SOUTH VIETNAM: THE GROWING MANPOWER SQUEEZE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000400180001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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Project No. 52.5541
South Vietnam: Growing
Manpower Squeeze
June 1969
June 1969 South Vietnam: The Growing Manpower Squeeze
NOT REFERRED TO OSD. On-file release instructions
apply.
USAID review
completed
ARMY review
completed
State Dept. review completed
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South Vietnam: The Growing Manpower Squeeze
NOT REFERRED TO OSD. On-file release instructions
apply.
Introduction
ARMY review
completed
Tw-v
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As the tempo of combat in South Vietnam has increased and Saigon's
participation in the conflict has grown, the Government of South Vietnam
(GVN) has been compelled to dig deeply into its available manpower resources
to meet its military manpower requirements. The Communist Tet 1968 offensive
in particular spurred the Saigon regime into greater efforts to mobilize the
population and to increase the country's commitment to its own defense. The
General Mobilization Act of 15 June 1968 called for the mobilization of most
ma__es between the ages of 16 and 50, with those in the 18-38 age g,c.:xf; liable
for :3ertri e in the regular and territorial forces. Males in the 16-17 and
39--50 age groups are eligible only for part-time service in the newly-created
People's Self-Defense Forces, although those 39-43 years of age may be given
noncombat assignments in rear service units.
Since 1967, the nummer of men serving in South Vietnam's regular and
territorial forces has increased nearly one-third, and the total number of
{~ #~vrv~aL~,.~ ,
forces has ri;n to
men in all Government of South Vietnam (GVN) military, 4
more than one million. As a result, the share of the population under arms
ha0 climbed to an estimated 4.8 percent (5.9 percent if the paramilitary
forces are included),* the highest in the world. In Taiwan, for example,
this ratio is 4.1 percent; in North Vietnam, 2.8 percent; and in the Soviet
Union, 1.4. percent.
*If only the GVN-controlled population'is included, the estimated
shares are 5.8 percent and 6.8 percent, respectively.
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As the GVN has striven to meet its military requirements, it has had to
shortchange the burgeoning civilian manpower demands (particularly the demand
for skilled labor) generated by an accelerated wartime urbanization. An
estimated 30-40 percent of the country's population is now located in or
near the main population centers. The migration from rural to urban areas,
which has been particularly rapid since 1964, stems largely from: the intensi-
fication of military operations iie g-~~ sm in-the country-
a rind the job opportunities in the cities; created by the US military
buildup. In addition, the expansion of the GVN's military forces has been
accompanied by an increased flow of military dependents to the cities. As
a result of this population influx, the manpower demands for industry, commerce,
civil service, construction, and public services have risen, and at a "rate
faster than the supply of available human resources. Consequently, the
country's manpower pool has been{strained and Saigon will be hard pressed to
fulfill any anticipated expansion of its military forces without seriously
impeding its economic growth. Moreover, the manpower shortage has been and
wial continue to be an important contribution to inflationary pressure.
Grcwth of South Vietnam's Military Forces
South Vietnam's military and paramilitary forces have more than doubled
since 196'>. At the end of March 1969, the GVN had more than one million men
under arms (see Table 1).
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NOW, NOW
Growth of South Vietnam's Military Forces
1963 - March 1969a/
1963 1966
1967
1968
Max 1 6
Regular Forces
216.0 322.9
442.9
426.9
434.5
Regional Forces
85.9 149.9
151.4
219.8
232.0
-Popular Forces
95.5 150.1
148.8
172.5
176.0
Total RVNAF Forces
397.4 622.9
643.1
819.2
842.5
National Police
19.7 58.3
73.4
78.4
77.1
Re,rolutionary Development
Cadre
0
37.0
45.9
47.3
Gi'rilian Irregular Defense
Groups
18.0 34.7
38.3
42.3
44.0
Truong Son Cadre
6.7
7.0
7.3
Armed Propaganda Teams
3.8
4.0
Ki', Carson Scouts
1.5
1.9
Total Paramilitary Forces
128. 111-0
1 .7
178.9
181.6
Total RVN Forces
525:8 735.9
798.8
998.1
1,024.1
a. Data are for end of period shown.
b. :Armed Combat Youth data are included in total from 1960 through 1966;
;the organization was disbanded in 1967.
The manpower for the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) -- the
Regular Forces and the Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF) -- consists of
volunteers and draftees, with the former having accounted for 70-80 percent
of the total during the past three years. The manpower input for 1966 totaled
abc -ut 205 , 000 men, but fell to 164,000 in 1967 (see Table 2).. 'The number
soared to nearly 315,000 in 1968 as a result of Saigon's post-Tet 1968
mobilization program. The number of conscripts more than doubled and voluntary
enlistments jumped about 85, percent. The latter increase probably reflects
in large part the effort of many to avoid the draft in order to join the
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territorial forces and remain close to their home areas. The strength of
RF/PF forces increased. about 90,000 during 1968. The paramilitary forces
are staffed almost entirely with volunteers, and these averaged about 30,000
me: annually during the last three years,
Table 2
South Vietnamese Military Volunteers and Conscripts
1966 - March 1969
Manpower Input
,Paramilitary
Volunteers Conscripts Total Volunteers
1966
159.1
46.1
205.2
28.2
Monthly Average
13.2=
3:8
17.1
2.4
1967
115.8
48.5
164.3
33.1
Monthly Average
9.6
4.0
13.6
2.8
1968
215.3
99.1
314.4
28.8
Monthly Average
17.9
8.2
26.2
2?4
1969
January
8.3
6.8
15.1
2.7
February
11.1
7.0
18.1
1.4
March
20.6
5.4
26.0
1.8
Attrition of South Vietnam's Military Forces
While the South Vietnamese forces have. received sizable inputs in recent
years, their attrition also has been high. This attrition has consisted
almost entirely of desertions and combat casualties (see Table 3).* Losses
of 152,000 in 1966 and 122,000 in 1967 equalled about 75 percent of total
accretions for each of these years. In 1968,.losses jumped to 203,000, but
were only two-thirds of total accretions because of the sharp rise in
personnel inputs.
*There is no information available on other types of attrition, such
as retirement. However, the magnitude of other attritive factors is not.
considered significant.
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Table 3
South Vietnamese Military Losses
1966 - 1968
In Thousads
1966 967 1968-
Total Losses
152.5
122.1
203.4
Net Desertions
116. '
77.7
116.1
Casualties:
36.1
.44.4
87.3
Killed in Action
11.9
12.7
24.3
Wounded, non-fatal
20.9
29.4
61.1
Missing/Captured
3.3'
2.3
1.9
a. Paramilitary not included.
b.. Gross desertions.
c. There is no information concerning thenumber
of wounded who return to action. However, the
GVN only includes those whose wounds are serious
enough to require hospital-care. Therefore,
the number returning is not believed to be large
enough to affect significantly the aggregate
analysis.
Desertions
The major sharp of RVNAF losses has been through desertions; during
the 1966-68 period, desertions accounted for nearly two-thirds of total
attrition. Desertions totaled 116,000 in 1966, dropped to 78,000 the next
year, and jumped to 116,000 during 1968.- In addition, an average of 8J600
men deserted annually from the paramilitary forces during those years.
The average monthly desertion rate of 1'0.5 per thousand troops in 1967
was substantially less than the rate of. 16.3 recorded in 1966. However, the
rats; for 1968 increased to 12.7 per thousand troops. Although the rate
during the first quarter of 1968 continued to reflect the downward trend of
196'7 (averaging 7.7 per thousand troops), it jumped sharply after March,
*Figures for 1966 are gross desertions; for 1967 and 1968 they are net
desertions (grosa.-desertions less returnees(.
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rc?aching a high of 17.3 in October. Averages of about 15 per thousand
recorded during the third and fourth quarters of the year were the highest
s_nce a GVN crackdown on desertions in mid-1966, The rate subsequently
bE:gan to decline, falling to 8.3 in February 1969. In March, the rate rose
tc 10.7 and the quarterly rate remained well above the average for the first
quarter of 1968.
A particularly significnt trend is the comparatively high rate of
desertions among the major combat units which are expected to eventually
replace US combat forces. Desertions from.regular combat units during 1968,
were at a rate estimated to equal about one-third of the strengths of these
units, Thus, the overall RVNAF average is substantially, reduced by;the lower
rate of desertions among RF and PF units. The rate among the regular units
in 1969Acontinued at a high level. The March rate for ARVN's 10 infantry
divisions ranged from 13.5 per thousand to 50.4 per thousand with an overall
divisional average of 28.4 per thousand.
Casualties
The other element in available attrition data is combat casualties. The
country's battle casualties have risen sharply as RVNAF participation in the
war has increased. These totaled nearly 87,500 in 1968, about. double the
casualties sustained in 1967 and more than 140'percent greater than those in
1966. Combat deaths in these years averaged about 30 percent of total
casualties. There are no casualty figures available for the parmilitary
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'ter'
.fo,?ces prior to 1968.1 In 1968, paramilitary units suffered nearly 14,000
ca;3ualties, of which about 3,600 were combat deaths.
South Vietnam's Manpower Pool
Any assessment of Saigon's ability to maintain (and expand) its military
forces depends for the most part on estimates of the country's available
manpower. Estimating the size of this pool, however, is risky since accurate
demographic information on South Vietnam does not exist. South Vietnam is one
of the few countries that h4s never had a national census, and the most recent
area census was a pilot study of Phuoc TuyProvince undertaken in 1959.
Currently, the most widely used population figure is an estimated 17.2 million
in 1968. An additional obstacle to estimating the-GVN manpower pool is the
impossibility of determining with any great degree of accuracy the share of
the South Vietnamese population under the effective control of Saigon.
The most recent estimate of South Vietnam's population distribution was
undertaken by the US Agency for International Development in 1967. According
to this study, there were about 3.5 million males in the country between the
ages of 15 and 49. Using these figures as a base, we estimate the manpower
pool available to the GVN to be about 2.1 million men Wand those in the 18-38
group at more than 1.3 million (see Table 4). However, mare than one million,
men already were under arms at the end of Marcht1969, leaving a residual of
some-350,000 men available for induction into the military forces.,
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Estimated South, Vietnamese Manpower Pool
in '15-49 Year Age Group
In Thousads
Age Num
ixx cu of M
ber Number Less Those
ales TJn.der VC Control/
Number Less Those
Unfit for Service
15-17
540
459
321
18-33 1,
784
1,516
1,061
34-38
460
391
274
39-44 4
29
365
256
45-49 3
29
`280
196
5
42
3,011 ' .r
2,108
a. The Hamlet Evaluation Survey (I1E5 of January 1969 esti-
mated that 10.9 percent of the population was under VC
control. Another 9.2 percent were in so-called contested
areas. Assuming half of the latter to be under VC control,
we thus eliminate about 15 percent.
The GVN has reported that about 30 percent of draft age
men are found, to be unfit for military service.
Since most of the eligible draftable population already have been
conscripted, any sizable number of future conscripts must come from'those
reaching 18 years of age. It has been estimated that 320,000 South Vietnamese
reach the age of 18 each year, more than half of them males. Eliminating
those ostensibly under VC control and those unfit for service, the estimated
annual accretion would be around 100,000. Thus, the estimated total draftable
mar...power in the 18-38 age group available at the beginning of 1969 was about
450,000.
im-,act on the Labor Force
Although the mobilization program has as'yet not created any serious
general labor shortage, it has cut deeply into the country's limited.supply
of skilled manpower. The impact has been particularly severe in urban areas
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where the bulk of the skilled labor is located. About 30 percent of the 6.2
million South Vietnamese estimated to be in the civilian labor force are
engaged in nonagricultural pursuits, primarily-in the cities and towns. Since
the GVN has greater control over the urban areas, it seems likely that a
disproportiohate share of the draftees are coming from these areas.
According to studies undertaken by the:US Embassy in Saigon, approxi-
mately 90 percent of Vietnamese civil. servants are considered to be skilled.
Perhaps 60 percent of the Vietnamese employees of the,US sector of the
economy can be classified as skilled and semi-skilled. Civilian government.
employment was frozen at the 30 April 1968 level, and drafted personnel have
not been replaced. The impact of mobilization has been felt most in such
highly technical government operations as the Saigon Metropolitan Water Office
and Directorate of Civil Aviation and in such private companies as Esso
.Standard Eastern, which employs a large number of technically trained,
draft-eligible young men.
The mid-June mobilization,bill provided for limited deferments for police,
Revolutionary Development cadre, technical specialists, and teachers, as well
as for public health and education personnel serving in the countryside. In
September 1968 the government docided to exempt from the draft all primary
,chool teachers serving at the hamlet level and to allow all secondary and
primary school teachers on the government payroll in larger towns to continue
teaching after attendance at a nine-week military training course. In the
private sector, where as many as one-fifth of all employees are believed to
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eligible for the draft, agreement was reached with the Ministry of National
Defense (MOND) in October 1968 on deferment criteria affecting employees in
more than 1,000 manufacturing and commercial firms. Approximately 40,000
man in the civil service and private sectors have received deferments.
Mobilization at the present rate in combination with the lack of a well-
defined deferment policy for skilled civilian personnel will further deplete
the number of needed administrators, managers, technicians, and skilled
craftsmen who are as necessary for effective civilian operations as they are
for the armed forces. There are some 20,000 third-country nationals employed
ir.. South.Vietnam (primarily. skilled workers and technicians from South Korea
and the Philippines), but their number is not likely to increase significantly
in/view of the political sensitivity which surrqunds their employment. More-
over, with few exceptions, these nationals are employable only in the US
sector.
Outlook
Unless the GVN alters its draft.regulations, it is likely to be hard
pressed to meet its future military manpower requirements. Not only will the
military begin to encounter shortages of skilled personnel, but difficulty
in tapping the existing manpower pool also is likely,to emerge. Even if
attrition of Saigon's military forces during 1969 does not reach last year's
level, it is likely to remain high as RVNAF combat participation continues
to increase. Military replacement requirements alone are likely to be more
than 150,000 men. Combat casualties during the first quarter of 1969 were at
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an annual rate of about 75,000 men. Desertions also are running at a similar
rate, but are likely to rise as the number of 18 year old draftees increases.*
Even assuming the unlikely event that the entire crop of new 18-year
olds are drafted in 1969, Saigon would still have to find upwards of 50,000
men tc/ fill the remaining estimated gap. This, of course, assumes no
exoansion of forces. Should the US begin to pull out any/troops, replacements
for them would have to be found.** Saigon has in fact announced that is plans
to increase its regular forces by 71,000. men during 1969 in the expectation
that some US troops will start to withdraw this year.
Thus,-in order to fill its military manpower gap, Saigon either would
have to draft men over 38 and/or lower the fitness requirements. Drafting
me-.1 in the 39-44 group would increase the availability pool by more than
250,000 men. Lowering standards so that only 25. percent are rejected would
add an additional 100,000 men. In both cases,, however,.. it. is likely that
r
the quality of manpower would be lowered.
3,A recent OASD SA study indicated that the high desertion rate in 1968 was
due in large part to the sizable numbers of new men being drafted. It
:Lndicated that perhaps 80 percent of the deserters were men with less than
6 months of military service. These men presumably succumb quickly to the
pressures of severed family ties, unfamiliar surroundings, and poor morale.
*",This assumes an unrealistic 1:1 ratio. OASD/SA has estimated that an ARVN
division functions about half as well as a US division, or a 2:1 ratio.
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