PROBABLE CONSEQUENCE OF ALTERNATIVE US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THE BAGHDAD PACT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000500020009-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 2001
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 19, 1956
• Content Type: MEMO

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1. Now- i
CENTRAL lNTELLIVMs AGENCY
cffi(x or NA 'ltllS,A3. E TIM
19 November 1956
STI ' MOMRAM Nom 89-56
SOMCTg Probable Coaaequences of Alternative US Courses of
Action with Respect to the Plagh"d pact
1- Tkcertainty about the US relationship to the Baghdad Phet
has figured intly in the emplex per struggle .Ch has been
going on in the Middle East over the last two Years. As originator of
the regional defense concept embodied in the 1'ct and as the supplier
of military aid to all of the Middle East
mngmrs of the pact group,
the US has shared in the OffrObrium vented against the Pct and its
members by the USSR, by India and other Asian neutralists, and by Egypt
and its Arab friends. At the :same time, hover, US reluctance to adhere
to the Pct has been a major factor in the struggU between the pact
members and their regional rivals. The Opponents of the pact have sought
to play up the disadvantages to the US of becoming overly identified with
the pact group as against other countries of the area and have exploited
the ambiguity of the US position to ermine the pact and its Middle East
me 'bers
o The latter, in turn, have repested,l r Pressed the US to make a
firm and open co fitment to they pact a Although this press abated some-
what after the US decision in early 1956 to pirticipate in the economic
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CLASS. CHANGETS S
AUTH: HR 7Q?2
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and countersubversive activities of the pact organization and to sit in
as observer on the military side, the basic desire of the pact members
for a firm US cc it itment remained unsatisfied. Strong pressure for US
adherence was again applied following Egypt's nationalization of the Suez
Canal at the end of July 1956 and, in the mmke of the Anglo -French
military intervention In Egypt, bee now been rend with special.
urgency by the four Middle at manbers of the group.
Consequences of Early US Adherence to the Nphdad Pact
2 Early US adherence to the Paghdad Pact would be generally
interpreted as a dramatic demonstration of US determination to oppose the
extension of Soviet power and influence in the Middle at and its willing.
ness to take a strong stand against the efforts of Nasser and others to
undermine the Western position in the area. As a result it would do much
to dissipate the general impression of US weakness and indecision which,
over the last two years, has done much to diecourege the &Wbdad pact
governments, to weaken the will of friendly or uncoemaitted elements in
other Arab states to stand up against Egyptian or Soviet inspired anti-
Western pressures, to stimulate efforts to play the US off against the
USSR by Nasser and others, and to encourage greater boldness in Arab and
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Soviet efforts to undermine the Western position. The position of
the Baghdad Meat govervi nts would be considerably stresngthen*d, all the
would view US adherence to the Paghd ?^~ Pact as
a welcome sign of a hardening of the US attitude on Middle last smatters
and as a reassertion of US leadership in the Western gusto The possible
ed~:'.! G'~ ca~:l.
adherence of oz or more/Arab states would probably be increased,*
especially if it became evident that substantial US support for the Pact
was forthcomingo
3- Soarever, early US adherence to the Da~ Pact would also
involve responsibilities end difficulties. its lasting effectiveness as a
means of rallying and providing leadership to those efts in the Middle
East which for an* reason or another oppose the spread of pro-Soviet and
ultra-rationalist influence In the arm would depend an US willingness to
regard it as the first stop in a more positive regional policy rather than
as a one-shot gestures The 8sgbdad Pact countries would alma -- certainly
regard US adherence to the pact as ackuow nt of their claim to
continuing occas-cmiie aud military suppoer't. (probably at increased levels),,
and if such support were not forthcoming their present adegiv'inge about the
wisdot of a pro-Pact, pro-US policy would recur. Should us adherence to
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the pact be follwed/by what the present Middle must members regarded as
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fat ' mm "M tom*' soosiIiation or appsssement of Dasaw aM otte.
aatia*,ust advaota of aoc O 14 with the ftviet 33 o, there teaalg1
be a
growing try to ttw act of adbae and %gw additimal
aid teem is coonsction with it as empty gstw " desigaad to
peopitiiate the 24864" Plait Gaup rather tbsn as
gsanuina manifestati ous
of iat+aot.
4? UO "bWwft to the Bap., Aad
Ant would al.o laid to an intensi-
the
fication of the opposition to Which/08#
despite its efforts to remain afoot,
he. alseady incurred is the Mddlas Asst and to misgivings in VMious
9IMPt4ws. dress the US
wen PVPWed and wilting to most the.. probabla
*ballseSea and iegivings, a dacUiean to Join the Doodad !fiat might serve',
to weaken ratter than to Strengthen the US position in the
lLtcZdlre Asst
5- The U Mr which almost certainly regards elimination of *4e
Iagbdad Brat as a major goal in the era, would do its best to l'.Lscredit
the US and vfthen its ire in the Middle RUM.. Altboui Nasser and
llk*snde~d lftdws in such states as :aria and Jordan might still hope to
induce the US to switch back to a visa neutral position in Middle Bast
aft Ira, they would probably revert to the attitude of hostilitye:s44
by Nasser in his speech eatiastlising the Sues tuna! and Would essentially
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depend on pressure tactics r4atbs r tbaz cc ciliation and concessions to
ruin W good wilt and support. Both they a=d the UM night, am& to
cams up with a daamatic riposte to tig accession to the Dagbdad Itet, ss
through a lattist coo p d'stat in 8yria? Jordan, or Iraq* or tbr'a -
organized efforts at sabotage of Tapth ,-Jaw o and after UB Installations.,
The UWM would probably counter with new warcinge, possibly unds chard by
threatening military maneuva va and gestures against Turkey and gran. Boy'
ever, we cc tinue to believe that the US= would wish to avo Et a situation
presenting a ssa?ious threat of a major military clash with the West
In their efforts to cvu nt act and discredit U8 adboreace to
the B%OW Pact, the Ui8i8Q and the Pact? s regional ononacts would be able
to glary an the stroaag au ti.W steam and natiovaliat asa which pervade
the Arab-Asian vorld, Ltke the press ut mire of the Dagb&A fact, the US
would be undw the special n&vssity of reconciling its wills es to
rasa ats with the LE in the Da0dad Pact with its disapproval of the
latter "s, actions in the Suez crisis, and would finds it considerably mare
difficult to do so than with eentiaund association with tbs Z in NATO.
79 Early L adbeez nn tope Me~ and ~I aft would elm be likely to
arouse disapproval on + Vie part of a and othe is of waste n
military aa1 as and., coming at this tiu, would probably arouse soma
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teas, not colyr by these cmmtries but by otbesj, that t). Cdr as
dvlibs~atsly ebaZlsngiag the U3 at a particularly delicate stage in
1nternaticeial aPhira and was in 1-ffrct undermining UN efforts to
stabilise the situation.
9. Timim The liklihood of strong adverse ft actions to us
adte3 -oe to the Pact -+ not only an the pert for its avowed opponents
but also by many others -- would probably be greatest at tae Weaent
unsettled stage of the Sues crisis. If the t1B, for example,, Vera to join
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the Viet b fo a same sceaamgdstian bad boea reached with s t to I (
control of the canal *o2 and the rem ml ct obsttuati , its efforts
at the %E to achieve some degree of stablUxation of the Suez and
Aaleatino situations might be sasrious1,y hampered and the risks at drastic
c action by t3 tt and its Arab collabcr tore 1 o Since
those problems we likely to rain esewt3*lly uvrosolved tear a consider-
able period, bad, the hazards involved in a policy of ice to the
Da"ad Pact will, also ted to be cc iouirrg a m&# and moaawhIlt the
pasasitie n of thoa urging prompt US adberean is likely to be under increas-
ing attack. Althau& the govwvmnft concamed (I kistenn, trans and, Zraq,)
ado-t, be reassured and mollified by private US undertaakinga to fain the
34ct at the Iftabded Fact Margie In Januarys, n the LaNOWMato crisis
in the dills last ml&t bave rasa sit, they would almost thinly
be greatly disc over any 1prolonged delay. At the saw tip,
confidential assurances to certain pro4setea Isaderep such as Pr aideaat
Cbuwm of Lebanon, of s t decision to adhere to the pact at an early
date mid encourage them to tats t tavorabli attitude towd it, and
might 1=4 co or more Arab states to join at about the saw tic the tai
decision was szmounced publicly.
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a e>! Continuad W Pefueaeel to Adbeft to the
10. UB rstu rl to adhoM to the Badbded Pact voulzd ahoy the US to
retain a certain of leei y in its efforts to rsaolve the p rcb3m
it fens in dsaling With the Ar'ab?l.Piern nations and. with the t1 t4 By
refusing to give the neutr Beets t for accusing it of ' -
tion with military all1w"GO
and by refusing to align itself with a at of
Middle 39ast entries as as iaet their regiamsl w1vvalsp the US alit be in
a better position to seek ea b nsive ac tion wide the forms OC
*tioeeliean arl anti.colc ulalie a in the Arab-Asian world. It w ,d also
avoid a furtbw source of friction with the t cud migf-t thereby ftcilibtaete
en easing of the present rlav*W n the 9i et Bloc and the West.
11. A t this s t a g e , however, these p o t e n t i a l 04WAtMOD s highly
msbul oho t prospects f r an effective detente with the in the Middle
Rust and elawA by do= l t1y with the unfoIAUs at the Suez
crisis wd mitt actually rea r TurUwr if the t1 and its local collabom-
twe b rine cea nced that the U to unwilling to oypwe then firmly a el
extrw= tion. The Qs eb]lish nt of an effective uncle rata Ming
harslet
with the vautzalist and aatioaoaliet et in the Axsb.Aa een world in,
in turn, likely to be a long a difficult Vrocess, in which * e ision
on joining or not joining the Pact would probably not have a
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decisive influsnae. Despite the piaudita the US bias won in the Arab-
Asian world for its fartlur3ght stand on lsraelip British anct French
military intervention in , it remains a subject of suspicion and
criticism tbreughoext the Arab?Asisn area.
12. As we noted a year ego in EIS 30-4.55, continued m refusal
to adhere to the pact would probably lead to its eventual donise and would
be a severs blew to the )Fiddle mast govez'vzaentn supporting it. Already
dissatisfi.d with what they have considered to be US U villqn ss to
sqV04* its f*lends, these governments have felt i=Waaaed rid for I
backing as a result of Nsasor?s increasing influence and pansstig+e in the
Middle lost, t h e growth of Soviet p and influence in the area, and the
went sharp decline in the ability of the 1Z to serve as an acceptable
coil to those faeces. While it is probable that y and possibly
also Pakistan could adjust to the fact of cootinusd US refusal to adhere to
the pact, the Shah of Iran would alueet mainly have increased misgivings
about Iran's exposed position vis-a-vis the t and vaaA probably be
e3WONA to Inareased domestic criticise for having unwisely d6parted from
Iran? a trsditiocaally mwe neutnl ccL ,,e. The MLMI 8aid regim would remain
in a particularly preearioame- position because of its relatively isolated
status in the Arab world and bemuse of its vuJ=ftbI3.tty to criticism
over its special coouec ,ans. Tout the Arab world, el,~nt8
disposed to loots to the US for suppart, would resin on the defensive.
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13. One alts ttve means at d tratfasg Lid f rte abip and
it for the Baghdad Pact g would be tba ofgnature of bi]at +al
deter egrawants with and Iraq, the two mananrs not a3rasar3y
covered by ree;laaaal daf+aese a1iianaas with the ua. (Tur&ey is covered
by its O mob my ship mad Pakistan by SRM.) Suer a tactic would have
the eAvautqp of ebieldiaag the W frraau see of the fire which bets been
diversted against the Ba~ Fact
It would take care of Irsan?s sU-kwg desire tear a formal datenaae accedt-
meAt ft= the Ua
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at Vith Lsba io az Seuali Arabis, both or which desire US Rupp t.
g , i t w o u l d m the virtual abandaa~rnt of atay etart at political,
a c is auod defense coopaaratIon an a regi o 3. basis and thus lases the
at $om visas is the rptis-mod Mac and the
ice.
1.4. For theme reaamep a resort to bilateral. with Irauu
mil Iaraq wa bay be 3.ssa eftective t *$ adbwmm to the
Baghdad Pact as a meaai of rraasasrting US Imadftrahip is t mreso The use
of tbla apWoach would a1a t certainly be aaeiraed upon by the tit, Egypt,
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snd otbero as sa atterm to Wtch up an otberviae indefeasible s sngs?
mean amd as a furthsr retreat from the ariginal cow of s camprebsusive
regiotsl argoiastioeio l6aroove r, e n if the US suro sd. in retaining or
p e r h a p s t 4 ng to its IitddL. Bast allies by this mmsns it vc i1d be cm-
fronted with increased responsibilities to tbe? but with liffitad
fiscilities tar recocci33ng their divergent .conic, military, sad
Political interests anti demt-nds o
Amm"Ih
I CONFIDEWMAL
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