BACKGROUND OF THE AGRICULTURAL REFORM PROGRAM OF THE SOVIET UNION

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000500450207-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 1999
• Sequence Number: 207
• Publication Date: April 14, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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:ricultaral Ref 0,
m Program
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1. At the present time the vhole structurIII of Soviet agricultural economy is
undergoing profound and significant cbtinges. Many Western observers refer to
these changes as the beginning of a nevi era of the "New Economic Policy" in
agriculture because some of the measur~a recently adopted by the Soviet govert.-
ment to incr:ase agricultural productilInseem to indicate that the Communists
are again retreating from their basic economic principles. ji) ,ee~re:ferences Enclo-
sure (A)7 Some economists are even in lined to call this l'e.u.'tu "the third
revo.Lutiot, in Soviet agriculture" and i~io compare it with what is known as the
first and second agricultural reevolutipns, namely:, the nationalization of land
which followed the Bolshevix Revoluti.o of 1917 and the campaign of'icomplete
collectivization and ,l quidation of Kulaks as a class" during the First-Five-
21
Year-Plan in 192j-q0.
2. The Malenkov regime has certainly adopted a new policy toward collective farm-
ing, which lays greater stress upon agriculture and calls for increased invest-
ments. The question arises: will Cormaunists be able to solve successfully
their agricultural difficulties within the limitations set by their! own dogma?
The agricultural reform program laune: I in September 1953 represents only
another link in the chain of evente which has been linfluencing and molding the
development of Soviet agriculture during the last decade. Therefore it must be
considered in the light of historical retrospect. It is''a well established fact
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CENTRAL INTEL IGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATI N REPORT
I
 me :1ec
.
1i:e i,olr_ Putt:r'_ oft Constuniutn, wit!'. i U: ulti':Lat-. o"! c ,1114^
fife pre-/orld War TI Five-Year-Plans, Soviet agriculture had been
7J
?:nk.1i , '.r,, T) M.:- ';J ?1;tE'
.'11 q. LUL I:.:U uue1'. _ ...:u L..r ~:.~ ?lt v??iL
..~il?
'r 1. 1, auiCk r':.1 inn":)Ii G. t:" rl^1 en
j; L( z .i T n r i ? : 1 . rounnr-,' into an inductrial In C , lfull' ?
,
. 1 i',i nt r'i an;ri"iiltune : ].ways OC^_U_)i: a :;fuurd2.lcil~' ITI;I s r'. ?C:1? IJ'
S Cvit't (';:^.(~rzcso It ^ I,ar nitly I:r_:,i?,VLuau clan no I:CC1 :: Ll. 11 '?~t.
d I + -,u r ctn. At (the _& SS3 on of the Suorc c govt in 1': ?3. i'r :i'__ Val rLcv
~?1.C,1 L:1^. .11^O?.i _ o; all i::v?st}:1unt bet'._Un 2 TM' 1`.JJ ~`.f+_ di.;?i?. l;ct'.L1.1
w?:r:t for rr?cuuction o" consumer's goods and only 9.4 for
al! ur, . j :;) l s exult on th ev'_ of Wor! t
11.1 i.3 eu' _~u:. o:.' `her.:coin ag ri cultu-t1 eroduct hr. rdly ecu d tike 1?_v-?1 c: s.
ll d veal'.," _n the I,'1SIi before th_ Iriti O'..11r ~1nl clf ail! U!lr,'
r" ltccr uffored grcat~y as tale result el t ' 1lr.v^ , . L 1 n 4 o 1'
I , o_ t , t. i1c rer;ions of
Il tnc.' Cori!:-, Un; on r cv1t, ~, rteu 1,-, tlcn it ll
ur ion. 1o1 .lr ct ivel and ,CCd!.et s ate f:_? ms, 1'. 1L r`' 1 ca 1. l;
UinCry . iA_, -c in .:n.npotrcr w'lre Dire V':1 1'.;01:7 ( ilia) 1.h_e .3L]C.i
' :1~ :?l.r.e vrzted by rle tact t'ia'. r:Cte'r the c: c: 1 t
o r t 1 r ?r Dr :I'eL
1 i. ,r'rviccln t rr?d nndto Co i:.cl_ ti druc t.:c
v. _1??_, but to core twat).wtcnt in(urban lI'_iustr':'. A:'ten tll tla.. ~.?.? CO:'hl'. ue
of 'tr'ees Conrmmist 1gricult'ara_l 'r)o].iry r :)('??,r e ce t n. Tn
Vi"I r'r.1 CUitu1'e curfert'n _ur?t:1er from it sun ;..,, lttiitioil
! I. fur balnic elolicv changes. Overall n annin' of L::c C;,ov1 t
'e(. co:nr,l''to r?evnl.uat?ion. All. corrective iconsu:.... c Ise-u e.l:rr'' '"'
l i n('; nr?:_-.:=:r ar,. icultural policy, nitci, P.5 otr-::I1,'tic.:Ili:'h.; ;). 11kolkhoz-
l :,r i .:1 7 no" che:nrec in remuneration of labor, introduction of new
_'.:3113^. ;I t', Ie: etc )rovuci i1~.a depu^t;. It'~is Ij ,4-t".1: 1':1ran t; oo111C7,Ue11Cr. tl,n Ii t; t:l l:'.'
( )iii :olmy Vozn ueky, head :) t ?.; .. r'i.t iilrec rs 'o".11", i.:r'n
ri .: ?'Ttr-.l;ta C'l ,' t:O i:aorove the critical :onditiG115 e t': :'r is ih'7n:
c ?er,li_ i rogorcda". Q3) Eventually this idea ?rov,_. _:a_:;nt?;:n and. 1I Lr to s
given a.; r inally, in Clctober 1t' 2 Stalin hiciscltook to the rnstrtra to Vo'!c?.
-i.1,-in! gnu trarni.nC;. He recognized the necessit;,- of 01 rcforr. ;'i1r: calr
t I:c i.u c', t 1 ? O 111
1.'lO 1551 !l .i'rlrtlC iCh'1;::;uz an)'
'
ll.ra 6.1
1.a
u,2 t_1. 113.
J ?i
('r.t whit rl ;rite of Stalin in :;arch) 119:33 did the ot;;.ci is lex ld
r
lccrn ;about
? :r i.ou;- ;'r?clno::a I I selnse a, f acting the Soviet Union. Stalin's ac?ius ;lac
'r .;li.?1 rI r uc:1% and :Irn?r)t',tant decisionllabout the loo;ninj, eriai3 'n aggr??'culture,
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The so-called! "Collective leadership" which took over, knew that in the atmoc-
ehere of political unr~ ~Qir'a~s ht?anA.-e~ctz"fely d ngeib:Ys"
and could explode from the smallest spark. Such a catastrophe would push the
whole Soviet structure into the abyss of economic depression.
In September 1953 Nikita FOzrushchev, First Secretary of the ,ommunist Party, in
a dramatic move bluntly told about the tragic situation in Soviet agriculture.(13)
'without bothering to offer any explanation of the striking controversy between
his own evaluation and that of his chief, Premier Malenkov(14), Khrushchev
reveui.ed some, of the statistics on agriculture. He cited absolute figures and
drew a picture of Soviet agriculture, which even though incomplete, showed that
the industrial might of the Soviet Union had been built on quick sand. From
Khrushchev's'speech we learn that Soviet agriculture could not provide gr ade-
quate supply of basic products, since gross agricultural production increased.
between 19401 and 1952 by only lo%i.(15) Especially appalling is the situation
which, according to Khrushchev, exists in Soviet livestock breeding. He gave,
for instance ilthe following statistical data: in the whole Soviet Union there
%rerc 33.2 million cows in 1928, 28.6 million in 1941, and only 24.3 million in
'153. He reported that collective farms have shown complete inability in hand-
ling livestock.. The number of cows in the collective farm herds is at a danger-
ously low level. In the Ukraine the ratio has beer. reduced to 24% of the total
number of cattle, in Rostov region to' 24, in Moldavia to 19",0. On all Soviet
collective farms (kolkhoz, there were only one million three hundred thousand
cows in 1953 as compared with one million eight hundred thousand coos in 1935.(lf,)
According to FO rushchev j aft an of, m12h has reached a very low lcvol. in
1952 it was only 906 till =it oil the 'aaLUat4vA farias in the Koatroma ref;ion,
819 kg per cow or the collective farma'in the Vologdd region, 457 v- -r raw on
the collective farms in the Georgian SSR, ,k-VWV ;~Jsi,~FZt. Azerbaijan SSR. (17)
In the main region of Soviet Sheep-raising, K.a akh GSR, the average output of
wool per sheep decreased from 2.4 kg in 1940 to 1.9 kg in 1952. Khrushchev
=tated: "The', output of the gross produce in swine-breeding in 1952 was? pi1J._y l.u
?1:,.n tons as compared with 1.5 million tons in 1940".(1 )
Khrushchwv's data v.-l some of the figures published ezrliur in the Soviet press
?Ze compiled in the following table:
Livestock in the USSR (in millions)
Anirr:ls 1?28 1938 1953 1954 (plan)
eztle, L, 70.5 63.2 56.6 65.
S:^c':' goats'', 140.7 10,2. 109.9 144.4
26.0 30.6 23.5 34.5
Since the a tion of the Soviet Union has increased during the lrst 25 years
'.~y some 40a(l9), computation on a per capita basis gives an even more representa-
tive picture of Soviet regression in animal hu:,bandry. Such per capita figures
yield the following results:
Livestock in the USSR (per capita)
Animals
1928
1953
Cottle, horned
0.44
0.27
Sheep ?? goats
0.76
0.52
i
P1'58
0.16
0.14
For reasons not given, Khrushchev did not reveal any absolute figures on grain
rroduction. But even b;,, using 2'igurce quoted by Malenkov in his, rath Qpt'~mio-
ti.c, report to the XD Congress 'of the Communist Party in October 19525013, we
"Ind that there were 730 kg of grain per capita in 1937 and only 620 kg of grain
per capita in', 1952... Articles published by leading Soviet .ewepaperb reveal ciore
shout deploruole conditions existing in Soviet agriculture. For instai:^e,Travda;
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Sep 53 - complained that: "... In many regions, districts and republics tiv.~
Sowing areas under potatoes and other vegetables have not reached the prewar
=eve l... yield remains low". ? "Pravda,",. 26. 6ep-.53 stated that: "Tire level
rer_cned in production of meats, milk, wool, eggs, hides and other products o
ctni:; 1 husbandry is unsatisfactory... State plans for the increase of livest ck
:nv Poultry have not been fulfilled year after year. " ~
iumc c?as artificial substitutes for thisc'tasict al
bwun_,progres;
Thes~ so-called "social stimuli" have been the' features of Soviet economic 1L ,
since the time of the Bolshevik. Revolution. They have taken different forms rind
they have been called diffe're&..'?names: "Socialist emulation",'broletarian.
consciousness", "Stakhanov's'movement", "Soviet patriotism", "criticism and s lf-
critiicism", etc, But they all have this in common: They ?,v,ve not produced
results unless supplemented to a great extent by plain elLwontal fear, fear of
arrest, fear of torture, fear of starvation, fear of cold death in Siberia an
.^.y therlkinds of fear. And every time the Soviet government, for reasons
c~;:er~thanlhumanity, has had to resort temporarily to milder treatment of its
subjects, it had to reintroduce well recognized but completely anti-Narxian
methods of economic stimulation.
u
r -ro uc ve work is personal interest.k,23) During he years of
"theegreatlsocial experiment" Communists triedin vain to invent and to unoly
or
age o manpower but the low ,:ro-
ductivity of the so-called "socialized" labor, which has heen mainly responsi le
for i allures of the Soviet agricultural economy. -i c ct!,
i Present reform is, in
Communist recognition of the simple economic axiom that the most esscu
incentive fo
d ti
s ithynueh-higher than in the advanced industrial countries of the Western
l;'orl(a. 22) Therefore it is not physical sh
t
Kirushchev has tried diligently to show that the main cause of the present c iti-
cal situation in Soviet agriculture has been a "technical" one. he would lisp,
to convey the impression that the basic principles of Communist .arm policy Lave
nrov d correct and were not responsible for any shortcomings. ne complained
tt.at: "During the post-war years.a.large number of the best educated collec ive
peasants have transferred to work in industr$r.?(21) He also blamed local co lec-
t.ive farm leadership for its inability and low. efficiency. Actually, theseI
actprs played only the secondarr,role.in the development of the present crisis.
The main reasons for the failure of Soviet agricultural policy are to be f ounri.
?_lsewhere.l
III
. i:= a well known fact that the percentage of rural population in 1--lie Soviet U~ pion
10. Today, ii. order to save their regime, Communists are forced to do more than
merely 'dev se now slogans and mottos for their propaganda. A period of a
"pocket size New F. nomic Policy" in agriculture has actually bebun. Collects e
peasants are encouraged to enlarge and develop their private landholdings.
Prices for cattle delivered to the state have been increased by not less than
55;',, delivery prices for milk- and butter have been increased by 10M
.(24) This
71 not only create economic stimulus but will also increase buying power of
ae peeasants sad their demand for industrial consumer's goods. In order to
this demand and to avoid increase in prices and general inflation, the
regime, will; have to step up productic.u of consumer's good. Taxes paid by
collective farmers on the income derived from their individual households have
been substantially reduced.(25) Simultaneously an increase in output of light
industry has been promised by the new leaders. (26) But at the same time Communists
are undertasing a new political-administrative campaign in order to ev.:ntually
place hc weakened sector of their. "economic front" under tight control.
Khrush'I hev dedicated a good part of.hic speech on agriculture to this theme. ie
raid: 'Whyldo not we now... issue an appeal on behalf of the Party, call on the
best people from the cities, let us say, r'ifty thousand Communists, and send
them to strengthen the work in tl}e village?"(7)
11. It : is cry likely that, based on tiis'torXcal precedent, as soon as th Party :onI rol
appara+ua feels itself strong enough and becomes again absolute master in Soviet
villages, "the Malenkov New Economic Policy"' will be called off. Communists doll
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not. change their', goals and db;e9 V*se They. only change their tt*,ctics. Their
tactics are flexible but' their goa3 rain tho sense, and their main goal was,
is and will continue to be yrorl.d?couy at by Communism. Ccnnumist leaders in
the Kremlin realize that ''this goal can be achieved only, on the basis of a strong-
arnpolicy, a policy which calla for industrial development, at the expense of
the general economic welfare of We muiist subjects. "Cannons instead of butter"
is the motto of Communists today_and will continue to be their motto in the dears
co come. The recent reforz!w,do;_not,present a lasting solution of the basic nrob-
lem:of Soviet agriculture, namely: the conflict between individualistic and
collectivist psychologies. Thane reforms are only a temporary expedient on the
part of Communists, a compromiser,introduced in order to postpone the implemen-
tation of the solution of the .--ipultural problem to an historical moment more
favorable to them. ~~ .
ENCLOSURE (A):
List of Reforeries in the Compilation of this
Report 25X1 X
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(1)1 The New Economic Policy - Bp:P -j-Vas4a policy of restoration cf "limited capi-
talism" devised as a remedy a ga9.nDt-ecorjmic crisis, caused ''by the first attempt
at forming social order-, so-called "War-Communism". The "tactical
retreat" was adapted by the Tenth Congress of the Communist Party in March 1921,
and lasted to 1928.
Also see: V I Lenin; CoUlected&Works, vol XVIII, pt I, pp 67, 343-4.
One of the first decrees promulptid, by the Second Congress of Soviets
(26 October - 8 November 1917)`aboi.drhed?private ownership of land and declared
all land to be the property of the state.
The following statement about the significance of the complete collectivization
which vas forcibly carried out in the campaign of 1929-30 appears in the official
manual of the history of the Coimnsnist Party.
Jump from an old qualita-
tive was a most profound revolutionary change, a
tive social condition into a' new qualitative condition. It wr.s equal in its
significance to the revolutionary change in October 1917."
The Histor of the All.-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik), brief course, Moscow,
1946, p 291.
(3) Malenkov's breakdown )f the total investments between 1928 and 1953:
Heavy Industry - 638 billion rubles, 63.9% of total
Light Industry 72 7.3%
Agriculture - 94 " 9.14
.'
.I~ 7
Transportation -'193 19.4
(5) Estimated losses of the USSR in manpower during World War II are 37.5 million.
1
N S Timacheff, "The Postwar Population of the Soviet Union", The American
journal of Sociology, No 2, SeptAmber 1948.
According to the official Soviet etatistice, the 6oviet Union had temporarily
lost,ae the result of the German occupation during World War II.,an area which
accounted for 456 of the Da ! $p% 3 of gross output of industry, 47% of
the sown area, 45T of cattle a44.55% of railway lines.
N Voznesensky, The War -Economy.f the USSR during the Patriotic War, Moscow, 1947.
(6) According to the official Soviet figures, gross grain production dropped frcm
66 million metric tone in 1945'1 to 61 million metric tons in 3,46.
Pravda, 22 Jan 47.
(71) Nikolay Voznenenelgr, a leadinglBoviet economist, was the head of the State
Planning commission (,J plan") from 19~ to 1949. He wan also a member of the
Party Central Committ= and o rthe%11 T'. He also held the position of
Vice-Premier. No rea bons for his d1 nissal were ever given by the Soviet
Pravda, 9 Aug 53-
(4) Alexander Baykov-,gives the following statistical data:
Item
1928
l
Grain (in million quin'.als)
8 0 or 801
733.2
1,054
Sugar beet
99.2
101.4
210.2
6
Cattle (millions)
60.6
70.5
64.
Sheep and goats (millions)
121.2
146.7
111.6
Pigs (millions)
20.9
26.0
32.5
A Daykov, Soviet Economic System, New York, 1948, p 325
There was an increase! in population of about 406 between 1913 and 1 39?
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{') ".n.~rogcrtd" In }u ta.r. n1r..tt~r? parr,.-City. Corrruntstc tried to lmprov? ,.toducti-
(9) 1 V Stalin, Econonic-;rchlt:ms of-Snr1n1ion in the USSR, Moscow, 1952.
regions of the $ovlet Union and exri.ucion of i^rige.tion projects.
numercus w,-asure~: krown As ' talin's Plan of Transformation of Nature". This
included a huge pleb for a :.".forestation or large areas in the most fertile
hu c_ rtatc farms (Sovkhozy). T. ikit Kl.rushchev was believed to be in chsrge of
this campaign which was launched In 19-50. c:s.rlier, in 19+7-4F;, Communists made
(12 ) The Gr,'t ;oviet !n.,y^10 tt9ire., Vol O, 1, r`w,
( ') rrn.vc1" 15 Sep ` 3
(1) }'rsvl 1n Oct,
(vi) 'Gross ngr1-.At6rs i;ro,?u,l,:Lnn in t.h