SOVIET PROPAGANDA (SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS)

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• Publication Date: November 11, 1998
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E. MQTTVLS AFPEALGD T
P'. LIES AND DTSTORTTO
O Ai'VLl VALUES ]:
NS ..'i.. . .
G. OMTSSTONS AND EVAS
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COUNTRY
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SUBJECT
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. CL~ISSIFICATIOf~ ', CAhFIDENTTJIL I'
CENTRAL If~TELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION FROM
FOREIC3N DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BRGADCASTS
uss~R
S~DVIF.T PRAPAGANDA (Some
UBLISHEU
'?WHERE
II I UBLISHED
DATE
PUBLISHED
LANGUAGE
~~~
1. Simplioity : .
2. UniSorm3.ty .
7NTRADUCTTON .
A. GOATS .
STATE
ARMX
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N0. OF PAGES 1!~
SUPPLEMENT TO
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION ``- ~.
B. METHOTIS . .' .
Selection anil!,Omission .
Slanted Tntex~iretation .
Ci ? MEDIA ? ? ? ? ? ? ~ . ~ ? w ? ? ? ?
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D. GROUPS APPEALF,D TQ ..' .. .
H. HXpOTHETTCAT. DIRECTIVES TO PROPAGANDISTS . . 13
General Observations)
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SOVIET PROPA(IANLIA
Some General Observations
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T.I~I; The folloi-ing observations are based primarily on a study of Soviet
radio propaganda during the three I! i nd a half years between Iuley 1947 and December l 50 by
i
the Special Reports Branch of 'the'Foreign Broadcast Information Service. The descriptive
g~nernli.zationa'are composite fud~ents, concurred in by two or more a lysts in ABIS.
'!
',Strictly speaking, the generalizations apply to radio propaganda pnly. There is,
however, apparently n close simfla ity between Soviet radio .and Sovie~,. press mnteri al--
a similarity se ',close that it Would be misleading to speak continual]y about Soviei ~iQ
propaganda, as if it were something separate and distinct. (there is also some reason to
think that Communist word-of-mouthiipropaganda throughout thelllworld is based largely on the
'bff,icial line" ~s transmitted by,xadio from Muecow, so that
monolithic character of Soviet propaganda appears here also. We will ?~herefore male the
tentative assumption that what is ,true of Soviet radio propaganda is also true o? Soviet
propaganda jn ecneral. This trill '~o no harm if the reader it aware of the fact Chit,
although our generalizations.rathex definitely apply tq the ~adfo, they apply only
tentatively to other media.
A . 'GOALS
Soviet propaganda apparently attempts two basic tanks which are somewhat different)
peychologionlly;, to consolidate 'Wae adherence of peraor-s who are already in the Ccmiraunist
camp, raising it',if possible toith;~C pitch of Communist fanaticism, and, on the other hand,
to detach from the Western cainp.,aemany as possible of its more lukewar1m members. (These
two purposes differ qualitatively,Lleinee the detachment of persona from the Western camp
does no?l. need i.o' involve any pro-: aviei, a:.igr:rei~ ~ ; it is enough if the (Western camp is
merely disunited'tnd if certain~,parts of it are, for ex+~ple~ unwilling to send troops to
fight in Korea.;l~oscovr has scored'~a victory if it can simply increaseneutrality senti-
ment, or anti A...erican sentiment, i.n individiiala or govarnmahts which ould otherw se
follow American leadership.
i
To a'large extent-these two go~ls',jconsolidation and r.~utra~~tzation, squire ident c~].
prap~tganda ?techniquee. Both ale served, for example, by pgiapting "Walk Street" in~the
blackcs+? of colors, and both are served by picturing the. Soviet iinion a;e the Uulwank of
peace and democracy. Ta some exte:ut, hotvt~~cr, they call.fgr~ldifferent ~emphasea. The
lukewarm Westerxter, for instance, inay be repelled by uncritical personal adulation of
Stalin, while the convinced Coamjun~et will not; the nationalist Frenchman who is already
suspicious of both. "Wa11,Stree~!! a d the Kremlin may be receptive to denunciation of Wa11
Street and not receptive to prase~of the Kremlin. A basic question iz~ the anaiysi~s of
Soviet propaganda, then, is the;;que~tion of which o?' these two ultimata goals is Loa
in Moscow's owii ~~inking. ~.; ~~ ; ! P~ ='Y
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A',first superficial impreasionof Soviet propaganda xou1d per~apa point toward consoli-
dation as the prima- goal. Its bludgeoning tactics and its toss distortions seem
manifestly ill-adaptedjto the task !of winning good will trnrard the Kremlin, or ~nt~)-
~,ectual acceptance of ~ts pz~emiaes,'~'iri'the mind of a skeptica~, fence-skitter. One wonders,
how a person with even a minimum of o',;ectivity could possibly be impressed. It is easy
to conclude that the pTOpagaada is ',not directed towardthe fe~ce-sitter at all, but to-
~rard amateur Communists_whc~ muit b^~tranaformed as fast as possible into fanatical and
disciplined professioiutls. It is possible, however, that thi~is impression is based largely
upon our difficulty in bridging the groan gap between our who ~e outlook and twat of the
Soviet prop~-gandist. St is perhap9idi?ficult for us to appreciate hex reasonable his
premises seem "_'rom j~s point of vied. ''He may be trying, acco,~ding to his lights, to ~,
adapt his propaganda to the psychology ', of the fence-sitter, ahd he may, even believe that !,
it ~ adapted to the psychology of I,thc fence-sitter. ~(Whethe he is comet in~this be-
lief is a different question. We aurs~lves may be deluded if~we assume that the fence-
sitter shares our own profound skepticism toward all of the major Soviet themes.)
Amore thorough examination of the~,relevant datn does, in fact, tend to support the
hypothesis that neutralization is nit least equal to consolida ion in its importance in
er an ideological~~one, in
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Politburo ant' in his int~i~national'alignments. He has a~so expressed it c?.early ',
and explicitly in his articled"Three Slogans on the Peasant Problem" (PROHL'E~ OF !~
hENTNISM, 1937 edition, pp. !i~ ),,. In this important gaper he analyses each step ~,
in the revolutionary process in forms of four varying e1 ments; 'immediate ob,jcetivca,
enemies, allies, and neutrals .! The questions area WhatPcan we now accomplish? ~~
Who are our enemies? Whoare'our'alllies? 8nd.whom can g~ neutralizes
(3) The appeal to non-Communisti W~starners has ben direjet and explicit, within '~
Cou?nunist propaganda itself,, since ithe new phase of the i"peace campaign" which be-
gan with the publication of the Stockholm Appeal in AQerr~i 1950. The Appeal addresses
itself not to "the democretic'',camp,~" but to "men of goodwill" throughout the world,',
"regardless of their reli$iou~beli'~efs or political convdetions,", And, similarly,
the Mcnifesto adopted at the Second World Peace Congress in Warsaw stresses the de-
sire of all peoples to ma~ntain peace "dPSpitc divergent viewpoints."
(4) The peace campaign ie only' the most conspicuous illu'istration 'of a tendency
which has chnractbrized SpvieE propaganda since the beginning of Ithe Popular Front ~,
policy in 1934-35s a tendencyto play dawn what is specifically ,Communist, or even
what is specifically socialist, in hits pr.ipagandaiplatfo'~zw, and to concentrate or.
universally or almost uniYersally.app_~oved valuessuch ais peace, ;democracy, and anti-
imperialism. The~word 'revolution", is rarely heard on Moscow's foreign benms, and
the term "dictatrr: hip of i the proletariat;" which' Stalin) himself has described as
(1) The proportion of denunciation',of Wall Stree*?and its "lackeys" is very much
higher, in Sovietipropaganda beamed to foreign audiences, than the proportion of
Soviet self-approval. The approach is far more offensive than defensive. This
applies especial]y to personal adulation of Stalin; it its much less fxequent in
broadcasts to foreign audiences than'in broadcasts to domestic audiences or in the
Soviet prcas. This is ,just wliRt mould be expected if Moscow propRgandists reasoned
that their uncommitted Westernilsteners would be more receptive Ito ?nti-American
than to pro-Cormnuiist or pro-Sl i Teti propaganda .
(2) Ths strategy of neutralization,~'I or of divide-and-conquer, is 'one which Stalin
himself has employed repeRtedly, both in his progress towward power within the
superiority of it's own Communist ,brand of socidliem over) other brands? or wen in ',
the sense that it devates~muG2iof~ort to proving the necessity of, the common owner- '
ship of the meana~of prod~tetian, 'or, any other clearly de~incd meaning of the word
"Qc=ialism." Rather, the contesf has become a power eonteat, or ~a purely po'_itical
contest, in the sense that allot'the universallyinccept~ed virtues are continually
nscribed to one political power group, the USSR and its allies, vrhile all of the
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universally-evndemned vices are attributed to its capitalist (end non-capitalist)
enemies, In other words, Mosco~ seems to have gone all out--within the limitslof
its awn prrspective--to'concenl its revolutionary socialist ideology end to apoeal
to non-socialist'nnd non-revolutionary elements throughout the world. It is ap-
parently trying (with methods which are in some respects perhaps misguided) toy
appeal to the fence-sitters and to the lukewarm Westerners fully as much as to!
those who are already ~'n the pro~oviet aide of the fence. ~ l
I i I
This last onsideration'brings up also another noteworthy characteristic of Soviet
ropagandastrategy~ i;ts concert ation on tasks ~.h~ thAn chan~in~ the bgs_ir~.'~
P
gogi],a ar viluea o? thee' suers, A fundamental in present Soviet'aseumptione',about
human nature (whether it is explicit or only implicit in the thinking of Soviet
strategists} appears to be the assumption that the deeper goals end values ofhuman
beings arejrelatively unchangeable. It seems to be assumed that nearly all m n
(all, that ie, except the devils is human form who inhabit Wall Street ~r who~~are
the servil? lackeys of Wall Stree ) want pretty much the same things; peace, j
democracy,'national independence, economic welfare. Moscow leavca,these goals.
untouched and, instead~Iof trying o modify them, seeks instead to modify its listen-
ers reliefs about h~l,these goals can be attained or about X14 isliikely to help.
in attaining them.
en the is sutaordinated o the ~. There is almost nojpractical di~-
And ev h~
cussion oflthe adaptat~~ion of moans to ends. like Hitler (and unlike Churchil~ or
Roosevelt), Soviet pro~agandieta confine themselves almost entirely to painting a
sort of dream-picture;i',n mythology of gods and devils in which the' gods are a ways
in the "democratic camp" and .the devils arc always in the "imperialist ca~ap."' The
h4]L is implicit, but o ly implicit, in the ~,. The explicit message is that!"the
Soviet Union is heading the camp fi?hich is struggling for peace and democracy";' and
the implicit message is, "If you ant peace and democracy you must join the Soviet
Camp." I ~'
If we examine more nnrrowlyl'the methodP by which Moscow attempts to establish in its
listeners' mind's the "dream-picture" mentioned above, we find that all 'of these methods
seem to be predicated upon~leertain fur~her psychological assumptions.~This does not
necessarily mean, of course;?that either the assumptions or th^ methods are explicit in
the minds of Soviet propagandists, As Inkeles has pointed cut ("Public Opil3on iri'ISoviet
Russia," pp z4-5), the published writi~-ga of Soviet propagandists are~oxtremely unpsycholog-
ical and eeemiily oblivious of proble~s of method. "In the Soviet lite,nture onpublic
opinion and in the practical ,journals nd handbooks for propagandists and agitators, sur-
prisingly little attention~is given to~problema of method; the importance of content is
stressed infiniltely more thin questions of how, by what devices end meehan3sms, e e can
influence atti?`.~udes and cY..age opinions." This non-psychological approach is, as~we will
see later, probably a major;reascn for the inflexible, monolithic chaxaicter of Soviet
propaganda, and perhaps a Bui,for element of vulnerability in the conte'et with Western pro-
pagandists who'are at leest''~capable oi:j using all the resources of modern experimental
psychology and of an empirical, experimental approach to the apecificp6ychologicRl prob-
lems of East-West propaganda. The probably implicit character of So fiat psychological
asa~unptiona, however, doesnot mean that those assumptions do not exist. It only means
that we must infer the propagandist's assumptions from what he actually doee.* j
The assumptions appear to Ue those of n
~, one might expect to find in' the country
sample aseociationism.
of Pavlov, who trained
They liars the assuq~ptions
dogs t~,o I, associate the sound
* Domestic broadcasts have eomctim's explained to agitators that they must be dear and
'st s local exam les must draw the listener into the discussion b~ using
e P
~ ~ ~
~~interesting, mu u
a question-and answer technique, etc. This type of common-sense psychology, however, probably
does not constitute an important exception to the generalization madQ above; tizcr fare no
indications of Muse of "depth," psycr~''. ~gl or of experiments on propaganda as such. ;
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of a bell vrith the experience of being fed, so
They are perhnps also the assumptions one migYit
Russian elite, which greatlyr values machine-lik
hat they salivated at the sound of a bell.
expect to find in the minds of the ner~li ~
cor ^orcn.ity in its follower which avows
.., awe ..ca aw~a.+~ raa a.av?+vray, aaau naatcu aaa~ i"G ~f GG bCU, ril Lll acjuat V1({Or, ~GL1C ptiyCAOlOg10S "~,
Freud and of Bostoievski. The result is a psychology without', depth,Ifocusing on thosaI
su
fi
i
l
t
l
e
hi
e
'
'
a
sses w
p
r
c
a
proc
men
ch art actually
nss~ciete a bell and food.
In Soviet propaganda the bell consists of words
words such as "democracy," and the dog is the listener. By sheer
thq~dog presumably comes to associate the two terms, so that when
slap thinks "democracy.", The folloeing example is typical? '
similar to those of the dog i
who learn
such as "Soviet,"
t~
I
the food c'ionsists of
incessant repetition},
t?.e thinks ~I-Soviet" tie
' j "The Second World Peace Congress sued up the results of the self-sacrificing '~i
struggle of all peoples of the world against the dark forces of 'war. The delegates
'~ of the Congress have torn the mask off the false peacemongcrs and have Shown to ttic
', i world who is the real friend and who the real enemy of the people." (Soviet Home' '
Service, November e3, 1950)
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Here the words which bring out asure-fire reneti~ion of dislike and avoidance are "dark,l'~
"war," ?mask," "false," "monger," and "enemy"; they era here directly assoc'~ted with ~ '
+we clearly implied hate''-object, Wall S treat. The words which presumably br;i.ng out a
favorable reaction are "peace," "selfcsacrificing," "peoples,~~ and "friend";'they are I'I
associated equally directly with the ..Quiet-sponsored Puce Congress 'and therefore with,
the'Soviet Government . 'The whole process is ones of simple associn tion. In the broad- I ',
cast from which this passage was taken there is no raising of ',embarrassing or complicat'ed'I
uestions such as the available evidence on which side started the war in Xorea or the'I
q
requisites for effective) international control of atomic energy. Thera is no evidenes Info
concern with the possible existence of latent skepticism in ttie listener's mind, or ofl
ways of meeting and overcoming such skepticism on its own ground. There is only persist-~
eat direct association between what the listener already erants and ~t the propagandist wants
;,
him '.to went . I
The;~ollowing five characteristics of Soviet propaganda methodlcan all be logically ralited
to, the implicit assumption of simple association ! ; !,~ ',
1 .'~ '~ ~ Si.mnli city
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In'Soviet terminology, what Westerners call "Soviet propaganda," is not propaganda but
agitation. The distinction was well expressed by Plelthanov: "A propagandist presents
ma~y~idens to one or a few persons; an agitator presents only one or a few ideas, but
helpresents them to a maAS of people."' :,y this definition ovcrything',or nearly every-
thing that is said on the radio is agitation, since it is designed tol,reach "a moss of
people"; and by the same 'token it does. not attempt to convey more than "one or a few
ideas." Soviet propagandists would agree in this respect with'Hitler who said that in
order to be effective "propags^.8- has to limit itself to a very few points and to use
themllike slogans until eves the very last man is able to imagine what ie intended by
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nt' of variety, in the I concrete illustrations
Ther? is, to be sure, a conlsider~able amou
which So~Ket broQdc4ste~s use to illustraite' their ma,for themes. Perhaps the variety
of illustrations is enough !to preserve the ordinary li'stener'from being gored by the
repetitiveness of the mayor themes themselves. If so,'~,then the simplicity of Soviet
propaganda and its single-minded devotion) to the .one males task must sae counted as a
source o? very great at~?ength. At least ~,i;t' does not suffer i~om any over-estimation
of the mental poVrers of'its listeners,. Oi the other hand, e'questian may be raised as
to whether the Soviet radio does not lose~millians of potential listeners by carrying
to an extreme the virtue of simplicity iThis, like many other questions which will be
raised in the following pages, is an empirical question which!cen only be answered by
direct study of the lis~~teners themselves~j
2. IIn~gT~Hity
i
e v_.et-
f the who) So
acteristic is the monolithic uniformity o
A closely relates chu?
Com?unist propaganda output, There are s]iarp fluctuations in the amount o? attention
paid to particular t~pi'cs of .current interrest, but these fluctuations do not ordinarily
affect basic themes, and alien they occur they tend to affect !all media simultaneously.
With a few exceptions (which are all the,l~more significant because they are exceptions)
the rule of uniformity seems to hold in the following'respects~ (a) between the ma,~or
media of propaganda: press, radio, and word-of-mouth; (b) between the Soviet trans-
mitters and Satellite tiransmitters such. as Warsaw and Bucharest; (c) between what is
beamed to domestic audiences and what is I>ieemed to foreign audiences; (d) between the
various beams or languages within the output to foreign audiences; (e) between official
and '..clandestine Communist Rations; (f) between news reports and commentaries, which are
much leas differentiated than they ordinarily are in the Wes',, (g) between what is said
about various national~'iand~claes groups (ias,a rule they are all treated as part of the
undifferentiated mass oaf "p?oples" which ~~are "struggling for',peace"); and (h) between
various writers end. comunentators~ With the exception 'of IlyaEhrenbu~ g, whose brilliance
and lightness of touch iare'IOUtstanding, most of those;whoae writings are quoted have
somewhat the same solid, hard hitting, huaaorless, Stalin like style_ The commentator is
semi-anonymous; no commentator is individualized and dramatised as commentators often
are 'in the West.
While the sim licity ofT Soviet propaganda' lie probably ~!,an element of strength, its uniformity
P
may well be an elementjof Reaknesa. The general similarity between What is said to
different national audiences,can be take jae a case in point~i It has one important
propaganda advantage in that Moscow cannot easily be accused',~as Hitler was) of saying one
thing to one audience and the opposite toaaother. The propaganda opponents of the USSR
cannot make capital out of~an3r obvious inconsistencies of this 'sort. Even the few in-
stances of clear beam differentiation which', have been'we11 established are nc,t logical
sell'-contradictions; they are merely marked differences of emphasis,. But a real element
of weal~ess may lie inlthelfact that these differences o~ emphasis are not more marked and
more numerous than they are,' Moscow ordinarily adapts itael.fjonly grudgingly to the wide
actual divergencies between national cultures, religions, historical backgrounds and
political. systems The Norwegians, the Turks, the da,~anese and the Brazilians hear much
the 'same prograuns, A1.1 brands of listen~-~~-peycholagy'seem to ~~ be conceived not on
the'basis of empirical )evidence but on ttie basis of the seme'standardized two camps
picture of the world and the ',same standardized Pavl.ev].an propeeganda techni.que~
In Sact, one begins to wonder whether thi'vs rigid uniformity does mat represent a blind spot
in the minds of the regimP+ited Soviet propagandists ~rhich is ',comparable with their blind
spot in regard to psycriolc.b~ro Anthropology, and the infant science of na.ti.onal character
apparently interest them as little as psychology dees~ The term "monolithic," with its
connotations of rigidity as well as of strength, seems peculiarly appraFriate here, Tt may
well be that in the long runlthe Soviet p~copaganda dinas8ur ~ri11 be outdone by ?Haller
but mars agile propaganda opponents, whojhave been schooled sot in the dogmas of
Stalinist Marxism but in the more truly revolutionary ,disciplines of empirical. and
experimental sci.once~
I
3~ ~ y~ le on and Omiesi.o~ ~ ~i
Another corollary of the associationist assumptions is that the propagandist can decide
what current events he~will associate with the ideas he waAt~sto uphold or t7 condemn
If there are economic iifficulties in th United States he c i repeatedly link thetiidea of
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Wall Street with~the idealof millions'~,hunting for work, while i.f American business is
booming he can e'imply ignore such issues and concentrate on the "struggle for peace." If
the Soviet case on the control. of atomic energy is inherently weak, he can'simply omit
discussion of th~~is issue,l~ead concentr'te on'presumably safer eubfects such as Wasters
reazmemen' and militarisma I ',
A special!and extreme form of selection is the actual manufacturing of propaganda ?eventa"
which can then be capitali2ed prcpagaridistically as if they were ordinary events of the
day. Outsteadin~g examples in recent Soviet propaganda are the creation of the German
Democratic Republic, the Khabarovsk trial of Japanese bacteriological-warfare scientists,
the prolonged world-wide campaign for~,signaturas to the Stockholm Appeal, and, of course,
the two great World PeacelCongresses in Paris and in Warsa*. Every one of these r-as
given far;, more pub'.ticity than, for exiamgle, the Republican gains in the Congressional
electionel in 19510. ~,
While this neceRsarily results in a highly distort.ad general picture, it probably must be
ranked among the' inevitable, indispensable devices of effective propaganda, and the
extensive',Soviet~ use of it is probably to be counted as one of the strongest aspects of
Soviet propaganda as a whole, 11
4, S2a-*?ted I_nterr~retation
t with the ro er worlds, almost any avant on the face of the globs can be
By associating i P P
made to 1'o~k as if it supports the Soviet two-camps mythology. The rules ''are simple.
The American Congress decides nothing;'lit is the American "monopolists" wtio decide. The
U.No General Assembly does not vote; it is the U.S.-controlled "mechanical maJority" or
"obedient majority" whichivotas. The'I,Soviet delegate to the Security Council dons not
insist 3n his veto privilege; he "upholds the principle or unanimity" andjthe "Charter of
the United Nations." Coimnunists rarely do anything or suffer anything; it is usually
"the people" or "democratic elements"Iwho do and who suffer. France and the United
States do, not agree to anything; "1aGkeys" of Wall Street in the French Government "sub-
mit" to t3,Se "orders. "
While such glib distortion by means ofiword-selection can be easily ridiculed, it is
doubtful 'xhether any ridi.ule mould detract much from the effectiveness of the technique
in the mind of a listenerlwho was at the outset even moderately pro-Soviet. To a
receptive listener, the slanted Soviet,veraion of facts, presented as if it were a
description of the facts thezaselves, must seem reasonably factual. And, since it contains
fees demonstrab.e outrightlies, it is',proof against ~l counter-weapon except, perhaps,
ridiculed 1a is .therefore probably the most potent, as wHl1 as 'the most constantly used,
of all the deviies of Soviet propaganda.
5. Lrns ~ptx~rted A.gse
We canerio~r? hoejever, to iFhat is perhaps the most vulnerable of all the associationistic
Soviet propaganda methoda~o the tendency to rely solely upon unsupported assertion or
associative word-ebo{ce,rather thanl,upon any systematic ~rarehaling of facts, to?support
the essential ~.:.~int at issue. It is here that the superficiality of the propagandist's
psychological assumptionslis moat apparent. He simply ignores emotional factors such ae
the latent skepticism of the listenera~l Tt is as if he expects to overcome the emotional
resistance and logical skepticism of the listener solely by shoat weight of frequent
association? r~ither than by methods specifically adapted to the listener's emotional
resistance or tai his isitellectual doubts. Aa example will perhaps make the cnethotii clear
"The main object of the U.S? invallsion of Korea was the conversion of ',her territory
3.nto a mainland military base for aggression against China end the USSR. The
invasion a~ Korea was the beginning of the implementation of the U,S' plan for the
establishment of damnation overlithe whole of Asia." (~viet Home Service,
23 November 195fl) I~ I ',
To a receptive listener this probablyll,trould not be a demonstrable lie. Tt is merely a
monstrous leap-3.n-the-dark, on an absolutely crucial issue, which happenslt~o be aholly
untrue, 'ILilce most of laos'cow's eva2ydey assertions it ha8 a factual starting-?point--3n this
I I ',
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CONFIDENTIAL
cage, MacArthur's advar,e into Northern Korea. But, also like most o~?!Yoecow's assertions,
its factual support stops at that point, The fact is merely 1 convenient peg on which tG
hang a mayor propaganda theme ;which is by no means directly implied by!the fact, and which
is not supported by ~ Qther'facts whatsoever, yet the propagandist blandly asserts it
as if it were one of those self-evident facts which "everyone',I]mows" any which do not need
to be proved. III ~~ ~?
Another conspicuous. case in point is the Soviet use of Western rearmame' as evidence of
aggressive intentions. As a rule the equating of rearmament with agg>essive intent is
direct and unsupported by further facts or arguments. Occasionally, toibe sure, it is
supported by anlexplicit statement that the armaments must be for aggression, because, as
"everyone know~:'?" the Soviet Union is incapable of aggreasion'sad could not possibly be
a cause of genuine fear in Western Europe. But here, at one remove frotalthe starting-
point of the di,~cueaion, the same device of unsupported assertion reappears as plainly as
ever No factslare given ?to support the statement that the Soviet Unionlis 3.ncapable of
aggression, although this is fully as controversial as the statement that 1Nestern arms
are for aggressive purposes. ',
It could be contended that this technique represents one of the strongefs~t aspects of Moscow's
approach, Simple assertion of ', the essential point at issue probably con~reys a very strong
impression (atjleast in the minds of uncritical listeners or of listeners who do riot hear
any opposing vei?sion of the facets) that the Soviet generalizations are in fact wholly
obvious and not in need of sr~y',factusl support. xo support aconclusionawith facts is,
perhaps, equivalent to admitting that its truth is not already, self-evident. The technique
also has the advantage that it ',makes no demands on the intelligence of the listener; the
speaker cetera Ito the mental inertia of the listener by not asking him is weigh or
assemble facts. 'I I '' I
On the other hand, it could also be contended that, at least in the minds of uncommitted,
skeptical, fence'-sitting listeners, such dogmatism is peculis~ly vulnerable. While psrhaps
initially effective even with such listeners, it may in the long run b'elvulnerable to
counterattack by', a resourceful 'propaganda opponent who makes contrary !etaftements with equal
confidence, ~*ho'~'supports them with abundant facts 'systematically press c d, and who
repeatedly chall'lenges the Soviet dogmatist to do the same. ~
., ,.~~r. II ~ ', I
~~
The tendency te,alonolithic uniformity which chars^terizes Soviet propag~~da as a whole
applies, as has!been indicated 'above, also tc the various media in which'it appears. There
is at least a great'deal of similarity between what is said in 'the Comm' st press (both
inside and outside the USSR) acid on the Communist iradio (to bo~Ith domestic and foreign
audiences). There is of course' a tendency to concentrate on events of~nrterest to the
particular audience which is addressed. The USSR press and the domestic;~5oviet radio
programs give heavy 'stress to Soviet elections, national ho13d~,ys, eco~n,omic achievements,
the need far greater economic efforts, "criticism and self-?crit'icism," e,t~ ;the Catmaunist
press in France discusses especially French affairs; and Mosco~r radio broadcasts in
French discuss I!i?ench affairs more than those of az~y other siD,g_le coun~Ery~ This is of
course to be expected. Soviet propagandists have at least some. appreciation of the axiom
that persons inl,every country are primarily concerned with their own affairs, or with
~~orld affairs w.~i.n directly concern them. Yet evQn this type of differentiation is not
carried so far aie might perhaps be expected. Moatof the coun?~ries ofth~ xorld hear much more
from Moscow abauit w4~1~ sffairs'~ in rig e a than they do about their own country, They do
nor, neceasa"ilylven hear as much about their own continent asmigh~t bey expected; previous
to the year 1.950 As9,an listeners :ieard more about Europe and the USSR than about Asia
The general similarity between press and radio probably holds for all f the mayor, constant
characteristics iahieh are discussed in this paper,',if only for the reason that a very
large part of Rhat ie broadcast ',over the radio consists o? press reviehs;',4quoting liberally
from the pro~??Cc~iunist press in lother countries as !well as in the USSR), !, and of articles
drawn from PRAVDA, IZYFST?Ay TRUD, the Comint'orm ,journal FOR A LASTTNG,PEQ~CE, FOR A
'
PEOPLE
S DEMOCRACX, and other Communist publications.
Is there a similar uniformity as between either radio or press o~; the one:hand and word-of-
mouth
ro
a
anda o
th
th
h
s
d?
'
p
p
g
n
e o
er
s
n
The testimony
of persons w2~o have talked with
Communists sugges~te that the unifo:rmi.ty here is equally great,~and that tie radio is in
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feet a ma,ior means of keeping Communists in all countries up-to-date on what they should
say about eve .~s of current ini xe$t:ThYe'.in-soe answer, incidentally, to those who wonder
why the USSR invests as much effortas it does invest~!in broadcasts to the United States,
where listening is at a minimum. At least one answer, apparently, pis that the raidio is
relied upon to keep American Communists informed, including the, editors of the DAILY
WORKER. The same consideration constitutes a possib'l~;answer to the question of why
Moseow~s only broadcasts to Southc..st Asia are in Ehglish ~-nd not in Annamese orar~y
other language of the region. The'Teason may be that some local Communists is each area
can be relied upon to understand English, while few local Communists can be expected to
imow more than one ar two of the indigenous languages. ', ~
i
On the other hand, it can be argued that if complete uniformity, exists Moscow is over-
looking an important; opportunity. ,The very nature of 'radio propaganda implies that what
is said mey be overheard by the ?cvrong? peopled Much that might be said to Germans cannot
be said on the radio for fear of antagonizing Frenchmen, and m~~ch that could be said to
the poorest landless peasants cannoi be said on the radio without antagonizing landholding
peasants or the urban middle class' To some extent the same can be said of any printed
material. A face-to-face conversation, however, can be much more specifically talilored
to the particular needs and prejudiices of the other person.
L'probable case in point is the Co unist propaganda aoAg the IItal.ian peasants alit the
time of the 1948 elections. American press corrospondtnts reported that Italian Communists
wire going among the landless peasants, showing them mope and pointing out to ind~dvidual
peasants exactly what land would b~theirs in case the~'ICommunists came to power. At the
same time, the whole issue of landreform was being given surprisingly little stress in
Soviet broadcasts to Italy. It may'~well be that this z~adio avoidance ocourred in~order
not ,to disturb unduly the middle-cleiss persons in Italy who hold property of arty kind,
and who presumably were more likely~ijto own r~:3ios than'the peasants were. If so,~lit
represents a type of shrewd diversification in methods and media which is out of line with
the generally monolithic character 'of Soviet propaganda. Yet some differences of emphasis
in word-of-mouth propaganda arc perhaps to be expected~leven within the monolithic structure.
'Nithout directly contradicting in arty way the general official Line, it is entirely possible
for oral propagandists in working-e2a~s areas to play up v+orking class appeals, for middle-..
class Party members to play up middle-class appeals, etc.
D GROUPS APPEALED TO
', ~ 'I I
As has been indicated above, most oft the Soviet appeals ere to universal or nearly tuii-
vereal *raiues~ peace, democracy, national independence,) economic welfare. As such, they
are calculated to appeal to middle-class persons as much as to the "toiling masse?," to
workers as much as to peasants, andl,to religious persons as much as to a'heist~. In fact,
instead of diversifying its appealslto different groups, Moscow'seems to have attmpted
rather consistently to say onlj+ those things which would have an appeal to ad,~ groups, with
the exception of "Wall Street" itself. Wha+ever mightiantagonize ax~y group has in general
been omitted. I ,
This applies most conspicuously to middle-class groups;' the at?tcmpt to neutralizcthem is
evident in the extreme soft-pedaling o`' the old Leninist ideology of revolution and prole-
tarian dictatorship ., The word "proletarian" itself' i~a~ almost disappeared in broadcasts to
foreign audiences, and, although the- word "~,vcrkei" ~:. fjairly frequent, it is far less fre-
quent than the word "poople,~' Nhich''?mplicitly inolude~i mid~~le c.less groups. Thelterrr~
"petit bourgeoi.sio" is even morn. rni~;e tl^.r~n "i-~roletariar~, ^ and no synamym has tal~en its place .
N-arx?s rnvn openly avowed distrust ofthe petit bourgcoiisie does ',not appear at allt In other
cords, the pictare presented is onelof ? capitalist world in which all of the "people"--
peace-loving, democracy-loving, ordinary human beings--'are oppressed and used as cannon-
fodder by a small minority of capLtaliats, variously known as Wall Streets monopolists, imperial-
1eitB9 etc; 3t ie~ n c7.ase ideology insofar as the line (between '!people" and monopolists is
.. c1aeE+ line, bat it is not the Marxist or Leninist id'cology, in which the proletariat
wet sharply differentiated from everyone alas.
~''en ? lipt of groups is presonted,',e:g., in describing! those wild have a stake in the peace
movement, it often includes five components; "workers, peasants, intelligentsia, women,
youth." Tt ie noteworthy that at least 9996 of the human tact iii included in this list.
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White collar groups could be included as either workers or intelligentsi~i, rand even the
elves and children of Wall Street magnates are net clear:L~r? excluded from +.he categories
o f "women" and "y i uth o " ~
The effort to avoid antagonizing any group also shows clearly in the handling of national
rivalries. Mosco~ does uot, as hassometimes been assumed, "euploit exi?ting antagonisms
wherever they maybe found." Gn the contrary, it typically ignores all antagonisms which
do not coincide rather clearly withthe one great cleavage between pro-?Soviet and eati--
Soviet, friend and foe Deeply rooted national hostilities, for instance, are usually
ignored. i7iis holds for the 'Jew-Arab cor-l~lict, the India-Pakistan conflict, the Italian-
Yhgoslav conflict over Trieste, theGreek;Turkish antagonism, the Irish-English antagonism,
etc Religious differences also, between Hindu and Moslem, or between Protestant and
Catholic, might almost not exist as far as Moscow is concerned; if mentioned et all, they
are mentioned as ~nstances of the "divide-and-rule" policy of the imperialists. French
and German differences, e, g, over the Ruhrlor the Saar, are rarely diecus9ed; a revival
of Nazism, but not Germany as such, is presented as a menace tc French security. Instead
of antagonizing religious persons by preaching atheism, Moscow instead appeals to them on
the peace issue, quoting priests and clergymen on the necessity of peace.) Instead of
antagonizing nationalists by preaching that "the working men have_no country," Moscow de-
nounceE "cosmopolitani?," and glorifies "rational sovereignty" as against the effort of
Wall Street to reduce all nations t4 slavery, But at the same time internationalists are
e~pealed to by laying tremendous emphasis ~n peace and insisting on Sovi. t loyalty to the
United Nations
An especially interesting prcabl:em in this 'connection is the handling of the thorny
questions of raceand of colonial imperialism, The general Western a.ssuniption is that
Communists lay great stress on bothissues, In certain ways and in certain contexts they
do~ The ?~egro issue is exploited in broadcasts on internal UaS. affairs, but Wall Street's
"persecution of p~ogreseives" and its "wan hysteria" are much more emphas~ized~ Anti-
semitism is almost never mentioned in a~c~y context; and, 3.11 direct contrast with a current
misconception, Moscow has as yet made almost no capital out of the racial issue as such in
Korea For example it did not once; in available broadcasts, notice or c ndemn the use of
the wrrd "gook" bi American troops n re?ei ing to North Koreans
As for colonial imperialism, it does constitute probably the chief exception -to 'Che general-
ization that Moscow does not publicize conflicts other than the primary one. This is under-
standable, since the Chinese Communists in tb.eir own opposition to Western "imperialism"
have made their conflict coincide closely with that which Moscow considers primary The
ward "imperialist's has been a primefavorite in Soviet broadcasts for several years, and it
is not infrequent]~y elaborated in terms ofspecifically colonial imperial~iem, especially in
Asia Yet even here the effort notto make enemies needlessly is apparent. As a rule only
American and sc~etimee British imperielism~has been condemned; the French), Belgieas, and
Dutch have been let off with eurprisL*~gly little condemnation In broadc sts to France and
elsewhere there have been condemnations of~the "dirty war" in Vietnam, bust the native
independence movement in North Africa has been virtually ignored on all beams, and there
has been far moreatress on the effort of 'imperialist" Wa11 Street to enslave France it~-
self than on the effort of Wall Street's French puppets to enslave Vietnam, In other words,
colonial-minded Frenchmen have been given dust as li?t,tle offense as eculdpossibly be
managed without abandoning t~e clan that lie USSR supports e11 liberatioi movements against
all forms of impexyialism~
E, M,DTIVES APPEALED TO AND VALUES
Four of Moscow's labor appeals have
independence, andieconomic welfare.
also to clarify what the Communists
INVOKED
already been mentioned: peace, democracy, national
It islneressary, however, to expand this list, and
apparently mean to convey by the term)"democracy "
There has been much talk in this country about a Soviet definition of dem+~cracy which is
radically different from our own definition of it. Soviet radio propaganda lends little
support to this idea. Although Stallin's writings on the dictatorship of ~be proletariat
and the leading role of the Party do give a conception of democracy which is explici+~.y
somewhat 9ifferen?t~from that which ils current in the Weat, very little of this finds its
way into broadcasts intended for forieign consumption Instead, the contexts in which the
word is used are such as to indicate that Moscow want~_to be~gr~stood as meanix~ very
much what democracy means in the West, with "government by-the people" etxongly stressed as
well as "government for the people."i. Even individual liberty, though it is given far less
emphasis than in Western writings, is defiitely approved of~ For example's
"A true democratic nature cleanly manifests itself in the Soviet eler~toral system.
The bourgeoisiconstitutions widely advertise freedom of speech, press, meetings,
education, and the activities of socia'1 organizations. All this, ho~ever, remains
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only on paper,) In actual fact the people's masses in the capitalist countries
cannot make use'of these rights because of all sorts of supplementary 'restrictions.
Here is a letter which depicts the American Constitution. It is written by a fore-
man from San Francisco, Edward Taylor: 'We have freedom of ,speech, but there is na
money to hire a hall for making speeches. We have freedom of the press, but only~~,for
those who have *,he means to awn newspapers. Yre have the freedom to travel about the ~
country, in first class, if one could afford it. .. We have abstract rights, but
no material rights."' (Soviet Home Service, 22 tdovember 1950) ',
Apart from ?the smaller stress on individual freedom, 'the one major difference between the
meaning of -the word'"democracy" as inferred from its usage in Soviet propaganda and as,in-
ferred from its usage in Western writings is that Soviet propagandists tend to equate '~
democracy with leftism, or elimination of class exploitation. "The camp of reaction"
(i.e., the camp of class exploitation) is often contrasted with "the camp of democracy,!"
as 3f whatever is in the interests of the exploited,clasaes is b?* definition democratic.
And, in terms of the'Soviet world-picture, this is consistent. ?If the cap;talist world
is divided into a small exploiting minority and a large exploited majo_?ity,'iand i? the'~~
exploiters manage by force or fraud to hold the majority in political as well as ecronamic
subjection, then almost necessarily a democratic go?~ernment is one which frees the majority
fros- this bondage. This is in fact the chief form in which the old Marxianl,ideology still
survives. While class appeals in the old direct sense have tended io fade into the back-
ground, the more universally acceptable n'ord "democracy" is perhaps designed to make use
.f all the emotional dynamite in the old "Arise, ye prisoners of starvation!"
In addition to the four values mentioned above, at least four others deserve mention: ~,
moral values (especially truthfulness), strength, culture, and national unity. Moral v~slues
are continually invoked in condemning the "ruling c'_rcles" in the West; strength is an
attribute often claimed for +~tie "democratic camp" as a whole, the vanguard and bulwark o?
which is the "mi.ghty" Soviet Union; culture is said to be strangled in the Y~eat and
Cultivated in the East; and national unity is continually invoked iz discussions of Germany.
In going over this list, one is struck by its similarity to our own value-system, and to the
values stressed in our own propaganda. Tt seems clear that, as far ae values are concerned,
tt.ere is no "diametric opposition" between their official ideology and our awn, such as!has
sometimes been claimed by Western ideologists. If there is any diametric opposition itl,
lies in purposes which Moscow does not put into words (such as a Politburo determination to
da~inate the world),!,or in the beliefs which are held about who are the gods and who are
the devils. While the verbally avowed values are strikingly similar, there ~i.s of course
complete disagreement as to which side represents these values and which side represents
their negation.
i~ I~ I
F LIE5 AND DISTORTIONS
We come now to the aspect of Soviet propaganda which has preoccupied Westernobservers Iniuch
more than any other: how much does it li.e, and how does it lie? ~
The first answer that has to be given, in order to clarify a very widespread partial mis-
conception, is that Moscow does not continually engage in barefaced, obvious demonstrable
lying. Soviet propagandists are much too shrewd, and have much ?too firm a grasp of the!
basic essentials of all effective propaganda, to do anything of the sort.
There have been, t:, be sure, a few glaring instances of this sort. The one frith which the
whole Western world is now all too familiar is the claim that South Korea attacked North
Korea on 25 June 1950. This is a barefaced and colossal lie, if there ever rtes one. But.
it is not, as nearly a71 /lmericans have probably assumed it to be, typical of Moscow's
everyday propaganda procedure. Perhaps the two outstanding similar instances during the
past three years have ,been the claim, often reiterated even during the past year, that ~
there are 18 million unemployed in the United States, and the claim that the Soviet Union,
rather than the Western powers, has stood for "strict international control" of atomic I
energy. Apart from these, the absolutely clearcut, easily demonstrable lies have been ~,
few and far between.
Of course ?t~his does not mean ?that the Communists are basically any more moral than we have
assumed them to be, or that they do not have a wholly amoral, cynical, opportunistic
attitude toward truth'. A11 it means :is that they have a fairly keen and realistic appre~cia-
ti'cr~ of the nccessity'o? establishing one's own credibility, in the eyes of one's listeners, i
if any later propaganda is to be believed. They know that 'they cannot affc:~i?co squander their
capital of credibility.
v
i
On the other hand, the great element of validity in the coiumon American conception of So
viet
l
in
i
th
?
y
g
s
e extent o
the distortion which is created by Soviet propaganda wechniques other
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other 'than obvious (lying. By selection and omission, and by stretching slanted interpreh',
tation to. the limit, Moscow produces distortions wblch,~iat least from our aide of~the
fence, I appear to b
Among these enormous and continually emphasized distort
I
',~~;~~~?Fi~~ i~1A
!~
ions the following are outstanding.,
1 P Tae blurrizta of distinctions between the Ric~htl ~ and ~ non-Sov~J,et Left. Since
t2ie world is pictured as divided into "camps" which are respectively ell black and
al+ whiteT^it+followswthat__the enemyacamp must be,~formly, monolithically black.
-
vwvavua? ao lilYVlYGt3, aVl' 1115
bt1i1CC, ignoring or aenying the difference between ''
capitalists and socialists--s distinction which lids at the heart of Marxism itself',,
considered as a social ideology-~-whenever this dis inetion does not coincide with ttie,
line the Soviet Goverment draws between those who~are subservient to it and those ~''
I
,
w2io are nat. Tito and Wall Street are treated as indistinguishable, except that Tito:
s
i
the lackey and Wall Street the master. Similarl''y, Robert Taft is treatedas
essentially indistinguishable from Norman Thanas, Ernest Bevin, and (now) Henry
Wallace ~ I i
20~ T e finding of diabol.ical_motives for evervthiz:E thp* a_*+ a*+ti,~Sovi.et uerson doesd~
Since motives are always a matter of interpretation',rather tY.an of',demoastrable fact;'
Moscow can indulge in almost unlimited distortion in this field while preaerv~ng a ''
certain amount of truthful
ess
ith
d t
i
n
w
regar
o what
ts enemies have actually done.
Twb outstanding examples of this have already been mentioned thelclaim that~the
Ai~rican advance in Korea meant an intention to conquer Axis, and the claim that
Western rearmament has an obviously aggressive purpose.
R
3.. !, An exaxlRer
ion of the extent of nro-Soviet a l~ or of the 'extent of ereemPnt
g~th Soviet nremis~ea. in the on-Soviet world We~tern rearmament must be aggressive'
because, as "everyone lmows," the Soviet Union cauhd not possibly bye a dangerl "The',i
peoples of the world" are protesting against American aggression in Korea. "The peoples
o?'the world? look to the Soviet Union as the might~yr bulwark of peaces Continually,~in
innumerable contexts, Moscow multiplies by $ factor~~of at least 5 o'r 10 the amount of,j-
pro~-Soviet sentiment in countries like Britain and the United State's where prq-Sovief.
sentiment is actually relatively very small.
Are such distortions obvious enough, in the minds of relatively neutral,luncommitted
listeners, to constitute boomerangs which tend to discredit all Soviet propaganda) If no ~~,
could they easily bemade obvious by skillful ridicule o~ other forma oficounter.-a~tack? '
Such questions are tempting, but could only be reliably swered by actual investigation of
listene~~psychology. ~~
I
G, OtdISSIONS AND EVASIONS
Distortion b omission is in a ~_
ner b
y al oth safer an
g d more I~'effective than Idistortio
n commie-
sione It is not surprising, then, that a very large part of all Soviet'idistortion~3s '
achieved by omission? by near-omission, or by confusing and evasive treatment of thiose ie es
on which it is most ziulnerable. The usual technique is not total omission, but a cpmbination'
nP mir~~Kmo~ o44 ow+~'n.. ~ /' f.....4 ..~...... ..L a. i--__ __~s _____ ~ ,. _ . ~ ~ .. _ _
+... ..caaas ova ~-~cVCUCUJ wiu CvgC1vC 11t1I1U11Ilge I ~'
I
Some of ~~Ithe ma,~or toiics which are avoided in this way ~I I'll
1. (!The actual {mplementation of world control ,Q a is energr~ Apart ft?Gm its
extremely simple slogan-like demand for "prohibitior}',of the atomic weapon," endorsed
allegedly by 500,000,000 signers of the Stockholm Appeal, Moscow has had almos
nothing to say on tLe?crucial issue of how this proYiibition can be effectively~imple-
mentede On the ~ifew occasions when it has discusaedthe matter at aL1 it has
strenuously oppo ed the Baruch Plan as a proposal.for management of 'a11 atomic
tacl.lities by a "UaSo monopoly," but it has scarcerpretended tc~ re;concile this
pa8ition with the claim that the Soviet Union itsell~,atands for "strict international
contsol," which 'the Western Powers are obstructinge ~~''zch key issueal as cons ~t vs.
intermittent inspection, and international management vs. mere inspection, are simply
notldiscussede
2e Iii Tn~'lyidual f eed~,~thin the Soviet snheree Wi l(Ch few exception's, Western charges
with regard to slave labor, secret police, forced confessions and other techniques of
the '(police state have not bean a .swered by Moscow. '.'hey have simply] been ignored.
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The great shift yr emphasis since the days of Leni.n!ha~ been highly unobtrusive;
MO'sc01- has 'aei'sher admitted it nor tried to ,justify it. The fiction of monolithic
self-consistency and constancy of doctrine in the "democratic camp" remains ua-!
touched, except .for an occasional mention of haw St'!lin "developed" the doctrines
of~ Msrx and Lenin,
I
i
L? Western fear of Soviet agBre~gsion. end the hist~ical basis of that fear.
With three~ieolated exceptions, during the past three years, there have been no
monitored discussions of or attempts to ,justify previous Soviet actions in j
relation to Finland, Poland, Romanis, anti the Baltic states. The period of
the Nazi-.~ovl.et Pact is a blind-spot 3~ Soviet sketches of recent history, sad ~
the period when Soviet troops were in Iraq is not rgeal2ed,
5u )~eet~~narisons bet..~en livinu-star nc~ds~ W2xi.le economic conditipna in ~Ithe
soviet Union are rather often compared with conditipns in the capitalist West,
to the detriment of the latter, there are never concrete and direct camgarisone
in terms o? xhat the ordinary citizen has to eat, the wears, the kind of house
he lives in, etc.
bl. $ooi,alisna aru~ labor a.Qins in the Went. This a oidance follows as a corollary
of t';' "blurring of distinctions between the Right snd the non-Soviet Left"
which has 'already been mentioned. To Ares?rve its black-white dichotomy intact,
Moscrn- cannot afford to admit, or to let its listeners think about, the possibility
of achieving socialism or social ,justice by democratic methods and apart from ~
Soviet auspices. The familiar combination of nearramisaion tend evasive handl3rig
3!a therefore applied to such developments as socialized medicine or the controversy
over. the nationalization of steel in Great Britain ~~
I
Since they are negative rather than positive, the probability is that few of these
avoidances have been observed by marry listeners or have been boomerangs on a large ~
scale; They probably have done little, as yet, to discredit Soviet pz*opagarda even~in
the eyes of semi-skeptical listeners. But might they become boomerangs if they mere
repeatedly poi.:ted out by an opponent who repeatedly challenged Soviet propagandists
to sand up and face the music? Here again, only actual investigation and experiment
can provide the answer.
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H. HYPOTHETICAL DIRECTIVES TO PROPAGANDISTS '~ ICI
A compact way of suuanarizing much of what~has been said above is to',formulate a Y~ pothetical
set of dixectives to Soviet propagandists which might conceivably exist, and v~ich would
at least be consistent with what they do. Probably nothing very similar to it actually does
exist, because, as has been suggested above, Soviet methodological assumptions aro.probably
implicit and unverbalized rather than explicit. Never~Y-eleas, this'may represent, something
like what they go .dul say if they put into words the implioit assumptions on which''~~,they operate.
1. Never forget that sou are an agitator and not'~a propagandist. You are not talking
to Marxist, theoreticians, but to the masses. Be simple; be clear; vary your'~,illustra-
tions continually, but pound, pound, pound on theifundamentals!
(Your mediate listener will of caurse very often be a Party member, and sometimes a
Marxist theoretician, but your fob is not to enlighten him theoretically. Yopr job is
to provide him with simple agitational materials which he in turn. can use inln+ord-of-
mouth agitation among the masses.) '~
2. Study and imitate the sai.tational writi~uzs of '~ our beloved lgader and tea Ic er. the
great Stalin; Be, as he is, dignified, forceful,',rutaless in exposing the lies and
treacheries of the enemies of democracy, and absolutely confident in the ultimate
victory of our cause.
3. ~oneeatrr~te your fire, Our deadly enemy is 1Ya11 Street, supported by its docile
lackeys throughput the world. We cannot afford to let this mortal enemy employ against
us the deluded masses in his own country or the goverrmients of!other countries which,
because of the contrRdictions within the capitalist camp, necessarily have latent
hostilities to Wall Street. 'very member of the petit bourgeoisie, every patriot,
every religious person, every member of anon-American government whom we canl~detach
from his subservience to the ruling circles of America represents a victory for the
cause of pease, democracy, and Socialism, even though he may be only neutralitn the
struggle. ! !~
At the same time, we must never admit for a moment that neutrality is possible.
Actually it is not possible, since there is not and cannot be any middle ground, any
"Third Force" between the camp of peace and the camp of war.
/,. of be diet ar cted by the widely-publicized'events, the national ?rivalries,
the puppet-shows such as elections) in the capitalist world. '.Wall S~~.reet aa6ploys
them to distract the masses from their true task of 'struggle for peace, democracy and
Sociali?u; we w311 be only playing Wall Street's game if we cater to such transient and
superificial interests. There is only one real struggle; every fact you use',aad every
~~~
5. J~o mot Give currency to Wa11 Street's more plausil~~,e lies,l even by quoting them or
at~Lempting to refute them. And do not let the enemy draw you into a discussion of those
issues on which hiy case has a certain superficial plausibility. Concentrate on
issues on which our own case is most obvluusly strong. I,
Naturalljr this avoidance should not be too obvious. Do not let any ma,~or event which is
uppermost in your listeners' minds go too long without some sort of comment.'~,jThis is
necessary in order not to appear evasive, and it fin uecessary also in order to give
Communists throughout the trorld a ready answer Rhen they are challenged by their
opponents. A Co~nunist should never be without s ready answer ', to any challenge. Hut'
beyond this minimum, any additio~aa. attention to certain issues should be carefully
a. The Baruch Plan ?or "world" control of atomic energy.', '~i
c. Our basic doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat. "i
d. Alleged instances of Soviet "sgg:ession";or "expansion." III
e. Alleged capitalist superiority in living~atandards. ~'~,
f., Alleged "socialism" or "labor gains" in the capitalist world. i
6. Every word m_gst be a wee~+n. Do not let your 'style be infected by the rotten
"ob,jectivity," the cosmopolitan "scientific" gpiri't which is cultivated by Social
Democrats, opport,uiists and perudo-intellocti'aals in the capitalist world. Ce~].l an imperial-
ist an imperialist, and not a "Congressman"; call 'an incendiary'of war an incendiary of war,
and not, a "businessman" or "an opponent of 'the Soviet ilnion." To refrain froi6 tearing the
mask from the face of a pseudo neutral enemy ie to plsy into his hands.
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time, let facts sneak for theznse].ves. ~ ~Th'e
fasts of capitalist
71; Hut, ~at the Vie
;
,
oppreseign ead~aggreasion are wholly obvious; they do nQt need be "proved," but
must simply be~~oept~ia the forefront of the listener's mind:~'~~.since the facts
are obvious, weido}xot need to gave the false impression that wq~ ourpelves, the
agitators who convey the facts, are trying to "influeneQ" oi~~l~steners. Our manner
should not bee#oQtfcmal, and the directly agitational style ~ gtl~y Dsy slogeas should
be avoided. Ttis~e'~should be nothing in our style or mannerjw~ic~h distracts the
13stener~from~,cjaaplste concentration on the one essential fac the struggle for peace,
democracy ead~Socialism: ~ 1
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