OVERVIEW/NATIONAL FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00772A000100010026-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: January 17, 1978
• Content Type: MF

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DCI/IC-78-3705
17 January 1978
1. EMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James 0. Bush
Permanent House Select Committee
on Intelligence
Acting Deputy to the DCI for
Intelligence Community
SUBJECT: Overview/National Foreign
Counterintelligence
The attached discussion of the United States
111,tional Foreign Counterintelligence effort is intended
to provide a : ramewwork for the FBI and Do?J presentations
to the Program and Budget' Authorization Subcommittee on
19 January 1978, and CIA's presentation on 20 January.
I hope the Committee moi bcrs will find it an informative
overview of the rational aspects of our counterintelli-
gence program.
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Att: Paper on U.S. National
Foreign CI Program
(DCI/IC-78-3706)
Distribution:
Origi,, - Addressee (Mr. J.O.Busli)
A-D/DCI/IC
IC Registry
1 - 0PP
1 - OPEI
1 - OPBD Chrono
1 - OPBD Subject
D(--I/ [C/OPBD 116 Jan 78
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DCI/IC 78-3706
16 January 1971
FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OVERVIEW
The national foreign counterintelligence (FCI) effort is
conducted by five agencies under three programs, i.e., CIA/FCIP, FBI/FCIP
and DoD/FCIP. The DoD program is conducted by three military service CI
agencies, i.e., United States Army Intelligence and Security Command,
Naval Investigative Service and Air Force Office of Special Investi-
gations. The five agencies cooperate in what is essentially a collegial
system.
2. An important step toward improving management of the
national FCI effort was accomplished in 1977 by including all of these
agencies' FY 1979 FCI programs in the NFIP for the first time. Prior to
that only the FBI's FCI program was clearly identifiable. Establishment
of a national FCI policymaking committee is included in the draft
Executive Order (E.O.) prepared as a replacement for E.O. 11905. All
FCI agencies seek to detect and neutralize hostile intelligence services,
and a national FCI committee can provide authoritative guidance to the
DCI in exercising his NFIP resource allocation and program evaluation
authorities for FCI programs.
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3. ^ The national FCI effort must cope with a hostile intelli-
gence service threat greatly increased in size and in sophistication of
capabilities. The hostile threat within the United States is characterized
by wider geographic access, by use of sophisticated technical collection
equipment, and by an operational climate influenced by detente which
assists Communist Bloc intelligence efforts.
a. ^ Within the United States the number of Communist Bloc
officials alone has increased 50% during the past four years so
Sino-Soviet Bloc officials assigned
to the New York, Washington, D.C., Chicago and San Francisco areas
alone, about=of whom are known or suspect intelligence officers.
It is likely that the actual long-term intelligence presence is
greater than these figures indicate. FBI experience has shown that
there is a relationship between the number of Communist Bloc officials
stationed in the United States and the extent of hostile intelligence
activity.
h. 0 In addition to this increase in the long-term official
Bloc presence, the number of Bloc visitors, including those partici-
pating in commercial and cultural exchanges, has more than doubled
since 1972. During the first 11 months of 1977, for example, 5,180
Soviets visited the United States under the East-West Exchange
Program, formally titled, "Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation in
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Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural and Other Fields," up
from a total of 2,080 in 1974. Known or suspect intelligence
officers in this group numbered in 1974 and ^ during the 1977
period. A recent exemplification of the problem occurred at the
Soviet National Exhibition in Los Angeles, California, November 12-
29, 1977. Approximately 400 Soviet nationals came there then, over
300 directly from the Soviet Union and close to 100 from the
various Soviet establishments in the United States. Of these 400,
were known or suspect Soviet intelligence officers.
c. ^ Another aspect of the increasing threat is evidenced
in the visit during the first nine months of 1977 of 316 Soviet
vessels, with a total crew complement of 15,034, to the 40 open
United States ports.
4. =The threat involves carefully orchestrated and related
efforts by Bloc intelligence officers operating against the United
States in third countries. There are more such officers abroad than
ever and their American targets tend to be more relaxed and susceptible
to recruitment. While hostile intelligence services continue their
long-standing efforts to penetrate the United States Government and its
armed forces, these services are also directing their operations towards
bridging the technological and industrial gap between the United States
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and the Communist Bloc nations. They aim to recruit our scientific
personnel, steal our research and development technology, and develop
information on the economic policies of the United States. To help
accomplish this, the Soviet Union maintains diplomatic relations with
over 110 countries. In each of these countries intelligence officers
(KGB and GRU) are assigned to the embassy and trade representation, as
well as to non-diplomatic installations such as airline and shipping
offices. Using validated criteria for identification of Soviet intelli-
gence personnel, CIA has identified approximately
Soviet officials who are serving abroad as either known or suspect
intelligence officers, but believes that the actual number may be
approximately
To counter this integrated worldwide threat, there are
cooperatively constructed strategies and priorities. The FBI and CIA
have primary FCI responsibilities at home and abroad, respectively. The
military CI agencies coordinate with the FBI or CIA depending on the
locale; and while responsible only for their own service security
protection, they help the national FBI and CIA efforts appreciably.
The foundation of the national FCI effort, however, is the
FBI's FCI program. The high proportion of the total FCI resources
allocated to it reflects the fact that the major hostile threat is
within the United States, and that its FCI responsibility is
comprehensive detection, identification, penetration and neutralization
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(including prosecution when appropriate) of hostile intelligence service
and international terrorist personnel and efforts. Because the resources
of this program are smaller than those of the hostile services arrayed
against it, the FBI has developed a number of techniques to ensure more
effective "stretching" of its resources.
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8. 0 Supporting both the FBI and CIA national FCI program is
the DoD FCI program which primarily responds, however, to departmental
and military service FCI needs. Each of the three military service CI
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agencies now exercises central direction and control over its respective
CIA activities worldwide. It is through offensive CI/CE operations,
principally, using double-agent operations, that the DoD/CI program is
a major supporter of the FBI and CIA national FCI effort.
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