CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE JACKSON/IDEALIST PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP33-02415A000300060021-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2001
• Sequence Number: 21
• Content Type: REPORT

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kCCOF O IONS YO&THE A ON IDE/:LI`S`f ? G
25X1A6a
25X1X3
25X1X3
25XIX3
It"
"C' S ing_._for
I DI .,Radii of
The ~os of this paper is..-twofold. Firstly, it is intended
to hi igh son Iac integr ti n rithi .the ckson/Ideal t`
t
requirement~
int >out
ion of the
ulAJ is intended as a means o resenln to
far is Churn. in an acceptable form, the various operational
considerations inherent in the mounting of dackson/Ideali?st missions.
1 tit 4a" I TM A" C014
!%,- So that the information may be presented in a logical pattern
it has been necessary to assume various hypothetical areas for
future operation. Assumptions have been made also with regard to
the likely period of operational liability
AREAS OF INTEREST:'
3. The following areas have been selected as being of possible
mutual interest for future operations:-
(a) The Middle East. The area of the Middle East
includin specifically Iraq, Iran, _ and the 25X6
25X6
(b) South East Asia. The general area of South East Asia
including specifically Laos, North and South Vietnam,
Cambodia, Burma and Thailand.
(c)
Indonesia.
OPERATIONS ABILITY PERIOD
4. In order to provide typical details for the deployment, stagi
and logistic requirements, the problem has been examined so as to
cover two separate types of operation:-
(a) Deployment to a forward base of one aircraft and
two pilots with the intention of mounting one
mission followed by subsequent rapid withdrawal.
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(b) Deployment to a forward base of two aircraft
and four pilots with the intention of mounting
ten missions during a thirty-day period.
JUSTIFICATION FOR A JOINT APPROACH
5. The Headquarters Idealist concept of operations includes the
'fast move' for staging to a forward base. The main reasons for
this are:-
(a) Security.
(b) Aircraft Serviceability.
(c) Possible limited political clearance or agreement
for the use of a particular staging base.
6. In order to achieve this fast move concept whilst keeping pilot
fatigue down to an acceptable level, it has been found necessary to
position one pilot, for each aircraft, at each staging base en route
to the forward base. Reference to the staging examples at Annex's
A,B & C will show that there are invariably at least two stagings
involved. The penalty for this in terms of pilots required is
considerable and the following points become self evident:-
(a) It will not be practicable to employ the fast
move concept using Jackson pilots alone.
(b) Now that Detachment 'G' has been reduced to an effective
strength of six pilots it may be necessary, at least
for ce,,rtain areas of operation, to use Jackson
pilots for ferrying on Idealist operations.
7. The foregoing paragraphs point to the logical solution to the
operational problem, namely, a joint integrated programme based
upon the following three types of activity:-
(a) A mission or missions which for political considerations
may be flown only by Idealist pilots but for which
Jackson pilots may participate in the staging.
(b) A mission or missions which for political considerations
may be flown only by Jackson pilots but for which
Idealist pilots may participate in the staging:
(c) Joint missions for which there is full integration
of Jackson/Idealist pilots in those areas where this
is politically acceptable.
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dR'
8. In order to implement a joint programme of this nature a much
closer working liason would be necessary at all levels and particularly
at the operational levels, than is in effect at the present time.
The re-introduction of the Idealist/Jackson reporting procedures
would also be a pre-requisite.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTSAFFECTING CAPABILITY
25X1A2g
9. The J.75 Eneine. Detachment 'G' now has two aircraft fitted
with the J.75 engine There will be a tot4al of five aircraft
so fitted by abo wb March, 1962.
10. Performance. The following are some realistic planning figures
for aircraft with full fuel load. They serve to highlight the
25X1A2g essential differences in performance between the
25X1A2g
25X1A2g
25X1A2g
25X1A2g
25X1A2g
25X1A2g
(a) Initial level out at 62,500' after 35 minutes,
reaching 70,000' when 200 gallons fuel remain.
T.A.S:- 415 Knots. Range:- 3,900 Nautical miles.
(b) Initial level out at 66,700' after 35 minutes,
reaching 70,000' after 3 hours 12 minutes.
T.A.S:- 395 Knots. Range:- 3,400 Nautical miles.
(c) When flying for range the cruises at
70,000'. However, it can reach after 25X1D
5 hours and cruises at that altit a or a total
distance of 3,240 nautical miles at which point
there will be 100 gallons of fuel remaining.
(d) The maximum aitAtude profile for the reaches
- with 200 gallons of fuel remaining after
7 hours. Range is 3,060 nautical miles to 100
gallons remaining.
11. Tactical Concept. The present concept is that except for
missions in those areas where the known defences are of little
consequence, or where contrails do not constitute a serious problem,
that penetration of denied areas will be made, invariabl at
altitudes around 70,000'. Altitudes of 70,000' will be25X1D
maintained at all times whilst over denied territ ry. ssions
that are planned to conform with this requirement will usually
suffer a reduction in range capability; this Is accepted in the
interests of tactical expedience;
12. In-Flight Refuelllng. Detachment 'G' now has one - fitted
for I.F.R. There will be a second - so fitted by December,
1961. In-flight trials have been completed successfully and it is
hoped to start pilot training an the Unit in the near future.
It is expected that only aAIR certaiin number, probably some fifty-
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23. The suitability of bases from which to operate in the areas
under review has been considered in the light of:-
(a) Possible radius of action.
(b) Security of use.
(c)' Possible approval for use in the project.
(d) Facilities.
The accent has been placed on the use of
25X1C8a bases as it appears that for the areas of the world under review
such bases are eminently suitable.
The Middle East.
25X1 C8a 14. base at - is the most suitable in the
25X1A6a Middle East area. It is located in sparsely populated area well
away from towns and the problem of foreign labour on the airfield
is at a minimum. The resources in terms of housing, feeding,
technical accommodation and storage facilities are adequate and the
runway is excellent. It is well situated for coverage of the
areas of interest; reference to the radius of action chants at
Annex 'D' will make this point blear.
25X1 X4 15. -target area can be covered from - direct,
25X1A6a but if necessary, is available for staging or emergency.
4( The bases a are available from
25X1A6a which to stage for certain areas of Iraq and Iran. However, these
two bases, although suitable for staging, have only natural
runway surfaces and this would probably preclude their use for
a prolonged operation.
South East Asia.
16. The entire area of interest in South East Asia, includi
25X1 X4 can be covered from two bases,
25X1 A6
a The former is a b
25X1C8a necessary facilities, the latter is a joint /Civil operated
25X1A2g interest to note that of Strategic Air Command-have been
25X1 A6a operating from Bases during recent months in an overt
operation; this fact could be useful in formulating the cover story.
25X1 C8a
Alternatives.
25X1C
17. If the use of bases as outlined in
paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 is unacceptable, the only alternatives
envisaged at this time are the United States bases at Adana and
Neither of these two bases is considered to be as suitable in al
respects as those already proposed.
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ase and it has all the
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Radius of Action
18. Radius of action circles for all of these bases are at Annex 'D'.
The circles are all based on 1000' miles; this can be extended
depending upon the amount of time to be spent on photography on a
particular mission. The safe maximum planning figure is for a
round trip of 3,400 nautical miles with the this reduces
to 3,060 nautical miles if maximum altitude cruise is required
for tactical reasons. See paragraph 10.
25X1 C8a Some Special Considerations
25X1 C8a
use or Znese Dases nas Deen given i u wii.i. uv nuvcoxsrxi-y vv o vuuy v,,.-
-communication problem in detail with all the information on
existing chantaels of communication available.
21. For planning purposes it should be assumed that, particularly
in the Far East, a period of up to two months prior to depployment
may be required in order to set up adequate communications.
19 . Geer . The logistic prlem, including the prepositioning
of fuel is largely the same whether a United States or - base
is used, however, there are bound to be certain administrative and
security matters which will require detailed examination; it is not
anticipated that any of these problems will be difficult to resolve.
f0< Communications. The provision of an adequate communications
system is vital for this operation. In the Middle East area it is
anticipated that adequate facilities can be provided by positioning
CW staging kits at the base or bases concerned and by utilizing
existing communications networks. However, the Far East area poses
1 a more difficult problem because of the distances involved and +as"el the
various deleterious tropical effects on radio transmissions. The
positioning of suitably powe?ed CW radio facilities may be required
at the operational bases. When approval in principle for the
PROCESSING FACILITIES
22. Unless them is an urgent requirement for interpretation of
photography, it is assumed that the film would be sent to the United
States for processing so that advantage may be taken of those
facilities which afford the maximum quality ofroduction. However,
25X1 D
oth
of thes2units are operated by the Strategic Air Command.
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