WHERE WE STAND IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000500090003-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: PAPER

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WHERE W E STAi`TD ID3 ViETN.Ait+I
I
Few subjects today geyser-.ate as rs~nch etzxrrtiona..l h~oat ae the cc~mple~
struggle for freedoxra now being waged in Vietnan2. The issues involved are
poorly understood by many critics of your goverx3ment's policy. These
issues cannot realty be understood or intelligently discussed without a
clear appreciation o! the struggle's complex history. To see clearly where
we stand today, we must first go basic to the beginning.
Tha origins of this war are routed in the political arr3bitfons of the
leaders of the ~J'ietnarr~ese Cor~-munist Party, no'~v known as the i,ao tong.
Ever since the Party was founded in 1830, its leaders have had one
unwavering and overriding objectives the- acquisition of political control
ov+sr all of Vietnam. This prirrxary objective has also had what might be
called a negative corollary to which the Lao Dong's leaders have also
always subscribed: that by whatever means necessary the Party must prevent
the evolution of an independent Vietnamese state structure not under
Gomrnunist Party control. The insurgency rovhich began in 1'457 and has
evolved. into the war we are fighting today was deliberately started. by the
Communist Party. The Party opted far Svar because at recognized that the
hopeful achievements of the Iii?rr2 govexnment'~s early years, if not. checked,
~~ ~~ ~r ~- Q~ ~4~~v
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could; teed tc~ the evolution of a viabte nc~n-Communist estate. This was a
devetognxent the Party had tc~ smash before it b~ecaxxze an fnsuperabte
obsta.cte tea the achieverx~ent of the Party's primary objective.
the fate 1$Stls, South Vietnam ~vae beset with basic. social and
political probtezns. Its p+eogte vvsrs inheritor~a oaf ail th+e suits of divisive
colonial rote and stood dared ir- the- aftermath of almost two decades of
anarchy a~ chaos. d3espite its m
sing aspects, the }~exn govern
rnent even in its ea-rty years vvae far fraria perfect and made many xzxistakes.
The Vietnamese Communist Party did everything it cc~uid to capitalize on
the exr~ars cif the Saigon ~verz~axacnt. to es~a.cerbate the basic probtems
and difficutties 4f ties 5eauth ~'ietnaxxxese p+~ople andr wherever possibte, to
prevent the Saigon Cowernnc,:e~nt from addressing itself effectively to their
solution. The Party was interested only in its own goti#ic~l aggrandizement,
he vrelfare of the paaple of Yietnan~
misery inflicted on them
in the Party's ruthless guest for power.
It is, of course true than even had there never bees a Yietna~nese
Gammunist Qarty there would have bean unrest in South Vietnam g+aneratfng
political t~trliulence ,~rhi~h might have found saxx~e e~rpressioa~ in arrn.e~d
protest. 'I`ha fact remains, however, that there would never- have been a
war of the kind. wee are ~vvaging today with all it,~ attendant hurx~an gnis~ery
had the 'Vietnar~r~ese G~smmunist Party not adopted a deliberate policy of
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attempting tca dictate 5t~uth "~`etna.rn's pa2iti~al future- by farce of arrz~s.
'The Party did not create many of the basic malad,~uetmente~ and mtreeses
in Strutix Vietnamca~e oociety and ix~ the Vietna~rxese body politic, but it
aystematicalty e~cploited these basic evils for its a~uvz~ goitica? advantage
and did eve
,aribte tc~ ,prevent nc~n-frorr~munist nati?~nal,ists fro~rx
resolving tbern. ~e Pasty xnada the deliberate political decisic,n to start
t$e war and, ~rvm the morrxent of its inception, has. directed ~e wa.r frcna
F~-rty headgaarters in ~aagvi.
The stx^ategy emplc+y~ad by the Cnxnmunst Party in the course of its
attexx~pt tt~ dictate South Vietnam's future by i`vrce of arrrne has gone thrraugh
aever~el clearly defi~xed stay~es. 'rum 195? to i95'~ the Party relied primarily
caa r~ubveraion and terr~orisrxx largely Carr#ed uut by persar~e native to South
Yiet~ brt~sm actions w,~re coordinated through Party ~ehannels, under
~ianoi's direction, 'i"hie +Ca-txxpai~n of terrorism and autavereion took .a
heavy toll, garti~xlarly those co~n:ponents of the gC'~vlbrnxxie~'it mho were
trying hardest to better the lot a# the South Vietnazr~ese people anti whose
a+etvitiea, eonaequentiy, t~rere regarded by the C+~xr~rnunist Party a;s s: great
~liticai threat: the schaalteachers, the village nurses asxd even rxterx~bers
e~f the r~zoaquitc~ +contrc~l teams attempting to eliminate the age-c~id scourge
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s~f rra~rl~tria i'rorx~ r
South Vietnazx~. Such pea~aans wes~s m~x1~~s~ ~a~rl~~r
illation and,. where that did not work, brutal as~assi~xation,
This early c8-t'~ipai~~n c~# terrorism az-d aubvarsfon v~raa designed to
recreate the ana~xchy and chaos of previous yeaxs sell black. furthez political
progre~ta. This. ;
~xx complicated the gosh#ve euffoxts of the mierr~
but dfcl t prove sufifcient to topple that gt~verxus~ent. In 1
therec~re, the Commaist Psarty decided that somathing more vvae xequir~td,
said escal$t+~d tae struggle to a new stager the national liberation war.
fiver largex a9urx~lar,ra o~ ~3tetn~ese of ,aouthero; oxgixx resicle~st ir. I~rth
'V'is-t~~ax~ were c+xgaaci, trained and d$patchs~d back to the ~aouth to develop,
sacpand send direct the V'ie~t ~aa~g military amd political apparatus. Thin
phaa~e o? a~teadily iateneffg~#rig struggle waged under lanai's direction
pri~rnaxily with persona crriglna:tly nat3ue to South V'iet~ lasted #rom ly5y
until l 9~fi4.
1 ~~~ Hano3. eecala,ticn a~aturally prompted a subst;
increa+re in our support an?t advisory coAtributQn tca our beleaguered South..
Vietres+e allies in thefr double task of turning a ate,#te~ed e+acie~tlr ~,r~t~s
~x~ee nation vvhfle efmultaaeously coping with steadily mounting aggreaaan
directed and supported. from Fian+~i. Whey Pxesident Kennedy took ot'fice,
v-e ~ about ~3Qt~ xnilitaxy persc~rr,l in South ~'iet~, ~y the end csf 1~63~
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this nu~n'ber had been ix~creasec3 ms~re than twentyir~id to ~n~t cv,~x l~r, Ot3t~.
By th+e ~~~ of 1943, hc~wevex, Hanoi had s
cage that ~va-
south avsx 33, t?~ ctisci~plined
. These wexe not advis
Insteadr the
csrganis~ex~s, ?lirectcrs ar-ci field comrx3arxdeare of the rnc3unt
assault ox~ the freedom c youth '~ietnam?
,are th
ate. aprir~g ~~ eaxly scurnmex~ of 19~6#~, +~ F+arty p'olftburo
iu Hanoi revel
the biddia~g once again and deckled ~ take another step
Qt escalation. to the a#texmath of ~.exrs's ~,verthxow, ns>r~-~Ccmznux+st
uth ~ietnarn vv+~xe trying to creates- a political structure
n~~e to their needs axed the realities of the crisis eituati+ou. 'There
,. _ - ,;
wares nc~ traditional or ir-stit~xtic~n~a1 pzecesclente to guide them in this difficult
Lack, which the ~nmun:ists ~rexe doing everything ~ssible t?' coxnplicste.
'~ riot alv~ays peaceful cornpetitic~n of ~va.riaus groups engagesd in testing
reslatives political stxemgths, striping, politics.'! balancee, and forging
a vvax prt~duced a g,akoci deaf cif turbulences.
this unsettle~ci polio
~ia:z~oi thought it saw a golden Qpp4rtunity
to deli~esx a cou de r~.~ to its- near-Communist natioxialirt crpp~c+nents fn
e sov-th by in~ectiisg line elexx~esnts of ther Naxth Yietnarneee Axx~y into the
Hang
n numbers sufficierxt to collapse youth ''fiiet~.ase resitetances to
t such tslements begarx movie
augh Laps in the fall ~~
19 and began t# lea thesix places on then southern battlefielS Tate that leas
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ar~d early in ~~#+~. 'Thin 1#64 Party poxi~y decatran ni#.tated what has
became a prc>gree$ive and ev'+ex mare blatant i~tcrrth ''~ietnarxxa~aton a~
y aspect cif the etruggte. '1?aday there are almost twig ae rnany
T~oxth ~ietna
Vii. e.. sptithe~n
their hsatt~rical ~
Ngrth 'tt'fetnamesa~ s
ps. and. manor unf
n~ largely if
~t3.11 called "YC#' because a#'
predr~n~
x'etly made up cif
tes in questit~n here are very important. Given the lead tune
r~ece+~aary to in~plerrient such a dec~aon, frorx~ the fact thst lfine elements
~-~ the Wirth ~ietn
s dearly ~:ade tong; before the ~?ak3~n fief #ncidents of the
~~~ eve can be certain that they polfcy decision tc- dir~patch them con~3d not
have been taken later than. the early sucnrr~er of iqb~. 'That decieian~ xx~y
friend
1964 many msntha before the greeent bom~-ing carx~paign began
~`ebr~xa~ry 1'~~i5, cloee tc~ ~-. year lsefore we sent even a battal3crn of
3~iarines in to gird Danang airfield and s. ~~ yeas befcare Preei+dent 3ohnsas~
;psanded: to Hanoi'a act~ane by dispatching organised '~S unita~ to ,loin the
~uvere moving thrnngh Lame in the fall. o
'ht to rauth ~'ietr~arn. "i'nu
~o~v better, #hat the
hear it argued by many, including some
ion csf North ~Vietna?.n~ese trcoga intn floe
be+sn but a r$eponee to your go~rernxner~t's +tescalatic~n.. *'' T`he
is airnply not true. In fact, it is the precise agpc+site c~i the truth,.. l~'c~rth
trnopa fightl;s~g in mouth ~3,etnarn as them are ac
.~6~
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'V3atnainese trocp~ ware put in this struggle not bccaua+~ H~.noi vsra~
responding to our- lnvolyexxxent but ba~cauae Hanoi. believad that the diagatch
~f ~ruch tro?~pa would enable th+e +~ammuniat Party to topple tha Saigon
~c-vernmer-t before that goverer~t could become strong etxough to xesist
such an ir~rra~ian.
III
1~ith the in,acti~sx of North Vietnamese tros~pe, a~sd the ~xxtxerican
opa which. came many rn:ontha later, tha ~ruggle entered ~ ~Shase that
d from 1965 until th+~ aurnxner of 3967. l'~uri~xg this period the
~ornrnunists did riot succeed in tcsppHng the Saigon ~overnrn+~nt or arreatir~g
the process of gciitical evolution arr~oag non-~oznrnuniat Yietnarneee
natifln~liats. Instead. deegit+a aurfac+~ disturbances, the FFi,epublic of
made pcslitica3 pr~agr+~ss that in the aggregate vas txuly remarkable.
~'~,rtherrnore, a Comrr~unieta lost the strategic Yn.ilita.ry initiatives durirsg
th~,a p,sriod and found thermelves beset with mounting problt~ms. As ~: result,.
last sumxxae:r them rovers yet another review of the bidding in Hanoi and
another s+~ri+as Qf strategic decisions which have moved the struggle into
anothea~ new phase.
'T'h+e present upsurge of Gcamxnux}iat activity im South 1i`ietxxaa~: --
including the "'I`et 4ffenaive`~ -- is ~e outgrowth of this strategic debate.
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which hoe max~ffe~ated ft~elf publicly ~~ varir~us irnportax~t sp~s~schea and
articles by Cflmmunist leadersr neat notablgr Giap~s "Big `~ictorg, Crest
T`ask}'' of September 196' and ~ Ju~xe 19b7 artfcle published under the isen
~a of "Truoag Son-- and. written bye a North Yiat~eae~ ,general named
Trap who until he ~vaa killed in tY~e T"et +t~ftensive vvas cans of ~e tvp
ct~mmat~ders ~ the VC. forces ink Vietnam. From such published
mate~ria~l, the recall of North V'ietnarn~s ambassadors to Hanoi aad ether,
x~or~e sensitive evider-ce, a cen build a general picture of the tons and
substance cif last surnrra+~r~s disc~xsarion and decisions.
lic evidence of thta dacusaf~sn, such as the ~rtf+~laa~
e~t~tioned is vary eonfident tone., The Vi~rtnannese Cpmrxiunists claim
to have mastered what they call our "special v+ar~~ ~~. e., a struggle in which
err~pl?ay ,t~ericart actv#eors but not American troops} and cla3rn that
co~ctinue~d ef3'oxt they can coge~ with cur present 'limited war. rr 'I'h~sse
pctblic documents, however, make it very clean that the+ Communist Pa:
at in orcTar to achiav+~ its paliticai objectives it had to couz~tasr our
ability to x~aaunt e~earch and destroy operations -- i. e. , regain the. strategic
initiatiae ~-- and it had to smash the deve2r>ping pacificativa prflgram.
Theac dctcumeats also :Hake it dear thst the Co~~arnu~aiats intend to p~ursua
political objectives by e~cerbatz~g what they call thm "contradiction
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between the Safgcrn Ga~ernrmex~t aed #te pec~gle, be~eez~ yQ~' gc~vernrnex~t
axed ate '~etx~:a~mesre aLliea. and ~e '~car~tradict[on,~" the Cc~rr~mur~ets see
U'. S. pc~ltt3cal life, 3. e. , crux domestic d3saex~t st the vvar.
f3+aepite the confident note etrucl~ in published antic
ncldf~x~ thc~~e deemed grimasi~}~ fir internal ''arty cone
principal rea+uon fax last suxxmxner's diucus~ti4n ~arae the ~?
and ~~aee+cheas,
esderahip
~cua~#n.~ cc~ncerr~ ~-~'+~~` wvhat ft considered the adverse ~4irec#on cif the be.sic
treads in the ~$eta~.arra~e~te struggte.
the depln}nxxent of L1S ga~~aut~d foxces iza yes
'~~ a Y~a~th 1fie~arne~te Arr~a-y: the ~c~mmu~xists hs.ci
iufti;~#ue. '~`h+~~ h~:d ~.c~t had ~- sigu~~#car~t tactica"~ eu~~ear ice: twra year.
This lack of even tactical succ~-ss way causiz~~ mounting mt~xale polalexr
,sir fc~xce structure. !fin insurgent arxn
bsorb revexsee but
w~.ll cc~tlapse if tc~c~ 14ng denitd some sense ?~~' torw8~d rnomentu..
re< alli+ed aetfr~ns during 196 auci early 151b? sha,ttcred the aura
,hat had once surrauncied ~CQinxzaunist military ae#one and
}~ Ior~,g ~aesn c~n~? o!` the Gramwnists' most potextt ~litical ~reapEans. The
~~~ 1esclership had to recogn#~ae that its fc~rcee were taI?ing h+tavy and
yes on tha field: of battle.
Tr~anoi aLsc~ ksd to reeagnire that the portion of the youth "~`ietx~anaee~e
t~"ptian tca which the Communist Part~- had re2~ati~~tely easy access was
M ~ y.
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teradily shrintsfog, ~ fact that c~.me through much. nar+~r+a c~earty x~. the
pagan ~f cagtiur+sd GQmnzuu~at d+acum~rr~ta thasi faY: the ~editoria~ columnar of
l~ad~s~-g ~aeau,~papera. 1''his ahrirtng pc~~u2atfon bane gc>aed ~.
fu~enta threat tc a Party's ab~ty #o susta3r~ the gretexree that the
V''lrrd~arn artzuggle ~-~ rea~;y a '~ss~utherrt cvfl ~.~. -~
Abr~va atl.
t Party was dfsturbead by the ~ao~.ftcal.
a3ralut~~n that. pact tahar~ place in South Vietnam !n the twv years bat~+veern
die sumrr~es~ of 19b5 and tha suxxixrxer of 19~i?~ a grocers whosre fundarnenta~l
sf,gxcieatacc vvas much xncrre keax~ly alrpre+~is.tcd by tha Hanoi. I~olitburo than
azty ~me+rics~n ,~ourr~aliste~ and palti.cfaue~. I~egte its problerrxs and
wea3crxe~se:s, the #gcu f.~arxum+~nt had rncavac3 ar~d eras rrrov~4ng in
era~ct~:cr~. then Pa.rt}* could naat talerate. Fragile arid. ~ib3e ae ita V'ietnaeser
gnd torei.gr~ cr3tfce ha.~e claimed. ~# to be, by the sutrkxxxer at 19~~ the
~epubl3c cf '~tatna~rs had a conetitut#an drafted hY an elect~sd ~sserr,bly
ch,+rrsen. an e~ectfcrx~ 3r~ which over hslf So~,th ~{i~+stnarr~x`s eutixe adult
pcaiaulation tocr~e frt. Irx additiarx to the x~atior eleactone which caught a
pr#rne~ attentlor~t of ~a fcrrei~n gran, the gavcr~mcnt had. also conducted
vklaga akud hazaa.let electicxna ai gr+eat pcrlf~tical ~3gnific~-nca. U~-der thG
ters~art o~ their ~ireae3~y drafted +~or~artituticrr~. the V~etr~eses geopler wezr~e ab~aut
tr, chaose a preasident, wise ~reaidcnt~ and a two chamt~cr leagis~:ature in
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eBecti~c~x~s Hano# kFnevy it ws.~- nc-t g~in~ to be able to d#~rupt sar grevex~t.
'I'h#s con~st#tut#,~z~al and eiectosal grQC~ssa~ ways far froxxz gerfect; but #t held
gc~e#tve hope ~. gxc-mia~e, and #t gave the goverr~zz~e~nt #r~ Sa~#~~~a an #s~f#n#tel~r
batter cla#rn ~ rnandat~s thaun an~th#x~g the Ccarnmun#e#a~ guPFat "I~at#onal
Z~#be~rat#on Fronts' ccau#d atfer. ,As the South '~ietx~amesa gsvgke ~v
~rat1>ar than. many ~merfcane. such; go#t#cal Wirer air the Front may have
r#ses gr3~r~ax#ly, #n Mao Tse Twr-g`s warc#s, cant ~~` the baxre
these ~,ys, mare otters than... not. a Russ#an or Fast Eurogean rxtiazxufactured
ahigged through china anc~ carried. by a Ncarth ~#atnames$ sold~.er~.
dcavelopnlat~te the Cc~xnms~n#~st party saw net only a
tsandas'x~ental threat to ita pr#rx~ary gbject#~*a of acqu#rrcg go13.t#cax c4r~tro
over ~ of ~t'tst~+aaen, but -- c~~ran v~arse ~., d#~sturbfn~ evidence that the
,'trats~
ade~gted tc~ p~~~r-
est a;i
e sfnigiy not working, for that- strategy had bean i~it#ally
ah cleveioprrrents ixoxr~ occurr#ng. In shc~r
along c3~.f#erent strategic 1#nes not because our
effarts w
to#~,#ng but because ~w#th ~r sugport} they
>ng to hold gsx~u#ne -_ aL~d, to Hang#, deeply d#t~te~sb#a~~ -_
ga~an~#t~o of success...
ccallagse t&e ~tepublie of 'Yic,tnam befczrrs #t became iraev?acabiy toe
a toreg+~
trategy vt pre~tracted war and dove swifty, whatever ba +~ hug
geaarai terms Leo's Leae#er$ decided 1as# s
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do tom. #~;oi ~ecic~ed to ~~hle, camYnit ~:+.~ as~a~!
rase ,..~
lcs i~,gotved i~ al~...rrut atfe~rt tv a~hiesus dscfs#*re resta~.te du~ia
ris
j~yV f
t~h9a~t ~-~ ~ai~s n~ stratsgX is to rsvsrss ~e~ krasc
th+c strug~'i
~~ that th~saea t~rex
~oieat.
Party ~otitbaro cleaxly ~~'~?~x~ised last
nest x~vexssd, sp~I:isd ~~r~ui
maximux~x sff~rt, I~arao
s$~,sr s h~p~s to ~1
~rity and, ~iki~
t o~rsxt~ms~at
becomes tc~o ~'tro tea a~e~xthrow.
d~y~elopn~ and before
~caz~ g~artcips
~e
~y
oaF
`i hopes de~t~ray the pr~litic~. baeia for
t:xamesa p~pF1e's stru~{~e 1o~r
ax~~ try crac& Akmerica'e +~ri11 to cor~ti~-ue~ sx~gp~arng that stra~~e.
free
f E+~+6~ ~.
._ ~_ ~~ ~~~-~~t that Hax~f chc~ee the A~?~ri+~an elaactian ys~rar o
a~ effort. jti~et~+~se +~amzr~e~n~:et ~t~lica~.~c~sa~ a..,,.
ate' ~emaostrst+~ clearly 'how c~,os+~~y ~aQi follows ~e vs~ces
d3scoxd
t~ States ar~d hc~w d~rue
r~ca~ disc~-x~a~+~ment a~~ discontent ever th+~ v~ar mo,~t tax a rr~ao~er
pt~~:itica~ly profitable tc+ tha ~"iet~ese Gamm~i~t cav.~a~.
'fie e~+esxkq' b+
ple~xrentati~sn
~arlC fox his ~rfa'Eer-springy c~~~a~#
erxs~atia~ tra
.. 1
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dlv~r# our re~reet end a##ea~#~:~tn awa~r from ~vuth ~~#na~'s r~xQet h+~a~ri~,yr
-g?~te+d areae~ #+~ ~e #h~y Populated frantiex~e. Th+e high casualt~r #vil;
pia
a# I.~oc Nfnh, ~?a3~c To. ar~d o#he~r ~n~ag+e~e3n#~ a~~ng sir mar
oet+~r~- atxd ac-rtherr~ bc~rd~ex~ bear xnu,#~ #eatis~nt~ny to the
Ct~nuxs~~s# Par#y's ut#~r d~eregarcl for harnax~ life in r~uit of its goli#ical
~#rateg~c c~b,~ecti~ree. ~'he e~harp buildup of Wirth '~fc~#uan~eae fc~re+~~
you#h Vfe~, nc~udi~~ #i~e d#sg~#ch cif a# ~eaa# ~avr~ a~dc~f#i~sna, ~via~ione
o~ ~~ Wirth ~'ie#~iarnese ~xmy ~~e 34th and. 32Q#h), sae also part a# th
]?ar#Y'e p~regare.#io~s ~cax aA all-ou# attack, att a##ack tha# e+~eme to have
"~~ Getzeral Gag hfmself. In #~.?~ Planning aax~d ex+~cu#ion of
cl~, Haa~eai has virtually abandoned aii Preter~~e tha# the aatxu~gle is
Y~ athe~x than a N's~rth V'ietxtaxne~a_rur~ wary tlu~ctgh both l~axZo
~d tha# rat ~#+~ ItiTL3~" gupgets have tre~ci #o nxafntafzx the. y1"h of
:Taal ~eouther~a ~truf~g~.er~ :ta their pronot~n+~~rr~ente aimed ~.# tQreigt~
zrxC+ve,~ o~ th
egrim~~, c~apeigrx ~xrere, of c+cn~rs~
built arou tYie oo-e~tll.ed t?Tet C3i~'+~asive. ~'
,n~ Qn the night
~q ~anu$ry~ Cornux~ist troo~e cleeeorated the rrioe# sacred anti #radi#inrl
+~ al1 Y'itatnae+~e holda~rs ;~~ xxaouating coordixu~ted ~ettac&s agafast e-~rer ltlt3
+.~ ,e~nti military Carets threughcut ~au#h Vistx~a~m.
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is ai~as
xnFact of the
sf'bl+~ fc~r .~r~eri.~ana tv s,~,pre~iate the psycholc~ic~el
picking th~.+~ rn,~; ent tc~
~a,s, I~Tew "Fear
all rc~lle~ ix~t4 +oane. ~v+erq ~ie~arr,eae is
Tet, tb.e lunar
and g`c~urt~. t~f
c1 to rein
_ _ __~ ~~~~ account to hi~a ancest+~ra cif hie cu~'to~Y ~~ #h+~
ily
+~ prec~sdin~; year..
public activity ceases as exrar
tlv3tie s,
lrtsn+a ex~gsgea in fgxrs.i
,.oriented
nd ceTebxatioras,. The- Ctrrnunists opted to xxxc~ve at Tet
~eae~uxe of ~ldespread tactical
- ---_,. ~.~...~ ~.~ to. To ac
ar,.d desl:ruction the C~mr~aurcist~r caused i~a desecxat~n
sucrcd gol~,ciay has
~,~, Tet ~# e. ~c~yc~ua time caFa ~,,xV..~..~--_-_~
ced a political r
~c~rnprehend. "T'tie ~~-mmus~ist
ys dust befc-r~e
an dif#ic,slt fc~r v~esterrzers
actions have- made it clear t+o the
~''ieta~.ese ~Pl~' that the+ Ps.rtY gill strap a'
__ ~..~~.~~t of ite political ob,
ab aalutely ~~
-
+~ ,..,Mess a.ctican+~ of ~Qmrnunist forces in urn ~ra~~ ..... --,~--
'etna p~rcavided a cleat foretaste of q~rhat fixture the Vetx~ar.xx~ese
th+e rrxrs
h
en
e~# !~` ~.ey evex c+~m.e uxsder Cor~nist x~e.
~~.~ es~ with the
asked the tcawrxs~ their c+~rnrtaisaars anal ,~~;ecu't~.caners ostne iu
a~tt
wive of trc~c~ps.
? hasl tsa take advantage cf the holiday atmt~ap;tzcra ~.~. ~.~__-_
t cif people throughout tlxe cc~ux~t~rY ~,n
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Much ~ has beep: epit3ed aad xnaa~ haa~da- wruxYg over ur-fo~tunate
+~xtrexre ~cctio~s+a comxriitted by ~s4rne of ~xux allies thes heat o3' pressure
,Actiox~a which arc mora~.lly wxoa~ should be co~tdtr~r3ued sxo attex
ho ~co~x
:d x~a mstter aV~t be the circuxcasta~ces ~artder which
are cornz~xitted. But the cond~nr~,tons I have seen or ha+ard +or raa-d
:ountry have been alruost entircly~ directer~ agai~s~t the s~,~e,~cee or
idve~rtent acttcar~s of a few Peaple ou uux vide. I ha~*e gaited in vafn far
arit~,ch xne~sxo~z} Iet alone cQrkdemnaation of the C:~am~uu#sts~ wfde~tpread,
csatdlg- calculated terxtar#srn:, actud~tr~g the deliberate xnurd+~r
~l.dren whraerc ~,~ cxime wars that their husbands or fathcr;o wet`+~ +~ffdcis.ls
mt #h
s verxu~e~t ~~ rx~exnbe~ra~ of $ts armed fc~rces< ~'heee
were- ruat accidents or e~ccsses cornmittad the ixcat cif battle.. They. vv,exe
delfberate, p xcmeditated po3fticat acts caxried cut b}: Gemmw~ist forcca~
thr+~ugh~ut youth Viatnam irn a-ccord~ce with the traditiur~al Gamurtist
axx~playmer~t of terror ~d v~rantax~e xnurdear fox pt~z~pc~stee of palitics.l
g+~z~suas
"'+ all have h+~ard from thG prca~a snd tele~viaitsn about gene
~$tr-~r ma~ey of yott have Beard: what ha~~pened tin the oi~ht of 32 ~Taauary wh,se,
the Corramux~t~- tem~ararily e~v~arrau a 5r~uth "Vietnamese arrr~or cc~.
.can +st fiO Vap year Safgon? I'12 teat you what he-~~ez~,ed; The diet
wag cagtur~ed twra ~crufi~i "Vetnamcsc arrs~ored corps r~ffice~ s and their
in. the- ct~xnp~ound~ '~ha~ VC demanded that
0 officers ~ofn the +C~smrxxunist c e he ~'
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rfra~ged the- two o~f`fcezs to their quarters and au made the ea d
with the ra~f3,cer' t
tandin~ by. .Again, both o~ffcers
revised. "V~'ith .~~ xefusal, the VG ~~+~~ and. k3fled one chifd right before
~sr'~ ey+~s< '~6'her~ their- chfidren were dead, ~e mffic+~xs' vr~fvee we-r?~
'Then the two s~fff~cers still refused, both of them were- decs:pitated.
Y friends,. ~~ they en~err~y +~ ~outk~ 1~'fe+ttna~nese allies are
"Their of of the 8ttex x~~ay bo found ts~ E~:e words of th+
oomrxtsnd+er
had refused to defect.
have knawx~ the enemy fQr anany yeaxs, ~' h+~
d, "ft's ae simple as th~-+
fih~e. Tct a~tta.clCS maxk~ed th,~ ~a
rd tt~ mea+~u~re, ~-rtly because ore have a aanuch s:aore cox~~plet~a pfeture
~ommu~:et +~ffort. 't'he pr+ecises coaasetquer~ces ~rf thew attA-cks
ems and dffffcu.ltfe~r we an~i our al3.fes face thaw.
haves
+~ adv,~r~aariee~ irnmedfates probleems and dffffcultfes. Thus, any balance
z~ th+~ .ss
st#gn nom fn hard will inevitably be:
d~is}~roporti~anately weighted on the ryeNative sfde-. ~'urthe~rmore:a n~ oner
+~ar~ give: they fir
~rhen h.e was later asked. why his tvvo avbordir~ates
~~ a game the-t fs still hexing guyed. 'l'he 'Test
naive v-$s not.. a cane:-timer action. Yt was they opening move# in a battle
. l E,~
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tit is far from aver, a beetle ~vhase outcome wt~l ~,ueace a entire course
"~"ietna~mes~s struggle.
hoc~reve~r.
:s obv~oua that the +Corx7,~x:-unists fuelled to attain
tkxei~c ma~~ al~jec~tiv~es. They hoped ~ paral}rae tlae ~atgc~n ~ove+rnrnen
;
r
lc series of rab'~ft punches. . this they- wiled. 'i~he ~.epubtic of
~rietnam dlc3 ~t cr~llapse. '1'h~a much. criticised South '~`ietnaes+a Atrr.~y rose
$~ the #~ca of advea~eity to beat off +svery!Ehis'~g the ~,orsnista c?avcld thxavv
'Virtually Ali of ;~,R'~N's units were ex~g~aged ix~ th+e fig3~t. Name collapsed
~ one mere overxun. N+c~here ~rere tkie ~orrsrnunietas able to gain even.
control a~r~,er a vrhole Deity or tarn. T`hraughaut the land. sveryv-heax~s
the Coxnrnunists e,ttacked they were met, m~astered* ~d thrown back. 'Fhe
+C~muzsts had hoped to persuade ox force the PoP~atioz~e caf at least
nas.,~car
nd citie+~ ~ ral1Y to then YC cause. the early ?tays cif
ebze~.sry, ~n~oi's propaganda ax3d the propaganda of ~iai's Nt~F' puppats
f +ed that
patiti+eal activit~r ~aa ta~.ng place in msxxy~ of
mouth Yetnarx~'e towns and eiti~,s. These cla~an:s, csf cc~usse,.
no t car cif dic3 any signitica~ra-t eteme~xt of the ps~pu;lati?n pub
azfest euppc~xlw for the V'C1NL~' cause.
-v~relaz~d has reported that in the iir st three m?ntha of mss' yea
caf htowa~, the +~om~nauniats tcc-k terrible caeuaities. saner
their attempt to ccrlispee etas Republic +~~ "~
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cea have 'had g(~, QCf~1 of their nuxn;ber killed in acti:?r~a. erne
~f ~, Press ~d rnany of cur critie? ~3is~te this figure.. I dc~ nrrt pra~pas~e
cntesr into that dispute her$. All ~ aek ycu ~? recognise is that even
in half or cut by three quarters ~?-~' indisputable an8
inescapable tact remains th~.t in the last three ~~nths the- ~a~rx?unists have
last more tr~+vpe in c?smbat 3n South. Vietnam than vrre have lost during the
,~~~ period of our involyerr~e$t.
ore, the qualftative inzpacs
Ct~rnmstniet i~aaea ~'~ presbably even. greater than their- ~antitati~re impact.
They ~ls+~ iac~.udes highly trained upper. terrorist a.~ad ass~s.ssis~ation
included key leaders, or8as~s~ers# arrxd cornmander~- difficult to
e~cluads, which w+cre ciuite literally vriped caut and
sit gears. to replaces with personnel of equal sk~:ll. In shcr
net only failed tc~ achieve what they hoped to acc~
#hesy psd. a terxible ps~ice.
'~ fact
sans lead.
our adversaries
dish. but, in eFrs failin;
~rnunista did nc~t suecee'~ in their initial try Kati
up the ~#,ght. Far frorx~ !t. Wes ~w fro
cs~pture,d +d~cutr-ente,
othcer e~auarc+es cif inforzrxation, that the
~- _ sts plan to cs.rry on their intensi~'e carnnpaiQn throughc~u~t ~suth
~c~xnv
t~xa~ ire the v~reek.>e and r,aonths ahead.
s engaged. in an all-out
ete~rt ~ cc~llapmse ~e< Sa3gan Cc~vesx~rn:ent as an effective golitca'i instrumear~t.
'rhe
tra harry sand harass the Alt'~lq, hoping tc~ inflict at
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 -~: .~
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lesast ec-xxie defesats arwd, if gaesiblew, induces the eurxewzxdesr rrr e3efectian of
e.t least some unite. tour advesrsaries+~ also plan to e3a everythSn~ they can.
to bury away at the ~VN'a civil comgonenta, paging tee intixr3idates key.
officials and to cornge~und ~aigan'a adxrsinistxativa grable~a by ceusin:g
misery and dislcacation whe3resver gosaible. In ruxal areas tempora~rf,ly
uncovered by the ~VI~'s immeadiate need to grated tavrne~ and citiesa,
't~C ass making a ma~Sn?urr~ esffaxt tee recruit and ?rganfse, to reaglenish their
lasses ane3 undo thei work cif gacificatton. All of these actions axe carefully
orchestrated. 'They are designed ttt goes the! CrYI~t ~v3.th Hoare grobleYna than
it can. hso.dle. Above a
thesy a,re designed to create an atrnasghere
~creis and feax 'that will erode then Vietnaxneweea geogla's~ confidence in thesis
government's ability to fu~xcti?r~. At the same time, Communist actions
throughout South '~iestnam are ales aimed at ~rriesrican opinion and caresful
deaaigned tc~ mare- the3 aggearance:s, tf Hat the realite3s, of t]aew stus,tion
increase our discouragement and distress.
'This ugeurges of Gomrnuniet activity anal the. rrxasp~ive commitment
s~f ~Canwmunist reaaurcee involved therein, has gored our Vietnaxxieeaea allies
grave threats, problems, and challenges. 'Theses grrwblems will be
well known to rrwost of you, for they a-xa e~ttensively reported its our grade
and gublic media. Ixadee;d, th,~y stew so extensively, and rt~ften exs:g,gexate33y,
re:gortesd that it ies eaaa~y to overlook the fact that our advearsa,ries stew Hat
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ps:ragons of perfection, are not Invincible, send hate rnsny serous problerrss
of their owrn.
The elctensve ~-rflpaganda claims the ~t~mrnunists have made, in-
cluring claims made to their own forCets, coupled with their lack of real.
initial golitical or zrsiltary success, have made the Communists bath
gsy~chologically and p~-litically vulrserable to ffurther reversal or failure.
t;omxrsunlst forces may now ring ma~ay South Vietnarxsese towns and cities
but thaere forces are operating #ar franx their traditiorsal base and sanctuary
areas. They are over-extended, weir logistic supply lines are taxed w
~$:ernands these sugply chamneli were never designed to handle, and these
supply lines are being even. ?urther crimged by allied. air- and ground action.
Th+~ losses the Gommiu,.ists Dave staffered have taken an inevitalrie toll can.
the morale and effectve~ass caf their forces. In any renev~ed attacks oxs
cities and towns, Cornrnunist traoge~ ernglc-yed will kno~? that they do not
have the elerxxent of surprise this tune., that they cannot expect the support
~+f the urban ~pulatican, and that in such attacks, many of them v~il2
inevitably die. Evea~ the com:rnissars cannot conceal these brute facts
from tro4ge~ who know what happened to their c+~rade+~ in the initial Tet
assa~.ts. Ixs trying to mount much. larger and mare coordinated operations
than. they have ever trefore attempted, our Communist a,dversar3es have
encountered serious command and control problers~s and in xrsany areas
their cocardinataan has beers di+~astrousky faulty. 1"h+e C~xsmunists cairuaot
~~}
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succeed without asp eft+~ctivo rnaxfaxa~azn effort fro~aa every corxxpo~nent of
their crganias.ti+an. ~'he e~stent ~~ which they are already t3ver-~extentte+d
with their aaacret apparatus now out in the ripen ar:d thex forces exposed,.
the ce~eu$ities and losses that' naafi to recoup, their exaggerated claims
which. have already been given the lie by actual eute, and the grorr~ises
cif early victc~xy they have mmde to their awn cadre and trac~ps all combine
to make the Gommunints Nighty vulnerable is political and military taunter
sttaclC. I~x driving for quick victory
risk of shattering dafastt.
ve unavaid~bly incurred the
nova ally the 'V'ietnamese Connrnunists have a fundamental probterr
scr transparentt~r s~bviaus that zarany tail teA recagni~a its existence. I# it
indeed trues, as Goxnxnunist pro~-aganda stridently asserts, that the
buck cif the South ~"fetnaxx~e~ae gac3ple wan;te~d to live: under a re:ginae cc~n-
trotted by the ''Vietnaee~e CorrRrnunist Party, or even if it ~aaere true that
ther xaam~carity of tI~e South ~'ietnamesel people were ga.seivelp wining tv
s~ueh $ regime without draconian coercion, the V'iettnaxn. struggle
ulci hav
since been over. "f'h? fact is, howev+sr, that neither the
't~'ie-tnaxnaer~ Cvrramunists nor their NLF pupFcta __ vrhoxn the ~t'ietnaxrxese
people cl~sarly reeognise~ for what thesy are -- ha~*s a~sy ~rignificant xx~easux~e
cat genuiare popular support. 'b'oo .many Vietnamese are ~o well a.~ware fxc3m
first hand aapar#anca, the e~xpericnce of close retativas or the testimony cif
truetecl fri,ands v~~l~:t life under Cozx~rnuni~st Marty rule is like. In the rinds
~t
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?~~ many Vietnaxxaese, of coura+e, aaereicu to Comxxa,ur~ie~t rule does not
trar~sla:te into po~-itive ~rcxpport far the- Saigon government. Translating
such aversfon irsto positive support is gerha:ps uur Vi+ttname,se allies'
moe-t irr~porLai~t goxitical task. but this wide~apsa:ad if often pa.e~~sive
aversion ie the princiga~l o~sstacle and it is as Qbetacle that, sa far,
has fs~ae~trated the Coxx~x~uasts' every effc~xt tca achieve theix ultimate
political ambitions.
days anal weeks mead, the Comzr~unists clearly intend.
to continue the harassrrxent of rnanp taw~a arnd cities aa~d to r~+aintain as
n3uch f+ressure as they +caa an our ~illi+ss' rnilitaxy and political structure.
They will a3axost certainly a-ttexrxpt same rer-ewad aeries of rr~a,~or ~~t~cks.
saucy with which North Vietaarr~ fs endeavoring to reinforce its
tarc~d~as in the northscrn. part o#` South Visxtnaxri rYxaksss it clear that we caxe
anticipate as apsurge of militaary a~ctinn ire I +Corps, pssrhaps at ~la:e Sax~h,
now gallantlq defended laoth by our I~Iarines an~i by South Vietnamese
~.asgs3rs, whcsse contribution to Kiae Sax~h's ciefenae eoxtxe in. thfs country
delibserately igncsxe. 1w"rom prisoners and docurnenta, ws~ Know ncsf fa
paxticularly al.ous to gain political control. oven South Vietr~arxx'a tyro
xiorth+~rxarz~ost provinces -= Quang T`ri sad Thum ~'hiea. Th~xs we xaust
s3s:psact arenewed assaxxits on Fuse and grobably ~r~g Tri city.. Elssawhsa
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u,~t e~cpect the enemy to probe incessantly s.nd to sittack wherevea~ he
~-~cal t~dds mar be favorable No One carp ~araatee that #n their
ct~untry-wide ms.s~~ujrn effort, our adversaries will raat be able tc~ attain.
some local tactical accasa. If they do, we can be certain that the
Camxnunists vrill endeavor to convince the world at large that such local
success gortends the inev3.table total collapse cf the Satgan go~xer~aent
,Cammunist propaganda 'will bend every etfart tv imbue the V'ietnarxiese
people and. their allies with a sense of despair that could make such claims
-fulfilling.
.I~is it zncxeznts pressuare by politica-1 agitatfan and military action
in and around 5vutt~'~fet~taxr~, Ha~aof gill always have avaitabie another
.al card. to thxaw crn the taste: aegotiatic~r~s. Ta Hanoi's leatters,
raegvtlatic~x~a are: but another political tactf~c -- nat an end #n therris~lves
and neat an avenue to the honorable resal~atimn of a. camrtxan problerr~.
I?+espite your Pxesfd~ent and your goverrnnesa~t's cona~tant and unceasxxg
efforts to find. an honorable solution try the atr~xggle in 'fets~axn, Nano
ayed the ali~i~#t~st interest fn any rnea-~ain~'ul d#~acuasc~t~
issues fnvoved, let along any reasaas~ble settlement t~f them..
Hanoi has, how+~vex, cynl.+cally e~glofted our unending west fox peace
to e~aw seeds of suspicion in the minds of our ~J'ietnamese a3~.Ifes
effort to make tham doubt our constancy and to generate the fear that we
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ht sell them Gaut is~ some private deal arranged behind their ba,ck~.
~credibla as it may seam to us, th~a Conasxxunist~s have plax:-tcd tlx
rumor th~ouihout South Yictnaxn that the Am+~ricans were rsilcxat partners
in the Tat c~#'#eu~e~v+e and #ha~t Lhe crf#aueve v~ae ready a~ Waehingtcns -Hanoi
glut d~+sfgned to give Axx~erica an +~xcuee #ar withdrawing #rorxz 'Vietna~z.
rix~Q a gcricad when it is ~,xerting ana~un't greesure on our
~fetna~n:ese allice~ within South '~iets~a Hanoi fe quite capable of rxx
a subetanti~*ely rneanngiess but ouperi'icially tamgtin,g geeture in the
n~gotiatic~n arcs in the h+ape that our exploration of that gesture r~~ight
constitute the tirtal straw of di~co~ragez~?ent aesccse~ary #~ collapses tour
'Viatnarneees allies' gill to carry on the. stru
which we a~uet be prepar+a+d and a t
samethir~g for
tic 'by which,. i# it come
must
nt~t be deccive~d. 1~'es must never cease our quest fox ,an honor~ables.,eace,
but at +dxe same tin3es our desires for pesace~ must nvt be allowed to trick ue~
into- disguised aurreader.
YII
fn ~'ietnarn} we: stand today in the midst of a crucial peris~d of iateaser
struggles. And what, you ask, ie the autiook? l~c- ones can stay #or ce:main,
be~scause~ Yiastnaxxs's futures is not rtow irresvocably detcrrzaine~d. It wfil bee
decided by the wierdom., stamina aAd courage of xxsany pcc~gle. pe~~splr~ in
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'1~iettsarxx ita~alf and, ter ~- leaser but still significant extent, people ks+ere irY
ttae United States. Tine only thing naas~ racily clear a~ that the ai#uation in
"~d'ietnam ie sever likely to rtturr~ tc- the pro-T+~t status ciao. Too muds
sae happen+~d si#ic+a then. The Comn~xunista have committed tact rr~uch to
their effort to fcares an early -- a,nd, fcr tlcexx~, fazrorablo -- decision.
'~~ ansasdtur~ ~sf#ort ~$uestionably po8es a grave ~challen$e tc+ rear
'V'ietnaeao alii+~s. but in that challonge there is aclso gr+~at c~pp~ortunity.
The ne~ct isrw sxsonths will probably be critical and cautd be decisive.
uzslsts have gambled a groat deal on their ability to collapse the
aigon verner~t in ~ +ahort spats ~xf time. If thi? garrxble auccecds,
:avo talre~n a Tang step towaxda tho achieve~xnent of its ult3xx~ates c~bjoctiva.
gamble fa3~
ever, rxur allies mill hive pasaod a rna~or
atone on their road to inde~en+deast eaciatence as a fre+s nation..
In the, critical {weeks ahead, the main contribution: wo its the United
ea can ~xavide to flee $tTuggle will be much mere in the znora~; than.
the. material realm. , idv-x erten~.ie s would naturally like to know etcactly
what we intctsd tc~- provide in tht~ way o~ xxaaterfal support and I am not So
ttt toll them here tonight. i do want to err~phasi~ae t?s you, hwwevsr,
tmnage thfs cttssntry proj~scts of wiliingnesa ?- or unwillingness -- to
stay the cours,s and tweet the challenge will bave~ a profound itsfluence can tho
behavior of our 'Vietstaa~eso allies and their Cr~mmwaist a~dversariea.
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rx~u,at g;
~ pri
b~?xden of capiag roa~fth the es~e~x~y'e iriarnediates tbruet
,ce i`a~ os~ the aho~lders of air "t~ietnerrxe~e+~ ~iiie~r. backed up
the American mitit~ry aad civi3iar~ pereor~r~+si already ~~ Yietxtarn.
ae~k nc,r ehould we aspect perfection f~arr~ onr allies. ~+ve must
xos~ that fey riot only have to ~,~~'~ ~ war for survival butt at the same
~~~ cope vrrith fundamental social, golitical ansl ecoraorsxic prr~b~etre
that }eye dm~,p hlstori.ca
d are z~ct euscepti'ble to quick c-r easy
.cation. 't`he ~oxrxmc~.e#~ have ~e ai~r~ple task. 111 theq v~e.nt or ~.+ need
to da Se v~~eck and deg-troy. The leaders cif the Repnbl#c cif '~"ietr~arr, are
faced Frith t'he awesorxxe challex~.~e of #~31cl;z~g a ~cn end e3xr~,ultaneouely
de#'end3r~~ it fron~x sa~ra~e e~ctetna~llq dxected attack.
~~x~eiderix-$ the ctixrxaneions of the3~r ~hallen~a, ae~r
slue
rfcrrz~ance have been truly rerx~atkabl,o. In ~e seagge ~erc-city ~~
have bar~deei tc~ether xk the clear lace of carr-mcsxa daxa-~er~
,tic~ne of conatit~itional de~cr~cy vi~,t~ic~te~ the huge pi~r.ce~1
i,et ettaciCe. their will, and spirit a~cwex faltered. The
d their prt~rx~iee. N?~t-Commu~~at natic~~liate Qf all
cal pereuaeiox~e., in~clud~tg merry oppBoeed t+~ tha present aai~a~s
~auth 't~ietname-ee A.rzrxy fought every
and ettc c e ssfull~
it vvas atcked; hraveiy, w~sll
fters~ath cif the iiati~rl Qaslau~ht, +~ Seigor~
~vermaae~nt hart n~otrad a#f~ectively acct Daly to defend its gec~pla but alas
,. ~6
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address itael~ to sosxie of the#r basic problem` snd gr#evr~nces. Certainly.
#here axe eis,z~~ers. C~,rtaia-ly, them are pgobler~nr~. Certa#nly, theeze have
been. ehoxtfalls #~ i~adividual perfornxance. +~v~er-atl, h~~r~~rerr tie +~tega
~rur brave all#e
aken to aneet the crisis, tv defend the#r towns and
+cit#es, to c+~pe with the hwx~,an misary er~gendcrecl by a Gom~x~usaist attacks,
~ to rise ts~ ell the ~,s~#ivld dexx~a~nds cif tl~.e irx~r~e~adate s#tv~a~tica~ ame
hearter~#ng. encoura~irx,~: ~tnd rr~ore ths,n. cleserv#n~ a! our wholehearted support.
thre ~#a~a# axsalyefs~, caly the Vet~mes~a the~x~eives cam create a
viable and. #ndependers
th Yietna~ese stat+~. phis fe a task #n which we
ca~a only ass#st, partly by rrrrrater#al support and pr#xx~arfly by aid#sg #n
defena~e against axternal or eater
cted a
scion. Although our
'~*#etr~an^~ese all#ee have never been faced with graven threatst
x~evar hacl greater apporht#es? In weathering th#s cr#sis,
ca~a prove
#~- them}sei?~es, thefr laeapte aid the w+arl~ +~ha~t they can eke +s~erxf the
Hand# aggressors are capable of thra~v#ng against th~mm, By do#ng so,
c deal those aggressors a shatter#ng blow earl sa~:prre
brward in
the work of b~,#ding ~ free natir~n. in +do#r~g th#s, our all#es can pravids the
only ev#+dence ever really l##ee
Hanoi's ,~udg~ne~nt or cbnvix~ce the
Com,xxiu~st Party leadersh#~ that #ts attempt to dictate South 31`fetne
afore fay force Qi am;s is foredoomed to fafA,a:~e. if caur alles're~ponse
to Ha
e~avage c~n;~lar~ght forces Ha~so# to cha.~ege its strategy ~ pursue
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its crb~ectves ~y ~ea.c+~ful political coxr~petition xather than arrt~.ed struggt+e,
t.~a,ey will ~~~+~ mad~s a rnajax cc~ntritaution snot c~n}y #~ the rovelfare s~# thefr
people bit ai ua~ all.
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- , _~.
__,~
Pflssible insert to second paragraph on first page:
Qld Text: The origins of this war are rooted in the political ambitions
of the ;ea+ders of the Vietnamese Communist Party. now known e-s
so Long.
olitic al
possible Insert: A,~Iore precisely. they are rooted in the lifelong g
Though he now
ar~nbitifln of the rxsan who 'now calls himself I3o Chi 3~1inh.
rise to reject the image of a benign nationalist father figure --
t P
Saintly Uncle Hc- -- he has actually been a ruthless Communist
h
a paratchnik for a~.most fifty years.
P
A chzrter member of the Frenc
Communist Part'l? he spent the twenties end thirties directing the
Southeast Asian activities of the Third International. die has always
been a L;ornrrsunist first and. a 'f~ationalist second. His beard ies white
and wispy. but his hands axe indelibly stained. with the blood of
Vietnamese nationsiist patriots whom he betrayed to the preach or
his own Communist followers because they would not
load murdexed by
cce t Cornmut~ist control, He looks kindly and talks softly. but he
a P
resided over the delibexate. doctrinally inspired slaughter of close
F
to 1~t1.44i~ Vietnamese during the so-called "land refoxm" pragraxxzs
of the middle nineteen fifties. innocent Vietnamese whose only cricn~
was t3~iat Ho and his lieutenants thought they ox their parents had
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una-ccep#able '-claee origins. ft He has alwags cons#deaed he#raya3, rnurdcr,
az~ci even genocide as norxria.8:, ra:cceg#able gol#tieal tac#ica. He founded
the Lazo ~arag. Party, has a~.~srays controlled ~.#, and has molded it in h#a
owri, ru#hless, doctxinaise and fans.#ical ~i~.a.ge.
Fick up text with new paragraphs
Ever efr~ce the ~'ar#y was founded in I93Q .....
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