THE MISSILE GAP CONTROVERSY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000100020079-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2003
• Sequence Number: 79
• Publication Date: December 1, 1970
• Content Type: OPEN

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ROY E. I.,ICI:I.IDER
.Douglass College
Rutgers University
The disputes surrounding the formation of military
policy are not famous for their clarity, yet, even so, the-contro-
versy over the missile gap stands out as a muddled issue. The con-.
troversy arose in the late x95os as a result of intelligence esti-
mates that between 1960 and 5,64 the Soviet Union might have
more intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) operational than
would the United States. Assuming the existence of a missile gap,
opponents of the Eisenhower administration argued the existence
of a deteircnce gap, that Soviet supremacy in ICBMs was so great.
that the American strategic forces could be eliminated in a -single
massive attack. Administration spokesmen generally conceded the
missile gap but denied a deterrence gap on the grounds that the
American strategic forces were too numerous and varied to be
eliminated by a single attack and that the leaders of the Soviet
Union were aware of this fact.
We now know that the administration's contention that a mis-
sile gap did not necessarily imply a deterrence .gap was never
tested, since the missile gap itself never developed. Therefore it
acknowledge with gratitude the assistance of BruceFM. Russett, Morton
.H. Halperin, and especially Ii. Bradford Westerfiield.-
is almost impossible ,to evaluate the question of the deterrence
gap, and we shall not endeavor to do so here---although, as the
administration quite rightly pointed out,, thus rather than the mis-
sile gap was the relevant issue.
The missile gap was the result of a deliberate decision by the,,
Eisenhower administration. The United States had many more
strategic bombers than did the Soviet Union.' However, the Rus-
sians had recognised before the United States did the importance
of the ballistic missile as a? delivery system for hydrogen wea-
pons;, and they appeared to be ahead. in developing this new
weapon which might neutralize the 'American advantage in
manned aircraft. It was obvious that the United States, to meet the
challenge, would have to develop a ballistic missile,; the question
A06Th atFk' 4914 M9/12/02 : CIA-RDP75-00001. R000100020079-9