SECRET U.S. REPORT DETAILS POLICY IN DOMINICAN CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000500100009-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2003
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 14, 1965
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP67BOO446ROO0500100009-7
H aYi 4b iii'fYJV r VVLWi'ti ) iT ytV V W f
secret U.S. , ort Details
Policy in Dominican Crisis
i/ By MAX FRANKEL.
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Nov. 13-The Johnson Administration
wants to keep secret its testimony to the Senate that threw
new light on its intervention in the Dominican Republic last
spring. It fears that publica-
tion of the record would re-j
kindle . a bitter debate and
furnish new ammunition to
its critics.
That testimony, drawn last
summer by the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee from high
officials of the State and De-
fense Departments and the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, pro-
duced evidence of the following:
Mat the United States ex-
plicitly solicited from a rump
military junta In the Dominican
Republic the urgent requestlast
April 28 that it send troops to
protect American lives.
9That at the start of the Do-
minican civil war last April 24,
the Administration decided that
only the military could effec-
tively prevent a Communist
takeover. It worked behind thel
scenes to bolster the military;
forces while still professing non-;
intervention, but was prepared
to use its own troops if the'
rebels gained the upper hand.
Record Is Voluminous
9That the United States was
'determined to prevent the re-,
turn of former President Juan
Bosch and to prevent a victory
by his rebel supporters because'
It believed that they had made
"an effective alliance" with Do-
minican Communists.
That after landing 21,000
troops in the Dominican capital:
in what was then described as!
a neutral peace-.keeping opera
tion, the Administration seri-!
ously considered an attack to,
,wipe out the rebel force and!
was deterred only because ofj
the high number of casualties
it would have inflicted on
women and children.
That even before the revolt
the United States gave not only
t extensive economic aid but also
political advice to the civilian
junta of Donald Reid Cabral
even though it knew from its
own public-opinion polls that
the junta had no popular sup-
port and was planning to cancel
elections scheduled for Septem-
ber. The United States let the
. I. A. train the police force
?,~ on Pa a 32, Column I
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U. S. DATA DETAIL
DO1ID ICAN POLICY
a3owever, the paper is also still)
`secret. It is more clearly aimed,
produced a white paper cover-I
`in 'the files of the Foreign Re-
lations Committee. The Admin-
lstration was gven a promise
by the chairman, Senator J. W.
'ullbri ,ht, Democrat of Arkan
is as, that it could edit the tcs
:timony before it was published.
f' Instead of pressing for publi
ation, the State Department
senate's, inquiry last July into
he decision. to land troops in
unto Domingo remains locked
Continued From Page 1, Col. 3
f~nd warned the Cabral junta of
Mr. Bosch's "endemic plotting."
The voluminous record of the
at justifying rather than ex-
plaining the intervention and
does not make some of the
najor points developed at the
hearings.
L. Mr. Fulbright, in criticizing
the intervention, has fallen nto
an almost personal feud wth
president Johnson's principal
adviser on Latin America,
T'homas C. Mann, Under Secre-
ary of State for Economic Af-
airs. Their argument at the
1earings has continued in pub-
Pic speeches, but neither has
published the written record
upon which their rival interpre-
Mann the Key Witness
Administration's desire to keep
the Senate record secret was a
principal reason for not publish.
,In-
the white paper.
Though it is much more dis-
.paper, the testimony to the
deeper insight into the attitudes
and motives. of Administration
;polcymakers as they watched
'the crisis develop and traded ur-
gent messages with the embassy
in. Santo Domingo.
Mr. Mann was the main wit-
ness. Among the other con-
tributors to the Senate record
the most important are said
to have been Cyrus R. Vance.
Deputy Secretary of Defense,
and Vice Adm. William F. Ra-
born Jr., Director of Central
Intelligence.
Persons familiar with their
testimony have extracted from
the record the following roughly
chronological account of Ad-
ministration atitudes and activi.
ties in the crisis:
The C.I.A. knew of four plots
in March and April well before
the start of the rebellion against
against the civilian junta led;Bosch was said to have signed;
1by Mr. Reid Cabral. These plots i an agreement with the left wing
were traced to Mr. Bosch, thelof a small Dominican Socialist`
IInly legally elected President Christian party. Moreover, ac-
af the last 35 years, who was cording to intelligence informa-
deposed by a military coup lj tion, he "reportedly told" a
d'etat in September, 1963. resentative of a po-
Mr. Bosch, in exile in Puertojgroup in the spring of 1964 than
Rico, was officially appraised'port eeded ana wanted its sup-,
as an incompetent "poet-prof es- This and other 'information)
sor type" and a "do-gooder,- about meetings of Dominicans
who n common "with many was said to have persuaded)
Latin-American politicians," ac- Washington that Mr. Bosch and
cording to Mr. Mann, "would selves s Communists, s, though not them-'
selmunists, had entered
make an allowance with the a "coaition" with the Castro
devil himself if he thought "it ites, who in turn solicited sup-I
would get him into office." 1port from two Dominican Marx-
In his alleged plotting, Mr. k ist parties.
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 STAT Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP67B00446R000500100009-7
Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP67B00446R000500100009-7