PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD CONCEPT OF THE ORGANIZATION TO PROVIDE DYMANIC PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN THE COLD WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000600010072-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 1999
• Sequence Number: 72
• Publication Date: May 21, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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REVISE; 21 z7s7 1951
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
CONCEPT OF TM CRGANIZATION TO PROVIDE
DYIIANIC PSYCHOLCOICAL OPERATIONS
III TM C-.LD WAR
THE. PIDBIEC
1, To amalyze the scope and mission of the Psychological Strategy
Board and the tasks of the Director and the Staff; and to derive there-
from the qualifications and approximate composition of the staff,
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEII
2,, The pur2ose Of the Doacutive ctive of 1& April 1951, is
"to authorize and provide for/mo fiective pluming,
coordination and oonckict, uithin the franirgatk of
approved national policies, of psychological opera-
tions
3. The Psychological Strategy Board is resp)nsible for the
"formula.tion and promulgation, as guidance to the
departments and'agencie a responsible for psycho-
logical operationi, of ovor.all national psychololcal objectives, :elides and prevents, and for
the coordinatien and evalaaticm of the national
psychological effort"
14. There is provided a Dizector, decimated by the President, re.
stionsible under the Board for directing its. activities, He in assisted
by a staff* the organisation, qualifications and size of which,- within
limitn set by the Board, are established by him,
DISCUMOld.
5i The Directive neaten no new operating agency, It nssults from a
general sense of need for harnessing the ciispari tie resources of ezi.stim
ctzipartiments and agencies respons-iblo for executng various psychological
operations and intensifying the national effort,. It includes under the
term "psychological operations" a uide spectrum lair overt and covert
activities - from propagation of truthful foreign information to sub.
versive operations of both a morW. sica3 charactero
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60 In face of the peculiar challenge of Bolshevict Rucsias the primary
objective of intensifying these unconventional national efforts is to win
the cold uar and prevent declared global war, Fatling this? the second-
ary objective is to create coneltione favorable to our orthodox forces
In the event of taw. If all our resources available for psychological
operations wore bro.,,ght to bear consistentlys progrecrively and cumula-
tively, the chances of hoe ing the peace or speedLly winning the war
would be imamasurably increased. If that is true, the establishment of
an organisation for exploiting those resources should be consider( d a
major naitonal project. It should not be undertaken with half measu.rese
7. Psychological operations axe in no manner a substitute for sound
political.diplcmatic actions, strong armed forces or alert intelligence.
Psychological operations reflect the strength of all these but Id-11
uays be subsidiary or supplementary to orthodox governmental operations,
Therefore, the functions of the Psychological Strategy Board are not in
competition or conflict -with normal operations of the departments and
agencies. Instead, the Board coordinates and steers the resources of
their psycholo.cal units Into profitable channels toward national goals.
8. Soviet RUSSIA, and the satellites employ every instrumentality of
governments orthodox and unorthodox, in fighting the cold war. Parolee
offices back up their propaganda; grounds sea and air forces shift and
maneuver in support of the psychological war. It is di ficult to say
whether orthodox forces eupplement psychological operatic= or the core.
trary which is dog and which is tail. An Soviet rerourcee are des.
ployed actively or potentially in support of tzar that is now being waged.
As long as they have the initiatives our conventional planning for a
future declared Var is constant/7 throtm off balance and tends to be con-
fused or unrealistic.
,
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9. Conventional concepts and plans based upon a rp?Day which no man
can predict lead us into the dile= of tr.ro dangerous extrema.
Either our state of preparedness will be inadequate on the critical
day or over...mobilisation long..drawn.out will be 000Thomies327 destrac*
tive. Particularly is this true because war plans are bawd won
the assump. tion that the cold war cannot be decisive. Planning would
be more realistic if it were assumed that the cold mar could be von
and, if won, could be decisive, This assumption would occasion a
modification of conventional war plans blt not in such manner or de-
gree as to alter significantly the state of our preparedness at any
particular future daft. The Ctesumptd.on would, however, greatly enhance
the importance to be attached to current cold war operations, enlarge
the concept of such operations and ensure the availability of both
active and potential national facilities (orthodox as wall as unortho-
dem) in its conduct.
10. This conceptual background of tie Psychological Strategy Board,
the Importance of the ctakes involved, and the scope and varlet, of
operations to be coordinated these all are indicators of the requi..
site qualifications of the director and his staff.
110 Although the Board does net perbrm psychological operations, its
reEponsibility to give impotue to an intensified psychological effort
implies considerable power of decision in the Initiation and control of
major projects. Likewise, while the psychological operating units within
the departments and agencies cann9t be directed by the Board to carry out
its programs, the individual membors of the Board em.officdo are of such
prestige as to create the presumption that the executing agencies will
concider guidance approved by the members as being in effect mandatory.
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.TNCLUSIONS
120 'facing in mind this implied authority, the Board, Director and
Staff should exercice functions comparable to beth command and staff
even though their explicit authority limits the nature of "command
to guidance, Otherwise expressedothe Director and Staff are respons.
Bible for the management of the Psychological aspects of the national
cold uar effort, ranee no single individual could have the competence
or time to manage the global campaign, it seems evident that under the
supervision of the Director, thin management must be in part delegated
to staff assistants. A workable arrangement would be to employ for
this purpose regional and functional specialists, each of whom would
bo responsible for assisting in the formulation of and directly
charged with steering his part of a coordinated global program,
13. Here precision can noW be given to the role of the Board,
to the qualifications of the Lirector and to the composition and
fUnctions of the Staff,
THE BOARD
14, In the specific field of psychological operations the Board
functions begin uhere the functions of the National Security Council
leave off, The Council promulgates broad national policies and prim-
e:LI:41es but its reports are too general to constitute blue-prints for
implementat1on, The Board on the other hand adopts specific and practie
cable objectives and initiates action to attain them, The Board
proves lines of action and programs which assign workable and coordi..
nated tasks to the operating agencies,
15. The members of the Board will be able to give only limited
pers.nal time to the details of management of national psychological
operations, However, their decisions, vim translated into dynamic
action programs by the Director and his Staff and promulgated to the
Departments and Agencies, can give national purpose, consistency and
continuity hitherto impossible in this field,
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Within the powore of the Board, the irector shmild be alp
1.onod a high degree of initiative to act promptly and fierlbly in those
faat-nloving situations inherent in psychological warfare. He should
be supported against bureaucratic inertia or obstruction in bringing
to bear, at favorable opportnaties, all national psychological re-
souloos in order to maintain the offensive in the cold 'oar.
THE DIRECTOR
17. The DireCtor should he a nationally knot* figure and have a
broad backgromd ininteniatimal. affairs. PreferAbly he should have
experience in more than ono aspect of the broad spectrum of activities
comprised in psychological operations as defined in the Prosidontoe
nirective. Ho should be noro a man of action than an intellectual
analyst. Ho should be capable of quick and bold decisions within his-
authonity? but mothodical in directing long.range planning by his staff.
By judgmont and tact he should be able to inspire teamwork in operating
departments and agencies.
18* His task is of such national ivrportance as to deserve unhesitating
support from the Board and the President himself.
As prescribed by the Presidents Directives, he shalt
13e responsible for having prepared the programs,
policies, reports, and recomoendations for the
Doardo s consideration:
b. L cJit, nith the Board and be responsible to it for
organizing its business and for if:Tod-Ming the
reaching of decisions,
t- Promulgate the decisions of the Board,
d, Ascertain the manner in which agreed upon objec.
tiveo, policies, and prograras of the Board are
being implemented and co ?rdinated ar.long the
departments and agencies concerned,
e. Report thereon and on his evaluation of the
!, national psychological operations to the Board
together with his recommendations,
in Perform such other duties necessary to?carry out
his responsibilities as the Board may direct.
MET
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THE. SWF"
l90 The Staff all:did have responnibility onder the Director for
the performance of the following specificIWIctions which oanno4e
delegated to operating agencies:
a, Within the framework of approved national policiessand
as authorized by the Beard the fon:ulation mad prmulgatian in
practical operating terms (not abstractions) of coordinated world.
wide and regional
(2) psychological policies'
(2) psychological objectivee,
(3) psychological programs.
b., Giving impetus to the detailed planning and execution
by the operating agencies,
c. Continuous evaluation of thl resits of operations)
with a view to :making prompt adjustment; in the programs when:amis.
r70
d. The preparation of required reports,
0. Its own pecretariaUadministrative duties.
20. The foregoing list incAtwateyreflects activities required
to give vitality to the conduct of the cold war, It does,,howevews
suggest the indispensability of dynamic personalities to give flash
andblpod to the orgu4zatips4 IftheDiroct=aad.Staff glye than..
selves up to pondering and planning., lat shall have suceeed04.0'filY' in
establishing another Ivory Tower, Ut1e they must plan systematicaI4
to the extent necessary to formulate sound strategic objectives and
practical programs, the Director and his principal assistants should
sense them:Selves as being full time "at the front!! in the cold War as
literally as comoanders in orthodox lmm4
210 As principal aids the 'treetop should have certain regional
and functional Chiefs (each with a felt assistants) o should be onto
standing experts in their respective Geographic,political and functional
areas. These principal subordinates present in a sense the.noommandere
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of the regional operations. Isore accurately, ae a group they might
appropriately be called the:
rational Coordrmtion lend entation Division
ZrpearfiC regional Staff Sectd.one suggested 'arei
(a) Soviet Russia and Emmen satellites,
(b) China, South East Asia wad Eolith Asia,
(c) Middle and Near East and Noelem North Africa,
(d) British COMOluntaith and Free Europe,
(e) Latin America,
22. a, In intliate personal liaison with the corresponding
regional heads of the operating agenties? the Chiefs of the faregoing
,
staff sections exercise tbeir? steering...coordinating function
within the terms of the aaproved policies objectives) and pro-
grams formulated by the Strategy Group and the Plans and Programs
Division. Also, in collaboration with the latter staff, they assist
in all steps in the formulatics a policies, objectives, and pro-
grams applicable to their respective regions, They follow the
development of the opc rations, evaluate the results and keep the
Director currently informed of modifications which may be required
in the programs,
be The regional chiefs should be empowered to furnish the
authorized interpretation to operating agencies of approved policies,
objectives and programs.
c. There should also be provisions for functional speciali.
zation as appropriate.
23, The other major responsibility of the staff is that of planning
on the nati nal level, that is, the formulation of policies, objectives
and programs as guidanto to the operating agencies. These major divi.
sions of the staff might be called the i>lre.2.-olajind the piam
and Pro aiz ja_as Rivision. These staff divisions, should be responsible
for the formulation and communication to the operating deparbeente and
agencies of all types of formal guidance required to initiate the
projects and purposes of the Board,
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240 This gr.,up sits at the call of the Director and is chaired
by him. Its permanent membership should consist of the Director,
the Board Designees and a small graqp"ofprefessiamally skilled
iNal.tine consultants. In addition, Regional -and Functional 1M.
plemsnters from the Oporational Coordination and Implementation
Division, as uell as consultants from operating departments and
agencies should sit uith this group, uhen the oUbject of discussion
requires,
25, In addition to routine businces of the Staffp the Strategy
Group considers policies, Objectives and projects originated
by the Board as veil as these self-originated. Illenaaprovedby
the Board, they are passed to the Plans and Programs Division for
formulation into coordinated guidances, plaps,or-programs for
promulgation to the oprrating agencies.
26. It is from the Strategy Group perhaps that the most imagis
native and consecutive thinking should emerge. Ibis here that
the global psychological aspects of the cold uar are considered as
a. uhole. The long.range objectives having been formulated, inter-
mediate Objectives are adopted and strategic nnvos to attain than aro
continuously studied, The initiative in the cold %tar is seized at
each f-vorable opportunity. Tho broad terms of the action required
are decided. The Plans and Programs Division then uorks out coordi.
nated guidance or programs required by the operating agencies to
initiate planaing or immediate action, depending upon the nature
and urgency of the operation.
L,
Plans and Pro:poems Division
27, This is tho pla ning unit of the Staff utich performs the
mechanics of program planning, Its functions are to incorporate into
coordinated guidances, plans or programs the strategic decieione and
courses of action approved by the Board and to promulgate them to the
operating agencies. In their final fora these guidances, plans and
programs, while of broad national scope and in a global framework,
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should constitute basic blueprints for action on the part of
one or more of the operating agencies, 4iey should not be perk.
mitted to degenerate into abstractions or generalities, but
should be formulated only in terms of practicable tangible ob-
jectives,
28. A key nucleus of the Plans and Programs Division should be
recruited from the only area of government I:here Systematic and
coordinated planrehig is really understood and practiced? namely,
the armed services.. Thew key planners,es4a2ld establiah. a pattern
and instruct specialists, drawn from ?sycholoalcal operating
agencier, in the es,sential mechanics of prograoming. Plans and
programs should be kept realistic by intimate collaboration on
an ad hoc or task basis of regional and funct,onal specialiste
from the operating departments and agencies and from the Operational
Coordint:tion and Implementation Division,
SUM/IRY OP ONICEPT
29. Planning and oporational coor&natice should be based
on the assumption that the cold uar can be wan. As a secondary
responsibility only, should the Board permit the energies of the
Staff to be diverted to planning wartime programs as distinct from
current operations. A small nucleus of planners might appropriately
be set apart for programming national. plans for psychological warfare
in wartime, but major consideration should be given to the curront
operations of the global conflict.
30 Rembering the D.Day for the cold war occArred several years
ago? the plans and programs Irith which the Board trill be primarily
concerned are for a campaign being fought now. The Board and its
Staff should conceive itself to function as the comand and staff
of an army in combat rather than as a department of defense preparing
for a war to came.
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