NORTH VIETNAM'S ABILITY TO WITHSTAND MANPOWER ATTRITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01629R000300080005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2008
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: June 1, 1968
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Secret
Intelligence Memorandum
North Vietnam's Ability
to Withstand Manpower Attrition
ARMY and DIA
review(s) completed.
JCS Review Completed
On file Department of
Commerce release
instructions apply.
Secret 25X1
JUNE 1968
24
COPY NO.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
June 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
North Vietnam's Ability to Withstand
Manpower Attrition
Summary
This memorandum analyzes North Vietnam's ability
to withstand manpower attrition at the very high
levels sustained during the first five months of
1968.
Manpower losses are placing a heavy burden on
North Vietnam but have not exhausted its manpower
reserves. Even if losses are sustained at their
present high levels, North Vietnam can maintain
the combat forces in South Vietnam at their current
strength well beyond 1969.
The sharp accel-
eration of manpower inputs into the South and the
need to sustain them over extended periods of time
will, however, produce increasingly severe strains on
North Vietnam. Both military and civilian morale may
decline, and the combat effectiveness of the Northern
troops sent South will suffer. In addition, North
Vietnam will have to sacrifice even greater elements
of its most prized human resources.
The present and prospective manpower drains may
have influenced Hanoi's shift to the current fight-
talk strategy in an effort to achieve a decisive
outcome in a relatively short period of time. In
the final analysis, however, North Vietnam's will-
ingness to bear this manpower burden will be
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determined by the extent to which Hanoi feels that
its effort is moving the war toward a satisfactory
solution. Hanoi's strategy in short will be
dictated more by political judgments than by
simple questions of physical capability.
Enemy losses in North Vietnam, Laos, and South
Vietnam have reached record levels during 1968 and
are running in excess of 32,000 a month. More than
90 percent of these losses take place in South Viet-
nam. Because the Viet Cong have only a limited
recruitment capability --' an estimated 7,000 to
10,000 a month -- most manpower replacements-must
The limits of estimated Viet Cong recruitment
capabilities would indicate that North Vietnam might
have to provide as many as 260,000 to 300,000 men a
year to replace all losses -- in the North, in Laos,
and in the South. This requirement seems exdessive
because the losses in the South may be overstated
A possible requirement to furnish as many as
240,000 men to the South and to make up losses in
the North and in Laos will force North Vietnam to
dig deeply into its manpower reserves. The esti-
mated requirements far exceed the annual draft
input of about 120,000 males. To furnish the: re-
mainder North Vietnam has several options. It can
draw down its in-country military establishment,
but, unless it is willing to go into the strategic
reserve, this option would provide only about 50,000
troops. It could also widen draft age limits for
military service. A large part of this manpower --
from about 25 to 30 percent -- must come from: the
civilian labor force which contains an estimated
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mobilization pool of 500,000 physically fit males.
It is estimated that this drain will not be excessive
as long as North Vietnam can continue to import
increasing amounts of foodstuffs and consumer goods
from its Communist allies.
the net change from 1 January to 30 April
has been an increase of only about 10,000 troops.
It is apparent, however, that further expansion is
under way.
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I. Assumptions
This analysis of North Vietnam's capability to
withstand manpower attrition is based on the following
assumptions:
1. The level of combat during 1968
and 1969 will result in enemy manpower
losses at the extremely high rate
sustained during the first five months
of 1968.
2. Manpower requirments must be
met completely from resources within
North Vietnam and South Vietnam, with
no manpower inputs from third
countries.
3. The present bombing of North
Vietnam will continue, and, because
of uncertainty about future bombing
programs, the North Vietnamese will
not feel free to disband the civilian
labor forces or air defense forces
organized against the bombing
program.
4. The North Vietnamese will
attempt to furnish manpower without
reducing their strategic reserve,
estimated to be about 300,000
troops.
II. Present Manpower Distribution
A. North Vietnam
1. Military Forces
The North Vietnamese are estimated to
have about 500,000 men in the Regular Armed Forces
and another 400,000 in the militia/security forces
as of 1 April 1968. About 35,000 of these troops
are deployed in Laos; an estimated 115,000 to 130,000
regular troops and support personnel are deployed
in South Vietnam.0
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The North Vietnamese forces inSouth
Vietnam are a significant element of the total
enemy combat strength in South Vietnam. TIey
account for about 70 percent of the organized
strength of Main and Local Force units.
2. Civilian Labor Force
North Vietnam has an estimated 10.4 mil-
lion people in the 15-to-64 age group. Excluding
the 500,000 in the armed forces and the approximately
120,000 students 15 years of age and above!, the
civilian labor forces comprises about 9.8 million.
The number of civilian workers that have been re-
quired to offset the effects of airstrikes;on North
Vietnam is estimated to be about 600,000, .ncluding
full-time and part-time workers, both maleland female
of all ages. Nearly a third of these workers are
occupied full-time in the reconstruction and main-
tenance of lines of communication and in tae move-
ment of supplies. The part-time civilian force
required for war-related tasks is used primarily as
conditions warrant in civil defense activities,
bomb damage repair, and movement of supplies.
B. South Vietnam
The Viet Cong have established an organized
insurgency base that numbers roughly 500,000 people,
including the NVA troops in South Vietnam.; This
insurgency base includes organized militar'and
irregular units as well as the political infrastruc-
ture. Less than half of the people are full-time
personnel in the organized military and irregular
units that constitute a true military threat. The
remainder includes large numbers of older people
and youths as well as women, most of them organized
on a part-time basis. Although they are vital to
the functioning of the VC infrastructure and are
important for support of military forces,they do
not constitute offensive military threats.,
III. Manpower Availabilities
A. North Vietnam
1. Annual Additions
Of North Vietnam's population of 18.7
million at the beginning of 1968, approximately
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2.8 million are males within the draft ages of 17
and 35. About 1.5 million of these draft-age males
are believed to be physically fit, and about 500,000
are already in the armed forces, leaving a poten-
tial military manpower pool in the civilian labor
force of more than one million physically fit draft
age men. During 1968, slightly less than 200,000
will reach the military service age and an esti-
mated 120,000 of these probably would be fit for
military service. Although total forces have
increased only slightly since the beginning of
1967, induction at an annual level of 100,000 to
120,000 was almost certainly continued during 1967
to replace normal attrition and the greatly increased
Communist losses in South Vietnam. If Communist
losses continue at the level of the first five
months of this year and if the North Vietnamese
replace these losses, the estimated 120,000
physically fit men reaching draft age this year
will fall far short of meeting these demands.
Three alternatives are available to make up this
deficit: (a) further reducing in-country forces;
(b) tapping the physically fit civilian manpower
pool; or (c) widening the draft age limits for
military service.
2. In-Country Forces
The current Joint Staff/DIA estimate is
that North Vietnam probably considers about 300,000
of the present in-country forces necessary to provide
for defense of the homeland. This basic defense
force includes six infantry divisions, air and
coastal defense forces, and command and logistics
elements. A force of about 50,000 would be available
for out-of-country deployment during the last half
of 1968. This diversion of 50,000 military personnel
would be a one-time nonrecurring input to the Com-
munist force level in South Vietnam until such time
as the original units were regenerated in the North.
3. Civilian Labor Force
North Vietnam has a civilian manpower
pool of nearly one million physically fit draft-age
males. An estimated 500,000 of these could be mobi-
lized from the civilian labor force for military
service without grave disruption to the economy.*
* In addition, many of the 120,000 students above
the age of 15 could be put to work to replace draft-
age laborers not now in military service.
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As with the drawdown of in-country military forces,
the drains from the labor force would be alone-time
nonrecurring gain for the armed forces andwhen
exhausted could not be regenerated.
Labor could be drawn from several
sectors of the economy. The North Vietnamese
labor force is largely unskilled, underemployed,
and, at least in agriculture, seasonally unemployed.
Agriculture (including animal husbandry, fishing,
and forestry) employs about 7 million people, or
almost 70 percent of the civilian labor force,
and is particularly labor-intensive. It iq esti-
mated that at least 200,000 workers could be drawn
from agriculture without a decline in agricultural
output because of the low average productivity of
North Vietnamese farmers. Moreover, additijonal
labor can be withdrawn from agriculture by'sub-
stituting imported food for lost domestic produc-
tion. Of the approximately 800,000 in the indus-
trial labor force, about 600,000 are engaged in
handicraft activities. Probably about one-fourth
of these could be diverted to the armed forces
without a significant loss in essential output.
Consumer goods would be scarcer, but increajsed
imports could be at least a partial offset. it
is estimated that 10 percent of the 1.1 million
workers in the trade and services sector of'the
economy could be diverted to the military establish-
ment with only a slight effect on the economy.
Much of the labor in the trade and services sector.
is engaged in marginal occupations such as personal
services, sanitation work, and the like. These
workers can be easily replaced by less trai~ed
people, without serious economic disruption;.
B. South Vietnam
Since the beginning of the year the Com-
munists have substantially increased the South
Vietnamese population under their control and,
consequently, the manpower available for recruit-
ment. Although the Communists claim that b the
end of March 1.6 million people had been "lLberated,"
US population control data indicate that th6
figure probably is closer to 1 million. Atthe
end of 1967, the Hamlet Evaluation System ($IES)
recorded 2.8 million people under VC contro . At
the end of March 1968, the HES data recorded more
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than 3.1 million under VC control. An additional
720,000 were added to the contested category. The
VC are able to draw on this base plus other popu-
lation groups not directly under their control.
IV. Manpower Losses
Losses sustained by Viet Cong/North Vietnamese
enemy forces have been running at unprecedented
rates during 1968. On a monthly basis, total man-
power losses have exceeded 32,000 a month, more
than 90 percent of these taking place in South
Vietnam.
A. South Vietnam
According to MACV estimates, Viet Cong/
North Vietnamese forces have lost more than 145,000
men during the first five months of 1968. This
estimate includes all causes -- killed, died of
wounds, disabled, died of sickness and accident,
deserted, defected, and captured. We believe this
estimate is high enough to include those lost from
airstrikes, losses during infiltration, and would
note that it probably includes large numbers from
the insurgency base outside the Regular Forces.
The average monthly rate of 29,000 is in contrast
to a monthly rate of about 13,000 during the last
quarter of 1967.
It is estimated that the forces within
North Vietnam lose personnel, through such causes
as disability, retirement, and losses resulting
from air attack, at a maximum annual rate of about
10 percent. This amounts to about 35,000 a year,
or a monthly rate of about 3,000 persons. North
Vietnamese civilian and military losses resulting
from air attacks have been negligible since
31 March because of the reduced level of bombing.
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V. Current Manpower Replacement
A. Viet Cong Recruiting
Primarily because of the large rur .l popu-
lation now under Viet Cong control, the Coimunists
in South Vietnam have apparently been ableto come
by sufficient manpower to replace most of the
heavy 1968 losses in Viet Cong organizations. But
the average quality of these forces has de~lined
somewhat. We believe that present Viet Cotig monthly
recruiting is on the order of 7,000 to 10,000.
The Viet Cong have resorted to an increasing degree
of coercion in its recruitment program during the
last few months. To the extent that the n :ed for
coercion may portend an inability to keep recruit-
ment at the 7,000 to 10,000 level then the drain
on North Vietnamese manpower could become Oven
greater than estimated but still would not'exceed
North Vietnamese capabilities.
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VI. Manpower Replacement Capabilities
A. Quantitative Aspects
Total estimated enemy manpower losses dur-
ing 1968 are heavily weighted by the MACV estimates
of losses in South Vietnam, which account for more
than 90 percent of the estimated average monthly
loss of 32,000 persons, or more than 380,000 for
the year. The MACV estimate of 29,000 losses a
month includes in it a substantial number of
laborers and other civilians as well as persons
in lower order irregular elements such as Self-
Defense Forces and Assault Youth. Thus they should
probably be regarded as an overstatement of the
manpower that must be provided to maintain the
strength of the regular military forces.
It is impossible to differentiate between
losses sustained by regular combat units and other
categories of organized forces or civilians. The
available evidence on current recruitment efforts
makes it apparent
that the Communists are intent on and have the
capability of maintaining the strength of regular
combat forces and guerrillas at their pre-Tet
levels.
Recruitment in South Vietnam is estimated
to have averaged about 7,000 to 10,000 a month
thus far in 1968. Unless Viet Cong control over
its population base is significantly eroded, this
rate can probably be maintained, giving the Viet
Cong a total manpower input of from 80,000 to
120,000 for 1968.
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With this capability in the South and
assuming that the remainder of the manpower burden
must be assumed by North Vietnam, then Handi must
provide from 260,000 to 300,000 personnel.
Quantitatively this burden is within North
Vietnam's capabilities, as shown in the following
tabulation for 1968 and 1969::
Thousand Persons
1968
196119
Annual draft
120
120:
Military redeployment
Drawdown from
50
civilian labor force 90 to 130 140 to 180
Total 260 to 300 260 to300
These manpower requirements imply adraw-
down of the civilian labor force of about 110,000
in 1968 and 160,000 in 1969. This is roughly
25 to 30 percent per year of the 500,000 laborers
estimated to be available for mobilization.' A large
number of these would already have had some training,
being members of reserve or militia units. Thus
the quantitative limits of North Vietnamese; manpower
would not be exhausted by the end of 1969 and indeed
could be continued for at least another yeah or two.
The provision of this much manpower: implies
that North Vietnam would replace all losses:, regard-
less of the type of forces sustaining them.: This
is doubtful because, as noted above, many of the
casualties are sustained by low-order irregular
elements or civilians.
It should be noted that about 40,000 of the
estimated losses are sustained by forces in: North
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Vietnam and Laos.
B. Qualitative As ep cts
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ualty has
deteriorated, itTmayhpartlynreflectgt
hellimitations
of the North Vietnamese training base.
tnames
e training base.
th has been a
decline in morale and
th Training obviously has an important influence on
morale as well as combat effectiveness.
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There is an increasing
body of evidence indicating that the high number
of casualties being taken by enemy forces and the
fear of air attack contribute to a decline in troop
morale and combat effectiveness.
These problems have not yet reached
serious proportions but the must be of some
concern to Hanoi.
Formal non-commissioned officer (NCO) and
officer training schools, as well as the military
academy at Son Tay, were abandoned after they
were taken under attack by bombing. Officer
training classes -- conducted at division level
and lasting from two to three months -- are com-
posed of senior NCO's or individuals who have
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completed at least seven years of formal'schooling.
NCO training is no longer mandatory, but some
divisions conduct short courses. Soldiers who
have good records and exhibit olitical zeal are
eligible to hold NC
The North Vietnamese army is apparently
experiencing a shortage of trained personnel to
fill platoon leader, platoon sergeant, anti squad
leader positions, and the overall competence of
the company-grade officer has declined. 'these
factors are probably the result of increased
demands of the air defense effort, the upgrading
of several brigades to divisions, and the require-
ment to create additional divisions, regiments,
and supporting elements for infiltration Into
South Vietnam. This quality problem will probably
continue to plague the North Vietnamese a&my. It
undoubtedly has caused some reduction in the
effectiveness and regenerative capacity of some
units.
The fact that the 1968 filler groups are
comprised increasingly of men outside of the prime
military age group -- many of them young,recent
draftees and older reservists -- is considtent
with Hanoi's desire not to weaken the quality of
the home army. Hanoi, moreover, may be trying to
avoid creating a large gap in particular age groups
and to husband a share of the superior manpower in
each age group. Some evidence of this is:the fact
that large numbers of prime candidates for:, lower
level military leadership could be found among the
student population which has expanded during the
past three years, despite the increasing need for
troops.
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VIII. The Price of Maintaining Force Levels
North Vietnam's manpower losses in suppot of
the war in the South have been high, amounting to
probably well over 200,000 men. It is possible that
the present manpower drain and the prospects for its
continuation have been an important influence on the
North Vietnamese in their shift of policy on'the war
this year. Their decision to move to a "fight-talk"
stage in the confict -- seen in the current ~aris
talks -- appears to involve a desire to achieve a
"decisive" outcome in the war in 1968 if pospible,
or in 1969 at the latest. Rather than face the drain
of a continued long and piecemeal attritiona war
with the US, Hanoi may have opted for a nearmaximum
effort in the hope that it could force a decisive
outcome in a relatively short period of time. It
may have viewed such an effort as potentially less
costly -- if it could be brought off successfully --
than a continuation of its strategy of prioryears.
Having opted for such a course the North Viet-
namese will now be under strong pressure to rake
sure that their gamble pays off, and that th!
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expenditure of manpower is not in vain. They may
thus be more willing to accept some compromises,
at least on the less significant elements of a
settlement in the South, than they would have been
had they attempted to continue along past policy
lines. In the final analysis, however, Hanoi's
willingness to continue to bear the burden of a
stepped up input of manpower to the South will
relate primarily to its judgment on extent to which
the effort is moving the situation in South Vietnam
toward a satisfactory solution.
As the North assumes an increasing role in the
fighting, its share of the manpower drain is
undoubtedly a matter of growing concern. Neverthe-
less, Hanoi shows no signs yet of backing away from
its commitment and is apparently willing to increase
its manpower investment if that is the price of
achieving its political goals.
The gross levy on North Vietnam's manpower base
will have reached highly significant levels if the
inputs observed thus far in 1968 have to be main-
tained for extended periods of time. The manpower
reserves are, however, adequate to absorb this level
of attrition well beyond 1969. Hanoi, moreover,
has other options that make the quantitative man-
power drain more manageable. These would include
a widening of draft age limits, additional drawdowns
from the in-country military force, a reduction of
the air defense and labor forces still kept intact
to react to the bombings, and deeper cuts into the
civilian labor force. The major effect of most of
these measures would be an increase in North Viet-
nam's vulnerability to offensive military action,
an increase in its dependence on its Communist
allies for material aid, and additional personal
sacrifice and deprivation.
Although a sustained and heavy input of man-
power into the South is within North Vietnam's
capabilities, there are additional considerations
that make the effort a costly venture. These are
primarily the long-term effects of substantial
manpower losses and the probability of a worsening
of morale among military forces and civilians.
Although morale in North Vietnam is adversely
affected by results of the fighting in the South,
the regime tightly controls the amount and kind of
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information made available on the home frontf. The
nature of the war, its direction, and the ldvel
of casualties suffered by North Vietnamese is
probably not fully understood by most Northl'Viet-
namese. This knowledge will, however, be mare
difficult to conceal as the manpower commitment
is sustained and casualties continue to mount.
As draft calls continue, the effect on the morale
of draft age males within North Vietnam probably
is debilitating. By appealing to patriotism and
by expounding the theme that victory is within
sight, the regime is probably able to minimize
the degree of resistance and resentment. The
main contact that the average North Vietnamese
civilian has with the war is the US bombingin
the North, which has caused the separation Of
families, the loss of possessions, mental anguish,
and physical pain. With the cessation of the
bombing north of the 19th parallel, the morale of
much of the population has undoubtedly imprved.
To convince the populace of the continuing deed
for the draft and other sacrifices, the regime
is striving to remind the people that the US
bombing program continues in part of North Vietnam
and could be expanded at any time.
Although there are indications that the average
quality of North Vietnamese troops has probably
declined somewhat, military effectiveness has not
yet been seriously affected.
The increasing evidence of declining morale
among military forces and the likelihood thot this
will become more pervasive among civilians 6annot
be overlooked by Hanoi. These problems, however,
are not governing for the regime. In a society
as rigidly controlled as is that in North Vietnam,
it is unlikely that popular disaffection will grow
to the point at which it begins to exert a con-
trolling influence on Hanoi's war policies.'
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The final determinant of Hanoi's willingness
to sacrifice manpower will be its judgment of the
likely course of events in the South. If the
regime is convinced that its persistence can lead
(1) to a toppling of the South Vietnamese leadership
and the ascendancy of the National Liberation
Front or the Alliance, (2) to a weakening of US
determination to stay in the war, or (3) to a
movement of the Paris talks along paths favorable
to Hanoi's interest, the price will seem worthwhile.
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