SOVIET RELATIONS WITH WEST GERMANY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006300020006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 17, 2008
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 16, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Soviet Relations with West Germany
State Dept. review completed
Secret
N2 36
16 February 1968
No. 0007/68B
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The main postulates of Soviet policy toward
West Germany (FRG) have not really altered in the
last two decades. Nevertheless, Moscow has had
to use different approaches to Bonn because of
changing circumstances in Eastern Europe and has
seen advantages in new approaches because of de-
velopments in Western Europe. Thus the Russians
in recent months have made a series of moves de-
signed to test how far West Germany will go in its
eagerness for progress on its eastern policy. At
the same time, the USSR evidently has hoped it can
placate its allies in Eastern Europe, who have
long feared any Soviet-FRG contacts, and encourage
stresses within Bonn's coalition government and on
FRG-Allied relations.
The Soviets lately have spoken with several
voices and have varied their tactics and emphasis
at different levels and times. Since early last
fall Soviet Ambassador Tsarapkin and Foreign Min-
ister Brandt have had several informal talks cen-
tering on renunciation of force agreements. Dur-
ing the same period the Soviet Government has
sent Bonn a formal statement expressing concern
about "neo-Nazism," a memorandum and other diplo-
matic approaches focused on alleged FRG attempts
to "incorporate West Berlin," and a note setting
a stiff price on an exchange of declarations re-
nouncing the use of force. In recent efforts to
dissuade the FRG from more conspicuous demonstra-
tions of its ties with West Berlin, Soviet offi-
cials have hinted both at possible "difficulties"
and at possible bargains benefiting the city.
The Soviets simultaneously have abused Bonn
in public and cajoled it in private. None of
this, however, suggests that Moscow is prepared
to break away from its basic Germany policy, which
for years has been the bedrock of Soviet diplomacy
in Europe.
Challenge to Soviet German Policy
Moscow's German policy still
consists of four fundamental
theses: there are two sover-
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Page 1 SPECIAL REPORT
eign German states: their borders
are permanent; West Berlin is a
"separate entity," and West Ger-
many should not develop, possess,
or control nuclear weapons. The
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Soviets surely have sensed, how-
ever, that the ground on which
this policy rests is rapidly
shifting.
The Soviets are somewhat
on the defensive in the face of
Bonn's persistent efforts, de-
spite repeated rebuffs, to en-
gage them and their European al-
lies in dialogues on topics--
such as recognition questions,
troop reductions, and borders--
that have long been avoided.
Moscow is somewhat uneasy about
the powerful pull West Germany
exerts on Eastern Europe and
about the process of maneuver
under way there. It is surely
concerned over the recent re-
surgence of national interest
that has caused increased flu-
idity in European arrangements.
Last year the Soviets saw
their allies break ranks on how
to do business with West Germany.
Bucharest and Belgrade have es-
tablished diplomatic relations
with Bonn, and Prague has per-
mitted the opening of a perma-
nent West German trade mission
with semidiplomatic status and
some consular functions. New
men have come to power in Czecho-
slovakia and may be more willing
to move toward recognition of
Bonn, encouraging Budapest and
Sofia to follow suit.
The Soviets have no reason
to fear sudden alliance-switch-
ing by their Eastern European
allies. The USSR in recent years
has actually encouraged Eastern
European countries to do business
with the West in order to develop
more viable economies and thus
place fewer demands on Soviet
support. Nevertheless, the FRG
remains Russia's bete noire on the
continent, and Moscow as well as
its East German and Polish allies
are happiest when West German -
Eastern diplomacy is inactive and
uneasy when it is not.
On the other hand, the col-
lective leadership in the Kremlin,
despite its conservative bent, is
tempted by the present European
scene to do some probing and per-
haps even to run some risks. The
year ahead holds the prospect that
Western Europe's growing interest
in detente and in exploring new
security arrangements could be
accelerated by agreement on a non-
proliferation treaty (NPT), sub-
stantial Western troop withdrawals,
and the fact that in 1969 members
are entitled under the NATO treaty
to announce their intention to
withdraw from the alliance. The
Soviets have been encouraging West-
ern Europe to take a fresh look at
East-West relations. Moscow views
with some disquiet any moves by
Bonn which could thwart this ap-
proach and which could, over the
longer run, pose some challenge
to the territorial status quo.
The Soviet memorandum on Ber-
lin--warning Bonn about expanding
its ties with the city--may reflect
genuine fears that the FRG might
force Moscow's hand and bring about
unwanted tension. Ties between
Bonn and Berlin are regarded by
the Soviets as incompatible with
the principle that the city is an
entity entirely separate from the
"two Germanies."
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Much of Moscow's public pos-
ture--both in propaganda and in
official statements such as the
broadside of 8 December accusing
Bonn of fostering neo-Nazism--
is clearly designed to reassure
the chronically nervous East Ger-
man regime that the Soviets are
not being careless of Pankow's
interests while they are talking
with the FRG. These verbal at-
tacks also serve a wider purpose.
Fear of a revived and aggressive
Germany is one factor linking
the Eastern European countries
with the USSR, and the Soviets
exploit it fully.
At the same time, Moscow
is not averse to sowing discord
in the Bonn coalition, although
this appears to be a secondary
rather than the paramount aim
of Soviet diplomacy. This objec-
tive may have been a factor, for
example, in the timing of the
Soviets' memorandum of 6 January
to Bonn about its ties with.Ber-
lin. They took the occasion of
a brief out-of-town trip by
Chancellor Kiesinger to deliver
the memorandum to foreign minis-
ter Brandt, who was acting chan-
cellor.
The Soviets
probably feel that their messages
are more likely to strike a re-
sponsive chord with Brandt, since
Eastern policy issues necessarily
figure prominently in his party's
political fortunes.
The Real Soviet Fears
The suspicion of Bonn's mo-
tives that is so evident in Mos-
cow's strident anti-German prop-
aganda is not, however, merely
contrived for effect. Moscow's
fears of a resurgence of German
power may appear to be exagger-
ated, but in large measure are a
reflection of Russian psychology.
The Soviets cannot easily for-
give and forget 20 million war
dead, and their German policy is
fraught with emotional as well
as political and strategic con-
siderations.
225X6
The whole point for Moscow
in building an Eastern European
empire in the first place was
protection from Germany. The
bogey man of West German "re-
vanchism" helped hold that em-
pire. Some Soviets may at times
look back with nostalgia at the 25X6
East-West confrontation at the
height of the Cold War which,
however dangerous, made simpler
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the politics of drawing the lines
on the German question. Moscow
cannot take its German policy
for granted any more. Its ap-
plication has become more a
source of friction than a rally-
ing point for Eastern European
Communists.
At a conference of European
Communists at Karlovy Vary,
Czechoslovakia, last spring--os-
tensibly convened to deal with
questions of "European security"
(i.e., Germany)--the change that
has taken place was clearly evi-
dent. Public treatment of West
Germany was hackneyed and hurried.
Brezhnev used his first speech as
Soviet party boss primarily to
promote Moscow's image as a
peaceful participant in European
affairs. The brief conference
apparently was adjourned a day
early to keep disagreement over
German policy from breaking into
the open. Even the once tightly-
knit Warsaw Pact clan which met
in Bucharest the year before to
draw up a joint pronouncement on
European security has since dis-
agreed--and in some instances
bitterly disputed--the meaning
of what they said.
The Soviets, of course,
would prefer an evolution in Eu-
rope which would permit them to
reap the benefits of normal re-
lations with the West while pre-
serving hegemony in the East.
Moscow still is trying--albeit
with increasing difficulty--to
have it both ways. It would
like to promote a loosening of
bonds within the Western Alliance
and at the same time maintain
cohesion in its own camp.
Moscow's Price for Progress
Moscow realizes that the
currents of change in Europe
make it more difficult to con-
cert bloc contacts with the West.
It has no magic formula with
which to ensure their direction
and control. It can be expected
to try to coordinate them, how-
ever, at least to assure that
concessions are not made to Bonn
on key questions, and that the
cost to West Germany for any real
movement on these matters does
not go down. Russian interest
in bringing about Bonn's accept-
ance of East Germany and pres-
ent European frontiers is gen-
uine. The Soviets would have
no regrets if that status quo
were to be frozen forever.
Although the Soviets have
not closed the door to direct
overtures from Bonn, they are
setting tough terms. The day
the new coalition government was
installed in Bonn, Premier
Kosygin--then in Paris--publicly
reiterated Moscow's conditions
that Bonn must meet in order to
achieve improved relations with
the Eastern bloc: renunciation
of nuclear weapons, acceptance
of the Oder-Neisse frontier, and
recognition of East Germany.
These conditions are, of
course, not basically new, but
the Soviets have introduced some
embellishments. Less than a
year ago, for example, Soviet
Ambassador Tsarapkin remarked
informally that he was optimis-
tic that Soviet-FRG relations
could some day be made friendly.
He then hastened to recite
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"certain obstacles" Bonn first
must overcome, including the usual
recognition of existing frontiers
and two German states. The am-
bassador then added that Bonn
should liberalize trade with the
Soviets, and implied that it also
should deal with re-emerging
"neo-Nazi forces" and drop its
claim to be the sole representa-
tive of the German people. A
German diplomat told Tsarapkin
a thaw in USSR-FRG relations
could begin if only Moscow would
make a gesture of good will, such
as an invitation to Kiesinger
to visit Russia. Tsarapkin was
so unenthusiastic about the sug-
gestion that he threw in two more
prerequisites for good measure:
a West German commitment to de-
liver steel pipe to the USSR,
and acceptance of an atom-free
zone in Europe.
The Soviets customarily
paint an attractive picture of
the prospects better relations
could bring, then point to the
political price tag. It has been
enough for Moscow, by demanding
diplomatic recognition of East
Germany, to price rapprochement
out of Bonn's reach. As re-
cently as 29 January 1968, the
Soviets were testing in this
fashion Bonn's desire for progress
in its Eastern policy. To bring
about negotiation of an exchange
of declarations with the USSR
renouncing the use of force, Bonn
was told that it would have to
make far-reaching concessions
that would all but recognize
East Germany. Moreover, it was
to accept existing European
frontiers and acknowledge that
the Munich agreement was in-
valid from the start, and re-
nounce its claim to speak for
all Germans, its alleged efforts
to get nuclear weapons, and its
"illegal encroachments" in Ber-
lin.
Prospects
Russia's long-term goal in
Europe still is to ward off any
possibility of German reunifica-
tion, and Moscow does not feel
compelled to alter its policy of
forcing Bonn to bear the cost
of any improvements in Soviet-
German relations.
Although the Soviets surely
are apprehensive about their
future relations with the Chinese,
they do not now feel compelled
by any strategic military threat
from Peking to pay a high polit-
ical price in Europe to secure
their western flank.
Thus, there is likely to
be no marked change in Moscow's
conduct of its German policy
over the near term. The Soviets
will not close off the quiet,
indeterminate dialogue with Bonn.
They will mollify East German and
Polish fears by making clear in
public that there is no change
in Moscow's terms for the solu-
tion of the German problem. In
private, the Soviets presumably
will caution other Eastern Euro-
pean capitals against precipitate
and unconditional acceptance of
Bonn's overtures. In this fash-
ion, Moscow hopes to hold the line
against change detrimental to its
interest in preserving the divi-
sion of Germany. Meanwhile, So-
viet diplomacy will try to foster
a mood of expectancy in Western
Europe that pan-European harmony
and new security arrangements
await only Bonn's abandonment of
its "aggressive designs," and
its acceptance of the "real situ-
ation" resulting from World War
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