AFRICA REVIEW
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010031-6
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
May 18, 2004
Sequence Number:
31
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 8, 1978
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
p National
For Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00912AO027
Assessment
Center
Africa Review
Supplement
8 December 1978
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AFRICA REVIEW (U)
SUPPLEMENT
Sudan: Numayri's Ethiopian Dilemma
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In the wake of the recent reversals suffered
by the Eritrean guerrillas at the hands of
Ethiopian forces, the Sudanese Government is
reassessing its policy toward Ethiopia.
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Sudan: Numayri's Ethiopian Dilemma J
In the wake of the recent reversals suffered by the
Eritrean guerrillas at the hands of Ethiopian forces,
the Sudanese Government is reassessing its policy toward
Ethiopia. The Numayri regime is confronted with a dif-
ficult choice. It can continue to allow Sudan to be used
as a conduit for aid to the Eritrean insurgents and risk
Ethiopian retaliation by attempts to stir up trouble in
southern Sudan, or it can deny the use of Sudanese ter-
ritory to the Eritreans and incur the anger of the
rebels' Arab supporters, especially Saudi Arabia. At
present, the pressures to continue supporting the
Eritreans appear to outweigh the incentives to stop.
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The Sudanese have been active proponents of the
unification of the three major insurgent groups and have
sponsored meetings in Khartoum designed to promote this.
Their efforts have been unsuccessful, however. The loss
of Keren, the last major city under Eritrean control,
has been attributed in large part to the failure of the
Marxist Eritrean Popular Liberation Front to obtain the
support of the other two groups. In recent weeks seri-
ous clashes have occurred between the moderate socialist
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Muslim-dominated
Eritrean Liberation Front/Popular Liberation Forces.
The'latest fighting was apparently initiated by the ELF
and on at least two occasions spread to Sudanese terri-
tory.
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continuea support o e ri reans w1 1 ease
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the risk of Ethiopian-Sudanese border clashes. In late
November, Ethiopian regular forces attacked an Ethiopian
Democratic Union camp in Sudanese territory, and since
mid-October, the Ethiopians have been supporting former
southern Sudanese rebels who have been raiding across
the border into southern Sudan from bases in Ethiopia.
The Sudanese would prefer, if possible, to avoid a
direct conflict with Ethiopia. They are conscious of
Ethiopian military superiority and believe that the re-
cent Eritrean defeats will free major Ethiopian units
for deployment along the Ethiopian-Sudanese border.
Following the attack on the Ethiopian Democratic Union
camp in late November, Sudanese forces were ordered to
engage the Ethiopians, but not to pursue them across the
border. Numayri has repeatedly indicated his desire to
meet with Ethiopian leader Mengistu to arrange a polit-
ical solution to problems between the two countries and
the Sudanese President reportedly plans to raise the
possibility of such a meeting with Tanza --President
Nyerere in Dar es Salaam on 9 December.
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Nevertheless, it appears unlikely that Numayri has
any immediate intention of reversing Sudanese policy and
preventing support from reaching the Eritreans through
Sudanese territory. To do so could cause Sudan serious
difficulties with Saudi Arabia. Sudanese officials are
already fearful that Sudanese support of the Camp David
accords could lead the Saudis to reconsider their deci-
sion to help ease Sudan's financial plight. Since mid-
1978, Saudi Arabia has provided Sudan with $350 million
in aid and rescheduled their share of Sudanese official
debt on highly favorable terms. It is possible that if
the Eritrean setbacks lead to a Saudi decision to cease
or limit the support for the insurgents, Numayri might
then be willing to limit the support for the rebels as
part of an understanding with Mengistu. There is no in-
dication at this time, however, that the Saudis v de-
cided to end their support for the Eritreans.
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