RHODESIA: LOOKING BEYOND THE APRIL ELECTION (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A000900020001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 3, 1979
• Content Type: IR

,Approve,d'For Release 2002/01/15 :CIA-RDP80T00942A000900020001-3
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Dissemination Contral NOFORN (NF) _ Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
Abbreviations NOCONTRACT (NC) Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN (PP)
ORCON (OC)
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 National Secret
rEaeei~r~or Release 2002/01/15 :CIA-RDP80T00942A0009000?~n3rvocoNrR,acT-
Assessment ORCON
Center
Rhodesia:
Looking Beyond
The April Election (v)
Research for this report was completed
an 3 April 1979.
The author of this paper is
Africa Division, Office of Political Analysis, with
contributions from Western Europe and USSR
Divisions. Comments and queries are welcome and
should be directed to
This paper was coordinated with the Office of
Strategic Research, the Office of Economic
Research, the Directorate of Operations, and the
National Intelligence Officer for Africa. (U)
Secret
PA 79-10172
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Rhodesia:
Looking Beyond
The April Election (v)
The election later this month of a black-led govern-
ment of national unity in Rhodesia will bring substan-
tial pressure on the United States and the United
Kingdom to recognize the new government and to lift
economic sanctions:
? The Rhociesians will make an all-out effort to ensure
adequate security and a large turnout for the election.
? Although. the Zimbabwe African National Union
and the Zimbabwe African People's Union will try to
disrupt the election, neither guerrilla group will be able
to prevent it from taking place. (s)
Bishop Muzorewa is the most likely candidate to
emerge as the head of the new government:
? He will seek to consolidate his position by strength-
ening his relationship with the whites, establishing
greater control over the countryside, and inducing
defections from ZANU and ZAPU.
? He may try to split the guerrillas further by offering
to strike a separate deal with ZANU or ZAPU.
? We doubt, however, that the white leaders will show
enough flexibility t:o alaow Muzorewa to propose a deal
acceptable to either guerrilla leader. (s)
The election of a new government, coupled with a
continuation of the fighting, will create some hard
choices for those states most closely involved with the
Rhodesian problem:
? The frontline states will continue to support the
guerrillas, but an intensification of the fighting could
force some presidents into an open-ended commitment
to an increased Soviet and Cuban presence in their
countries.
? The frontline states might also have to consider the
possibility of~ supportint; one guerrilla group against
the other in 1:he event of a civil war. (u)
~
(~1-3
N"_' N000NTRACT-
ORCON
If the Soviets and the Cubans continue to favor ZAPU
over ZANU, they risk alienating Tanzania and Mo-
zambique, which would like to see more support given
to ZANU:
? if they agree to support both groups, however, they
could become involved in a civil war.
? If Nkomo makes a separate deal with the Salisbury
government, they might find themselves forced to
throw their support behind ZANU. (u)
The US and the UK must decide whether to reca~nize
the newly elected government and lift economic
sanctions:
? A positive decision would strengthen the position of
the new government, but provoke a hostile reaction
from black African leaders outside Rhodesia.
? A negative decision would undercut the viability of
the new regime, but not deter the frontline states from
supporting further efforts to reach a negotiated settle-
ment. (u)
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NOFORN-NOCONT CT-
ORCON
Prospects for a successful all-parties conference or
agreement on the part of the internal government to
UN-sponsored elections are exceedingly dim:
? Short-term prospects are for a continuation of the
stalemate, particularly now that South Africa has
promised to provide substantial military and political
support to the new government.
? The fighting certainly will continue, providing ex-
panding opportunities for the Soviets and the Cubans.
~S NF NC OC~
Secret iv
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Zambia
Nyerere, Julius
Patriotic
Front
Mozambique
_ {: _ ~_. ,
South Africa
Patriotic
Front
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Botha, Pieter
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Formation of Government of Zimbabwe Rhodesia
5 Ndebele and
10 Blacks elected by
10 Whites elected
Senate
5 Shona Chiefs
black members of
by white members
elected by Council
the House
of the House
of Chiefs
Council of Chiefs
House of
Assembly
72 Blacks elected by
black and white
voters
_?
RFx~iesia
20 Whites elected 8 Whites elected by
by white voters 92 other new mem-
bers of parliament
from list of 16 white
candidates selected
by the 50 members
of the present
,parliament.
President
Chosen by electoral
college made up of
the members of
j House and Senate
Prime Minister
Appointed by
President
Cabinet
Selected by
Prime Minister
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N N~CONTR 4C? -
Rhodesia:
Looking Beyond
The April Election (u)
The Rhodesian Government is making an all-out effort
to ensure adequate security and a large turnout for the
election. Government pressure and intimidation by the
black parties and their auxiliary forces should result in
a fairly high turnout. The government estimates a total
black turnout of about 60 percent, with the highest
percentage being urban blacks and blacks living in
white farming areas. Uver 70 percent of the eligible
white voters turned out for the constitutional referen-
dumlast January and at least that many should vote in
the election. (s NF Nc oc)
All military and police leaves have been canceled
during the election period, and all civilian reservists
have been called up to provide security and to police
the polling stations during the election. We estimate
that a manpower pool totaling some 75,000 Rhode-
sians will be mobilized. These forces will be assisted by
about 10,000 ex-guerrillas and local recruits who are
loyal to internal black leaders Bishop Muzorewa and
Reverend Sithole. (s)
As the election approaches, Rhodesian security Forces
will intensify their raids on guerrilla camps and staging
areas in Zambia and Mozambique, and possibly in
Angola, Tanzania, and Botswana. By forcing the
guerrillas to relocate their command posts farther from
the border and to disperse their camps, guerrilla
communication links and supply lines will be length-
ened, resulting in an erosion of guerrilla capabilities
and morale. (s)
Although ZANU and ZAPU are committed to dis-
rupting the election, it is unlikely either can prevent it
from taking place. ZANU and ZAPU now have at
least 10,000 guerrillas inside Rhodesi
we believe
sufficient control to proceed with the polling in most if
not all regions of the country. (s)
e number
and economic importance to the whites, however, is
certain to increase. (s)
The Election Process
White Rhodesians reportedly will go to the polls on ! 0
April to elect 20 white members to the House of
Assembly. Four of these seats are contested by
independents, but Ian Smith's Rhodesian hront Par[y
should have little difficulty in winning all 20 seats. The
72 black members of the House will be elected
sometime after 12 April by both black and white
Rhodesians. The election probably will be held over a
five-day period beginning 17 April. Security forces v~ ill
be rotated from one region of the country to another --
possibly by military district-to ensure maximum
security around the polling stations. (s)
Both the white and black members will be elected
directly from party lists established for each constitu-
ency. * A party must win at least 10 percent of the vc>~ e
in a given constituency to qualify for a seat. Parliamet,-
tary seats within each constituency will be allocated un
the basis of the proportion of votes received by the
parties in that constituency. (u)
The 72 black and 20 white members of the House thrn
will caucus to elect eight additional white members
from a list of 16 candidates chosen by the white
members of the present parliament. The Senate will
consist of 10 blacks elected by the 72 black members F ~f
the lower house, 10 whites elected by the 28 white
members, and five Ndebele and five Shona chiefs
elected by their tribal counterparts in the Council of
Chiefs. Both houses jointly elect a "constitutional"
President who then appoints as Prime Minister the
person "in his discretion, he considers to be best able 1,~
command the support of the majority of the member;
'Maps of the white and black electoral constituencies and the fivs
military operational areas appear at the end of this memorandum.
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Probable Distribution of Seats in
New Rhodesian Parliament
1,.+-~e Minister !an Smi#_ h
(Rhodesian Front)
Under pressure from some
whites to leave politics, but
so far has resisted. Most,if not
all, RF candidates are running
unopposed.
Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole
(Zimbabwe African National
Union/Sithole)
Broke with ZANU external
organization in 1377. Popularity
appears to be on the decline
inside Rhodesia.
Chief Kayisa Ndiweni
(United National Federal Party)
Broke with Chirau and the
transitional govt. early this
year to form a Ndebele-based
party. Would be a stalking
horse for Nkomo in the election.
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Bishop Abel Muzorewa
(United African
National Council)
Most likely candidate for Prime
Minister, but would rather place
himself above partisan politics
and could opt for the Presidency.
Chief Jeremiah Chirau
(Zimbabwe United
People's Organization)
taken a more independent position
calling for an all parties conference
before the election and the
disbanding of all auxiliary forces.
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of the House of Assembly." The President also
appoints the Cabinet, acting on the advice of the Prime
Minister. (u)
Although the new :Parliament will be numerically
dominated by blacks, the whites will retain substan-
tial-if riot controlling-influence over the new gov-
ernment. Continued white domination of the military,
police, judiciary, and civil service is ensured by the
Constitution, which establishes criteria such as senior
rank, longevity, and "efficiency and suitability" far
appointment to top positions in these fields. (u)
Moreover, none of the important clauses in the new
constitution can be amended or deleted without the
approval of all 72 black and at least six white members
of the House of Assembly. These so-called entrenched
clauses, which guarantee the whites 28 seats in the
House, will remain in effect for at least 10 years, after
which a c:ornmission-consisting of three whites and
two blacks-will be established and empowered to
recommend changes. The Constitution also states that
posts in the Cabinet will be allocated according to each
party's strength in the House of Assembly, thus
guaranteeing the whites at least four positions in the
new Cabinet. (v)
Most whites probably are not enthusiastic about a
black-led government taking power in Rhodesia, but
they appear willing 1;o give the new government a
chance. White emigration dropped considerably this
year after a dramatic rise last fall-peaking at 2,7-1 l
net departures in December. Net departures for
January a.nd February totaled only 1,073 and 592
whites, respectively. (u)
Muzorewa on Top
Bishop Abel. Muzorewa should emerge in a strong
position of leadership in the new government of
national unity, with his party winning at least half the
black seats in Parliament. His closest rival, Reverend
Ndabaningi Sithole, has lost ground in recent months,
and his party probably will win less than a third of the
black seats. Chief Jeremiah Chirau, the other black
leader in the internal government, lacks broad popular
support but should pick up a few seats. Chief Ndiweni,
who broke with Chirau last November to form his own
Ndebele-based party, has not developed a strong
political base, but his party could win enough seats to
gain a post: in the Cabinet. (s)
Muzorewa hopes to establish more government c.~ntrol
over the countryside by augmenting the size and
expanding the role of the auxiliary forces. He~ als,}
hopes to attract more black supporters- -including
guerrilla defectors-by offering land and socsal serv-
ices. The Bishop is expected to announce a majrn
amnesty program soon after taking office that wd~uld
encourage the guerrillas to return, but not. rectuir:-~
them to turn in their arms. The government i ho;~mg
that many of these guerrillas would agree to loin he
auxiliary forces. (s)
Muzorewa has already entered into negotiatons ~v~th
the white leaders, focusing on cooperation betwec n
their parties and a possible modification of'some
clauses in the new Constitution that work to the
disadvantage of the blacks. The Bishop realizes that he
will need white support for his government and w,~nts
to meet with the white leaders before the elec~ ion to
discuss possible ministerial appointments, to plan
future government policies, and to map a joint strategy
for obtaining international recognition for the netiF~
government. (s NF we oe)
Once in power, Muzorewa should be able to capitclize
on several trends that have become apparent in re.:ent
months, including:
? A deepening political and military rivalry brtwc~en
LANU and ZAPU. With the virtual collapse ?~f
negotiations for a political settlement, each gr~~up has
come increasingly to perceive the other as a rival i;ti the
struggle for control of a black-ruled Rhodesia.
? Continuing disarray within the ZAPU leadership
that has weakened Nkomo's position internatinna+.v
and within his own organization, making it almost
irnpossible for ZAPU to implement its more grandiose
military plans.
? The decline of Nkomo's appeal to whites in R hodesia
since the downing of two civilian airliners by his
guerrillas.
? Growing weariness in Zambia over the economic and
political costs of the guerrilla struggle, which court
eventually lead to a political backlash against Tres
dent Kaunda.
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 Other (Tonga, Venda, Sena) 4
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Population Distribution in Zimbabwe Rhodesia
POPULATION
Persons per square kilom~"rr
0 5 15 2?
0 13 3B fi5 104
Persons per square mde
Source: 1969 population: census
NDAU Selected Shona speaking group
ticcret ~
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? Growing support for the internal settlement in the
US Congress and the British Parliament.
? South African promises to provide substantial politi-
cal and military support-short of military interven-
tion-to the new government of national unity. (s)
The South Africans have also said that they no longer
would press Prime Minister Smith to withdraw from
politics so long as his presence does not hinder the new
governrnent's chance of success. Prime Minister Botha
has indiicated, however, that South Africa will with-
hold diplomatic recognition from the new government;
we expect, Botha to wait until the new government has
won Borne international acceptance and demonstrated
a capacity to govern. (s NF Nc oc)
These factors accaunt for a growing confidence among
whites i;hat the internal settlement eventually might
succeed. A continuation of these trends could lead to a
hardening of white attitudes and a growing reluctance
to seek a political deal with the guerrillas. Given the
probability that the level of fighting inside Rhodesia
will escalate, however, most whites probably will
continue to support efforts to negotiate a political
settlement with the blacks. (u)
Possible Ilealignraents
The formation of a black-led government will open the
door to more jockE;ying among the various players in
the Rhodesian situation. Muzorewa, in particular,
probably will try to split the guerrillas further by
seeking a separate alliance with ZANU or ZAPU. (s)
Representatives of the Bishop have already made
approaches to ZANU to discuss a possible Shona-
based alliance, which could draw on 75 percent of the
black population for support. Although ZANU so far
has rejected Muzorewa's attempts to induce it--or a
significant faction of the guerrilla group-to join his
new government, some senior officials have indicated
they woufld not rule out talks at some future date. (s NF
NC OC)
Joshua Nkomo might try to preempt such an alliance
by seeking to make his own deal either with
Muzorewa, or with the whites, thus bringing the
Ndebeles and the Shonas into a single government.
White Rhodesian politicians would favor su`h a
coalition because they see Nkomo as a unify ing force
and regard Mugabe as too radical (s)
The pressure on Mugabe or Nkomo to consider joining
forces with the internal government is likely to !nount
the more each leader perceives the other as trying to
preempt him in reaching a settlement. Neither of these
realignments, however, would tip the balance of power
in Rhodesia sufficiently to bring an end to the fighting
because each excludes a major participant who could
attract enough foreign support to continue the guer-
rilla war. Nevertheless, either could change the com-
plexion of the war from one of equilibrium and growing
strength on the guerrillas' side to one of strength for
the new government in Salisbury. (v)
Hurd Choices Ahead
The election of a government of national unity, r~upled
with a continuation of the fighting, will create same
hard choices for the parties involved with the Rhode-
sian problem. The frontline states will continue to
support the guerrillas, but an intensification of the
Fighting could force Presidents Kaunda of Za-nbia and
Machel of Mozambique into an open-ended commt-
ment to an increased Soviet and Cuban presence in
their countries. Kaunda has consistently resisted any
augmentation of the Soviet and Cuban role in Zambia,
but he might feel forced to reverse himself if it
appeared this was the only way to resolve the canflict
and remove the military threat posed to his c~ux~try by
the Rhodesians. Machel is less concerned about the
Soviet and Cuban presence, largely because of tiffs
ideological commitment to ZANU, but he probably is
anxious to prevent it from endangering the pragmatic
economic ties he has established with South Africa. (s)
In the hope of minimizing the military spillover iota
their countries, Kaunda and Machel might consider
urging Nkomo and Mugabe to strike a separate deal
with the government in Salisbury. Such an approach,
however, would risk seriously antagonizing zhe other
frontline states. The frontline presidents also have to
consider the possibility of supporting one guerriiia
group against the other in a contest for power it
Rhodesia. (s)
5 Secret
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Principal Military Forces Involved in Rhodesian Conflict*
Rw@nda* igali *Nsirobi - _
COng0
Brazzavills
ZAPU 2,000
CUBANS 19,000-21.000
SOVIETS 1,000
Approximately 70 Soviets ;rnd
700 Cubans advise and pain
ZAPO personnel.
ZAPU 20,000
CUBANS 65-75
ZAPU 200
Malawi
Lilongwe,
ZANU 7,000
CUBANS 650
SOVIETS 250
Mast of the Soviet and Cuban
advisers are engaged in
supporting government
delense forces.
ZANU 8,000
ZAPU 2,000
Rhodesian Army 18,000
Rhodesian Air Force 1,500
Police, Paramilitary &
Reserves 55,000
kMaseru
Lesotho
"Totals for ZANU and ZAPU include trained guerrillas and those under training.
/There are 7,500 ZANU and 500-1,(]D0 ZAPU guerrillas in Ethiopia
and 500 ZANU guerrillas in Libya r+nder training./
ZANU 3,000
SOVIETS 120
No Soviets are involved
with ZANU.
Auxiliaries loyal to
Muzorewa 8,000
Auxiliaries loyal to
Sithole 2,000
Secret ~
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Secret
The Soviet and Cuhan Role
The common objective of Moscow and Havana is to
secure influence in a black-ruled Rhodesia, and they
have decided that backing ZAPU leader Nkomo is the
best means to that end. The election of a government of
national unity will riot force any immediate changes on
the Soviets or the Cubans. The fighting will continue,
and they will support the guerrillas, hoping that the
military pressure will bring a settlement favorable to
Nkomo. They will play on African fears of Western
recognition of the new government to maintain the
momentum of the military option. (s)
>~eyond that, the options available to the Soviets and
Cubans have not fully taken form. They will take their
cue from the response of the Africans to efforts by the
new government to entice the guerrilla leaders to
return to Rhodesia. Should Nkomo return, Moscow
and Havana probably would prefer to support him.
Even though Nyerere and Machel would disagree, the
Soviets would weigh the opportunities to improve their
credibility and influence with Zambia against the
belief that any friction with 'Tanzania and Mozam-
bique would only be temporary. (s)
Nevertheless, Nkomo's return to Rhodesia carries with
it the risk that Nkomo would cut his ties with the
Soviets and the Cubans in the process, thereby leading
them to support ZANU. This assumes that ZANtJ's
military c;ffort does not evaporate as a result of large-
scale defc;ctions to the new government. At the present
time, Moscow and Havana cannot support both ZAPU
and ZAI?dLf because of the rivalry between them and
the potential it holds for an eventual contest between
them for pawer in Rhodesia. (s)
Pressures on the United States and Britain
The newly elected government in Rhodesia will prc;ss
tYtc US and the UK to recognize it and lift economic
sanctions. It will argue that the election meets the
demands of the US and UK for a transfer of power to a
black government on the basis of one man, one vole.
(u)
Kecognizing the new government and lifting ;auctions
certainly would strengthen it. There would be grater
white resolve to support the black-led governmen and
a greater willingness among whites in the militar to
defend it. Government prospects for attracting large
numbers of guerrilla defectors could also be enhanced
if the economy improved sufficiently to allow the
government to improve social services for the bla~:ks.
(u)
The lifting of sanctions would improve the chances cr1~
stemming Rhodesia's economic decline and glue u
major psychological boost to the internal regime
Worldwide demand has been increasing for man
goods produced by the Rhodesians such as conne .
gold, and chrome. (u)
At the same time, such a decision would seriously
erode the "special relationship" the US has fi~stered
with black African leaders-particularly Zar~biczn
President Kaunda, Tanzanian President Nverere and
Nigerian President Obasanjo. They would conclude
that the US and the UK had chosen to support the
"enemy" and thus would come under increasing
pressure from the guerrillas and the Soviets tc puP~sue a
military solution in Rhodesia. (v)
While some African leaders might support lilting
sanctions if it were followed by US and UK efforts to
include ZANU or ZAPU in the new government. the
frontline African leaders would be further antagonized
by such a strategy. A call for a new constitution-
providing for a more rapid transition to full black. rule
and approved by both blacks and whites-might dispel
some of the frontline presidents' resentment, gut ~t
would still leave the US and the UK very much it
disfavor. (s)
Faced with a refusal by the US and the UK to lii~
sanctions, the internal government would have di.~fi-
culty taking hold. White emigration probably would
increase as the level of fighting escalated. White4 in
the military would begin to question why they wet?e
fighting for ablack-led government that was unat~le to
win external support. (U)
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The frontline states and Nigeria would continue to
support Anglo-American efforts t~.~ward a political
settlement, on the basis that the election was merely
one step in a process that eventually would involve the
guerrillas in a negotiated settlement. They probably
would remain highly skeptical, however, that such
efforts would succeed. Meanwhile, regardless of what
the US and the UK choose to do, Soviet and. Cuban
involvement with the guerrilla forces-and with their
hosts-would continue to grow. (~ )
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Constituencies for the Election of 20 White Members to the
Zimbabwe Rhodesia House of Assembly
~~ter?
", 200
Enkd~doarn
.$R#, a!
3,4tiD
_
Gwelo~
$outlin~rn'
3,640 ;
,Nar~ erg
a, a
TYlaa~ae=tVltrr
3,6a*0
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Constituencies for the Election of 72 Black Members to the
Zimbabwe Rhodesia House of Assembly
'~d8a1(la~
r Kariba ?~,
?~+ 1WI$sltosfal~s~~#. ? Mas-~cv~a~~ni! C~sttr~#
264,500 /
~8tc2~~akT~~s1~ N..~aC't~'c
'383,50D
~4rii,z~IP4fl';
4 i 9, 500
Matabeleland South
isi,ooo
s Ml~*h6ii7E?~n