WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT SUDAN'S 'ARAB' REVOLUTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007300030002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 11, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 5, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Sudan's "Arab" Revolution
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
Np 38
5 September 1969
No. 0386/69A
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6E U R VA'
SUDAN'S "ARAB" REVOLUTION
On 25 May 1969, a small, obscure group of middle-grade army officers overthrew
Sudan's elected government. It installed a military regime, ruled by a ten-man Revolutionary
Council (all but one member is military), and a largely civilian shadow cabinet to administer
the daily affairs of government.
The group, led by Colonel Jafar Numayri (now a major general and president of the
Revolutionary Council), claimed it acted to free the country of the waste, corruption, and
venality of its ineffective parliamentary predecessor. Despairing of the politicians' failure to
deal effectively with the country's urgent economic, political, and social problems, the new
regime was swift to suspend the provisional constitution and commit itself to major "social-
istic" economic reforms, the elimination of political parties, support for movements of
"national liberation," and firm adherence to the Arab cause in the dispute with Israel.
It is difficult to gauge the popular view of the new government, but initial reactions
seem to reflect at least relief at being rid of some of the old, often corrupt, and more often
incompetent members of the political establishment. At any rate, no effective opposition has
materialized, although resistance activity has been reported from several disparate groups.
THE REGIME'S POLITICAL COLORATION
ix o the ten council members,
me u ing umayri, are said to be sympathetic to
Communist aims. Fifteen of the 23-member cab-
inet allegedly are similarly inclined, and six cabi-
net officers are members of the Sudan Commu-
nist Party (SCP) central committee. A number of
others, including Prime Minister Awadallah, are
self-proclaimed socialists closely identified with
Egypt, and some reportedly have even served as
Egyptian intelligence agents.
The regime has taken pains to describe itself
as democratic, socialist, and nonaligned, empha-
sizing the "Sudanese" aspirations of the revolu-
tion. The trend in the economic sphere, as is the
case in many of the lesser developed nations, has
been toward a more socialistic orientation. Thus,
Special Report
the policies expressed during the first three
months of the new regime have probably not
been greatly influenced by the Communists in the
government. The presence of Communists at top
levels, however, presents the SCP, the best organ-
ized political group in the country and the leading
Revolutionary Council
President
SECRET
Prime Minister
Babikar Awadallah
5 September 1969
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SEURL I -
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Predominantly Arab Ad Damiy
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Omdurman
Khartoumf Kassala,
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Communist party in Africa, with a good opportu-
nity to assume real control. At the same time, it
seems likely that the nationalist elements in the
regime would resist any quick shift from the
country's traditionally more conservative institu-
tions.
PROMISES AND PERFORMANCES ON
INHERITED DOMESTIC PROBLEMS
The new government, regardless of its politi-
cal orientation, has assumed seemingly insur-
mountable burdens. The former government had
survived in a sort of hand-to-mouth fashion that
avoided the necessity to make major decisions. It
was formed out of expediency from a coalition of
the major political groups, and potentially dis-
turbing issues were avoided whenever possible.
The military regime has eliminated all politi-
cal activity and has called on the Sudanese people
to unite behind it in the process of developing a
"modern" and "socialist" Sudanese state. This
will be a formidable task. The Sudan's political
institutions have never advanced beyond a rudi-
mentary stage and continue to be dominated by a
primitive, tribal outlook, reflecting the wide range
of special interests among the populace.
The ethnic and religious diversity of the
country's 14 million people is most strongly re-
flected in the almost total disaffection of at least
one segment of the country. Since the mid-I950s,
a virtual state of civil war has existed in the
southern provinces, where security forces are hard
pressed to contain the insurgent activity of the
largely Negroid rebels. This basically pagan but
partially Christianized portion of the populace
abhors the radical Arabism of the north and the
military orientation of those in power in
Khartoum.
Special Report
One of the regime's first moves was to assure
the south that it could look forward to some
semblance of autonomy from Khartoum provided
that it developed a broad, socialist-oriented move-
ment consonant with the revolutionary regime in
the north. Such a task is almost impossible on a
short-term basis. The fighting continues unabated
in the south, and neither the residents nor the
government officials responsible for the area see
any real prospects for solution.
Another problem, not unusual for emerging
states, is a dearth of financial resources. With an
annual per capita GNP of probably less than $100
and an inherited debt of over $400 million, the
country lacks the funds to carry on day-to-day
government operations. There is little money
available to prosecute the extremely expensive
war in the south or to embark on country-wide
developmental projects. Pleas for aid and assist-
ance from the USSR and Eastern Europe will take
some time to bear fruit even if implemented.
Moreover, this would represent a sharp shift in
the direction of the flow of funds from aid and
trade. Trade with non-Communist countries ac-
counts for 79 percent of Sudan's exports and 76
percent of its imports (although the share to and
from the Communist countries has increased
about 60 percent since 1965), and developmental
projects are largely dependent on Western funds.
The US contributed about $107 million in aid
($69 million of this was in grants) between 1956
and 196-7. US aid was severed after the Arab-
Israeli war in June 1967.
The regime has made much of Soviet and
Eastern European moves for closer economic and
trade cooperation. It has, in fact, overstated the
extent of new agreements in order to underline
the shift away from economic dependence on the
"imperialist" West, a move on which it apparently
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prides itself. New agreements are being negotiated
with Hungary and East Germany and a 1967
agreement with Bulgaria may be reactivated.
These negotiations were initially played up as
"aid" commitments toward "100 new develop-
ment projects." Widespread Sudanese skepticism
and East European denials, however, forced the
government to retract its early description and
announce that the discussions were dealing with
trade and credit arrangements. The almost certain
failure of any quick jump toward "better times"
will contribute to a lessening of popular enthusi-
asm for the regime.
Special Report
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
In its foreign relations, the regime seems to
show the increased influence of leftists if not
Communists in high places. In one of its first
official acts, the new government recognized East
Germany, North Korea, and the South Vietnam
Provisional Revolutionary Government. It dis-
cussed trade and aid agreements with East Euro-
pean delegations
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As if to reassure its neighbors, however, the gov-
ernment also dispatched "enlightenment" teams
to its African and Middle Eastern neighbors in
search of support.
Another aspect of the swing toward Moscow
is the regime's allegation that the US and West
Germany have been guilty of attempts at subver-
sion. Prime Minister Awadalla chose the occasion
of a visit to Cairo to give extensive airing to these
accusations. He thereby got greater mileage out of
the affair than if it had only been broadcast to a
domestic audience, a large number of whom ap-
parently doubt the regime's charges against the
US. In any event, the US mission was forced to
reduce its embassy staff from nine to four, fur-
ther lessening the already meager Western pres-
ence that had been maintained since the Arab-
Israeli war of June 1967.
Even with this observable trend, however,
there remain undertones suggesting that some of
the government hierarchy realize that Western
support, particularly financial, is still necessary.
Thus, requests for aid from Western and other
international financial institutions can be ex-
pected.
OPPOSITION AND ITS POTENTIAL
After three months, opposition to the re-
gime's control in Khartoum is virtually nil. The
old political elements were surprised by the swift-
ness of the coup, and most leaders were arrested
and jailed; eventually, many will probably be
tried for activity alien to the revolution.
The Ansar, a Muslim religious sect com-
prising two million followers of Imam al-Hadi
al-Mahdi, probably represent the greatest popular
threat to the regime. They and their political arm,
the Umma Party, are still in disarray, however,
and would seem to have little chance for mount-
ing any effective counterrevolutionary activity in
Ansar tribesmen
the near future. Nevertheless, they are plotting on
their island stronghold south of Khartoum and,
with others also interested in opposing the re-
gime, could in time put together an effective
opposition force. Potentially in their favor is the
fact that 40 percent of the officers and men in
the armed forces are Ansar. If army service has
not diluted the Ansar's tribal allegiance, they
could be a source of trouble for the regime in
maintaining military control, now the basis of its
power.
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5 September 1969
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The army itself probably will be the biggest
threat to the regime. The coup leaders purged all
of the "establishment" general officers and now
appear to have firm control of the situation in the
Khartoum area. Sudan is a large country, how-
ever, and its limited military forces are widely
dispersed, a factor favoring counterrevolutionary
activity. Thus, quiet but effective antigovernment
plotting similar to that preceding the coup in May
is certainly a possibility.
PROSPECTS AND CONCLUSIONS
The prospects seem fairly good that this
government, in spite of conflicting loyalties at the
highest levels, will survive for the foreseeable
future, primarily because no opposition force
now seems capable of ousting it. Given the nature
and extent of the country's problems, however,
the regime's ability to achieve "middle age" is
more questionable.
In any case, the chances for the emergence
of constitutionalism seem slight. Patterns of re-
pression are already apparent in the arrest and
jailing of those engaging in-and probably of some
who are just suspected of-opposition to the gov-
ernment. Such repression may tend to coalesce
the forces of opposition (the Ansar, other reli-
gious sects, the rebel southerners) into some kind
of united front. Conflicting religious, political,
and social patterns, along with disorganization
and lack of material assets, however, will prob-
ably prevent any such unification without exten-
sive external assistance.
Thus, although the prospects of real success
for the present revolution may not be good, the
future of parliamentary government in Sudan
seems just as bleak. There is a good possibility
that -a radical Arab socialist state, anti-"imperial-
ist" and pro-Soviet, will emerge. A basically; total-
itarian regime similar to those in other radical
Arab states would bode ill for the stability of
political life in Sudan and for closer Sudanese-
Western relations.
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5 September 1969
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