INFERENCES BASED ON SOVIET PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000500730199-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 3, 2003
• Sequence Number: 199
• Publication Date: November 11, 1998
• Content Type: REPORT

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CLASSIFICATION
( MTDAI IAITrI 1 1
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INFORMATION
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS
COUNTRY U
SUBJECT
INFERENCES BASED ON SOVIET PROPAGANDA
HOW
PUBLISHED Radio Broadcasts
WHERE
PUBLISHED
DATE 1 '
PUBLISHED
LANGUAGE
TNN NN'ri0 YTATtU WITHIN TN[ ^41NIN[ 0?nnORAYR ACT 90
R. [. C.. YI ANO [Y, U M[N0[0. R. TRAM.IQION OR TM[ R[11[LATION
01 IT. CONTNNTI IN ANT NANN[R TO AN UNAUTPOY'120 PINION 13 PRO'
NI[1720 By LAW: /[IROOOCTIOR Or THIS FORK is f[00I[ITRD.
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DATE DIST..3 T*A/ 1951
NO. OF PAGES 13
SUPPLEMENT TO
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
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C O N T N T S
S{AN/1NliYL.L... 0 ....... 0 4 ...'~L ....................... . ..., :.......... , ....... 1
,TWO KINDS OF INFERENCE: ABOUT THE PROPAGANDIST AND ABOUT
THE LISTENER....................................:.................
AN EVALUATION OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA IN TERMS OR SIE N
RELATIVELY NON-CONTROVERSIAL PRINCIPLES OF PROPAGANDA ............. 2
Putting the Message Across............ ............:.......... 2
Avoiding Psychological Resistance ...... ...................... 5
III. INFERENCES ABOUT TIM PROPAGANDIST ............... ......~.......... 8
Reflection of Soviet Mentality......... 8
Basis for Prediction. L.....0..........11
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,_~.? . it
AL
i1 SUIMMARY
1, Two kinds of inferences can be drawn from the nature of Soviet propaganda:
inferences about its possible effectiveness (which can be caecked only by lirect
study of the listeners) and inferences about the Soviet
propagandists themselves-
their gentality, their intentions, etc.
2. Effectiveness can be tentatively estimated by comparing Soviet propaganda
with sixteen "principles of propaganda." It appears to have at least five strong
points: it is clear, it is simple, it appeals to strong and universal motives, it
gives an impression of absolute conviction, and, it does not create antagonism by
arguing issues other than the main one. Five weak points appear to be that it is
relatively uninteresting, it rarely speaks in terms of the listener's own life, it
does not know its listeners, group by group, or take their viewpoint very much into
account, it does-not-attack:the opponent' e' argumentte"directly'where?it -ehould?do. so, and
it probably does not give most of its potential listeners an impression of objectivity.
i
In six other respects it seems to have anintermediate pos?t?on between} st,rengtti,and
weakness.
III
The net result seems to be that Soviet propaganda has an intermidiiie position
between minimum and maximum effectiveness.,' It is possible for Western propaganda to be
greatly inferior -to it, or greatly superiur.
3. The -limitations of Soviet propaganda sue 'eat- corree ' ndin limitations-of the
Soviet mentality: rigidity, evasiveness, diabolism. Each of these auggests vulne'r-
ability to a particular kind of strategy on the 'part of Western propagandists.'
4. The use of Soviet propaganda as aibasis'for predicting Soviet policy warrants
(much more investigation than it has yet received'. A case for this kind of analysis
,,can be made on logical and also on empirical grounds; for instance, the Cominform
!break with Tito could have been predicted on the basis of propaganda analysis.
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- 2
1. TWO KINDS OF INFERENCE?I ABOUT THE PROPAGANAI,T AND ABOUT THE rISTJ R
No one studies Soviet propaganda for its own sake. There are two great practical reasons
for studying.it: (i) as a clue to the mentality of the Soviet leaders and their political
intentions, and (2) nn a clue to the probable impact of Soviet propaganda on those who hear
it. For those Western analysts whose thoughts are focused on the enigma of the Politburo,
"propaganda analysis" is likely to mean only. -"ie.first of these two types of inference; for
those who are concerned with combatting Soviet propaganda it is likely to mean only the
second. But both are legitimate subjects of study, and both call for systematic discussion.*
The previous report on "Soviet Propaganda (Same General Observations)" did not do justice
11 to either problem. Certain modest inferences were made in it with regard to the goals and
psychological assumptions of Soviet propagandists, and a few tentative evaluations were
made as to possible strong points or vulnerabilities of Soviet propaganda from the s~and-
point of the listener. The field of possible inferences was not at all systematically
explored, however, and nothing at all was said' about the crucial problem of the process of
inference-making itself. No answer was given to the question which perhaps should have
been asked first of all: How reliable can such inferences be? Nor was there any explora-
tion+of the safeguards that are needed if even:elatively sound and reliable inferenc?s
are to be made.
Of the two majoi types of -u; , f.,:' propagandist's mentality and as to the
listener's reaction--the first is ::,eIdcsil the more speculative. Soviet propaganda does
not', curry on its, face any clear evidence as to; the motives or beliefs of the men who pyrite
it, or of the men who directives to those who write it. ' Concealment is a large] part
of their business. Tne 1;:-toners, however, are less of a mystery. Those listeners whom we
of so might hope to ini'1ucn,e are in some respects like ourselves, and by putting ourselves
in their ;ilaeL ;;e can: L 1 e : ~_+nt estimate how they would be likely to react. It is
appropriate, then, to reverse the usual order and to consider the listeners first.
I I, AN TsVIiLUAT Q OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA IN TERMS OF SIXTEEN RrLAa.,,rj Y NON-.CONTROVERSIAL
PRINCIPLES OF PROPI.OANPA
It goes without saying that. ac i,u t 1 direct knowledge of listeners' reactions would be far more
reliable than speculation ab.~uL their probable reactions. There is, however, an immediate
need for an informed estimat of' tier-: ;strengths and weaknesses of Soviet propaganda, from the
standpoint of listeners' remotions, :.:rd the need is !great enough to warrant some thinking on
the subject ever in the absence of c:duque.te direct evidence-. It is possible, too, to make a
bett.er?-than -nothing estimate on two grounds: (1) asking ourselves how we would react if we
were in the listener's positon. and (2) comparing Soviet propaganda with those more
generally accepted principles of persuasion which are grounded in the practice of successful
propagandists in the past--Lenin, Hitler, Roosevelt, Churchill--and in what little welknow
!,,:about, public opinion in general.. It is true that the scientific study of public opinion is
still in its infancy, How far it still has to go is evidenced, for instance, by the failure
of public opinion "expert:;" to nr-'diet the election of Truman in 1948. But some thinking
ha:; been done, and it is n.os;iu put down at leastsixteen principles of propaganda
which are relatively non-controversial in the sense that a considerable majority of Western
student. of public opinion would probably accept them, tentatively, until they are proved
wrong, We present these principles herewith, together with an estimate, in each case, as to
how well Soviet propaganda con :coin to the principle. In each case Soviet propaganda will
be rated on a five-point nr:;-J e: "very good" to j'very poor." The principles can be
,divided, somewhat arbitrarily, i.r.Lo two groups:, "putting the message across" and "avoiding
psychological resistance":
1. Be clear.
In radio broadcasts, for instance, every word should be clearly enunciated, and the pace
should not be too fast.
I
Neither words nor sentences should be too long. Academic or technical words should be
avoided unless they are essential to the argument and are clearly explained. All or nearly
all of the ideas should be intelligible to a person of average intelligence.
The distinction made here is similar to the generally accepted distinction between three
aspects of propaganda: the intent of the propagandist, the contort of what he says, and the
effect on the listener. We are saying that content is of no interest except insofar as it
,permits inferences about intent or about effect.;' But the word "intent" seems too narrow; we
are actually concerned with the total psychology' of the propagandist, and not merely with
what he consciously intends tro accomplish. Mental biind-spots or rigidities, for instance,
are not cc,vered by the word ]intent," and they are a major part of our present interest.
II r'
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Not only facts but, als the implications of facts should be completely clear. This usually
means spellin out the implications rather than leaving it ;o the reader to make his own
inferences. (If carried,to an extreme, however, this may conflict with the principle of
appearing to be factual and objective.)
In this respect &viet propaganda is unquestionably very ao g. The Im l
picationr
of facts, from the Soviet standpoint, are continually spelled out with complete
clarity. If anytt}ing, Moscow errs on the side of carrying Chic principle to an
extreme at which it conflicts with the principle of appearing to be factual and
ejrev
2. Be
Concentrate on a few themes which are really of basic importance. Choose these themes car e-
fully, but, once they are'chosen,l stick to them and pound on them until they are completely
familiar 'even to your dullest or least attentive listener-
Aim at variety of illustrations and of supporting argument, but T141 at variety of basic
themes
Aga,-n' the Soviet ruing would be very roo. A small number of major themes
and the subthemes associated'with them, account for by far the larger part
I'
of Soviet propaganda.
3. Be interesting.
Vary illustrations, argiments, style,
irony, etc., where appropriate.
etc.--everything but basic themes. Use humor, ridicule,
Be timely; Catch the listener's interest in an event at the time
its peak.,
when that interest is at
Use human-interest stogies where possible: first-person narratives, eye-witness accounts.
Use drama in all its forrms, including, perhaps, even the drama of I conflicting opinions, if
the outcome of the discussion is clearly and absolutely in line with your own basic themes.
Personalize your commenators, so that your listener feels that he, knows the commentator as
an individual.
Here the rating falls to poor or berv poor. Soviet propaganda is monolithic,
standardized, repetitive, tola degree which might easily bore and repel an'in-
tellectually alert listener.' It is heavy-handed, humorless (with rare and)
welcome exceptions)? and largely devoid of narrative or dramatic interest.') it also
deals primarily in abstractions (such as peace and an undefined "democracy")
rather than in concrete and vivid detail.
It may be that the standardizing character of the Stalinist dictatorship has
something to do with this; and it may be, too, that the Soviet domestic propagan-
dist,I speaking ordinarily to 'a captive audience which can hardly avoid listening,
has little incentive to develop the skills of audience-appeal which are highly
developed in our competitive,lentertainment-minded American culture. The
advertising skills for which ;Americans are notorious may repel a West-european
intellectual, but a least they do not bore him as Soviet propaganda probably does.
4. Bit factual,,
The beat argument is a hard and tangible fact. No matter how clearly and continually the
implications of facts may be spelled out, the starting point of the inference shoal i always
be a concrete fact. And no matter how large the proportion of commentary may be, as
distinguished from news, general commentary should always be interlarded with enough
illustrative facts so that it seems like a generalization from facts rather than mere
polemics or speculation.
There are two great reasons for this: (1) timely and authoritative news is the ',best
attention-getter, and (2) it carries more conviction, especially with a skeptical listener,
than argument does. People usually like to think that they are arriving at their own
opinions directly from ti
e facts," and are not being pushed into them by self-interested
propagandists.
Here the Soviet rating would perhaps be. fair. Moscow's propagandists are adept
at using recent everts as pegs onwhich to hang their basic themes, even though
the themes themselves are rarely supported by any systematic marshalling of
facts-.! They are als I o adept at giving an impression of being descriptive at! those
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points where they are actually being most interpretive; where their conclusions area
most vulnerable they calmly refer to these conclusions as "facts" which "everyone
knows Soviet propaganda can perhaps be accurately described' as a o-factual--
i e,., giving an appearance of fact-mindedness, but perhaps vulnerable to attack by
shrewd opponent who could show how thin (not how false, but how thin) the factual
fac'ide actually is,
Play up the news that supports your case Select from history the facts that support yo
case. Select carefully also the arguments or frames of reference in which your case appears
strongest and keep the discussion in those frames of reference where! possible.
Corollary 1. Know the points on which your case is most vulnerableand reduce discussion
on these points to a minimum-without making the avoidance so extreme that it is obvious.
Corollary 2 Arrange to have events occur--a Congress, a protest meeting, an official
statement-.-which support your case. They can then be played up as "news" without losing
the,appearance of factual and objective reporting.
Here the Soviet rating is probably fair:, Although Moscow seems to miss a surprising
number of opportunities, it is especially effective in carrying out Corollaries 1
and 2-, evading without seeming to evade, and manufacturing events which seem to
support its case,.
6. Tj un_the propaganda with the listeners' own life.
Most people are absorbed in their own personal affairs, and interested in politics only is
it affects them personally., "Will ay house be bombed?" "Will WE boy be sent to fight?"
"Will j lose my job?" Talk on this personal level, at least until you have established
the necessary link between what the listener is already interested in and what you want him
to be interested in. I
ia2L. The personal level is not Moscow's long suit. It deals lcontinually in broad
abstractions such as peace and democracy, and perhaps it assumes that peace and
'economic welfare for the masses (which is always implicit in its use of the term
"democracy") are sufficiently concrete already in the minds oflits listeners. But
it does surprisingly little to drive hone this personal relevance,.
Ap eel to the strong motives that your listener already has.
Propaganda never creates energy; it only releases or directs the emotional energy that
already exists in your listeners' psychological make-up.
Find', out what is really on your listener's mind, and then talk in terms of it, showing ho'w
your program is the way to get what he already wants, or changing his loves and hates by
linking your side with what he loves and the enemy with what he hates. Don't waste time
on the relatively thankless task of trying to make him want, fundamentally, what he
doesn't already want,
in the absence of specific knowledge, focus on those motives which are in general the
strongest and most universal: the desires for peace, economic welfare, national indepen-
dence, etc.
Qo g Moscow has virtually abandoned its former attempt to preach a radically new
ideology, and concentrates instead on universally or almost universally approved
values. Its choice of values for primary emphasis also seems psychologically sound.'
The one major political motive which it does not stress is the desire for individual
freedom, and this is probably a necessary omission in view of the inherent vulner-
ability of the Soviet case on this point, I
Martina point and frame o? reference.
,IThis'does not necessarily call for anthropological generalizations about "national
'character," although such generalizations are useful if and when they can be made on a
Isound basis. As a minimum, however, it calls for specific knowledge) about the present
!beliefs, loyalties, prejudices, desires and frustrations of each major national group, and'
lof each major subdivision (working class, peasantry, urban middle class) within the more
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This mium is important because
(a)~I t makes your listener feel that you know him and are int
feels appreciated and, in a sense, flattered.
I
(b) It enables you to harness t
counter 1o his prejudices.
may-suggest-to him that you consider the point to be in need of further proof. What seems
to him self-evident or highly probable should be treated as if it were self-evident t: ,
everyone, and not argued as if it needed arguing; what he is dubiois about should be
solidly and factually supported. I may be desirable also to show~a candid recognition of
his doubts as legitimate, and to ani~wer them fully and patiently, tLough'I the attitude of
t-he propagandist. should be "you will be convinced when you know alp. 'the facts" rather than
"this is la debatable issue."
E4 though Moscow deals specifically with the political vents in each part
~.., Although
of the world, it shors a monolithic uniformity in type of treatment, and it seems
to make no attempt whatever to meet and answer the specific skepticisms in the
minds of its listeners. This may be related to the general Soviet lack of interest
to psychology and cultural anthropology, and to the typically dogmatic rather than
9 . Qt ve moression of absolute conviction
The speaker should have an air of complete self-confidence and strength of conviction.
He should not allow it to appear that he himself has the slightest doubt as to the validity
of his facts, the logic of his arguments, or the rightness of his cause.
This perhaps implies that in many cases an actually controversial
as if its truth were self-evident and universally accepted. Facts
as proof of a basic theme but. merely as one more illustration
no
scu
m
in
late
proved v~ ........ea.....l
.,_proof,,
-' -perhaps-- -be-'
i for r made to look ridiculouslby a resourceful opponent
it
can
newhocessidoestproduce proof; and it alsol has the disadvantage that it rides rough-shod over the
listeneris doubts rather than showing an understanding of them, We need empirical evide ce
1 i its ffectivenessI
t
h
empirical character of Soviet hinking.
os ng
ou
to how far the method can be pushed wit
ueo~. Soviet propaganda is outstanding in the impression of certainty and
conviction which it gives. The Soviet dogmatists admit no doubts whatever. In a
Th
d
?
7
d as unemotional; they are at
sense they can even be describ
impression they give is one of~caiet but absolute certainty.
idea should be presented
should perhaps be given
of what has already been
e
.
inexcite
.east
They also carry,to an extreme the "as everyone knows" technique. If they err, then'
they err on the side of riding rough-shod over listeners' doubts and over contrary
facts, rather than on the side of a needless admission that some points may be
debatable.
H Ayoidine Psychological Resist?DC'e
that some active identification of the speaker with his audience, some definit
b
I
e
t may
b'ondof fellow-feeling, is always needed. But as a minimum there should at least be an
absence of any barriers based on a feeling that the speaker is to "different," that he
is critical, that he is boastful, that he is condescending, or that he is exploiting the
special susceptibilities of his audlience . Humor helps to create bond 'of fellow-feelin;
and the path can also be made smootier,by showing an awareness of at is on the listeners
Corollary.- Where possible, work through native
quote local persons who uphold your viewpoint.
always suspect
or the local press and radio. 0
ents
a
,
g
Ideas coming from a foreign source are
In this respect the Soviet proppagandists are perhaps =. they go all ou-c to avoil
antagonizing the national or religious prejudices of their audiences; they appeal
specifically to the "people" in every nation, with criticism directed only against
their capitalist "ruling circles"; and they presumably create-a bond of identifica
tion also by appealing to universal motives such as the desire for lpeace. They make
ITS-fig"'
rested in him. He
is present strong motives (#7 above)
and avoid running
It enables you to concentr larger unity such as "the free nations," "the democratic nations," or th'j
United Nations. Resemblances between two nations (.e.g., between the French revolutionary
tradi:tl.on and the Russian revolution, or between the liberal democratic trs~dition ins
France and in America) can also be pointed out, if there is no indication of superiority
on tY a other side,
fair. Moscow continually identifies itself with "the peoples of the world," "the
democratic camp," etc. , with the implication that all of its supporters throughout
the world share in its glory At the same time, it often refers to the US-SR as the
"vanguard" of the democratic movement, or as the "mighty bulwark" of the forces of
peace: This is perhaps a reasonable compromise between the inevitable Soviet self-
glori.i'ication and the necessity to give credit to the 'llistener.
On the other hand, Ehrenburg's occasional masterly appeals to French national pride
and to the common revolutionary tradition of France and Russia represent the only
importance ins rice, in recent Soviet propaganda, of this type of th'ng. The kind
of understanding which shows real appreciation of other national cultures is not a
typical Soviet virtue.
12, ponnt ea e e tayonisrn by ,ruin _issues other than the main one,
No muter how much you may disapprove of the audience's religion, its racial prejudices,
i.ts monarchical sentiments, its way of treating women, its national egotism, its
national hostilities, or its economic practices, don't criticize or challenge these
unless you feel that they are actually the, major issue, You will have achieved much, as
a propagandist, if you convince your listeners of one single point-rand ifIthat is the
main point, The tenacity of established beliefs and prejudices is tremendous. To challenge
them needlessly hasltwo great disadvantages: it wastes time which might better be spent
on the main issue, and it creates needless antagonism.,
I
For example, if co'lective security against Soviet aggression is the primary objective of
American propaganda, and if the issue of capitalism vs. socialism is relatively secondary,
then Americans should not needlessly antagonize democratic socialists, in Britain and
elsewhere, by arguing for capitalism and against socialism. We should stress the great
common interests which unite us with the democratic socialists throughout the world, rather
than) the problems of economic organization on which we and they do not see eye to eye.
In this respect Soviet propagandists are very good. They have drastically soft-
pedaled their earlier attacks on religion, nationalism, the "bourgeois" family,
bourgeois parldamentarism, and "opportunists" as against revolutionists. They
rarely if ever attack monarchy (or Japanese emperor-worship) as such. They
scrupulously avoid needless entanglement in national controversies such as that
between the Jews and the Arabs. They even tend to ignore the distinction between
capitalism and socialism, whenever this line does not coincide with the one great
line between friend and foe.
D"` .~~
13. Attack. your opponenr,_t~cese directly and Ae a stsentlv at the ~ s where it 16
_eakest_-.i f _?our listeners are aware of your ouAOnenLt,'s c c, a and riot ,t t v' aware of -your
This in the chief exception to the usually valid principle (see above, /19) that your
opponent's case should not be advertised--or dignified--by quoting it. The decisive
factor is where your listener already stands. If he is in a friendly allied nation and
probably has not been listening to the enemy propaganda at all, you can probably con-
soli'date his support most effectively by treating that propaganda as too obviously false
to call for an answer. To take the enemy propaganda seriously would in this case be to
dignify it, and also to carry it to a. new audience. But if your listener has already been
thoroughly exposed to your opponent's ideology, you cannot ignore that ideology Without.
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leaving large sections of the p ropai ands iei i to your opponent, and also appearing to be
??rssi ve
,e o,. Moscow is itself highly evasive on the issues on which it is most vulner-
able, able, , and shows little resourcefulness iii exploiting the most vulnerable spotsi in its
opponents' case or in itsoppoients' propaganda..
1G r3irJe a~impres"on o e' 3v_X
This may seem to be incompatible with "givini; an impression of absolute conviction. Actually
it is r?-,t, if a clear enough distinction is made `etween the concepts of objectivity and
ne,utr'+li.ty,. Objectivity does not r I . d to imply neutrality. The attitude) of the propagandist
should be "these facts are so plaint that only' a biased person could fail to arrive atj our
conclusions An objective person could not fnil to take sides against Hitler's conquest of
Czechoslovakia and Poland; similarly, an objective person could n,)'. f it to take sides with
us.in the present conflict "
Et is necessary tol distinguish also between the impression of objectivity l which is created by
a, seemingly unbiased analysis of objective facts and the impression of neutrality*Iwhich is
created by refraining even from interpreting or pointing out the implications of facts.
The former is certainly sound propaganda practice; the latter is highly questionable. It
conflicts with our first propaganda principle, which is the need for clarity, and also with
our ninth principle, which is the i>eed to give an impression of absolute conviction.The
burden of proof is on those who claim that, in order to appear objective,li we should pretend
to be neutral and refrain even from pointing out how the facts support our own case.
i es act
t
Soviet commentators who were balanced and -their opponents who were
m r
22,2;: or fair, The Soviet! practice is peculiarly difficult to evaluate in
in the absence of direct knowledge of listeners' reactions. Its gross evasions and
distor.tions,is failure to include neutral news, and its violent denunciationlof
persons whom many of the listeners must?idmire (e.g, ..Tito), probably give many
listener- an impression of extreme non objectivity. Yet in several ways Soviet propa-
ganc]i,sts seem to be trying to appear objective, and perhaps with many listeners they
succeed.. Their typical. attitude is the one lrecommended above,. "the facts are so
obvious that no objective!person could remain neutral?" They keep a factual facade;
their tone of voice on the radio is calm and confident, without excitement or emotional
intensity; the form of their sentences is descriptive rather than imperative; I they
very often use the "everyone knows'' technique, which gives the impression thatno
urging or arguing is necessatysince ^ the facts arcialreeadythoo oimpressionAtreceitiwas the
i5. tbn't tP11 o vious lies,.
The morality of lying in propaganda is deoatable, -,= ok?ur.-W --_
audience will recognize as lying is not debatable at all. In all or nearly all matters of
tangible fact, as distinguished from interpretat-qn, it is worth while to be scrupulously
accurate
Corollary l Be especially cautious in regard to facts about the listener's owncountry,
where he may be in a position to discover your erors,.
t
Corollary 2; Avoid, predictions which may not come true.
rair. Contrary to a very general impressi n, Moscow is not ordinarily reckless in
disregarding matters of tangible fact. With certain outstanding exceptionsI(such as
the: claim that South Korea attacked North Korea, and the claim that there are 18
million unemployed in the United States`, it seems to be reasonably realistic in
the princip?e of not telling obvious lies.,
adhering tor
P ?
extI
c o.our over
16. Qo~f~ orta-t? the on 1i - y g-?~-
ethiat is
Your propaganda will be somewhat discredited nif your govern enter esvso mentnwilllhave clearly
its
vrith what you have been pedit g
mutual feel
hands tied t,i some extent if your propaganda t~ereesha moral coitment
to violate. On both counts, then,,
compelled
accommodation.. A moderate regard for the publicopinion factors which are paramount in the
mind of the propagandist would beta wholesome thing in the formation ofla policy, and a
,realistic regard for the necessities of practical actical policyi(e.g., from such urellydnaia d r-g, lie
standpoint) would be a wholesome thing for
might even present the practical considerations in his propaganda, so as to preparelthe
'minds of the world audience for what actually develops in the policy of his countiyp
4?.~ +.hp foreign policy of the USSR
s
en
S
i
~p~~~
ue twe
-
- - -- r- -- --
on
l.ii:.A.','. The coordina L
seems on the whole to be, good-. The two are', closely integrated in, for example aces,
tactics of Soviet delegates in the United Nations. There are at least two iisstance
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is clear.
is simple.,
h~wrever, in which the coordination appears to have been poor. The Berlin blockade
w s not given any intelligible rationale before it occurred (or after), and the North
Korean aggression must have been highly embarrassing to manypropagandists who had
been pushing the greatly intensified Soviet "peace campaign." From a purely military
3iandpoint the North Koreans probably gained 'ay the element of surprise, which would
hive been diminished if they had previously presented to the world a plausible pretext
for fighting; but from the standpoint of world public opinion the absence of a prior
pretext was probably a costly mistake. (There is of course nolway of knowing whether
the "ost of the omission was deliberately calculated and accepted, or whether there
was a failure of coordination between propagandists end military policy-makers within
the Communist system.)
~;~ r 2;,ng ~ I
A, Soviet propaganda has been estimated as trod in the following ways:
1.' It
2.. It
3, It
4. It
5. It
appeals to strong and universal motives,
gives an impression of absolute conviction,
does not create antagonism by arguing issues other
has been estimated as poor in the following ways:
thanthe main one.
It is relatively'uninteresti.ng~ll
It does not often tie up directly with the listeners' own life.
It does not know; its listeners,! group by group, or take their various
very much into account.
It does not attack directly and' persistently the opponent 'sarguments
viewpoints
which are
well known to the listener,.
It probably suesl!not give most of its listeners an impression of objectivity.'
C. it has been estimated as ? ii
1? It is only moderately factual. selective as might !be expected.
2.> It is perhaps not quite as intelligently
3. It establishes a bond with the listener only negatively, in that it apparently
tries to avoid' antagonizing him in any way.
4.' It does little' to build up the !self-esteem of its audience,iapart from including
all of its audience, implicitly, in the "democratic camp."
5. Although it apparently tries not to tell. obvious lies, there have been some
conspicuous exceptions to thislpolicy.
6. It conforms inlgeneral to the policy of the Soviet Government, though in two 'cases
there is reason to suspect a lack of coordination.
h
In other words, the 'indications are that Communist propaganda I as al whole falls somew ere
in th;i intermediate 'range between minimum and maximum effectiveness. In the absence lof
comparative data, nothing can be saidlabout how it compares with its Western competitors.
They might now be much better or much lworse. But this much can belsaid: it is possible
for our own propagandists to be far superior to those of Moscow. If we can equal them on
the points where they are strong and greatly surpass them on the points where they are
weak,lwe can win a decisive victory in the propaganda war.
g, Ago A T
+~1 T THE E,AP LAND ST
FNFEiRF
Zan.
A II' Soviet Prop Banda Qs a fief .ey__ Or soviet Mentality
As has been suggested above, inferences about the propagandist are: considerably more
speculative than inferences about thellist.ener This is perhaps especially true in the case
of Russian propagandists. The secretiveness of Russians in general, at least in their
dealings with foreigners, is proverbial; and th,1 secretivenes's of Stalin and his fellow
taken for granted that, Ciatever their
b
e
Politburo-members is equally, familiar It can
actual motives and intentions may be,! these men will not willingly betray their intentions
or expose to public scrutiny their less savory motives.
For example, a studyofSoviet propaganda gives no clear answer to' the one question which
has most exercised the minds of Western ooserverso How strongly does the Kremlin want to
avoid or postpone an all-out war with) the United States? The pious Soviet talk of peace
and democracy would, not be at -all incompatible with a conscious intention to provoke 'a
genet war with the Western democracies next month, or next year, or whenever the Kremlin
feels Jthat it would be most likely towin a world war which It perhaps believes to be
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inevitable in any case The ', :'i, '. peace and alour, Western n[,'ression may be a
norm OnS..inu Cu- uncon^cious pro jec r ,n, in which the .'ovi It leaders project onto the
7lal ] r: F 'ruling _.-4rcles" an aggress--ve intent which actually exists in their own
minds? ':'hi would presumably be goad propaganda strategy, since; if and when the Kremlin
provoke, r, vr'_irld war, it would be dcsi:'atle to have the listeners predisposed to believe
that, the "ruling circles" in the nest were the guilty parties.
On Lire oiher'hand, the peace talk could coexist with a genuine desire for peace and with a
genuine su-;;caon>-however irrational such a suspicion might b -that the rulers of the
..'est. are capable of launching a sudden atomic attack on the USSR,. This also would pre-
,u::mably 'r>e good propaganda strategy, if the Western attack had any plausible
pri! text w}ra tever, , Soviet propagand i s cs would want to ensure that world public opinion would
not, he taken lain by that pretext. An innocert man, like a guilty one, prefers to be
b=zl. i ev' d 'i nnocent And in any case , -regardless of whether a. world war comes, the peace
t.glk ;'a:, great propaganda value. In a world obsessed by fear of atomic war, the side which
rhos- successfully brands the enemy as endangering peace, reaps al great propaganda harvest.
On this questlon,:then, the propaganda evidence is nerb'sconclusive, Lien if one of the
two lines of. inference is more plausible thank the other, - it must still. be granted that the
facts do not point def'inttely in one direc'to r rather than. the other.
Clearly , t.he-nr the clues provided by Soviet propaganda with regard to the mentality of the
:;ovret elite must be of s relatively subtle ne7tur- 0 They must be 'things which the authors
of the propaganda are probably unaware of, orl which they are not likely to try to conceal.
!:t .least one group of propaganda characteristics fulfills. these specifications . the ways
i t.~oviet mropaganda gall. sho Lef maximum a vane ,! A misconception which causes
the propagandist to alienate his 14ssteners c n Y attributedito a desire for con-
cealinen t,, !tjmust be due to a real misunderstanding, because if the misunderstanding were
not real the ;~ropa'gandist would immediately eliminate the defects in his propaganda which
result from .it.. Our previous discussion of the weak points in Soviet propaganda is there-
fore relevant~t.o the present problem, in fact, for our presentjpuepose it is not essential
to have proof that a given technique is or is Inot effective with its intended audience.
The Soviet propagandist probably has even less empirical knowledge of listeners' reactions
than we do,, He is' guessing, as we are. But for that very reason, the nature of his guess
may have psychological significance; when knowledge is lacking, what a person believes is
especially likely to reflect his own psychological make-up. that we need to do, then, is
to examine somewhat more systematically the psychological problems touched upon in the
rre'iierus report, which made certain inferences about the goals and psychological assumptions
cf the propagandist based on the nature of his propaganda-.,
Thi e characteristics of the Soviet output will be considered from this standpoint.
I. , idlt;,f Does the rigid over??siinplicity of Soviet propaganda indicate a similar
rigid over-simplicity in Soviet thought as a whole? In several different aspects of Soviet
propaganda we have '' noticed rigidity, or simplicity, or both. Its basic simplicity has been
counted as a great; strength, but ,_t has been rated as simple also in the sense that if%ils
r,o adapt itself flexibly to the complexities of objective reality; and it is here, at the
point where simplicity becomes ri.gi.dity, that it becomes a source of weakness rather than
si;rength,, For' example, the Soviet output has been rated as- relatively uninteresting,
with repetitiveness not only in basic themes (which is-sound propaganda strategy) but also
in style of presentation (which is unnecessary?, and makes for boredom). The relative lack of
color, variety, humor, human interest, and drama cannot be attributed to deliberate policy,
espeeiaiiy since we know that oral agitators are instructed to "be interesting." It is
therefore a reasonable inference that it is due to a general drabness or timidity in the
minds of the propagandists themselves. Perhaps it follows partly from a misguided effort
to be dignified, or, to be like Stalin; but an identificat:'.on of dignity with slavish
imitation of Stalin's steam roller. style of writing is itself a sign of a poverty of
imagination? (Of course we are not here concerned withti?;e, Russian mentality as such.
Russian literature in the past has shown anything but poverty of imagination. We are con-
cerned only with the mentality of a particular ~ bureaucratic, group which has been drilled
_.n the pervasive discipline of the Communist Party and is continually under the watchful
eye of heresy-hunters in the Party. What is distinctive in their psychology may be far
more a product of totalitarianism than of the Russian culture assuch,)
In other ways too they fail to adapt to the complexities of reality. They seldom talk in
terns cf the li,.s ,ener's own life-.perhaps partly because of a lack of iaaginatian, or
curiosity, with regard to the life of persona other then themselves.. They seldom adapt
their propaganda tolparticular national audiences--perhaps, because they are satisfied with
the relatively simple Stalinist picture of "the capitalist world,~" and relatively un-
interested in finding out how the thinking of a French laborer actually differs from that of
all Indian peasant? They do not attack directly the opponent's arg';vents which are well
known to the listener perhaps partly because to do so effectively would mean to enter
momentdril.y into the whole anti Soviet system. of facts
and Ideas.' They have a blindspotfor
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j:?vciv_l.ory and another for arthr"}, gy pe 'h ps partly because the task of stretching
i'Flr nTl'r?` `cD :nu:'ode other mllid: %nc1 tl'Ii? uiture-; is to them vaguely baffling and
e:l r 1 in,:: jhey probably pref=r th,_ safe, farciliar, clear-u1 outlines of their super-
S,m-F t:1_l st; wo rid - picture
In fsct i i w: ,uld seem that, we can acid Lcn_eiu it p,,lsg} as a third inseparable aspect of the
ch j-) :It llit; which vre hive r.lre iiy defined as inclttdin rigidity and over-
l . Hi ty Soviet --opagandistc r'e olv to 1 .ck a strong interest in ob ;ective facts of any
scat eice.t. 4nsofir as facts crin be j?.resse . directly into *.he service of propaganda purposes.
YSr_t.t arc a1w73ys complicated, and ccnsplex;.t always ,:all- for the stretching of one's mind,
E?cs:d< t=he search fur facts might read to irreverent questioning of the revealed Truth
erd brand the quest:cr?r as nr) C,l"'l i'. 15' who " ovrtows" to Western intellectualism.
ii t.hi p_y:hological pattern (rigidity, ov r-?_rtp1Icity, and non-empiricism) is in fact a
.c 1. wea?tness i.n the mentality of S.;viet pr pagandi sis, then the way in which Western
propagandists I can take advantage of : t is c ear, We can be enormously superior to the
?oviet propagandists, 1n'some respect: if cultivate to the full our own questioning,
irreverent, fact-minded Western temper F1
and certainlylcomplexity should not. But f
cibility need not be sought for its own sake,
ct??mindednass should If our understanding of
l y greater than that of the Kremlin propa-
xploit their ignorance wherever the un
them from a. meeting of minds with those whom
2 Lvasivenrs~, Although Soviet propaganda sts often seem to be trying to say just enough
about a-topiclto avoid the appeara.nc.e of bang evasive, their evasions are nevertheless very
great., On the atomic issue, for instance, heir evasion of the problem of implementing
world control is almost total It would se t.m that their unwillingness to tackle the
enemy's case on the points where it is stro gest is considerably greater than could be
accounted for solely on the ground of good propaganda strategy, since they run a constant
risk of having their evasions exposed and exploited.. If this is true, a reasonable
inferer.::e is that their own thinking, and not merely their propaganda, is evasive. On the
atomic issue, for instance, it seems likely that they themselves shy away from honest
hinl:ing about the problems of i nternr tion control.
human minds throughout the world is enormou
gandists as it can be), we can detect and
realistic simplicity of their thinking keep
they want to influence.
Such a fa=ilure to think honestly and clearly about the issues on which they are most vulner-
able would constitute an especially important instance of the general. intellectual timidity
which we have already inferred on the basislof other facts- It is like the evasiveness
of a neurotic individual on the points where his self-esteem is most vitally threatened,
or like the frightened boxer who lowers his head and does not look at his opponent. And,
it' either. tna)ogy is valid, t indicates an especially important type of vulnerability,
It. means that a vigorous Western propaganda offensive on the issues which they, evade would
probably find them peculiarly unable to defend themselves on these issues. A systematic
exposure of their evasions would have valuefin itself, even if it forced them to change
their tactics and develop explicit counter-arguments. And in addition there is reason to
think that these counter-;,arguments would tu>(n out to be relatively weak, The neurotic
person does riot think clearly about the points on which he is neurotically defensive, and
the boxer with his head down does not see clearly what his opponent is doing, In all
probability the Soviet propagandists would be unable to think clearly or argue effectively
on world control of atomic energy, or on individual freedom within the Soviet sphere, or
on the historical record of Soviet aggression, or on any other of the threatening issues
which they have tended to ignore
Tni whole line of thinking may seem questionable to persons who are used to thinking of the
hussian.s as both realistic and ruthlessly self ??confident. Our image of Stalin: is not
that of a "timid" person;, But Stalin himself might not take the time to consider defensive
propaganda ptiategy; it would be more likely to be done by underlings who would be fearful
of Stalin's displeasure. And in any case, brazen self-,confidence on certain points, is not
at all incompatible, psychologically, with defensiveness on others. It can even be con-
ternded that the Soviet cult of militancy and of "iron discipline," with its glorification
of leaders who are "steeled in the struggle,!' is psychologir?ally inseparable from a
particular sort of intellect14 . timidity ti ^r Stalin hi,rr~lf may be intellectually
',inad, in the sense that he shrinks fro,a hose partl^;:iar thoughts which might weaken his
ideolo;;ical single-mindedness and cause doubt or vacillation. This is not equivalent to
saying that he, or the F(,litburo in general, or the disciplined propagandists who work under
the Fol-i.tburo, can be fairly described ": erotic " It means only that they have purchased
a certain kind of emotional strength at the cost of a certain kind of intellectual strength.
In the protected atmosphere of a culture in which discussion of fundamentals is prohibited,
their thinking on basic issues has not become resilient through the give-and-take of the
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ki.r.d of controversy which goes on continually Ln the West. Their basic beliefs have
extraordinary clarity and monolithic self -con: ist.ency, but these qualities have been
achieved only by' developing a defensive lack of attention to contradictory facts or ideas,
and riot by inc! .boldly inclusive and integrative type of thinking which can flourish only
in an atr.;o-pho;rel of free discussion.. F