THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM (INFORMATION AS OF 1200 EST) 12 SEPT 1963

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A001400060002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 3, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 12, 1963
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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DOS, JCS, ARMY review(s) completed.
THE SITUATION IN
SOUTH VIETNAM
(Information as of 1200 EST)
12 Sept 1963
PREPARED FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.
FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED.
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12 September 1963
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(Information as of 1200 EDT)
Our embassy in Saigon, reporting on a quick opin-
ion sampling of Vietnamese willing to talk to Ameri-
cans, finds that since 21 August there has been an
increase in disaffection and discontent among practi-
cally all leading elements of the population.
Except among students, however, this disaffec-
tion has not been translated into antiregime action,
and the embassy believes it is likely to remain pas-
sive as long as no dynamic leaders emerge to energize
the opposition.
The US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, as-
sessing military attitudes, finds the top commanders
committed to the regime in spite of disgruntlement,
with some feeling that if anything is to be done it
will have to be undertaken by the US. The war effort
has not been appreciably affected.
Both assessments find discontent centered more
sharply on the Nhus than on Diem, but there is wide
disagreement as to whether thay can be considered
separate entities, and whether Diem can in fact be
separated from Nhu.
General Dinh, military governor of Saigon and
commander of the adjacent Third Corps Area, report-
edly has been jockeyed out of both commands by dis-
parate military and civilian elements who consider
him ambitious and unstable. His slated replacement
as Saigon military governor is considered strongly
anti-American.
Student unrest continues but disorders are being
held in check. There are reports that suspected stu-
dent leaders are being rounded up at night.
The Viet Cong may be attempting to launch con-
certed attacks in their stronger areas to cash in
on any vulnerabilities engendered by the political
situation, but government counteraction has been much
more effective than press reports indicate.
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I. ASSESSMENTS
1. The US Embassy in Saigon reports that dis-
content an i-sa ec on ave ncreased since 21
August among top civilian echelons, urban profes-
sionals and students, and to a noticeable extent
in lower levels of the police and security services.
Except among students, this attitude has not crys-
tallized into antiregime action and is unlikely to
do so unless strong leadership should emerge from
some quarter.
(The embassy notes that this survey of
current attitudes is based on a quick sampling of
those persons willing to talk to Americans under
present circumstances,)
a) Among top government echelons, con-
fidence in-Diem and Nhu has been impaired, but
Diem is less a target than Nhu. There is an in-
creasing tendency to regard them as inseparable.
Nhu is respected but hated and Mme. Nhu is even
less popular, Most GVN leaders feel powerless
about the situation, but many would probably jump
on the bandwagon of a successful coup. Vice Presi-
dent Tho is regarded as well-meaning but not force-
ful. Foreign Minister Mau has gained stature by
his resignation,
b) Among the civilian bureaucracy in Sai-
gon, resentment is less sharp than among intellec-
tuals and students, but morale seems low. These
groups feel committed to GVN policies and fear re-
prisals if they talk freely,
c) Among province and district bureau-
crats there has been an increase in frustration
and some lowering of morale. Province chiefs, how-
ever, are an exception since they are hand-picked.
They feel the move against the Buddhists was neces-
sary. Information on district chiefs is scanty,
but they are less politically involved with the re-
gime. Most bureaucrats feel Nhu holds the real
power in the GVN. Attitudes seem to vary with lo-
cation, martial law having left many smaller com-
munities unaffected.
d) Among police and security officials
some top-level security officials including Mili-
tary Security Chief Do Mau are reportedly
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dissatisfied, and Police Commissioner Y more so than
ever before, Special Forces Commander Tung is loyal
and will go along with the regime. Almost all levels
of the police had become increasingly antagonistic
toward Buddhist demonstrations before the crackdown,
and many upper levels endorse the actions taken.-
Medium level officials, however, have expressed the
feeling that the actions were too severe and many
feel Diem and Nhu have lost face. Some demoraliza-
tion is reported in Hue. There is no indication,
however, that the police at all levels will not con-
tinue to work with the Diem-Nhu regime.
e) Urban professionals, intellectuals and
students: This group has been in large part disaf-
fected for years, although many have respected Diem
and focused their criticism on the Nhusa They tend
to believe the US is in large part responsible for
the regime. Their reaction to the crackdown on Bud-
dhists has been emotional, Their confidence in Diem's
ability to rule even without Nhu is greatly impaired,
although some still would accept him in such circum-
stances. They tend to believe the war cannot now
be won with Diem, but talk of turning to the VC seems
largely visceral, and they are not generally impressed
by a neutralist solution.
f) Labor: The only important group, Tran
Quoc Buues CVTC, appears shocked by the action against
the Buddhists and blames Nhu. While more disaffected
than previously, the CVTC and Buu are likely to fol-
low a policy of caution. Buu believes that if the
Ngo family survives, the Nhus will get worse, but
seems to see no clear alternative to Diem.
g) Buddhists: Buddhist leadership now
seems temporarily fragmented and the new GVN-spon-
sored Buddhist hierarchy is probably. unacceptable
to most of the Buddhist following. The Buddhist
campaign has promoted greater cohesiveness among
Buddhists in general. Militant leaders such as Tri
Quang have lost all confidence in Diem but have not
proposed any alternative,
h) Catholics: The majority of Catholics
have sought to dissociate themselves from GVN ac-
tions against the Buddhists. Many fear that they
may eventually suffer from heightened religious
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tensions. However, there has been some tendency
among Catholics, particularly in Hud, to close
ranks behind the government as the situation has
deteriorated.
2. The following are the main points of
MACV's survey of military attitudes:
a) The military remains loyal to the re-
gime, although confidence in the regime is not as
solid as it was.
b) The military regards Diem as the proper
and legal head of state, although perhaps poorly ad-
vised.
c) The military blames the Nhus rather
than Diem for the regime's troubles.
d) Ranking officers consider Diem and Nhu
inseparable for all practical purposes. Junior
officers, however, tend to regard them as separate
entities.
e) The military looks to the US to elim-
inate or reduce the influence of the Nhus. If
this is not done,, the military will accept the':
status quo.
f) The war effort has not been affected
very much, and military discipline remains good.
g) The military remains essentially pro-
US. The crisis has not caused any discernible
shift in sentiment toward the Viet Cong.
3. British Ambassador Etherington Smith in
Saigon feels that the Diem regime has overcome the
Buddhist problem and is strongly in the saddle. He
feels that even though hatred of the government is
very great in the middle and upper classes and is
bound to affect the war effort, attempts to get
another government will probably fail, and should
not be' tried even if inaction also spells failure.
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__~
IV. MILITARY SITUATION
The scope of Viet Cong activity on 9 and 10
September suggests a possible attempt to exploit the
political situation in South Vietnam, but--contrary
to the impression being given in some press reports--
government forces responded effectively and inflicted
heavy casualties on the Viet Cong.
The Viet Cong launched a total of two attacks
in battalion strength and three of company size in
the Fourth Corps area south of Saigon. The three smaller
attacks on 9 September, on widely separated outposts,
were simultaneous, suggesting a concerted operation.
Late on 10 September the Viet Cong fired 20
to 30 rounds of mortar at an important American heli-
copter base in the delta without hitting their target.
V. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
1. Italian Ambassador D'Orlandi in Saigon sizes
up French policy in Vietnam as one of wishful thinking
by De Gaulle and French Ambassador Lalouette that ne-
gotiations between the North and South will lead to
suspension of guerrilla warfare and a restoration of
French economic interests and political influence.
Ambassador Lodge agrees with D'Orlandi. Lalouette
leaves for France today for consultations.
2. Prince Sihanouk sees neutralization of South
Vietnam as the last hope for that country, and advises
the West to take this "last chance" if the Communist
camp offers it. In an editorial in his weekly news-
paper, The Nationalist, dated 10 September, Sihanouk
dismissed as unrealistic any notion that all or both
halves of Vietnam can be neutralized. Sihanouk ex-
pressed the belief that a Communist takeover in South
Vietnam is inevitable. He fears Cambodia's fate
will also be sealed soon afterward.
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