CRITICAL INDICATORS IN YUGOSLAV- COMINFORM PROPAGANDA: FOURTH REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000500730229-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 229
• Publication Date: November 11, 1998
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION FROM
FOREIGN! DOCUMENTS OR RADiO BROADCASTS
COUNTRY Yugo.s].ava end Soviet Satellites
SUBJECT Ck?TICAL INL`Il'Ait)RS 1N Ylir,~LAV-
CCf-~INFCift6~i PROPAfsANnA;; Fns
HOW
PUBLISHED
WHERE
PUBLISHED
DATE
PUBLISHED
LANr,UAGE
~
DATE DIST. 3
July 1951
N0. OF PAGES
8
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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
A conti.r~~.tng gaintlt.ative aucilyei.s of military charges against Yugoslavia :?'
b?TMo~,rlcs~t by the Cominform radios to their own peopled and to Yugoslavia _,
L, No appaT~ent Satellite propaganda intention to step
up the war- of nerves against T?i.to insofar as the
Satellite home audiences are concerned.
2~ Increasing emphasis, i.n Satellite broadcasts to
Yugoslavia, on Yugoslav resistance to Tito?s military
preparations; but no increase, during the past 10 weeks,
of the more th~xeatening military charges.
3. A substantial rise, coincident with the Korean
negotiations, in Radio Mosco N ~ s attacks on the Tito reW
gilne .
1~ Iu the period mid-May to late July there has been no rise in the
number.~of mllitaTy charges against Tito beamed by Satellite radios to
their domestic audiences. Ghief of Staff Popovic's visit to Washington
xeCe'ivC.s less stress in the home s,ervic,es than the announcement of Tito?8
April request for arms. Only during the week of 'the anniversary of the
Cominform Resolution against Tito (28 June) do charges increase a'C4ve
average; in the succeeding three weeks they resume their normal level.
.2. Since late May there has been a s~bstantfial increase in total
militar,~r charges beamed by the Satellites to Y'ugosluvi.a. This increase
has been particularly great during the past four weeks (see Figure ~`1).
Mast of it results from a rise in charges of Yugoslav resistance to
Tito?s military preparations. There have been tiro new qualitative develop-
ments within the resistance context during the past six wee]rEa:
s. Direct appeals for, as contrasted to descriptions
of, resistance ?to mil.itariem make their appearance for
the first tame at the end of May.
STATE
ARMY
WAVY
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SECRET S~~RET
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p.. During thepast four weeks, there have been some
references to partisan activities inside Yugoslavia.
these have been made only rarely in the past.
The increased atresi on resistance to Titoiat aggression coincides with
the announcement of General Popovic's presence in Washington, although
the theme and the event are not ea~plicitly related in Satellite propa~
gandal~ The propaganda evidence seems to be against the inference that a
rise ~ resistance references---considering their implications of Yugoslav
military weakness--foreshadows an attack in the near future. Fhrther, no
definitive choice caa be made as between the alternative possibilities
that the resistancepropaganda may be intended (a) to stimulate more
concrete acts of Yugoslav resistance, or' (b) to offset morale gains re-
sult-tng from the arx?ival of American azws .
3, poring the last four weeks (namely, since the beginning of the
Korean peace negotiations), Radio Moscow has markedly stepped up its
denunciation of alllaspects of the Yugoslav regime. TY-is suggests that
Moscow is using thelTito situation to further its global propaganda tactics
and that the increased dernuiciation is not solely a reaction to the Balkan
situs.~tion itself. In contrast, the pattern of current Satellite military
propaiganda suggeats~ithat it is more locally oriented.
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Tinis re~~~rt, succee~iirkz considers only Satellite charges
of a m: _-.taty uat~tre, charges w is mas~~rec . y and mast convincingly aim at
ceps' ~,__~ ~~yc~ic,logical tens ion.. The us~.of military charges against Tito is in a
sense a .l t,='t weapon; Satellite condemns ~ion of Tito in the ideological, economic,
and polit.irrrl i~rng? had been largely cc?mpleted by the late sununer of 1949
follocrin;; the ?;r;F`s denunciation of thee}} rcpime 3s "fascist.." Of the total rsnge
of ', a~~r,.l~at.ior._ b~?fore the 3orean war, m~"l:itary charges v,ere a minor element,
dealint- lar~r-ly ~~nd in strrenfyf~ed fash'lon with frontier violations rind occasional
esJ~ion-.~;;~:? -~::ai- The preen; r?F~~xt cc~ntinucs a serie of detailed qurintitative
stLy,li.?_~ c.f ~~~,rrent military charges baked on countinP curd a.ualysis at sentence
lure?.. I
S:i.rire mid-hia,Y, ar.~:3 }~artic~~larly since 1~}te June, Satell.i~te b.roadrasts to Yu~?oslav
au.l~ences hive ~ii,~wr, an i.nc+rease in cha ;es of a rD'lli.t:lr`f character leve.l.ed against.
the Yugosla~~ regime The ma.,jor compon~ of this i.ncrea::,e has been the greater
stress or. vugoslav civi.liari and army re_istance to Titoist militarry preparrations.
Dui; t}ierP has also been Borne concomitant 'rise in ether military charges as ;yell,
(See Figure f{l.)
~,Tal.rlf? CinC C3US2 r,f' Increased Stress on es~stance r Tixvnination of the events
di;c~z.-ed rn th? militaryy rontext by Satellite radios reveals no explici.~ tie-in
ber.,vreen t'tir;:r r.ventS a.nc'. charges oi' Yugoslav .resistance tq Tito's mili.tarism,.
No.ri i~- increased ;atrlli.t~~ Ilernpha::is oz; '!logo?lav resistance to militarism
exitlicable as a rc:acrion tri increased Yugoslav claims of military strength since
the. !stir-r J~a~. rn;t been t.hc~ case during this period,?
The:.inc.rease in rF_sistancP~chargFS, however, is coincident w1.th General Popovic?s
Wasbi.ngton yr=it tq discuss the question of a:rRns aid to Yugoslavia At the time
of the ~.,rt>ris~ announcement on B ?un~, t11e press stated that General Popovic had
arr.`ivr'd .?PVPra.l weeks before, or at about +.he tune that resistance charges
o,-tarted *~~ increa;-? But the Sat~~1l.i.te adios did Hots explicitly associate this
~risit cit2~ alleged Yugoslav resistance t Tito's militarism until the vreek of the
anniversat?y of the Cominform .Resolution pn Tito (28 ;June)?--~dPSpi.te theix immediate
and, continuing attention tcJ Fopovi c's vlelt, particularly in broadcasts to
Yugoslavia. !~
Thus, while there is l..ittle direct linki of the propaganda concerning Popovic 5s
visit to Washington wit!-, tYie increased emphasis on Yugoslav resistance,*-?~ the
evidence stggests that stress on resists ce was an indirect reaction to that visit
This nfe:roncc is supported by the fact that approximately coinMdent nrith the
public announcement of Popovic?s present' in Washington Satellite radios began to
interject two new types of ',resistance material?. (a) calls for, as distinguished
fmm descriptions of, Yugoslav resistant to Tito's militarism and aggression; and
(b) descriptions of partisan activities ~.gai.nst the Tito regime,. While these
charges a:re few in number, ',they have app~ared consistantly each week since their
:introduction; azrd almost a1:1. such charge are beamed tv Yugoslav audiences
~? Examination shoves that suuch types of goslav military references as charges
aga:i.tist Satellite armed forces, accusations of Satellite warmongering, and
discussions of popular Satellite resist ce to orbit military preparations also
have not increased, either prior to late~May or concurrent with rising Satellite
resistance charges in the weelc.9 : ubseque~t to Popovic's visit. Yugoslav
:references to resi7tance to''military measures in Satellite countries a.re quite
infrequent, although there has been same allusions to border guards escaping to
Yugoslavia as well as -to "outlaws" i?esis ing Bulgarian grain collections?
r?kNote the ub3enee of overlap between at ention to Popovic's visit and the
resistance theme Y.n Figure !{2.
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,qtr-rv.=?.t :~pe+tlie~es Rea,ated ?to Increased CharRr..s of Re~stanee : Why the
Saul.] ~. rN radios should increase their resistance propaganda morn than they do
ott~e.r. m.il.itary charges against the Yugoslav regime is not readily apparent. At
lernst i'cn,x rats r bit i ti es present themselves.
- Satellite propagandists may assume that, 9~l: 'tltgoalsvs will see in the
arrival-of American arms a definite strengthening of ?th;e Yugoslav regime against
'the threat of possible Comintotw attack. Thus, by emphasizing civilian sabotage
of vrar production and resists.-+ce '.is, the Prmy, thereby implying Yugoslav military
rreaLares" Satellite radio=. are trying to offset -the ps;rcl~logical gain resulting
fT?o!r the a r r i vat o f arms : I
It should b:= noted here that Cominform propaganda) has currently
m_idce no e.xplici_t references to Yugoslav military treal~rese, such
r~= rr~or max al e, out?-?dated equipmert,+~ or tl~.e l.ilsei.
b. Incxeas~:d Satellite radio discussion of anti-Tit;o `iugoslav resistance
might also be expected to be one component in a program intended tv soften up
Yti~{;oslav listenezG prior to iai.rly imminent military ac'tiorr. Guy, at least four
ancil.l.ary considerations tend to counter the applicabil'it.y of this hypothr:sis to
the ?na~c~.erial at hand., ~
1. In .the first place, the datarevea.l -that I~since late May emphasis
on civilian resistance has increased considerably, more than has emphasis
on Ar+~y r.e~i:;tancea 1'lere imminent action anti.ci.~ated, Satel.l.ite
propagandists might bP expected ~a Sive much more emphasis to resistance
by Army per-~onxrei. tbn:n by civilians, since AruW opposition ~roul.d much
more di.rer_.thr imply ?l;_+l toyer t?il it.ary ineffectiveness.
2.. As :rrit~d above, there have been no explicit and direct allusions
+,n poor military morale, inadequate equ?frnnent, geographic vulxcerability,
~~r.r_~ Aleedlese. to say, Communist output has rarely, i.f ever, explicitly
discussed m~.te.ri.a1 military vreakness, I
3. if ?increasing concentration on resistance portended hostile action,
nthe~ military prr~pnganda might be expected to bccotne mor? threatening and
frequent, Few marked quantitative increases or qualitative changes have
oa~?urred i*7 mat,erial beamed to Yugoslavia? Such chat^ges--qualitative and
quantitative-?-m:ig_ht b? expected to increase in the Satellite home sewvices
eFrpecially., Howe~rer. it i,4 precisely here that no upvrard shifts in
volume have occux~ed; if anything, the opposite is true. Nor have
qualitative changes occurred?
4. As a plausible pretex+, for attack, Sa-telllite radios might be
expected to concentrate on some such propitio.u currant event as Tito's
r.eque_t fora ar~r~ (8 Ap:^i l.) and Popovic's Washington visit (8 June). The
following con5ide:rati.ons are relevant to Satellite prol;aganda use of these
two Fvente as pretexas.
(a) Ulhils both These "military" events receive considerable
atten c:ion extending over many weeks, ?~~~ total attention to the
request for arms was higher than to Popovi.c.'s~negotiations. The
reverse might have been expected had -there. been a desire to play
up an event as a pretext_ Also there eras rw concomitant increase
ir. over -?all charges dating from the request for arms.
(b) Popovic's visit receives considerablyl~less emphasis in the
Satellite home services than does the arms request. Nor do references
to the visit exceed references to the request, in the Yugoslav beam
And i.n the last week under survey (1723 July), total attention to
the visit drops markedly. ~,
(c) The treatm.eni; given Popovic's visit does not stress charges
which pox tray its consequences as a direct threat to the Satellites
themselves. Comment. about the results to be expected concentrates on
Atnerir..an m.i.litttr^,~ domination of. Yugoslavia arr~3 the arrival of equip-?
went, rot how or against whom it will be used.
~? There had been changes, esperia:lly bei'ore Popovi.c ? 3 negotiations, that old
Hitlerite arras !.n France were what Tito was receiving. j
'~-xUsuaLly, events are played only for two or tYu^ee creeks sad then dropped.
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c_., Th.e Comtaform may be genuinely worried over the potential strength in-?
creases which American arms shipments portend, anal henc? is engaged in a greater
effort to foment and encourage Yugoslav opposition to Tito's military build-up.
The Satellite radios have in no way alluded to defections
vrithln the Titoite ran]s;s? But the several recent arrests
cf highly placed Yugoslav people may have caused the
Cominform to revise upward its estimate of the potentiali-
ties of resistance propaganda,
d, Tt may be tb.at the Satellite propagandists, while not yet ready to use
mare threatening charges against Tito, such as the use to which the new American
ez?ms will be put, at the same time desire some ,step-?up in their war of nerves
agal.nst him.. For the present, therefore, an 'increase in resistance-to?~aggression
charges m.ay, z.n Comin.form thinking, be sufficient to introduce some fr?i.ction into
the grocer of Yugoslav rearmament and to maintain or heighten popular Yugoslav
anxiety over the pnsaibilities of war; At the dame time, current avoidance of
threatening chargeH aesoci.ated with the arrival of American arms wi.li permit the
creation later of a more dramatic case that aa.tion by Tito and the ?t,S. is
imminent,
Sate11 ate propaganda since Tito ?s .request for arms and Popovi.c's visit
to Washington has sha_?~ply increased its the-gas that military equipment is
a*?-ri!ring iri Yugosi.avia and that American military men and methods are dominating
theYugos.'_av Army As yet, however, such propaganda has evaded epeculati.on as to
the vac of these new arms? Pot?entialit~es for more threatening propaganda
exploitation of the receipt of Aoaeric.an arms thus remain intact
ISo Soviet F_ropapanda Against Tito Since the Koreas Ne,~otintions
,Soviet r:~dio prop~gand~ denovncir:g all aspects of the Tito regime (military and
non?-military alike) has increased to a markedly higher level during the four
weals since the beginning of the Korean negotiations than during any previous
comparable period During the same four weeks, Satellite military charges have
also ircrea=ed, although not as markedly as have all Soviet charges against Tito.
At first glance. their coincidence with the initiation of the Korean negotiations
suggests that these increases by Radio Moscox and its Satellites are as'much a
function of the Soviet global war-of-nerves strategy as of the particular
strategy against Y~.igoslavia itself
Bemembe.ring the di.sproporti.onately greater increase in Satellite charges about
Yugoslav resistance to Tito's militarism, as compared +.o other military charges
against Tito, it would appear, however, that considerations more intrinsic to the
Tito situation might play the predominant part in Satellite propaganda,. (See
I'i.gure /~`1.~) Were the Satellites intent on maximizing general tension over
Ytigoslavia,direct emphasis on Tito's aggressive preparations rather than on
Yugoslav resistance to rearmament might be expected :ho ?ti~late grent~er
fear in Yugoslav listeners, anxiety among West Europeans, and concern among
Western offiRisls over Comif.nform i.ntentions~
II7:> qualitative Indicatoz^s Show No Marked Change
Those armed forces et~iarFes:+F which are considered to be of a more belligerent nature
haves not increased significantly since the beginning of May. These more
belligerent charges include such details as the naming of specific locations, units,
and numbers; explicit naming of the target of attack; and,.espeMally, descriptions
on an operational level?--such as charges of Yugoslav troop maneuvers along filie
Satellite frontiers. The latter type of charge as broadcast ~n the Satellite home
services have numbered only six in the ten weeks from mid-May through 23 Julyo This
compares with 13 such charges made in the same beams during the p~reviou& ten-week
period.
R :I'.ncluded under a~.-med forces charges are statements regarding supplies,'equipment,
training, strength and operations of the. Army.
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As fot the mlrnber of times a specific Satellite has been cited as theltaraet of
attack, there has been rn a^~t?all increase since late May when Satellite charges
of internal Yugoslav resistance began to mount. The number of times which
Albania is named in connection with armed fOTCes charges is decreasing. Bulgaria
is n~z~, ,~d _omewriat more frequently than previously, but still only half as often as
Alba:uid. Zt shou~.d be noted that few of these charges appear in the Satellite
home services. (.The Free Greece Radio's "Operation Lightning" charges that a
combined Yugoslav-Greek invasion of Albania was planned have disappeared. In
fact, at present there are virtually no detailed military charges of ~lY kind
fx?om the clandestine station, nor :i.s Albania or Bulgaria named as the target of
an attack.. A minor exception is the dYccu=aion of Yugoslav border violations.)
C r?es cif' P~estern plilitaz-v cpl_1,aboration with Tito, however, show a definite in-
crease., This increase i.s linked to the U?S. arms-aid negotiations. rn this
connection, two types of armed forces charges have been heard mare often than
prev-iou_~ly--?d.,e., that foreign troops will be brought to Yugoslavia, and that
Yugoslav soldiers will be trained by Americans, in both the United States and Yugo-
slavia.
,{1,_,~~,~ of charcee of operations beyond Xugosl.avia,?s borde,~ are mride for the
first time since last fall. The current charges, made in the context of Popovic's
v1~1 t, a.M! qu].t~ grxx~a-1.. l~ba? ~ar~glax "an essential part of these negotiations
vrere connected with the question of allowing the Titoite Army to wageioffensive
military operations outside the Yugoslav borders~s'es Such charges are not aired in
the 'come services.
~~ark~es wh%ch__continue_1:o be avoided include literal statements that Xugoslavia is
a threat to the Satellites. These are totally absent in broadcasts tti Satellite
atuliences and virtually ignored in broadcasts to YL?.goslavia~ During the past three
monthF they have appeared only four times Si~ilar~y, the charge that Yugoslavia
i.s tryi.ng to frighten the Satellites wa.Q made only ~3ee in this same period.
(Yugoslav bxoacicasta on the other hand continue to state that they are threatened;
bu.t the volume of these claims is much smaller than that recorded last winter.)
Satel.li.te claims of self strengtth continue to be given relatively slight attention--
with the exception of the first week in May when the Czech Liberation !Anniversary
and. May Day boosted the claims to a point higher than at any time at least since
last October... Such strength claims are confined to the home services! During the
pa~~t three months there has been a complete absence of earnlicit warnjn~a to the
Yugoslavs of the consequence of an attack---?nothing similar to Malenlflov, ? s 1949
warning to the Western world that a new war would mean the graveyard for capitalism.
Mere., also, +.he Belgrade radio presents a contrast with its continuing explicit
warnings of the consequences of a Satellite attack on YL~goslavis.)
Satellite denials of military preparations against Tito are fewer than during the
previous period? Such denials as made are of a general nature; the mode detailed
armed forces charges are not denied.
Zu:st f"a1.3n, it wo.s charged that Yugoslavia was "foreseeing a blitzkrieg a la
Hitler and the gv.ick disintegration of Bulgaria and Rumania together with a
lightning breakthrough to the Black Sea." This was obviously much more specific
and pointed. than the current charges I
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MILITARY CHARGES BEAMED TO YtK;OBIAVIA -
350
~3~
(13 ~brusry - 23 July 151)
..Total military charges
------ Charges of Yugoslav resistance
to Tito's military ~eparatic~s
Charges associated with Tito's
request ~cc~ ar~os
Charges associated vith
Popovic's visit to Washington
l9 ~26 5 12 19 26
Feb, fir,
2 9 16 23 30 7 14 21 28 4 II 18 25 2 9 16 23
Apr _ Say June July
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100
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(l3 February - 23 Jul 1951)
Total ~iiitary chargeB
Charges of Yugoeiev
resistance to Tito'e
military p2eperetions
6
r
C
n
.. _ .
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