HOTTEST ROLE IN THE COLD WAR.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000300290001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1957
• Content Type: NSPR

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An expert's intimate picture of the U. S.'s growing spy system
and how ii scored a decisive victory over Khrushchev
Ever since he served U.S. Army Intelligence in
World War II, Enno Robbing has been a fascinated
student of intelligence organizations and their meth.
ods. This interest was particularly spurred when,
after the war, he had the opportunity to interrogate
the leading members of Hitler's spy system. His
career since the war has taken him into numerous
areas ridden v ith international intrigue. lie was the
editor of Die l\'eue Zeiuuig, the U.S. military gov-
ernment German language newspaper, when it was
published in postwar Berlin, and he has been a
news correspondent both abroad and in Washington
I'm so good that I could swagger.
I knoll, things that would make you stagger.
I'm 90 per cent cloak ... and 10 per cent dagger.
Boo-boo, baby, I'm a spy.
INCE the days in World War II when a puckish Istanbul orchestra
played this song every time an unmistakably American intelligence
officer entered its cafe, the U.S. intelligence business has shucked any
and all quixotic romanticism. It is cold and serious big business now,
with upwards of 8,000 people employed by the pre-eminent U.S. intelli-
gence organization, the Central Intelligence Agency. And CIA work,
for all its partaking of many of the monotonous characteristics of corpo-
rate enterprise, is today the pursuit where an American in peacetime
supremely looks into the soul of others and his own. The CIA man is
more constantly, closely and tellingly at grips with his Communist oppo-
site number than any other American. The CIA man may penetrate
those state secrets the Reds want to hide and he conceals the American
secrets the Reds seek. The CIA man may discreetly disinfect a foreign
political climate poisoned by Red insinuations. Or the CIA man moves
swiftly through foreign political back rooms, to rescue and revive a
friendly government and a friendly people who were on the verge of being
choked by Communist pressure. Where he succeeds, the CIA man gets
no public acclaim, but has the unmatched reward of knowing that he,
in the night, massaged the heart of freedom back to life.
Within the last year, the CIA men have had loaded on them the biggest
range of responsibility that they have borne in their decade of existence.
(The CIA was established in September, 1947, when the lessons of
World War II made it apparent that the many disparate intelligence
activities of U.S. government departments needed a center and a head.)
As long as Joseph Stalin ran the U.S.S.R., the East-West struggle was
bluff and blatant, noisily black and white. With the advent of Nikita
Khrushchev, it has become a much more subtle proposition. Clandestine
activities in the Stalin era, it seems fair to say, had a vital tactical signifi-
cance. But Khrushchev has inaugurated what may properly be called
"the clandestine era," where such work is of strategic scope. In the place
of the old hannnS~illifi"ran 0?f In6Vgdl#sotrl e)enot for . ;
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 against us," l:h~ ' itt 5 Abbc Vdt``dr`i1k` e'1@ 501A-
against us is for us. e,as ann u ,cec a c ece tivc, c u cet earn aign
of competition for men's loyalties that Whittaker Chambers has described
as possibly making Communism "radioactive" again.
But Nikita Khrushchev did not succeed in starting that campaign
with the surprise and the finesse he had hoped. The CIA spoiled his
start, and in so doing declared that the U.S. was prepared to counter him
on his own clandestine grounds.
When the U.S. last year published to the world what Khrushchcv had
spoken in secret at the decisive 20th Party Congress of the Soviet Coin-
nnunist party, the CIA was reputedly responsible. One of its operatives
is believed to have obtained a copy of the speech abroad and sent it to
CIA in Washington. (Curiously enough, one of the few things not secret
about the CIA is its location. Over the entrance at 2430 "E" Street is a
sign proclaiming that it is the headquarters of the Central Intelligence
Agency.) Its publication, through the channels of the State Department,
wrecked the cautious timetable that Khrushchev had presumably set for
letting the speech and its radical implications trickle down through the
world-wide Communist apparatus. The various Communist parties, in-
stead of being spoon-fed de-Stalinization through a gentle dosage of
Kremlin directives, grew visibly sick.
Thousands of members quit the Communist parties, in a mass defec-
tion probably unmatched since the disillusionment of the I-Iitler-Stalin
pact. Those who remained clashed in bitter factional fights in their own
countries-and remonstrated excitedly with a Moscow that was unpre-
pared for their knowing so munch about the new line so soon. The political
potential of the lied International plummeted sharply downward. At the
same time, all the anti-Communists were explicitly warned of the new
tactics of cajolery and camouflage that Moscow had in mind. As an
erstwhile CIA critic grudgingly exclaimed, "With the publication of the
Khrushchcv speech, CIA certainly justified whatever it spent last year."
The story of how CIA got hold of the Khrushchev speech could con-
ceivably be told. But the telling would contribute more to the Soviets, in
hinting how they might break up an excellent American "penetration"
of their apparatus, than it would to American public enlightenment.
Suffice it to say that the CIA has at its disposal an ample battery of ways
to procure Communist documents. Coded Communist communications
can be monitored and the codes broken. Communist couriers.can have
their pouches rifled and the contents photographed and replaced, all
without their knowledge. Communist defectors may turn up as "walk-
ins" at a CIA "front" installation and deliver a bagful of vital papers-
something like turning state's evidence in an American court proceeding.
Or there may be at CIA's command that living paragon of clandestine
assets, the "defector in place"-i.e., a Communist who has broken with
the party without the party's knowing it, and who now uses his party
position to feed a stream of documents and oral reports to his CIA "case
officer" in regularly scheduled meetings in a CIA controlled "safe house."
By one or more of these ways, CIA presumably scored its coup in procur-
ing the Khrushchev speech.
A word to the worried, who by now may be concerned about the
propriety of American involvement in such shenanigans. The intelligence
business is at least as old as the time when Joshua sent spies into Jericho.
The purpose of intelligence work has always been quite simple: to dis-
cover in just what Way the enemy was lying, to help and save friends in
the enemy camp, to protect the intelligence man's own people against
foreign trickery and treachery. But the importance of intelligence has
never been higher in history than today, when the Communist empire
avowedly works on two levels: the diplomatic and public for sheer pur-
poses of deception, the covert and quiet to slaughter the sheep who
believe what Moscow officially professes. Yet some Americans in 1957
persist in the Wilsonian ideology of 1917, of "open covenants openly
arrived at," and decry U.S. clandestine activities. Others adhere to
the maxim of the redoubtable Henry L. Stimson who, as Secretary of
State under Herbert Hoover, closed clown the tiny secret section of the
State Department with the obsetvation that "gentlemen do not read other
people's mail." Both these postures lost their validity after 1945, when
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 nation` it scene ~rInt ec'1 17ret c-L c Pr t~irlfc~,~ tlitJA-R
qualms about the existence of CIA as a civil shield of the republic makes
about as much sense as to have qualms about the existence of the
StratL"'ic. Air Command and the I-I-bomb as a military shield.
0 N\'hat is of concern to the public, just as the quality of U.S. missiles,
1 f l 1?t f U S II ..
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ie qua y o . . spes. c, .b
bombs, planes and pi ots are o concern, is
well qualified arc the CIA men to take up the inescapable gauntlet that
khrushchcv has thrown clown?
Cl ?l men come in ', kaleidoscopic variety of shapes sizes and qualities
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-as they do in all human institutions. The director of CIA, the grey X
ear-old Allen W. Dulles
is a former Wall Street
-four-
enial sixt
d
,
y
y
an
(
1::,+)er. His chief value to his law firm, Sullivan & Cromwell, was not,
however, in his command of legal details. Instead, Dulles was regarded by
his legal partners as, first, a superb customer's man and, second, the man
?ho was willing to make the decisions they were reluctant to take. Both
these talents stand Dulles in excellent stead in his job as director of
the Central Intelligence Agency today.
From Tall Street to CIA via OSS
The former customer's man is generally regarded as the peer of Ameri-
can "case officers." He built that reputation with the World War II OSS
in Geneva, Switzerland. There he secured a fantastic flow of vital reports
-the elate of the Nazi attack on Russia, the location of the main V-I
bases-out of Hitler's Germany. He did it by instilling in German agents
like the celebrated "George Wood" (whose real initials were K.F.) the
same mixture of confidence in him and attachment to the U.S. that he
had once instilled in the clients of Sullivan & Cromwell. From his prac-
tical experience in intelligence details, Dulles as CIA chief has an inti-
mate understanding of the problems of his lower echelons. His capacity
to make decisions naturally serves CIA well too. He has been known to
break up divided and uncertain meetings of his top advisers with a con-
fident wave of the hand, "The operation will go on."
Next to Dulles in the CIA hierarchy is the sparsely sandy-haired and /
deeply Southern Air Force Lieutenant General Charles P. Cabell. He J
was formerly the boss of the secretariat of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the
Pentagon, and represents the CIA potential for effective co-operation with
the military intelligence. services. The presence of Cabcll, like that of
Dulles, underscores the fact that while the CIA itself is only ten years
old, it operates with American intelligence experience of considerably
better vintage. In Cabell's wake in the CIA come many former officers
from the military intelligence services who find their flair for espionage
better rewarded in the CIA than in the services, where line and all-around
performance is at premium; and service, supply and communications
officers who provide CIA with a hard core of logistical know-how. Dulles,
in his turn, heads a CIA contingent that includes lawyers who by teni-
perament prefer to be the principals, rather than the counselors, in an
action; former business executives who in the middle of life suddenly
hanker ;'ter rewards beyond money; and young men of private means
,: ho are unselfishly eager to redeem their unearned good luck.
Then there are in CIA the ex-FBI men, who bring with them the
investigative talents of an older organization, in which they perhaps did
not have the chances to advance that a new one offered. There are
t rui rrs, Germans who fled Hitler, Russians and many other nationalities,
it ith their varying wealths of language and area expertise. A sizable CIA
category consists of ex academicians, who can have more fun, make
money and pursue action rather than abstraction in the intelligence busi-
nrs'.. These include scholars with staggering linguistic gifts and poetical
twpes W ith an incredibly sensitive apperception of the psychological mo-
tiw.itions of potential agents. Finally, as it must to all organizations, there
("Ines to CIA the crowd of secretaries, budget officers, personnel directors
and other administrative officers who, while they use the same talents
t11.it are required in non-secret work, share the clandestine atmosphere.
A secular monkishness unites all these men from very diverse back-
grounds. They are really excluded from the inquisitive and open Ameri-
can society, where everyone is expected to answer the
uestion
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,
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 ~a,.h and to the 4 i h16a nd evaluation of tl f1o of mtlinen
uformation that pours in, (a acl'nlPON-YA91!t:t~IA-
cxt question, "What do you do there?" they must clams up; and they
lust sit mum and feibnedly ignorant through many a dinner conversa-
'on where an amateur rattles off his views on the very subject on which
0 he (;(:1 man is an expert. For if he identifies what he is doing, or if he
lows what he knows and thinks, the CIA man pinpoints a secret pre-
ccupation of the U.S. government or a secret policy. The "overt" side of
'IA is responsible, at the head of a task force from the military and other
oycrnment intelligence agencies, for the preparation of the National
ntelligence Estimates-the closely reasoned and finely qualified studies
~f foreign countries and international issues that distill everything overtly
r covertly known to the U.S. into objective analyses for the National
ecurity Council and its chairman, the President himself. If an "overt"
IA man talks, and it gets about, the Soviets will have clues to the inner-
nost councils of the U.S. administration.
The members of the "covert" side of CIA, the one that through secret
perations collects the information or creates the circumstances which the
'overt" side evaluates, must keep themselves even more under wraps.
deally, they should be able to claim plausibly sonic occupation totally
lifferent from CIA. But the task of acquiring "cover" and keeping it is
ricky and arduous. For example, it is practically impossible for a CIA
man to masquerade as a journalist because the journalistic fraternity is
close-knit and gregarious one, where everybody knows roughly what
verybody else is up to, and where, moreover, a man who does not get
published an amount of copy that requires his full working time soon
Inds himself under suspicion. Business "cover" is theoretically more
ractical; an agent could have a relationship with a firm that would leave
aim partly free for his CIA work. But, the claims of the Communists that
capitalism and CIA activities go hand in glove notwithstanding, American
companies are notably cool to the idea of putting agents on their payrolls.
Blocked at many a turn by the open-and-aboveboard American way of
doing things, "covert" CIA men must devise some kind of "cover" as best
they can. Often, it means they just have to keep out of sight as much as
possible.
This means that for social life and intellectual stimulus, the "covert"
CIA operatives are really thrown on each other. Their wives cannot be
told what they are doing. Their children are put off with some vague
story and not infrequently get the idea that their dedicated fathers don't
anoint to much in the world. Neighbors barge in, expansive about
their own affairs, and feel a slight chill when the CIA man does not talk
as freely of himself. When the covert operative goes on his tours of
overseas duty, he is again confined to a small sector of the foreign human
scene, denied the expansive pleasures that living abroad can have. No
matter where he is, the operative works odd hours, often meeting his
contacts at night and sometimes dropping from view for weeks and
months-while his wife worries helplessly and he has little idea if some-
thing has not struck his family that requires his presence at home.
To these personal deprivations, official ones must be added. Security
is the first requirement of intelligence work; therefore the operative
knows that, rather than being implicitly trusted by his superiors, he is
necessarily under their constant scrutiny for any signs that he may be
disloyal. If he gets into any kind of official row with a boss or a colleague
-and this happens in any organization-he should not take his case to
any public court of appeal. Worst of all, if the operative falls into
Communist hands, lie knows that his government has to disavow him. It
is a claustrophobic environment, in which only the very strong and the
supremely devoted survive to do well.
The CIA just has to take it
Just as the CIA man has no public recompense or redress, he and
his organization have no defense against public attacks. When someone
cries out after a national fiasco, "Where was our intelligence?" CIA lacks
the privilege of producing proof that it was right there. When CIA is
accused of doctoring the National Intelligence Estimates to serve the
political purposes of a current achninistration, the CIA cannot put its out-
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 can readily rip I{~ t'''~ jvFsRIM it`k1A_
practically arrogated tine sec ed co t o o foreign. po icy.
Actually, the CIA is perhaps more closely checked than any other
government agency. The inborn instincts of the democratic process, ever
on guard against secret concentrations of strength, have seen to that.
Seven of the most respected and responsible members of the U.S. Con-
gress form an ad hoc working group privy to CIA operations. The CIA
budget, which is packed into other appropriations for purposes of con-
cealment from foreign enemies, is known to selected officials in the
Bureau of the Budget and several members of Congress. In the last few
years, two notable committees have been through the agency stein to
stern, one headed by Lieutenant General Jimmy Doolittle, the other by
General Mark \V. Clark. Today there is in existence the President's
board for checking on the CIA. It is headed by Massachusetts Institute
of Technology President James R. Killian, Jr., and includes such
knowledgeable figures as former Defense Secretary Robert A. Lovett, Doo-
little, steel magnate Henry Ryerson and others. This board, with full
access to CIA activities, must report to the President twice a year. Mean-
while, Allen Dulles reports to the National Security Council every week.
Since the CIA is an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, it must also
co-ordinate closely and constantly with the pre-eminent U.S. foreign-
policy agency, the Department of State. (The joint decisions of State and
CIA are subject to National Security Council approval,) State may
'counsel against undertaking some operations on the ground that there
could not be "plausible denial" of the U.S. hand if the operations were
"blown", i.e., publicly exposed, and that the damage to U.S. interests
from a "blown" operation might be greater than what the operation could
hope to achieve. However, considering the effrontery with which the
Soviets deny participation in clandestine operations in which they have
been caught Red-handed, it may well be that the U.S. should consider
"implausible denial" as sufficient.
Among the things that CIA is permitted to do, one function is obvious:
intelligence procurement. Several others are matters of speculation.
CIA extracts Communist secrets by research, by technical means and
by straight agent operations. CIA analysts read everything published
and obtainable from the Communist orbit. Between the lines, they find
a wealth of information that the Communists would like to keep con-
cealed, but which they unconsciously imply in what they say. The CIA
analyst's job is of course immensely more complicated than that of his
Communist opposite number, who can take American publications at
face value. The CIA analyst is the man who must overcome the intel-
ligence advantage that the Soviets gain by censorship.
Electronic leakage: for aacl against
The CIA technical specialist also competes against formidable Com-
munist opposition. Any U.S. embassy or diplomat's home behind the
Iron Curtain is "bugged" by the Red landlords, who conceal electronic
audio surveillance devices with extraordinary skill and imagination. Out-
side the Iron Curtain, Red agents attempt to install such devices in inn
portant U.S. headquarters. The enemy listening gadgets must not only
be found so that American official business can be transacted in privacy;
it must also be assumed that some of them are not found as soon as
they are put in. In retaliation, CIA men presumably go about the busi-
ness of "hugging" Communist offices so that there is at least as much
electronic intelligence leakage out of them as out of U.S. offices.
But exhaustive reading and ultramodern electronics cannot and will
not replace the classic figure of all intelligence work, the agent. How does
a CIA man recruit a member of the Communist apparatus for U.S.
service?
CIA obviously never reveals its methods to outsiders. But the whole
process of wooing agents has been practiced by many nations over many
centuries. And since a human equation is always involved in recruitment,
it is doubtful that CIA has discovered anything new in the field. The
classic pattern of agent recruitment transposed into CIA circumstances
can be fairly closely imagined.
The process may begin with an analyst in Washington. He may note
that Mr. Z, in S Z6 nDAO*1X VTid5P R#W.19b f." OFA-
motion. Playing a hunch that Z might be miffed, the analyst may go to
CIA's vast collection of personal dossiers and examine Z's biography for
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might be promised assistance and asy tun in return or cer
the U.S. lloes he lean toward "national Communism"? Then a limited
bargai^ might be struck where he and the U.S. co-operate against Russian
influence on his country. Is he highly intellectual or idealistic? Then
CIA might envisage sending one of its top ideological debaters to win him
away from Communism. In any event, Mr. Z, unbeknownst to him, has
now been "spotted for recruitment."
. The next step is the "approach." A CIA case officer in Z's country
obviously should not approach Z cold. If Z refused to be recruited, the
case officer would not only be "blown." He might be expelled from Z's
country, his other operations endangered, the whole U.S. penetration of
the local Communist party jeopardized. In dire emergencies, CIA men
can make successful "cold approaches" to key foreign nationals and
secure their co-operation in the nick of time. But in ninety-nine cases
out of a hundred, it is essential that a third party be employed between
the case officer and the potential agent to feel the latter out.
In Z's case, the CIA man might use a Communist party clerk or chauf-
feur who is already on the CIA payroll. lie would be instructed to try
to get a job near Z, where he could observe him and gradually gain his
confidence. Then he would report regularly to the case officer on Z's
moods, opinions and problems. Sifting these reports, the case officer
might eventually decide that Z seemed ripe for the crucial "approach."
This is, of course, one of the most tense and chilling moments in the
intelligence business, and has to be prepared with maximum care. The
clerk or chauffeur might be chosen to do it, if his psychological relation
ship to Z seems sufficiently strong for him to convince Z to turn agent
but in case the clerk or chauffeur should fail, the crucial rendezvous ha
to be held in a site-preferably a CIA-controlled "safe house"-iron
which he can speedily be evacuated to safety, before the outraged Z car
turn him over to the police. Alternatively, another already employee
local agent might be injected into the picture-with similar precaution
for his safety. In that case, the man who had been reporting on Z woul
not be exposed. Ile could either keep further tabs on Z if the approacl
failed, or he could serve as a check on Z's loyalty while Z is working as a,
agent. Or, depending on circumstances, the CIA man could make th
decisive approach himself. This is frequently necessary because foreig
agents want the visible assurance that they are actually dealing with th
U.S. and will enjoy whatever protection the U.S. can give them durin
their hazardous duty.
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Recrnitnient of an agent
The "approach" scene compels the CIA man to marshal all his know -
edge, authority and persuasive powers with the resourcefulness of a top-
notch lawyer-and with the knowledge that, if his argument fails, I e
pays the penalty of the client. But if Z capitulates, the CIA mail thcri
moves relievedly on into the "recruitment," the fixing of the objectiv ,
communication arrangements and compensation aspects of the ne v
agent-case officer relationship.
Z will be given precise instructions as to the type of information lie Is
to obtain and pass on. Ile may communicate with the case officer throu< i
a "(lead drop," an innocuous-looking address to which the agent repo s
are mailed, or some physical spot where the agent leaves them and ii c
case officer picks them up. A "live drop" may be used, a store or prof -
sional office where the agent leaves his reports, disguised perhaps as a
package, which the case officer collects without the "live drop's" known g
what it is all about. Again, a "cut-out" may be injected, another age t
who can meet Z with more safety-and then Z may hardly see the came
officer at all. Or regular "safe-house" meetings may be scheduled
tween Z and the 'case officer. For these, there would always be pre. r-
ranged "emergency signals" in case either one felt lie had been follow d
to the rendezvous. Other signals would be devised to warn that cith'r
party had to skip a rendezvous. Finally, as the last detail of the "recru t-
ment," a form and a rate of compensation will be arranged. It is a
mistake to assume that agents generally work for money. Many do it
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Continued
 he same country. Meanwhile the U. . would profit from a constant flow
if secret information out of Z's party. But the (lay may also coarse when
is no longer safe as a "defector in place." Then he has to be evacuated,
)ften to the U.S. There, after he has been thoroughly "debriefed," after
:IA men have for weeks and months gone over all the knowledge that he
night not have had time to communicate in his necessarily infrequent
nd brief meetings with the case officer abroad, Z may be "surfaced."
This means that Z will be permitted to appear at a press conference or
once other appropriate forum. There he will tell the world those secrets
if his Communist apparatus that are of no use to CIA in the planning or
execution of further agent operations, but do have an anti-Communist
ropaganda value.
An outstanding example of a "surfaced" defector is Joseph Swiatlo, the
ormer colonel in the UB, the Polish secret police, who fled to the West in
1953. What Swiatlo told the world and his own Polish people about the
machinations of the UB completely discredited the UB and the Stalinist
apparatus in Poland. It directly paved the way for the Gomulka take-over
of power in October 1956-and helped to hand Nikita Khrushchev his
humiliating defeat when he flew to Warsaw to halt Gomulka, and failed.
This shadow area on the fringe of the intelligence business has been
extended by some press reports claiming that the CIA had a hand in
rescuing the country of Iran from Communist infiltration and that of
Guatemala from a Communist government. Such press assertions have
never been proved. But naturally they lead to speculation as to how the
Cli1 might be of help in similar situations.
The speculation can only be pursued by glancing at the extensive
operations of the Communists in the field generally known as "political
warfare." It is known that the Soviets subsidize the propaganda work of
Communist parties all over the world. It is known that the Soviets are
masters of the art of partisan warfare and have set up potential guerrilla
armies in many countries. (In France, for instance, it is estimated that
the Communists can call on some 50,000 "durs" for an armed civil up-
rising if they should judge the moment opportune.) Moreover, the Soviet
hand has been plainly visible in such postwar coups d'etat behind the
Iron Curtain as Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary and Poland. In each
instance, it was evident that the Soviet ambassador or some special deputy
arxiving from Moscow steered the local Communists through their piece-
meal whittling down of the democratic forces and presided over the final
liquidation of the democratic process.
Strength where it is needed
It is certainly to be hoped that the CIA has at its disposal some counter-
'ailing talents and assets to such Soviet stratagems. It would be cruel
indeed if, say, the Ruritanian Democratic Party in still-free Ruritania
succumbed to the Communists because it did not have as much skilled
assistance and advice from the U.S. as the Ruritanian Communists
inescapably receive from the Soviets. Especially in underdeveloped
countries, where the science of government is often at a low ebb and
where the Soviets pour in funds and agents in order to exploit the chaos,
it seems desirable for the U.S. to assist the democratic forces to develop
proper security measures against the Red enemy. And where a Com-
munist coup may be in the making, it appears almost mandatory for the
U.S. to put some mature political skill?and strength at the disposal of its
friends. Often the beleaguered democratic forces abroad could not openly
appeal to the U.S. for this kind of help, because the Communists would
hypocritically but tellingly raise the cry of "imperialism." The help would
have to be secretly provided.
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 vide hope-butt'f#Q ~ sigance^-~Pr tyOT. e r atiin C?A
a t i is at a c Ta c
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with the Soviets in its capacity to bail out its sinking allies in many parts
of the world.
All the things he does-and the added things that he probably ought
to do-throw a tremendous burden of responsibility on the CIA man, for
which he gets small pay and less recognition.
\Vliv does he stay on the job?
For one thing, he is a child of his time, the clandestine era. He is like
the mountain climber who ascends the peak "because it is there." The
Soviets are there with their vast subversive apparatus; someone has to
conquer it on behalf of the U.S. Anyone who thinks that proposition
through may find himself mailing a job application to Allen Dulles.
Ills organization consists largely of men who have.
A CIA man's epitaph is his' own
Then, odd as it may sound to the conventional man, CIA work satisfies
a profound sense of morality. The abstract devotee of the "noninter-
vention" school of political thought will stand by in pious horror as
Communists take over people and nations. He will do nothing about it
because that would be "intervention" too. For a? professor's mess of pot-
tage, he is ready to let human beings and human heritages pass into
bloody oblivion. He will, however, write an eloquent epitaph. The CIA
man believes that only those things are moral that are real. If by intelli-
gence work in all its ramifications he can save lives and happiness and
free institutions in a jungle world, that is civilized and right with him.
Lastly, the infinitely complex clandestine age takes on for its intimate
U.S. participants a splendid simplicity. Across the street from the C[A
agent, maybe next door, invisible but ever-present is the enemy, his Com-
munist counterpart. Amid the organizational jungle of modern life. the
CIA man's task is as clean and exhilarating and individually crucial as
ancient single combat. 1{t
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