(SANITIZED)USSR GUIDED MISSILES DEVELOPMENT(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A004600480001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 28, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 18, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
SECRET/
This material contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States within the mean-
ing of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793
and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in
any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law.
COUNTRY USSR (Kalinin, Moscow Oblasts)/Germany REPORT
DATE OF INFO.
(Soviet Zone)
Development
NO. OF PAGES 78
REQUIREMENT NO. RD
REFERENCES
This is UNEVALUATED Information
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
25X1
25X1
USSR Guided Missiles DATE DISTR. 18 Nov. 195+ 25X1
SECRET
STATE X ARMY X NAVY X AIR Ey X I Fai r ! AEC
(NOTE: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; .Field distributlon by "#".)
OSI E X1
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~u?r?~ u??~?
Summary
1. During the period 1945-1953 a group of some 150 German scientists and
engineers was employed by the Russians at Bleicherode and later in Russia, on
rocket studies. In Russia the group was at first split between NII.88 at Podlipki
on the N.E. outskirts of Moscow and a branch establishment on the lake island
of Gorodomlya near Ostashkov; later all were united on the Island
2. The initial task of the group was the improvement of the A.4 (V.2) ballistic
rocket. This was followed by more ambitious long-range rocket studies, culmina-
ting in a design to carry a 3,000 kg. warhead to a distance of 3,000 km. This was
the preferred solution to a requirement received from the Russian Minister of
Armaments USTINOV. An alternative solution was also considered. i orm
of an aircraft-like missile. .Later the
group tackled an A.A. rocket problem. The work was for the most part theoretical
but experimental verification of the novel features in the design studies was planned,
and in some cases carried out.
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25X1
projects
ncue.--
R-10.-A much modified and improved A.4 to carry 1,000 kg. to 900 km.
R-14.-A long-range single-stage ballistic rocket to carry 3,000 kg. to
3,000 km.
R-15.-A ram-jet powered winged missile of the same performance as
the R-14.
(K-1).-Russian development of an A.4 of improved range.
25X1
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SECRET 71
PEENEMUENDE : EFFECTS OF THE 1943 BOMBING
I
Protective measures against air attack at Peenemuende were inadequate.
Those in authority were concerned, almost entirely-yet even here, as it proved,
insufficiently-with the safety of the installations. Only after strong representa-
tions from the technical Director (v. Braun) did General Dornberger decide to
build a shelter for personnel. This shelter was built within the works, and was
useless except during day bombing raids. The family lines boasted of no more than
a few open trenches., the inadequacy of which was demonstrated in the course of
the very first raid.
II
The effectiveness of the first great raids in August 1943 lay in three factors : -
(a) Destruction of technical installations. Damage in the Development
factory proper was slight. Serious harm occurred right in my own
laboratory, where we were working on the transmission of measured
data and on fuel-cut-off procedure. The destruction of the sheds next
to the so-called "'Grosses Messhaus " was of particular importance.
These sheds contained the prototype trajectory simulator (Bahnmodell)
which was to make possible an experimental investigation of the A.4
guidance system. The reconstruction of the Bahnmodell absorbed
5-6 months, and delayed guidance development accordingly. Further
delays in the controls field were occasioned by the destruction of
numerous measuring equipment, prototypes of which were under con-
struction in the same shed. Major damage was done in the Werk Sued,
where originally the test series of rockets for Peenemuende trials and
for troop training purposes were to have been assembled. These
splendid buildings could thereafter, for better or for worse, be only used
for modifying the series products from the Mittelwerk. In consequence
the trials suffered a serious delay, and there were continual differences
with the O.C. Troop Training as to the number of rockets he could
draw from production.
(b) The loss of personnel was critical. Many bombs fell in the family lines
bringing disaster, especially to those in the open trenches. Among
other important specialists killed was Dr. Thiel, head of propulsion
development, with his family. His vacant post had to be filled by
an outsider, Dr. Schilling, who could only work himself in gradually.
Altogether we lost 800 killed in this attack.
(c) The worst effect of all, however, was the anxiety that gripped us. From
fear of further raids, many important development sections were moved
from Peenemuende, e.g., the controls and measurements section to
Pudagla, the laboratory for valves and jigs to Anklam and the section
for construction of mobile fuel-cut-off transmitters to Dresden. The
sections' dispersal took a lot of time, for no preparations had been made
to receive them. Understandably enough, efforts were made to give
the impression to higher authority that work was in full swing again
2-3 weeks later in the new locations, but an impartial observer would
have to admit a delay of 3-4 months. Added to all this were the
additional difficulties of communication between sections. Confer-
ences had to be organised, requiring time-consuming journeys. Contact
became worse and worse between laboratories, test-stands, and firing
ranges. The effect of this on the work can be imagined. Characteristic
of the state of affairs at that time was an instruction, to the effect that
senior staff were not to be away from Peenemuende on duty trips for
more than 20 days in the month.
III
Summarising, it may be said that the bombing raid on Peenemuende hit us at
that phase of development in which controls and guidance were the central theme
of the work. My estimate is that the resulting delay in development amounted to
more than 4 months. I beg you to consider, however, that this has been written,
from memory, more than 10 years after the event. A more exact evaluation would
no doubt be possible on the basis of my diaries (handed over in April 1945).
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COOLING
FUEL
GAS EXIT
MAIN COMBUSTION
CHAMBER WALL.
FIG.* 1 , GAS GENERATOR
COOLANT REGULATING
SECRET
CONTROL i
VALVE !
PRESSURE
DATUM
COOLER
FIG. 2 R.10 THRUST CONTROL SYSTEM.
COOLER.
(FUEL FOR COOLING
INJECTED HERE)
VALVE
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SECRE~'
MOSCOW KALIN [:R1n
O L
UNFINISHED _
TEST TOWER
JORDANSKI SOFFICES
C
e
11
A4 Assembly line in Corpus II
LARGE DUMP
A4. COMPONENTS
AIRCRAFT
COMPONENT S
Layout of experimental area N 1188
SKETCH OF V 2 Bosse T...--..
F
FIGS
FIG.6
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c%-crtaFT
LUVEL
IN OICATO R
1
PUMPS
$06 LIMIT
SWITCH
d
Q
LEVEL
INDICATOR
PROPELLANT
TANKS
FUEL
PUMPS
TURBINE CONTROL.
VALVES
FIG..3. SCHEMATIC OF R 14 THRUST
AND MIXTURE CON LL
SYSTEMS.
_
CET
OXYGEN
TURBINE
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 FIG. 7
KAPUSTIN
YAR
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46"06E
--,L 49 pON
,
A KRAVTSOV
cFrRrT
i
APPROX. DIRECTION OF FfRE
APPROX POSITION 220KM TO TAPGET SITE
OVERLAY OF PART OF SHEETS N.M. 38-11 & N.M 38-12
A.M.S. N 501
0 10 15 MILES
48! 00 N
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