apt aside ad4litia ral
tonnage this Crop t4ear as buffer at kfi, the it em
re4uireaeht would rise accordingly. Uevwrthelessa,
because t'i ranrte of possible production is on wide,
there is a reasonable chance that the tSP wo#ald not
have U. itrt -Ony grain at, all or. alterhativ1?y,
to'tt it mould ncol to purchase roach ore than 17S
n+illiott toia ?rr ahrtaad. ith a top of 140 pi1li~gl
tea or laas -- a distitact po04ibilit) d1'i an t!ro
acids range of poaaib:s outs= a -- the leadership
would probably ~h :. a to taaks taainful ad5tsat ?nts
i its praaent faro and cans r poli+:iecs to raid
paying the enom,%va arsma of hard currency that wouirk
bia necoasary to buy grain in the clua,ttktiea or? red
it,! PAP 1973.
is
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 CON' I I )1~: I' I A I
i`r*#*'Y't~~lr a for v11--f,aat inq
(;fair) Vr ' 1ai i'v)
I . Thr f i f a!: Gt.cI) i sera 3l~jt: i W .l I)r,r-
- +I!.t.ion ,sr "rain was to ''?3Lir-atc' a qf't of rR?riras43i?n
tarar =trt= ~ai~h.)? i-1,. ..11 , av)(-- h that for
eae'3~ e>1 11 ~),trailra, ant) I)a ~'inlrla ?}ryr taarVnGt.ecl
lIt a~ 3i t: s ? II- I
W114 ', . tI-n{*t'A floe 'JR ua1 911 St itbance tPU In
,
royrnaci:?t~ anaIysi T7zu' rn'tr-;z5ion nfill:lt iotic am
ahown ip ?+;,;,,-n- .tt P. I'1otc of thF' aCt?)a1 yi9l.c;
and the eat_01%ated (rc 'd are 01" W" for each {;ruin.
i. in.1 :i1 'r[}t~liEtion fot -.wh ,par 13
r'ri!V11-c);n i t.t1 ! )tI? ?.. ? I I 1i 1 t cTtz 4 i *3atr..~
11
CSI Ifit f t.li ' hit.D?t
W!-far!, tho Cct ?'it Crn4iatR of harVcat at-aa.
iv~c'~? tha rrt =r".. "d ;wtual '_ tat
arm kn~'n: ~ ~^~ ,,. ~,t~sFS:~~l~trs ~;rrf~ra se.~a r~t~w~ruted:
:'~e rfi~traa ri uarO dr ti with ~a.fi ia: :soviet
t?aairxa or t3roaa yitlih. when aj tr+ gatod 'Loo pro-
duction. a initorrb diacount of 19" start applied to
estimate u able gain. Alternatively, the yield
data could gave been ad)uatc*d by the appropriate
diaCoan* for aac year.
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(3) Dt:Vt t- AC't'ttAL,t - t:`tt .
The relationnhLps of estimated and actual production
far total gain and for bteadcprain can die sent in
the cha r t c in App ,ndi x C.
3. The Maximum absolute deviation, t?>Pasured in
million metric tong, in 33.2 for lm63i and the
average absolute deviation in 10.0 Si ll.ion tons.
The aurn of deviations in 2.2 Million tons, indi-
catint) no ?ulrstantlal bias toward errors of one
giyn. titan each abnolute deviation in divided by
the cotrest.onding actual total production. the
average of these to 10%. The root meal i#rluare
orror, computed ant
14
(4) Famr.
t-- i
1/2
In 14.2 roi 11ion tnr,p.. rot breadoraina, tho average
ahnoltfte doVi at ion i S 8.2 million tO n t ; th
pore ntaga deviation ip 121, .atzA the r F za:;
agu,s,ro error in 9.9 million tong.
4. Thug a roujh ositim ate bayed on the atatin-
tica prosented above in that the total forcecapt of
152.6 million tong for 1973 in accurate with a pro-
bability or 0.6H ititltin the ranrtn ;1 million tons.
For broadgraina the 681 prv!;iction interval simi-
larly would be +10 mi l1; ern tong about the 1973 fore-
oast of 76.3 million tons. A more rigorou,T pro-
cedura outained below gives 681 prediction
17
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