DRAFT REPORT ON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66R00638R000100150005-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 4, 2000
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: REPORT

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DRAFT mow o PRREC OG
NUTE
This report and its recommendations do
not include examination of possible
private disclosure of US reconnaissance
satellite capabilities to the Soviet
leaderehip.
OBJECTIVES
To develop a poil2;i with respect to United States reconnaissance
pmpz.vs which will:
A. Maintain our freedom of action unilaterally to conduct
eeceeraienance s.at6Elite operations.
B. Pent foreign political and physical imterference mith
the conduct of thee operations.
C. Prevent accidental or forced disclosure of details of the
operations or end products of the US satellite reconnaissance program.
D, Avoid nituations, otatementa or actions which, in the context
of our satellte reconnaioaance program, could later be exploited as
evidence either of allege US negzessiveness or duplicity.
E, Facilitate the easolution of any conflicts which might arise
between the essentiee eechnical and security requirements of the US
satellite eaceenaineaeee program and the international commitments and
feeeige policy ob]eetieee of the United Staten in a manner which is in
the ove!e-all boDt f!mtesta of the national security of the United States.
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1? The es;tial .:5ecty and technical requiroments of the US recon-
naissance sattliite weram era not incompatible with foreign policy
objectivee enuneiated 4 the US, nor do they eonflict with existing
tOlgittente aatEmmi ty thz US in International agroments on outer
space matter
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2 The US is not at present leganx bound to observe any commitments
regarding the UE of CAltOr space. However, as a natter of national
policy, the US does consider itself bound to eomply with the United
Nations General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI), which the US drafted
and sponsored and which was unanimously adopted by the UNGA on December
20, 1961. That Resolution "commends to States for their guidance in the
exploration and use of outer space" two principles:
(a) International law, including the Charter of the United Nations,
applies to outer space and celestial bodies;
(b) Outep space and celestial locales are free for exploration and
the use by al/ States in conformity with international law, and are not
subject to national appropriation.
e Pursuant f-,0 UNGA Resolution 1721, the United States now registers all
.
eatellite launching with the UN. There is no internationelly agreed
formula governing the data provided for registration with the United
Nations.
4. Also pursuant to UNGA Resolution 1721, the US has taken part in
the work of the UN Outer Space Committee, At the recent meetings of
the Committee's Legal Subcommittee in Geneve, the US proposed;
(a) A draft General AsseMbly rese3ution regarding assistance to
and return of pace vehicles and their occupants, and
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(b) A draft resolution requesting the Secretary General of the
United Nations to constitute a panel of experts to draft an international
agreement dealing with liability of launching states and international
organizations for injury? loss or damage caused by space vehicles.
Those proposals were carefully framed so as not to affect the
US reconnaissance satellite program. It should be noted, however, that
the issue of banning reconnaissance satellites was specifically raised
by the Soviets in a Draft Declaration of Principles. The question of
exempting reconnaissance satellites from any agreement to return space
vehicles inadvertently landing on the territory of other states was also
raised not only by the Bloc, but by some other countries as well. The
Legal Subcommittee was unable to reach agreement on any substantive
1851108. The US Delegation in the Outer Space Technical Subcommittee,
which met concurrently, proposed that reports on general national plans
for international spec o activities be submitted to the Outer Space
Committse and agreement vas reached on this point. /t was made clear
by the United States (ancl by the Soviet Union) that such information
1011 be submitted on a purely voluntary basin and at the discretion
of the reporting state,
5. There are at preriont no international agreements on disarmament or
arms control. Bowyer, the esent US disarmament proposal, to which we
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are committed, includes a provision which mould affect the reconnaissance
satellite program, The Treaty Outline on General and Complete Disarmament
of April 18, 19625, includes as a measure in Stage One provision for
prohibition of "the placing into orbit of weapons capable of producing
maas destmction," For verification of this measure, inspection of
vehicles and advance notification of all launchings of space vehicles
and missiles, including information on the track of the space vehicles
or missiles., mould be provided. In addition, the International Disarmament
Organisation would establish any arrangements necessary for detecting
unreported launchings. FJTIA11y, the production, stockpiling and testing
of boosters for space vehicles mould be subject to agreed limitations.
The US is also committed to consideration of a possible separate dis-
armament agreement limitod to banning weapons of mass destruction from
outer spa - We have notq, however9 advanced specific provisions of such
an agreement.
6. It is deaf that in negotiations involving outer space and disarmament
certain issues have besA or will be raised that have serious implications
for the US reconnaissance satellite program and on which the US position
must be carefully formulated and vigorously defended,. Our negotiating
posture is weakened, however, by current security restrictions that
prevent us from making a N11 and convincing explanation of our position
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to Allies and friendly neutrals. We are increasingly in danger of being
Isolated in negotiationn on seemingly minor issues, whose implications
axe bettor perlerstood by our enemies than our friends.
A earetei eeview of official statements on US plans for a reconnaissance
eatellite prnram, of present free world attitudes toward the concept of
oatellite reconnaissance? and of the probable extent of Soviet knowledge
of our program, indicates that the US might privately seek support from
allies and certain neutrals by impressing upon them the importance of the
program to the free world, the requirements it imposes on US negotiating
positions on outer space and disarmament matters, and US determination to
protect and pursue the program.
7. Public official statement?, budgetary funding of the reconnaissance
satellIte program, and limited publicity about launching of developmental
vehicles aseociated mith the program, have committed the US to some degree
of public acknouledgeeet of this program. Intent to develop a reconnaissance
capability i3 on YG301'do No official statement has indicated wbst results
might have bean achieved or information obtained from satellite reconnaissance.
8.
The eeietence of a US requirement for effective intelligence on the
SinoeSeviet bloc is generally clear to the leaders of the principal
countries of the free orid? as well as to official, military and some other
groups in those euuntries. Available evidence indicates that these elements
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generally support US efforts to develop reconnaissance satellite gystems.
In some easet4 US activities in connection with satellites (not specifically
reconnaissance satellites) have elicited concern. In Japan, for example,
there has been reluctance to cooperate with NASA on the establishment of US
tracking facilities because of suspicion that military activities might be
or become involved. In Zanzibar and Nigeria also some groups have argued
that the presence of US tracking stations is inconsistent with a neutralist
posture since the stations mey involve US activities of a military nature.
These scattered evidences of concern suggest that a concerted Sino-Soviet
bloc campaign attribut.ing sinister and threatening motives to US military
(Including reconnaissance) natellite programs might elicit a favorable and
sympathetic r _ction not only from anti-US elements, but also from some others
concerned over lally heightening of international tension. US private diplomatic
efforts to gain support for the concept of the right of space reconnaissance
would probably counteract the Soviet campaign to some degree, though it is
unlikely that the US could at this time gain widespread support for a positive
affirmation in the UN or other international forum of the right to conduct
space reconnaissance.
9. It is particularly Important that the US avoid public statements about
our satellite operations that mould pose a direct political challenge to
the Soviet Union on the sensitive issue of reconnaissance. The Soviets
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would feel compelled for reasons of prestige to react very strongly by
any of a variety of political moans to such statements. Similarly, if
the Soviets wore able to obtain any convincing evidence of the US
activity they might, even if not compelled to do no, use the opportunity
to launch a major political offensive against the US in an effort to end
the reconnaissance program.
10. There can be little doubt that the USSR is aware that the US is
engaged in a reconnaissance satellite program, though they are probably
in some doubt as to its precise effectiveness. EVen in this respect, by
exteapolating from knout U-2 photographic equipment, they can probably
make a reasonable estimate of the resolution of cameras that such a
matollite could have, Theo is reason to believe that the Soviets are
developieg an anti-satellite weapons system and they may have some
capability for anti-satellite operations by 1963. While the US probably
cannot keep the Soviete from attempting physical anti-satellite measures,
our objective should be to make the Soviets pay a political price for
doing so by creating a climate of acceptance of the principle of freedom
of apace, US handling of its pdblio relations on reconnaissance operations,
and on US development of anti-satellite capabilities, will have an important
bearing on this question. Mbreover, there are a series of technical
measures which the US can use to counter hostile active countermeasures.
On balance it seeme probable 'Mat from a technical point of view it should
be possible by coueorted efforts to maintain an effective reconnaissance
program despite hostile eeuetermeasures.
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RECOMMENDATIORS
General Principled
1. The United States should maintain the legal position that the principles
of international law end the UN Charter apply to activities in outer space
and, specifically, that all of outer space is free, just as are the high
seas. The US should therefore continue to avoid any position declaring
OP implying that observation (reconnaissance) activities in outer space
ars not "peaceful use," and are not legitimate.
2. The US should, to the extent feasible, seek to avoid public use
of the term "reconnaissance," and where appropriate use instead such
terms as "observation of the earth," or "photographic satellites."
Further studies should be made to determine whether there are releaseable
data, such as mapping information, which would help create wider public
acceptance of space observation and photography. The argument should be
made along the following lines:
Iternetionni law permits observation of the earth from
liter space whether by visual, electronic, phAographic,
or other means? Such action is peaceful in character, and
does not interfere with other activities on earth or in
space, For example, we consider that the observations made
by Major Titov while aboard Vostok II, as indeed any other
observation which the USSR may be conductsrg from outer
apace are peaceful, Observation of the earth from satellites
makes possible the accomplishment of many tasks beneficial to
mankind, such as weather forecasting? resource surveys, mapping,
and geodosy. Many such activities have military applications,
but this does not mean that they are non-peaceful.
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At the same time, it is recognised that the US cannot entirely avoid
or disclaim interest in reconnaissance, since to attempt to do so would
be unconvincing, mould render the US vulnerable to charges of deceit
and evasiveness, and would preclude efforts to broaden acceptance of
the principle of legitimacy of space reconnaissance. Therefore, where
feasible the US should also seek to gain acceptance of the principle of
the legitimacy of space reconnaissance, although we should avoid pressing
the iBtille to a decision in any 'world forum unless and until we believe
we could carry a majority on the issue.
As a step in gaining each acceptance, certain international legal
bodies composed of Allied countries, such as the Legal Advisers to NATO, ?
offer opportunities for furthering acceptance of the principle of the
legitimacy of space reconnaissance.
3. In the face of a sustained Soviet campaign to outlaw reconnaissance
activities in space, the US may be compelled to take a public stand on
the legitimacy of the nrinciple of reconnaissance from outer space.
In this case, the US should to the extent feasible continue to base
its position on the above two general principles, but it would probably
become necessary to make explicit and clear our position that reconnaissance
from areas beyond the sovereignty of a state is not unlawful, and is not in
itself aggressive or a violation of the United Nations Charter. Specific
tactical reactions would depend on the form and circumstances of the Soviet
political ass ult.
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4. The US should not at this time attempt to conduct a truly clandestine
program (by utich we mean a program with covert and unregistered launchings?
and public denial that the US is engaged in reconnaissance), for the
following reasons:
(a) it is already officially acknowledged that we are developing a
satellite reconnaissance capability;
(b) it could be used to undermine our claim to legitimaey; and
(c) it could tend to discredit our integrity by forcing the US to
violate or alter present registration practices pursuant to the UN
resolution which we ourselves proposed, and which was unanimously
adopted by the General Assembly (111GA Resolution 1721-XVI). However, it
is recognised that if the USSR should employ effective countermeasures,
drastic changes in present operating procedures mey be necessary, perhaps
including establishment of now launch sites which would permit truly secret
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launchings Tho The US should therefore investiggli'the technical recadrements
for a standby capability for clandestine operations in ease circumstances
ever make such operations necessary, even though such operations are not
now planned.
5. It does not appear practicable to attempt to submerge our space
reconnaissance programs in the over-all RASA scientific space program.
The present practice of not identifying individual military space launchings
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by mission or purpose is sound. However, current public information
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practice tends to focus speculation on the very programme eleh not to
publicise. We believe that there should be nore open Nut not more
detailed) public reference to the general over-all militat7 program, \\
whose stated objectives would purposely be left vague and broad (space
research, communications, observation, and the like). Information
officers could announce or refer to all lannehinge in terms of a
?,
single over-all military program. To be successful such a program
requires elimination of any in publicity between various
shots, and requires that all launchings uniformly be given broad
generalised descriptions. It should be stated, when the question
arises, that the US has no program for satellite or space veapone.45iP
6. The US should not, at this tine, publicly disclose the status,
extent, effectiveness or operational characteristics of its reconnaissance
program. Strict control over public statements and backgrounding concerning
reconnaissance satellites should be exercised to ensure consistency with the
policy guide-lines suggested in these recommendations. Satellite reconnaissance
should not be associated with possible future weapons-carrying satellites,
since relationships to disarmament and other matters differ. As little
public attention as possible should be given to development of anti-satellite
CRpailitiOS? *Ed in publicised demonstration of developmental work toward
such a capability should require White House approval, with fell account
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given to the adverse effects for our reconnaissance satellite program.
We should avoid agY indications that physical countermeasures to
reconnaissance vehicles mouId be justified, and as appropriate the
US should make a positive effort to propagate the idea that Interference
with or attacks on any space vehicle in peacetime are Inadmissible and
illegal.
7. The US should discreetly disclose to our allies and selected neutrals
the feat that the US is engaged -An a space reconnaissance program, making
each disclosure in a manner that viii preserve the essential security of
our program while impressing upon them its importance for the security
of the Free World.
In order to preclude the inquisition by the Communist Bloc of usable
evidence of an official US acknowledgment of a poli qy to conduct satellite
reconnaissance over Bloc territory, disclosures should generally be aade
to selected representatives of one government at a time, avoiding disclosures
in international forums (except for the NATO Council). Disclosures Should
also be made on a verbal basis only, without written aide mires or other
documentary evidence remaining with the country involved.
In carrying out the foregoing controlled disclosure procedures it
should be stressed to recipient:1 that the 118 mill not be pressured out
of this program, and that their cooperation is essential in parrying
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Soviet efforts to apply such pressure. The US should note that, emeept
in some cases for specifically' defined disarmeaent agreements, the US
cannot agree to (a) declarations of the precise purpose of all satellites,
(b) declarations of the equipment of all satellites, (c) general require-
ments for advance notification of satellite lannehings and the tracks
of satellites, (d) prelaunch inepeattmnof the satellites, ar (e) a
specific definition of peaceful uses &space vhieb does not embrace
unlimited observation.
8. The US should stand by' the disarmament proposal for a Stege One
provision banning weapons amass destruction in space, and providing
for advance notification and inspection of all space launchings to
insure that ban. The DS should continue to exclude any ban on recon-
naissance satellites.
9. The US should omit-nefersawto-satellitenrent=spain
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any proposal for notifications of lone-range missile firingss-imiLthary
..,jammerslialmierr as part of a proposal for measures to "reduce the risks
of var.' If attention should be drama to such omission in subsequent
debate and it mould seem to be incriminating to oppose the addition of
reference to them, disarmament negotiators should be authorised in
advance as a fail-back position to agree to advance notification of
satellite launchinge along vith notification of intermediate and later-
continentalsissile firings.
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10. The US is now committed to a discussion of the possibility of a
separate arms control agreement banning all weapons of mass destruction
from being carried in satellites or spacecraft, with appropriate verification
controls. This proposal does not indlade a ban on reconnaissance satellites.
The meMbers of this Committee are not agreed on the net advisability of this
proposal, which of course depends on pdlitioal considerations apart from its
effect on the reconnaissance =Wilts proven. They are agreed that no
such proposal should be tabled until the question has been reviemmd by the
Committee of Principals on Disarmament, with careful consideration of the
present report. The Representatives of Defense, CIL, And
do not believe that the US should advance such a proposal,
because of the possible berate the reconnaissance progren and the limited
value of the proposal. The Representatives of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, , and believe such dangers can
be controlled and that the measure is in, net an advantageous initiative for
the US. Arguments pro and con are summerised below.
Arguments Pros
The USSR is unlikely to accept such a proposal, tut
the US record of willingness to make such =agreement
would bring favorable 'world reactions. It is easier to
prevent armament of space than to get agreement to
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subsequent disarmament after the arms race had been
extended to outer specie. An agreement alungther lines
proposed by the DS could make a positive contribation
to the national security in that it would help curb the
arms race in an area of potential military significance
and reduce the threat of teebnological surprise in an
area where the Soviet Union, by virtue of its greeter
payload capabilities, enjoys present advantage. Moreover,
since the US has committed itself to examining such a
proposal, reversal of our position would raise doubts
as to the sincerity of US pablia statements and disarmement
positions, and perhaps adversely affect other political
interests as U. Heconmatimnummt vehicles mould not be
included, and such farther campromiee of /Jimmy of our
reconnaissance program as sight result from Soviet claims
that inspection for nuclear weapons revealed presumptive
evidence of reconnaissance would be largely offset by their
very acceptance of an armament mhicb, did ma boa recon-
naissance. The Soviet disaramment proposal itself provides
for Is ben on weapons In orbit and does not include a ban
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on reconnaissance. Also, agreement on such e measure
would create a political context in idlich Soviet
hostile countermeasures would bemire peliticaIky
costly to them, although advance notification might
assist hostile countermeasures.
Arguments Cog:
The USSR wou3d. use the occasion of debate on suchaben
to efts& reconnaissance satellites, and might t7 to
blame failure of agreement on US refusal to include a
ban on reconnaissance. It is important also to bear
in mind the possibility that the Soviets might decide
it was important enough to them to stop our reconnaissance
pewee actually to agree to an inspected ban on weapons
plus reconnaissance uses of enter apace. If the USSR
agreed to a ban on nuclear 'weapons in orbit, but excludieg
reconnaissance, they would learnmsch about our recon-
naissance operations (even though the degree of inspection
would not provide details such as resolution of photography),
and would be aided in physical active and passive counter-
measures by advance notification of launchings.
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