INDIA: DIM PROSPECTS FOR THE COMMUNISTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83S00854R000100200002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 15, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
India: Dim Prospects
for the Communists
A Research Paper
Secret
NESA 82-10509
September 1982
Copy 2 9 4
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State Dept. review completed
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Intelligence
India: Dim Prospects
for the Communists
This paper was prepared by Ithe
Office of Near East-South Asia Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations and
the National Intelligence Council. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be addressed to the
Chief, South Asia Division, NESA,
Secret
NESA 82-10509
September 1982
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Secret
Overview
Information available
as of 6 August 1982
was used in this report.
for the Communists
India: Dim Prospects
India's Communists are not a revolutionary threat, nor do they pose a
serious challenge to US interests. They have traded their class struggle
philosophy for a share of parliamentary power and have gradually become
integrated into the nation's system of parliamentary democracy. India's
religious, cultural, and social institutions resist revolutionary change,
forcing Communist leaders to concentrate on electoral politics.
Although the Communists over the past 30 years have won elections to
several state governments, we believe that the pro-Soviet Communist Party
of India (CPI) and the more independent Communist Party of India-
Marxist (CPM) have little chance of making significant gains at the
expense of Prime Minister Gandhi's ruling Congress Party within the next
few years. Their long-term prospects for eventually leading a national
government are almost as remote. A divisive tradition among the Indian
Communists has fragmented the movement, created morale problems, and
yielded two major parties and a host of factions whose leaders have a
vested interest in maintaining their separate identity. The Communist
parties have active grass-roots organizations in a number of states but have
been unable to broaden their popular appeal. An aging Communist
leadership has taken both the CPI and CPM in directions that many rank-
and-file members at the regional level oppose.
Prime Minister Gandhi harbors a deep distrust of Communists because
they publicly criticize most of her domestic policies and have illegal ties to
the Soviet Union. She sees the Communist parties' relationship with
Moscow as subversive and as a heavyhanded attempt by the Kremlin to in-
fluence Indian Government policy. Our assessment is that Gandhi views a
Soviet-encouraged reconciliation of the Communist parties as a possible
challenge to the succession of her son and political heir, Rajiv. Although
she maintains a dialogue with the Communist parties, Gandhi strongly
resents their increased opposition to her.
India's Communist parties continue to support the general foreign policy
goals of the Soviet Union in return for Moscow's patronage. The Soviets
encourage the growing cooperation between the CPI and CPM because a
unified Indian Communist party under Soviet influence could exert
Secret
NESA 82-10509
September 1982
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pressure on the Prime Minister to adopt more socialistic domestic and pro-
Soviet foreign policies. Such a party would also be better placed to make a
long-shot bid for national power in coalition with non-Communist opposi-
tion parties once Gandhi leaves office. The Communist parties have
apparently agreed at Moscow's urging to moderate criticism of Gandhi,
build up organizational strength, and continue to court the millions of
voters whose future political loyalties are still undetermined.
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India: Dim Prospects
for the Communists
Pattern of Communist Support
The Indian Communists have achieved only limited
local success in converting to their political advantage
the unrest caused by growing political consciousness
and accelerating economic and social change. The
Communists have attracted the support of somewhat
less than 10 percent of the electorate over the past 20
years, and they have had difficulty in maintaining this
small base of support and remain split into two major
and several minor parties.
Since the early 1960s the Communists' share of the
total national popular vote has declined slightly (see
table). Their reduced proportion of the vote from 1962
to 1980 would have been more pronounced had it not
been for significant gains by the Communist Party of
India-Marxist (CPM) in its strongholds of West Ben-
gal and Kerala. The two primary Communist parties,
the CPM and the Communist Party of India (CPI),
currently hold only 48 of the 526 seats in the Lok
Sabha, the lower house of parliament. (The appendix
provides background information on the Communist
movement in India.)
Embassy's estimate that the CPI has about 470,000
card-carrying members while the smaller but more
influential CPM has about 270,000 is roughly consist-
ent with the Communist parties' own membership
claims. CPI membership is widespread but thin
throughout the country. More than 60 percent of the
CPM membership is concentrated in West Bengal
and Kerala. The remaining 19 million or so Commu-
nist supporters participate in a variety of labor unions,
front organizations, and various peripheral groups.
Election statistics show that the Communists are
strong in the legislative assemblies of only three of
India's 22 states, all outside the critical Hindi-speak-
ing heartland. In 1980 the CPM fell just short of an
Communist Representation
in Lok Sabha Elections, 1952-80 a
a Includes CPI and CPM combined representation and popular vote
in 1971 and 1980. In parliamentary byelections since 1980, the
Communists have had a net gain of one seat in the Lok Sabha.
outright majority in Tripura, and in 1977 it polled
slightly less than 40 percent of the vote in West
Bengal and about 30 percent in Kerala. The Commu-
nists garnered 10 percent of the vote in only three 25X1
other states and about 5 percent in two additional 25X1
25X1
Prominent scholars of Indian Communism contend
that Communist strength in these states results from
the governing elite's belief that the Congress Party25X1
cannot serve their specific regional interests. The
CPM has exploited the Congress Party's weak organi-
zation and has become the champion of states rights
in West Bengal, Tripura, and Kerala.
Although the US Embassy estimates the Communists
have a larger number of labor union members than
any other party, the CPI in particular has gradually
been losing urban working-class support in regions
necessary for gaining national strength. In relatively
industrialized western India CPI support has dwin-
dled over the past decade, according to Embassy
reporting. Independent labor unions in contrast are
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India: Areas of Communist Strength
A ghanistan
Conti
d Kash
Communist controlled state
Former Communist controlled state
Primary Hindi-speaking area
Fo9n Secondary Hindi-speaking area
0 500
Kilometers
Lakshadweep
(India)
Bay of
Bengal
Nicobare
Islands
(India)
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Election studies have shown that the Communists
attract the highest percentage of their vote from the
"working classes, " but most Communist leaders are
well educated, high caste, and middle class.
attracting more politically active members than the
Communist-affiliated unions, and the CPI and CPM
now rank only third and fourth, respectively in labor
union membership in the highly industrialized Bom-
bay metropolitan area.
Communist Problems
Indian social and cultural institutions and Hindu
religious traditions are formidable barriers to revolu-
tionary Marxism. It appears to us that the predomi-
nance of caste, the prevalence of traditional, regional
politics based on language and culture, and the
public's habitual rejection of radical change have
limited the Communist parties' national appeal and
left them with no alternative but to participate in
parliamentary politics.
In instances where radical Maoist factions of the
Communist parties have adopted violent tactics-
often against ruling Communist state governments-
the two major Marxist parties have lost public sup-
port. Pockets of violence against landlords and shop-
keepers in the northern West Bengal countryside
prompted antigovernment protests and led the Marx-
ist government there to launch police campaigns
against the responsible Communist extremists. The
Congress Party's surprising success in Calcutta
against CPM candidates in the 1982 state assembly
elections was a public reaction against Marxist gangs
who-ignoring government orders-resorted to fre-
quent assaults on political opposition groups, accord-
ing to Indian journalists. We believe that the fall of
the CPM government in Kerala in October 1981
resulted largely from the electorate's perception of
excessive violence between Communist and rightwing
extremist groups. 25X1
The dominant caste system implicitly sanctions social
discrimination, enforces social oppression in rural 25X1
areas, and condones economic exploitation. The sys-
tem consigns each Hindu at birth to an immutable 25X1
dharma (duty) which encourages unquestioning ac-
ceptance of his existing environment and resistance to
change. In addition, India's 80 million Muslims have
long opposed the "godless" Communist parties.F_~
For a small share of political power the Communists
have abandoned their former goal of sabotaging the
constitution from within. Although Communists still
talk about future revolution in vague terms, they now
openly defend the political system and have been 25X1
absorbed into it. Communist platforms on land re-
form, a self-reliant economy, a vigorous public sector,
secularism, maintenance of national security, and
parliamentary democracy do not substantially differ
from programs espoused by the ruling Congress Par-
ty. By projecting themselves as simply left-leaning
parties, the Indian Communists have lost their dis- 25X1
tinctive revolutionary character. Indian journalists
note repeatedly that the ruling CPM in West Bengal
has even been accused by the political opposition and
elements of its own disgruntled cadre of cultivating
the Calcutta business and industrial establishment. F__1
Communist participation in the conventional parlia- 25X1
mentary system of government has reduced the revo-
lutionary consciousness of its followers. According to
Indian press observers who report on the Communist
parties, such participation has created discontent
among the rank and file and has caused many
proponents of radical political change to leave the CPI
and CPM. In states where Communists have held
power, Marxist trade unions have been tightly con-
trolled and have lost stature as militant organizations.
In our judgment, the CPI and CPM have consistently
reined in extremists in their affiliated front organiza-
tions in order to avoid attacks on the social and
economic order of which the Communists have be-
come a part.
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The need to cater to traditional Indian values at the
polls and the tendency to conform to parliamentary
politics make it difficult for the Communists to
achieve an identity apart from the Congress Party. By
condemning extremist politics, the Communist parties
have problems drawing sharp distinctions between
their programs and those of the "bourgeois" Congress
Party and have had trouble attracting a loyal constit-
uency apart from Communist front organizations. F_
Leadership. Differences over tactics and philosophy
between an aging and isolated national leadership and
the Communist state leaders who have actually exer-
cised political power clearly weaken the Communists
as a national alternative to the Congress Party. We
believe that the aging leadership has created a trou-
blesome generation gap in the Communist parties.
The top Communist party leaders are all in their late
sixties or seventies-CPI General Secretary Rao and
West Bengal CPM Chief Minister Basu are 68, and
CPM General Secretary Namboodiripad is 73. In
reply to a reporter's comment at the CPM congress in
January 1982 that gray hair seemed to dominate the
convention, a senior official admitted that the average
age of Politburo members was 70 and that of the
Central Committee, 65. The press noted that nearly
35 percent of the delegates to the CPI congress in
March 1982 joined the party before India achieved
independence in 1947. Moreover, Indian journalists
note that party cadres have increasingly accused the
leadership of being isolated and of developing a
bourgeois attitude that endangers the revolutionary
identity of the Communist parties.
In our judgment, the inadequate infusion of new
people and ideas to the policymaking apparatus is a
persistent weakness in the Communist movement even
though the leadership publicly professes sensitivity to
the problem. Only a handful of cadres has been
promoted from district to state committees and fewer
still from state to central committees. Instead of
promoting cadres to higher level positions, leaders
tend to retain organizational power. At both CPM
and CPI congresses this year few younger members
were inducted into decisionmaking committees of the
parties. According to press accounts, some disillu-
sioned and impatient young cadres are beginning to
seek new outlets for their energies outside the confines
of the Communist parties and have already left the
CPI and CPM.
Disunity. Intraparty differences within the CPI and
CPM diminish the effectiveness of opposition to Gan-
dhi and impede efforts by the collective Communist
leadership to present a united left alternative to the
national electorate. Squabbles in the CPI have recent-
ly resulted in a split in party ranks and raise the
possibility of further fissures. In our view, fundamen-
tal doctrinal and tactical differences in the CPM
hinder the leadership's efforts to project a national
image.
Disunity within the CPI is a major weakness that
Prime Minister Gandhi has sought to exploit. In 1981
the leadership expelled former leader S. A. Dange
because he objected to the party's opposition to
Gandhi and reconciliation with the CPM. With public
-encouragement from Gandhi, Dange subsequently
took a small following from the CPI and formed a
new party, the All-India Communist Party (AICP).
Gandhi probably hoped that she could reduce Soviet
support of the CPI and thereby weaken it by-in
effect-making the more friendly AICP the "sanc-
tioned" Communist party of India. Indian journalists
believe that a significant number of Dange's sympa-
thizers who remain in the CPI still may eventually
leave the party.
The CPM also has much potentially serious internal
dissent, in our judgment. The chief unresolved prob-
lem is whether or not party policy should be formulat-
ed by the national leadership and implemented by
25X1
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Revitalization Efforts
Coalition Strategy. Communist leaders appear to be
increasingly preoccupied with strengthening their par-
ties in preparation for the post-Gandhi era. As stated
by Communist party leaders in the press and in
official policy documents, the CPM and CPI have
made cooperation with non-Communist parties a top
priority. The CPM leadership in particular has decid-
ed in the past two party congresses that electoral
success in the Hindi-speaking belt-Uttar Pradesh,
Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Haryana-is
critical to its efforts to build a party with a national
constituency. Our analysis is that the series of local
electoral alliances made by the CPM with non-
Communist parties is intended to shortcut the time-
consuming, district-by-district recruitment of cadre.
This new electoral strategy, which has evolved in
selected district and municipal contests over the past
two years, has not yet led to notable Communist
successes in the Hindi-speaking north. Communist
leaders publicly maintain that this experiment needs
more time, but, according to the Indian press, a large
number of the rank and file reportedly argue that the
Communists must revert to painstaking recruiting in
the countryside.
The Issue of Communist Merger. Communist leaders
have made progress toward reunifying the CPI and
CPM, but they will probably stop short of a formal
merger. The recent Communist party congresses have
expressed an urgent need for a reunified Communist
party that is viewed by many political observers as
essential to achieve Communist participation in a
national government. Our conclusion is that the CPM
at its congress in January 1982 moved to align itself
more closely with the Soviet Union, thereby strength-
ening ties with its former rival, the pro-Soviet CPI.
The CPM's sharp criticism of China and tilt toward
the USSR removed a critical ideological obstruction
to reunification with the CPI. The CPI congress in
turn welcomed the CPM's condemnation of the Unit-
ed States and China but noted that differences with
the CPM remained.
Formidable barriers still stand in the way of Commu-
nist unity. A major obstacle to merger is the issue of
dealing with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a
conservative, nationalist party with strong overtones
of Hindu chauvinism. Unlike the CPM, the CPI until
recently refused to include the BJP in any delibera-
tions with other opposition parties. According to press
accounts and US Embassy reporting, state units of the
two Communist parties in May 1982 served together
with the BJP on a committee of opposition parties to
protest the installation of a Congress Party minister in
Haryana. Differences remain, however, between the
Communist parties over the BJP. At present the CPI
sees the BJP as fundamentally anti-Communist, while
CPM leaders view the BJP as a potential ally against
the main opponent, Indira Gandhi. The CPM and
CPI have operated independently for nearly 20 years,
and central party leaders especially have a vested
interest in maintaining the organizational status quo.
Accordingly, Communist leaders may only be using
the BJP issue as an excuse to avoid reunification. F_
Although we expect that the growing cooperation of
India's Communist parties will stop short of actual 25X1
merger, institutional arrangements have been set up
to minimize friction. A coordinating committee
formed in 1980 has made progress in smoothing out
problems between the CPM and CPI. Over the past
two years, furthermore, the Communist parties have
worked together in coalition governments in West 25X1
Bengal and Kerala. Last year CPM and CPI collabo-
ration in municipal elections in Andhra Pradesh
produced a number of council seats. The move of the
CPM headquarters from Calcutta to New Delhi has
helped to give the party a more national image,
facilitating frequent contacts with the CPI leadership
and government officials. 25X1
The Communists, Gandhi, and the Central Government
In our view, Gandhi tolerates the Communist parties
but is determined to confine them to regional-rather
than national-opposition. The Indian Communists'
success as a collective opposition in large part depends
on how effectively the CPM and CPI can balance
general support of Gandhi's "anti-imperialist" foreign
policy against sharp regional opposition to most of her
internal policies. Gandhi benefits from Communist
party support for her stand on Afghanistan, Kampu-
chea, and Vietnam. She is also encouraged by Com-
munist approval of her efforts to combat low-level
25X1
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insurgencies in the northeast. On the other hand,
Gandhi clearly has little patience for Communist
criticism of her domestic programs and her style of
leadership. The Communists' contradictory approach
to Gandhi blurs their public image, but it also has
protected them to some degree from the Prime Minis-
ter's wrath.
Gandhi has generally been successful in containing
the Communists as possible contenders for national
power. She has no apparent designs to liquidate the
Communist parties, but she is working hard to neu-
tralize them as serious rivals. Since her reelection in
1980, Gandhi has taken care to minimize the presence
of Communist sympathizers in her administration.
The central government under certain conditions can
impose direct administration in states, a prerogative
Gandhi has exercised before against Communist gov-
ernments in both West Bengal and Kerala. Gandhi
brought down the Communist front government in
Kerala in October 1981 by luring away a coalition
partner of the Marxists and maneuvered unsuccess-
fully earlier this year to have President's Rule de-
clared in CPM-run West Bengal. For the past two
years she has launched a vigorous attack on Commu-
nism as an ideology incompatible with Indian democ-
racy. In numerous campaign speeches during the state
assembly elections last May she attacked the Commu-
nists' inability to assure public order in states where
they governed and accused the Marxists of not provid-
ing basic human services.
Despite increasing strains in her relationship with the
CPM and CPI, Gandhi will probably maintain a
dialogue with the Communists as long as their gains
are confined to West Bengal and Kerala. By occasion-
ally consulting Communist leaders, Gandhi can antic-
ipate serious problems with them. If she perceives that
the Communists are making inroads in other states
previously free of Marxist support, however, we ex-
pect her to take immediate steps to undermine their
efforts.
If the Communists eventually succeed in gaining
control of state governments outside their current
bases of support, which we believe unlikely through
the mid- I980s, the powers of those governments will
be constrained by the constitution and by a potentially
hostile central government. The national government
has effective legislative, administrative, and financial
controls over the states and, with cause, can dismiss
elected state officials.' Because the Indian constitu-
tion embodies democratic ideals that are at variance
with conventional Marxist goals, any attempt by a
Communist state government to bring about a radical
change in society would involve constitutional viola-
tions and subject the state government to dismissal.
The overriding powers of the central government
explain CPM efforts to press persistently for changes
in federal-state relations that would increase the
powers of state governments. We believe fears of even
stronger executive powers in the central government
are motivating the Communists to oppose bitterly
proposals by some of Gandhi's supporters for a change
from a parliamentary system of government to one led
by a popularly elected president.
The Communists and Soviet Influence
The Soviets can rely on prompt obedience to their
directives by the CPI, but their overall ability to
influence Gandhi through the Communist parties has
declined since the early 1970s. Before 1977 the CPI
and Congress Party maintained an amicable political
relationship, with CPI support for the Prime Minister
flowing directly from the Indo-Soviet Friendship
Treaty of 1971. The CPI paid a political price for its
association with Gandhi's emergency rule of the mid-
1970s, however, and its credibility was almost de-
stroyed in the elections of 1977, which swept Gandhi
from power. The CPI thereafter adopted, with ap-
proval from Moscow, a line sharply critical of the
former Prime Minister. According to an Indian Gov-
ernment consultant, the Soviets began to encourage
CPI reconciliation with the more independent and
more powerful CPM, which had increased its strength
in parliament and won control of three state govern-
ments.
' The authority to impose federal controls through President's Rule,
the Essential Services Maintenance Act, and the National Security
Act gives New Delhi firm control over weak or opposition state
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25X1
25X1
Gandhi's
India's Communist parties.
reelection in 1980 surprised the Soviets, who had
snubbed her during the years she was out of power
and whose analysts had predicted that none of the
"bourgeois" parties-including Gandhi's Congress
Party-would win a stable and decisive majority.
After her reelection Gandhi continued to support
Soviet foreign policy but resented Soviet links with
The Soviet Union's interest in the dominant CPM
probably stems from Moscow's belief that an eventual
merger of the Communist parties-under Moscow's
influence-will result in a significant strengthening of
the Indian Communist movement. Alert to the shift in
the balance of power within the Indian Communist
movement and eager to take advantage of the CPM's
seeming interest in better relations with the USSR,
Moscow stepped up contacts with CPM officials.
In our judgment, Gandhi believes the Soviets have 25X1
improved their relations with the CPM to the point 25X1
that continued Soviet funding for the party at the
current level-traditional payoffs to Communist labor25X1
unions and other front groups-could have an impact25X1
on future local district elections and in isolated parlia-
mentary contests.
conferred in Calcutta with West Bengal CPM leader
Das Gupta, presumably to encourage unity talks. The
following month leaders of both parties met at CPI
headquarters for the first time since they split in
1964. Later in the year the Soviets invited a CPM
official to Moscow for the Olympics.
and support for the CPI and CPM.
We believe that the Soviet Union's interest in Gandhi
is tactical, but its interest in the unification of the 25X1
Communist movement in India is strategic. The Sovi-
ets probably believe that a strong Communist move-
ment in India under Moscow's control will influence 25X1
Indian foreign policy and help restrain Gandhi's
efforts to liberalize the Indian economy. A Soviet- 25X1
sponsored, reunified Communist party could also min-
imize Chinese influence in the CPM, a faction of 25X1
which has always looked to Beijing for inspiration.
We believe that the widening gulf between the Indian
Communists and Gandhi displeases the Soviet Union,
which probably fears that it may eventually be forced
to choose between its special relationship with Gandhi
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Gandhi probably believes that Soviet obligations to
her government and India's strategic importance to
the USSR far outweigh the USSR's sense of responsi-
bility to the Indian Communists, and that if forced to
make a choice the Soviets would sacrifice the Marx-
ists. Even so, Gandhi cannot be absolutely certain that
Moscow would choose to support her at the expense of
the Indian Communist parties because her grip on
power is not as firm today as it was in 1980. As a
result, she will probably avoid forcing Moscow to
make a choice.
For its part, Moscow will attempt to maintain low-key
support of the Indian Communists while cautioning
them. to avoid intense attacks on Gandhi. The Soviets
undoubtedly recognize that an all-out Communist
campaign against the Prime Minister would be detri-
mental to Moscow's interests and could destroy the
foundations of domestic support built by the Indian
Communist parties over the past five years.
Communist Prospects in the 1980s
We believe the Indian Communists have little hope of
making meaningful political gains in the next few
years. Gandhi's term as Prime Minister expires in
early 1985, when the next general election is sched-
uled, and in the interim it is unlikely that the
Communists will generate sufficient electoral support
to make gains in either parliamentary byelections or
state assembly contests. The Communists will proba-
bly win no more than 10 to 15 percent of the popular
vote in most scheduled state elections over the next
two to three years.
An inability to broaden their overall popular support
will limit the national influence of the Communist
parties. Communist strength seems to have peaked in
West Bengal, where factionalism among the CPM-led
Left Front partners may ultimately weaken the Marx-
ist grip. Declining votes for both the CPM and CPI
indicate that Communist support in Kerala may be on
the wane. Communist electoral gains over the past
five years in some rural areas of West Bengal and
Kerala have been offset by the growing numbers of
disillusioned tenants and landless laborers in these
states who once supported the CPM, but who now
believe, according to numerous press reports, that the
Marxists have become the "establishment." Embassy
and press reports note that militant Communist trade
unions in Calcutta have been tamed by the ruling
CPM government, which tries to serve the interests of
both big business and the industrial proletariat. Lead-
ership of trade unions in Bombay has been wrested
from complacent Communist affiliates by independ-
ent trade unionists.
Within the next 10 years, age will force the retire-
ment of senior officials in the Communist parties, and
we believe that the national leadership will face
increased difficulties directing party policy without 25X1
the consent of powerful state leaders with their own
electoral base. There is a strong regional bias among
the state units of the Communist parties, particularly
in the CPM. Although the Communist state leaders
have generally supported the national leadership's
policies, albeit unenthusiastically, they tend to view
themselves as Bengalis or Malayalis first and Com-
munists second. We believe CPM state leaders see
little advantage in following the central leadership,
which has a national vision of the party but only
limited experience in strengthening its grass-roots
support. Unless younger regional leaders of the CPI
and CPM are integrated into the Communist parties'
national policymaking committees, the senior leader-
ship will remain isolated from the rank and file.
Moreover, the regionalism of the CPM in West
Bengal and elsewhere will hinder the central leader-
ship's efforts to challenge seriously the Congress
Party on a national level.
The CPI and CPM will in all likelihood experiment
further with, but not wholeheartedly embrace, coali-
tion politics. The Communists may eventually be
represented in additional state coalition governments,
but their prospects are poor for strengthening their
national position through that tactic. Many skeptics in
the Communist parties believe that bourgeois parties
cannot be trusted. The fall of the CPM-led govern-
ment in Kerala in October 1981 after the defection of
a non-Communist party from the coalition supports
such a view. Moreover, anti-Communist elements
appear to predominate in the non-Communist opposi-
tion parties. In our view, Communist and non-Com-
munist party cooperation will be largely limited to
local rather than national electoral battles.
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The Communists probably anticipate that, after Gan-
dhi leaves office, the growing political awareness of
millions in the lower classes-who are voting in
greater numbers and whose loyalties have yet to be
determined-will work in their favor. We believe that
CPI and CPM cooperation and Communist attempts
to arrange alliances with non-Communist parties will
increase the possibility of an eventual replacement of
Gandhi's ruling Congress Party by a national coali-
tion of non-Communist opposition parties with a small
Communist representation. Even without a formal
merger, Communist efforts to achieve common goals
will deprive Gandhi of the ability to play one group
against the other and give the Communists a credibil-
ity they have so far lacked.
We believe Moscow has encouraged the Communist
parties to unite in order to increase the Soviet Union's
leverage with Gandhi as well as to prepare the CPI
and CPM for the post-Gandhi era. Moscow's willing-
ness to permit the Communists to remain opposed to
Gandhi's domestic policies testifies, in our view, to the
Kremlin's strategy of enduring short-term problems
with Gandhi in order to enhance their influence over
vinced that Indian Communists can lead a national
government, and they have publicly courted Gandhi's
son and heir, Rajiv, with an eye to the future.
Implications for the United States
Indian Communist propaganda against US policy in
South Asia and the Indian Ocean has little apparent
effect on Gandhi's government or on Indian public
opinion. Periodic Communist statements and demon-
strations at US Consulates in India, however, provide
a backdrop against which Gandhi's pro-Soviet posi-
tions must appear moderate and balanced to some
countries in the Nonalignment Movement and to most
segments of the Indian public. The Indian Commu-
nists attack US "imperialism" routinely at the same
time as they support Soviet foreign policy objectives.
The Communist parties do not appear to be attracting
voters by supporting the Soviet Union. Other than a
small number of middle class intellectuals and bu-
reaucrats, the Indian public generally ignores nuances
of foreign policy. 25X1
The Communists have no groundswell of anti-US
feeling in India to use against the Prime Minister.
The Indian intelligentsia and the large middle class
generally share some Western values, and Indian
parliamentary democracy has its roots in the Western
political tradition. Public opinion surveys consistently
show that the United States is widely admired by the
Indian public. 25X1
25X1
It appears to us that Gandhi's tilt toward Soviet
foreign policy positions appeases somewhat her anti-
American Communist opposition.
Nevertheless, we believe that continued Moscow- 25X1
backed Communist opposition to Gandhi is a source
of friction between the Soviets and the Prime Minister
that serves US interests in the subcontinent. At a time
when disciplinary and organizational problems in her
Congress Party are increasing and the intended suc-
cession of her son Rajiv is still in doubt, Gandhi seems
to be particularly sensitive to Soviet meddling in
Indian internal affairs. As long as Gandhi believes she
cannot trust Soviet policy toward her government, she
will be more likely to keep her options open for
greater cooperation with the West.
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Appendix
India's organized Communist movement-one of the
first outside the Soviet Union-began with the forma-
tion of the Communist Party of India (CPI) in early
1921. The Communists struggled through uncertain
years characterized by organizational difficulties and
repression by Anglo-Indian authorities. In 1935
Indian Communists adopted the Communist Interna-
tional policy of cooperation with legal, liberal, and
non-Communist organizations while seeking to infil-
trate them in order to gain control. By espousing an
anti-imperialist line the Communists gained influence
in the trade union movement and in the Indian
National Congress. The CPI acquired legal status as a
political party in 1942.
Communist strategy in India has varied considerably
over the years. Germany's attack on the Soviet Union
during World War II resulted in open support by
Indian Communists for the British war effort at the
same time the nationalist movement opposed the war
effort in India. The subsequent imprisonment of many
Congress Party leaders gave the Communists greater
latitude in building their organization and cadres, but
it also put them out of the political mainstream. After
India's independence in 1947, the Communists with
Soviet support encouraged violent revolution but were
able to mount a short-lived rebellion only in what is
now Andhra Pradesh. By 1951 this effort had clearly
failed, and the party fell back on its stronghold in the
labor unions in urban areas.
Hardline Communists were unreconciled to the shift
to parliamentary tactics in the early 1950s, but the
value of the change appeared to be proven in the
elections of 1957. The Communists gained control of
the newly constituted state of Kerala, the first time
that Communists had come to power by popular ballot
anywhere in the world. The subsequent collapse of the
Communist Kerala government in 1959 rekindled the
intraparty dispute between the moderates and the
militants. Party activists sympathetic to Maoist mili-
tancy argued that the Congress Party would never
permit a peaceful Communist takeover and that the
parliamentary approach was dulling the Communists'
capacity for more forceful action. Party moderates
were loyal to Moscow, which was attempting to
cement close ties with the Congress Party-dominated
government. The Chinese attack on India in 1962
further embittered the quarrel, when the moderates
strongly backed the Indian Government and many
militants were arrested. 25X1
The final split came in 1964 when the militants, with
about half of the membership of the CPI, broke from
the parent organization to form the Communist Party
of India-Marxist (CPM). The CPM controlled the
movement in West Bengal and Kerala, the two states
where the united party's organization and leadership
had been the strongest. The CPI was generally stron-
ger in other regions of India. 25X1
The fissure in the Indian Communist Party in 1964
clearly revealed wide differences among the party
members. Besides accusing the CPI of revisionism
and failure to become a truly revolutionary party, the
CPM refused to condemn the Chinese Communist
Party despite India's bitter border war with China in
1962-and was consequently but inaccurately dubbed
pro-Chinese. The two Communist parties also had
conflicting interpretations of the proper structure of a
Communist party. The CPI advocated imposition of a
socialist state through a cadre of indoctrinated "wise
men;" the CPM, on the other hand, wanted to replace
bourgeois/ landlord rule with a "people's democracy"
built from below on the basis of mass struggle against
the existing ruling forces in India. The split of 1964
set back the Communist movement because it gener-
ated deep personal animosities in the Communist
leadership, dissipated the energies of the collective
membership, and led to a decline in the cadre's
morale.
The degree of electoral cooperation and competition
between the two major Communist parties in the
1960s varied widely from state to state. The CPI
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fared slightly better in parliament than the CPM,
whereas in state contests the CPM had the edge.
CPM victories in Kerala and West Bengal were
characterized by strong anti-Gandhi campaigns and
gave the party a far more decisive role in those states
than the CPI had elsewhere. The CPI joined in anti-
Congress coalitions in the state governments wherever
possible. Following the failure of most coalitions, the
CPI reverted to its earlier policy of cooperation with
the Congress Party. This posture heightened the
antipathy between the CPI and CPM.
The CPI's position in Indian politics during the 1970s
was weakened by Gandhi's refusal to enter into
national election agreements that would place her in
debt to the CPI. Other than during the period of
emergency rule in 1975-77, Gandhi's overwhelming
control of parliament and almost all state assemblies
has rendered CPI support far less necessary than in
previous years when her position was more vulnerable.
The CPI's partial alliance with the Congress Party in
the 1970s limited its agitational capability and revolu-
tionary potential.
In the parliamentary elections of 1977 that brought
the Janata coalition to power, the CPM emerged as
the more vital of the two major Communist parties.
The CPM fought the election as a Janata ally and
won the majority of the parliamentary seats in West
Bengal and Tripura and a number of constituencies in
Kerala and Maharashtra. In contrast the CPI paid a
heavy price for having fought the election in alliance
with Gandhi's party. At a party congress in 1978 the
CPI acknowledged its support of Gandhi had been
wrong and resolved to seek tactical unity with the
CPM. The CPM followed suit with a resolution at its
congress making unity with the CPI a chief goal. In
1980 the Communist parties committed themselves to
embrace all left, democratic, and progressive ele-
ments, including those that could be found in the
bourgeois political parties.
Communist and leftist "unity," however, is still an
elusive goal. There appears to be considerable dis-
agreement between national and state Communist
leaders regarding which leftist and bourgeois parties
should be included in electoral alliances against the
ruling Congress Party.
CPM policy over the years has been above all prag-
matic, influenced more by the rapidly changing
Indian political situation than by dogmatic ideological
considerations. The party has always recruited selec-
tively in order to maintain strict organizational con-
trol. From its inception, the CP.M has been burdened
with severe intraparty friction over the use of parlia-
mentary versus revolutionary methods. Most of the
revolutionary extremists either have been purged or
have pulled out of the party to form parallel units in
some of the states.
In the late 1960s revolution-minded defectors from
the CPM announced the formation of another Indian
Communist party, the Communist Party of India-
Marxist-Leninist (CPI-ML). CPI-ML members are
known as "Naxalites," a name derived from a region
in West Bengal where they led an abortive guerrilla
and terrorist uprising in 1967. The CPI-ML casti-
gates both of the older Indian Communist parties for
trying to achieve power within India's constitutional
system. It calls for Maoist, revolutionary guerrilla
activities. The party favors stirring up peasant and
tribal revolts rather than trouble in the cities and
permits participation in mass movements only for the
purpose of sustaining tension and recruiting new
members.
view, ideological and organizational differences are so
deep among Naxalite factions that no agreement can
be reached on any concerted course of action.
Naxalites do not play a significant political role in
India now, and we believe they will remain weak.
Their almost unhesitating resort to violence makes 25X1
them a public order problem that has hurt the major
Communist parties more than it has popularized the
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Communist cause. The Naxalites have embarrassed
the CPM-led government of West Bengal with period-
ic murders in the countryside, and they contributed to
the downfall of the CPM coalition government in
Kerala in October 1981, which was charged with
inability to control political violence by both the
extreme left and right.
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