DOD TESTIMONY IN RESCUE OPERATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500020047-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2006
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: May 7, 1980
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SEG~`R\ETARY OF DEFENSE
PAY 7 1980
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OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Within a few days following the takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran, a
team of military experts was formed to begin developing contingency plans for
a possible hostage rescue mission. In simplest terms, the guiding concept
was to develop the capability for a rapid, clandestine insertion into Tehran,
a surprise entry of the Embassy with as little violence and loss of life as
possible on either side, and rapid exfiltration of the hostages and the rescue
force.
The key to such a bold undertaking was surprise. It was absolutely essen-
tial to develop the plans, select the forces, conduct the training, deploy
the people and equipment, and execute the mission in an environment of air-
tight operational security. Secrecy was paramount. The planners recognized
that a lean but adequate force that struck swiftly and unexpectedly stood a
good chance of rescuing the hostages. A larger, more elaborate force, on the
other hand, with its correspondingly larger supporting infrastructure, posed
an increased danger of a fatal leak which could have risked the lives not
only of the rescue force, but of the hostages whom they were planning to
free.
Within these constraints and after studying a variety of alternatives,
it became clear early in the planning effort that a helicopter-supported
operation offered the best prospects for success. Due to the distancas
involved, a corollary to this realization was that, at some point, a heli-
copter force would have to be refueled enroute from its launch point to its
destination in the vicinity of Tehran. A major portion of the planning
.effort was focused on finding the best combination of location, tactics, and
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equipment to make the refueling, as well as the remainder of the mission,
militarily feasible. Such a combination was found, and at the time the
mission was initiated, 5-1/2 months of scrupulously preserved operational
security had created a good chance for a successful surprise operation.
At about dusk on the evening of 24 April 1980, eight RH-53 helicopters
took off from the aircraft carrier NIMITZ, cruising south of the coast of
Iran, and began a journey of nearly 600 nautical miles at night and low
altitude to a pre-selected refueling site in the desert. Approximately two
hours after takeoff, the crew of the number 6 helicopter received cockpit
indications of an impending rotor blade failure, landed, verified the malfunc-
tion (an automatic abort situation), and abandoned their aircraft taking all
classified material with them. The crew was picked up by another helicopter
which then continued the mission as an individual unit.
Approximately one hour thereafter, the helicopter formation unexpectedly
encountered an area of dust of unknown size and density.
The helicopters broke out of the first area of suspended dust, but within
an hour entered a second larger and denser area. While attempting to navi-
gate through this second area with severely degraded visibility, a second
helicopter (number 5) experienced a failure of several critical navigational
instruments. Due to progressively deteriorating flight conditions that made
safe navigation extremely questionable, the helicopter pilot determined that
it would be unwise to continue. He aborted the mission, reversed course, and
recovered on the NIMITZ.
Some crews experienced severe spatial disorientation (vertigo) while
continuing to penetrate the obscuring dust cloud. It was impossible to
maintain formation integrity and airspeed was reduced to enable navigation.
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Eventually, six of the original eight helicopters, in separate flights,
arrived at the refueling site in intervals between approximately 50 minutes
and one hour and 25 minutes later than planned.
While enroute, a third helicopter (number 2) experienced a partial
hydraulic failure but the crew elected to continue to the refueling site
believing repairs could be accomplished there. Upon landing, however,
the crew and the helicopter unit commander determined that the helicopter
could not be repaired. A hydraulic pump had failed due to a fluid leak and
no replacement pump was available. Even if a pump had been available, there
was insufficient time available to change it, repair the cause of the leak,
service the system and complete the next leg prior to daylight. The helicopter
was unsafe to continue the mission unrepaired.
Earlier, it had been determined and recorded in the plan that a minimum
of six operational helicopters would be required at the refueling site to
continue the mission. Since at this point there were only five operational,
the on-scene commander advised the Joint Task Force Commander by radio
of the situation and he in turn communicated to Washington the status of the
force and the recommendation to abort the operation and return to launch
base. The President concurred in the decision that the mission could not
continue and preparations began for withdrawal of the five operational
helicopters, the C-130s, and the rescue force.
While repositioning one helicopter to permit another to top off his
fuel tanks for the return mission, the first helicopter collided with one
of the refueling C-130s. Both aircraft were immediately engulfed in flames
in which eight crew members died and five other members of the team were
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injured. Since the C-130 was loaded with members of the rescue force await-
ing extraction, even-greater injury and loss of life were avoided only by
swift and disciplined evacuation of the burning aircraft. Shortly afterwards,
ammunition aboard both aircraft began to explode. Several helicopters were
struck by shrapnel from the explosion and/or the burning ammunition and at
least one and possibly more were rendered non-flyable. At this point, with
time and fuel running out for the C-130s, the decision was made to transfer
all helicopter crews to the remaining C-130s and to depart the area.
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INTRODUCTION
The report which follows will provide a detailed history of the key
aspects of the attempted rescue mission, including planning, training,
mission preparation, and events the night the positioning portion of the
mission was attempted. At various points in this process, judgments were
made. To provide a better perspective for understanding the validity of the
decisions, this report will set down the rationale and the conditions under
which those judgments were reached. Since helicopter operations played such
a central role in both the concept and the eventual abandonment of the
mission, this report will focus particularly on this aspect of the mission.
Planning and Training
It was evident from the start that the refueling of the helicopters
enroute from their launch point to their landing site in the vicinity of
Tehran would be a very critical and difficult operation. Essentially,
selection of a refueling site came down to a choice between an airfield or an
area sufficiently flat, firm, and large to accommodate the landing and takeoff
of refueling aircraft and the conduct of refueling operations. Before
arriving at this conclusion, many other alternatives had been considered.
The risks, complexity, and dangers of compromise to the mission associated
with seizing an airfield or any of the other alternatives were judged to be
more serious than the selected concept of a reasonably remote air landing and
ground refueling.
Therefore, the planners decided it was necessary to find a refueling site
which was in a remote area within unrefueled range of the helicopter force, yet
close enough to Tehran to allow the helicopters to carry the rescue force and
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their equipment to.their destination with sufficient fuel reserves to support
a subsequent rescue mission. These boundaries on the problem forced the
planners to focus on a relatively constrained geographical area about 100
miles in diameter at some distance southeast of Tehran.
The site eventually selected was the only one which satisfied the
demanding criteria, in that it was level, firm, and large enough for C-130
takeoff and landing and refueling, met the requirement for both isolation
and proximity, and provided useable visual references for night landing
without use of aircraft lights. There was an obvious calculated risk in
using the site because the area selected, code named DESERT ONE, straddled a
narrow, unpaved road. However, no other location could be found which would
meet landing criteria and this risk was considered acceptable because of
the calculated probability of very light nighttime traffic on the road. For
extra insurance, however, the concept of operations was adjusted to send in
an advance C-130 with a combat control team aboard and a road security force
to secure and organize the landing and refueling area.
The planning for the operation underwent an almost continuous evolution
since the quiet gathering of.flight crews and helicopters began the day prior
to Thanksgiving 1979. One early decision was the selection of the US Navy
RH-53D helicopter as the mission aircraft, based on its range, payload, and
the fact that its familiarity-as a fleet aircraft would help conceal the true
reason for its presence in Iran's nearby waters. (The Navy had procured 30
of these aircraft in the early 1970s and employed them routinely in an aerial
mine countermeasures role.) Six of these helicopters were transported to the
aircraft carrier KITTY HAWK in the Arabian Sea in late November. These were
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later transferred to the NIMITZ when she arrived in late January, carrying
two additional RH-53s, to replace KITTY HAWK.
Meanwhile, the process of training, refinement of concepts and proced-
ures, and more training was carried out in the final weeks of 1979 and into
1980. The bulk of the helicopter training was conducted secretly in areas of
the western United States where weather and topography approximate that
of south and central Iran. The training aircraft were a mix of two similar
models of the same basic design: three RH-53s and five CH-53s. (Although
there are some differences in cockpit lay-outs between the two aircraft, the
flight characteristics are virtually identical and crews were given extensive
experience in the mission type--the RH model--throughout the training phase.
in no respect was the fact that slightly different models were sometimes used
during training considered an operational limitation by any of the planners
or flight crews, either before or after the actual mission.)
The pilots selected were the best and the crew composition was specially
adjusted for this mission. For comEparison, the normal cockpit crew consists
of an experienced pilot (the helicopter commander) and a less experienced
co-pilot. For this mission, both pilots of each crew were highly experienced
commanders to insure the highest level of flying skills obtainable under the
very difficult flying conditions contemplated. In view of the flight condi-
tions actually encountered during the night of 24-25 April, this experience
paid off.
The helicopter and flight crews were provided the latest state-of-the-art
electronic (OMEGA and inertial navigation systems) and visual navigational
equipment available and adaptable to the RH-53D, including night vision
devices. Even with these aids, the mission--and therefore the training--
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called for superior airmanship. Every effort was made to duplicate as closely
as possible in training the distances, conditions, and stresses that the crew
might have expected to encounter on an actual mission. This included some
experience in flight through conditions of reduced visibility such as fog, no
moonlight, as well as refueling and other ground operations at night on the
desert with engines running on all helicopters.
During the period between the preliminary planning efforts and the final
mission execution, four full-scale scenario rehearsals with all elements of
the force and about 20 exercises of separate parts of the planned mission
were conducted. As the proficiency of the elements in the rescue force
increased, as intelligence improved and planning factors were validated, and
as lessons continued to be learned from this intensive program, confidence
gradually grew. The entire organization, the planners, and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, became increasingly confident that the mission was not only
possible, but, in fact, had a good chance of success. From the beginning,
the military planning, resource requirements, and force recommendations were
fully supported. The size and composition of the planned rescue force were
judged to be proper. The Joint Chiefs of Staff made a final review of the
.entire plan, the training, and intelligence. They approved the plan, stated.
it. was militarily feasible, and recommended that it be implemented.
The many risks and uncertainties were clearly understood and taken into
account, but by the time the countdown for the mission began in mid-April,
the crews, aircraft (C-130s and helicopters), and rescue force were ready and
there was an air of confident resolve among all participants.
April 24th was established as the planning date for beginning the
mission. Selection of a date was necessary to begin deployment of the forces
which had to be done by clandestine means for security reasons, but April 24
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was not a firm and fixed date. Weather, intelligence, and a host of other
factors had to be considered for the final decision. The date could have,
slipped several days while waiting for suitable conditions, although a major
extension would have jeopardized security.
Mission Countdown
In early April the President authorized an increased level of preparation
for a possible rescue attempt. The necessary suporting deployments were
blended in with other routine operations and crews and aircraft were "peaked"
for mission tasking on short notice.
Six helicopters were initially put on board a carrier in late November
1979. At that time, six were considered sufficient for the entire mission as
initially planned, with adequate backup for unforeseen maintenance problems.
As mission planning was refined and more intelligence was gathered, the size
of the rescue force was increased slightly. Two additional helicopters
were added, both to accommodate the increased load and reduced helicopter
performance as temperatures increased, and to provide an additional margin of
confidence that the required number would be available if the plan were
executed.
Earlier, there had been a widespread reluctance to fly the shipborne
mission aircraft often to avoid drawing excessive attention to their presence.
By the end of January, the tempo of flying increased significantly, partly to
establish a familiar pattern for observers, but more importantly, to permit
regular exercising of helicopter systems and subsystems. The helicopters had
been maintained at'a high level of readiness for a prolonged period of time
and a special clandestine procedure had been established within the naval
aviation supply system to keep the NIMITZ supplied with essential helicopter
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parts in a timely fashion without revealing the true purpose. The helicopter
detachment aboard the NIMITZ had all the people and technical skills the
on-scene commanders determined they needed. The maintenance officer used an
extensive checklist to inspect all components of the aircraft. Components
were replaced if they showed evidence of wear. Some parts were changed if
they were approaching the last 20 percent of their normal flying hour
interval for change.
When the decision was made to begin the countdown for the rescue mission,
seven of the eight helicopters aboard the NIMITZ were mission capable. The
plan called for a minimum of seven operational helicopters to depart the
carrier and six operational helicopters to depart the desert refueling site.
Extraordinary efforts were made to expedite the necessary parts to bring the
eighth helicopter into a full mission readiness status prior to the time the
mission launched to gain even more confidence. This eighth helicopter was
one which made it all the way to the refueling site and would have flown on
had tho mission continued beyond the refueling site.
The helicopter crews (pilots and crew mechanics) arrived on the NIMITZ
four days prior to the target date for the mission. In the period between
arrival and mission execution, each of the flight crews flew its assigned
mission helicopter on a thorough check-out of all systems. By the time the
mission was ready to launch, crews were totally satisfied that they had not
only the best helicopters available, but the best maintenance and the highest
prospects for success of any point in their training.
There were three separate pre-mission events that bear comment. First,
a conscious decision was made to remove the sand screens (Engine Air Particle
Separators, or EAPS) normally carried over the engine inlets. These screens
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were designed to protect the service life of the engines, but carried a
penalty in terms of weight, drag, and power loss. Since the aircraft
were to be operating at very heavy gross weights and would have been abandoned
once the mission was successfully completed, long term engine life was not a
consideration and the sand screens were removed to gain the maximum available
engine performance. Removal of the sand screens had no known adverse impact
on the mechanical performance of any of the helicopters.
Second, the morning of mission execution, five of the eight mission
helicopters were inadvertently wetted to varying degrees with a salt water
and foam spray from the hangar deck fire protection system. Within minutes,
fresh water rinsing of the helicopters had begun and careful inspection of
the possible impact was made by maintenance and crew people. No foam or salt
water was found in any cockpit, communications or navigation equipment bay,
or equipment compartment. External electrical power was applied to each
helicopter and all electrical systems checked out satisfactorily. As an
additional precaution, the helicopters were brought up to the fligt;t deck
somewhat earlier than planned and the crews made extensive checks of engines,
flight controls, and other systems prior to launch. No discrepancies were
noted and it was the judgment of the pilots, crew, and maintenance people
that the short duration, limited wetting, and the speed and thoroughness of
cleanup had prevented any possi-ble adverse impact on the mission. None of
the material failures during the mission is attributable to the wetting.
The third is weather. Early in November 1979, a select weather group
was formed. This group, to include the designated mission forecaster, began
a series of climatological surveys and all of the necessary resources of the
Air Weather Service were available and utilized extensively. The forecaster
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began early on to develop forecasts for flight routes planned in Iran for the
mission as if they were to be flown that day. On a regular basis, he briefed
the Joint Task Force Commander and the Commander made judgments on whether
the weather was suitable for the mission. Often it was not.
The next day, actual, recorded weather conditions in Iran were compared
with forecasted conditions, both to check the validity of the forecast, and
also to learn as much as possible about environmental factors affecting weather
in Iran. Experience grew, and by late February there was high confidence in
the weather forecasting for the routes.
On April 24th, the forecaster forecasted good weather for the helicopter
flight route. The forecast called for nearly clear sky conditions, with high
scattered overcast, good visibility, and favorable winds. The forecast was
correlated with data from numerical models provided by Air Weather Service,
and it was concluded that the weather was satisfactory for the mission to
commence.
As described later, the helicopter pilots encountered a series of
unforecasted areas of suspended dust about half way to the refueling site.
The Air Weather Service conducted an extensive post-mission analysis. the
analysis concludes that all actual weather conditions occurred as forecasted,
with the exception of the dust phenomenon. There is nothing in any of the
weather data to indicate that the dust was forecastable or, for that matter,
any environmental conditions that could have caused them. There is a
remote possibility, however, unlikely, that downwash of air from thunder-
storms about 50 miles to the west of the planned route could have stirred
up the dust. These thunderstorms were forecasted accurately but were and
are not now considered to be a likely factor. The Air Weather Service
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concludes that the dust was a very localized phenomenon. The state of the
art does not enable forecasting such a spatial and temporal occurrence with
any degree of reliability. Unpredictable and difficult flight conditions
were ahead of the helicopter pilots as they prepared to take off from the
carri er.
Mission Execution
Takeoff and enroute: Shortly after 7:30 p.m. local time in Iran on 24
April, all eight helicopters departed the NIMITZ fully mission ready.
Remarkably,-some 5-1/2 months after planning had begun, the mission was
launched with the veil of total secrecy still in place. The carrier task
force had taken deception action to prevent any observers in the area from
being alerted at the last minute to unusual activity. (The C-130s carrying
their fuel, the refueling site security force, and the rest of the rescue
force were already enroute to DESERT ONE.) The helicopters flew in enroute
formation, four sections of two. each in roughly a diamond pattern. Using the
night vision devices, each crew was able to maintain visual contact with all
other aircraft as they proceded toward the coast at low altitude. They
crossed the coastline 100 feet above the ground, on course, away from
populated areas with winds and weather as predicted. Except for an inter-
mediate gear box chip light experienced by number 8 (which was not considered
a serious discrepancy), the flight continued uneventfully through the first
third of the distance.
At this point, number 6 helicopter received a cockpit warning light
indicating possible imminent main rotor blade failure, an unusual but poten-
tially disastrous occurrence. The crew elected to land immediately to
confirm the malfunction and dropped out of the formation toward a lake bed
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below. In accordance with preplanned radio silence procedures, the last
aircraft in the formation, number 8, followed number 6 down to render assis-
tance and, if necessary, to evacuate the crew.
Upon landing, the crew of number 6 visually inspected a mechanical
indicator located on each of the rotor blades. This inspection confirmed
that one of the blades had actually experienced a loss of blade spar pressure
indicating the possibility of an incipient blade failure. Continued flight
would have been unacceptably dangerous. The aircraft commander made an abort
decision and the crew boarded helicopter number 8 after transferring all
classified documents and equipment. Number 8 helicopter took off and con-
tinued the mission. At this point, there were still seven operational
helicopters enroute, one more than the mission required beyond DESERT ONE.
Several miles ahead, the rest of the formation was approaching what
at first appeared to be a fog bank, but which turned out to be the first of
several'nearly continuous areas of suspended dust. Immediately upon pene-
trating the dust, visibility was deg,aded to the point where it was impossible
for all mission aircraft to maintain visual contact with one another. The
aircraft separated into 1 and 2 aircraft flights and they continued on
course. Ground references were obscured or completely invisible and the
inherent vertigo-inducing properties of the night vision devices were
compounded.
This weather phenomenon had not been forecasted and the degree and duration
of obscured visibility thoroughly tested the crews' previous training experi-
ence with reduced ,visual contact. Although unsure of the nature or extent of
the phenomenon they were experiencing, and wishing not to communicate in
a radio-silence environment, the crews elected to proceed. In their judgment,
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flight conditions did not warrant a radio call to recommend mission termination.
(Some of the crews tried to maintain visual formation on one or more of their
colleagues. However, the combination of reduced visibility--likened to
being "inside a bowl of dark milk"--and frequent vertigo made it difficult to
maintain formation integrity.)
The flight leader (helicopter number 1) and his wingman had proceeded
into the first cloud for awhile, expecting to break out into the clear momen-
tarily. When conditions did not improve, the leader elected to reverse course
and exit the cloud. Number 2 followed him out and both landed.
The leader anticipated that the rest of the formation would observe his
turn and likewise.pull out and land until the cloud (or storm--no one was
sure what they were in) "blew past." Based on no radio calls from other
helicopters he concluded that all were proceeding on the mission and after
about 20 minutes he continued his flight. He and number 2 took off again,
reentered the dust cloud, and continued to navigate along the planned course
under instrument flight conditions. By this time, they were at the tail end
of the formation.
Shortly afterwards, the second major materiel problem in the helicopter
formation occurred. The number 5 helicopter had cleared the first areas of
dust like the others and entered another. For a time the crew attempted to
remain in visual contact with aircraft 3 and 4 which were ahead of them.
Seeing the serious control problems they were having and experiencing the
same problems themselves due to vertigo, the crew of number 5 soon became
visually separated from the rest.
About 45 minutes into this second area of dust, number 5.experienced a
malfunction of a motor which powered a blower providing cooling air to.an
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aircraft power supply. The power supply overheated and failed, rendering the
aircraft's heading reference inoperative. Additionally, other flight instru-
ments and part of the flight control system that were served by this power
supply either failed or began to operate intermittently.
An already difficult navigation problem was becoming impossible. At one
point, the crew descended on their radar altimeter to about 75 feet above the
ground and still could not see the surface, either for navigational reference
or for a possible landing until flight conditions improved. The crew conclu-
ded that the navigation references available to them, both from on-board
equipment and visually, were insufficient to maintain course.
They knew that this situation would soon become extremely dangerous.
While they were at that time still over reasonably level terrain, they were
aware that they were less than half an hour away from a range of mountains
standing between them and the refueling point.
They were faced with some difficult choices. There appeared.to be no
way to navigate the valleys ahead safely and they were not sure they could
climb above the mountains. Even if they could do so, they were reluctant to
attempt it because of the risk of exposing their aircraft to possible detection
and premature discovery of the mission. Moreover, each mile they continued
on course took them farther from the NIMITZ, the only possible safe recovery
site. (At that., they were doubtful whether they had enough fuel to permit
them to recover on NIMITZ.)
Faced with the risks of attempting to penetrate the mountains ahead,
they reluctantly aborted, reversed course, found their way out of the dust,
and subsequently recovered aboard NIMITZ with only minutes of fuel remaining.
Although no one knew it yet, the failure of their navigation instruments and
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their subsequent abort would foreclose continuing the mission because of a third
unpredictable and abnormal materiel failure, this one on helicopter number 2.
About two hours after takeoff, the crew on number 2 received a cockpit
indication of a failed second stage hydraulic system. (They would later
discover that a crack had occurred in a jam nut located outside of the crew
and cargo compartments, causing all the hydraulic fluid in the second stage
system to be pumped overboard. Since the pump is cooled by its own hydraulic
fluid, the dry pump soon burned out.) This is a potentially dangerous
malfunction in the RH-53, particularly under conditions of heavy loading. If
the first stage were also to fail, or if the demands on the first stage were
to exceed its capabilty with a failed second stage, the flight controls would
lock and a crash would be likely. Despite this continuous risk, along with
the difficulties of navigation and visibility being experienced by everyone,
the crew of number 2 stuck with the mission. They landed safely at DESERT
ONE, still hoping there might be some way to repair a malfunction whose
seriousness they had not yet been able to verify in flight.
Because of the delays, irregular flight paths flown and reduced airspeed
to enable navigation, the first aircraft arrived about 50 minutes behind
schedule, and the last about one hour and 25 minutes late. Their order of
arrival was 3, 4, 7, 8, 1 and 2. Number 8 landed about 15 minutes before 1
and 2 which came in together. As they arrived, each proceeded to commence
refueling. All had emerged from the dust 30 to 40 miles prior to reaching
DESERT ONE and they had been thoroughly taxed by the ordeal they had just
been through. Nevertheless, they began preparations immediately for the next
phase of the mission.
At DESERT ONE: The C-130s had been on the ground (with engines left
running, as planned, to avoid the problem of a failed starter) for about two
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hours before the first helicopter arrived. Within a very few minutes after
the first C-130 had landed with the combat control team aboard, an Iranian
bus carrying 40-plus civilians drove into the planned refueling area along
the unpaved road. In accordance with planning developed in the event of
traffic on the road, the bus was stopped and the passengers were detained
(courteously, and without harm to any of them) outside the actual area of
refueling operations. A few moments later, a fuel truck and a following
light truck approached. When the truck was stopped, the driver ran to the
following vehicle and fled the area. The occupants of the fuel truck and the
following truck never got close enough to the C-130s to see what was going
on. The judgment was that the mission had not been compromised. The C-130s
were on the ground for a total of over four hours and these three vehicles
were the only traffic along the road.
With the landing and refueling areas secure, the C-130s and their accom-
panying rescue force positioned themselves to await the arrival of the
helicopters.
Since the order of the formation changed in the dust cloud, the flight
leader landed next to last. As soon as he had positioned himself and begun
refueling operations, he began to assess the status of the other aircraft in
the helicopter flight. He confirmed that number 6 had aborted, although at
.this point he had no way of knowing that number 5 had also turned back.
While the refueling was under way, the rescue force began to load aboard the
helicopters for the onward flight to their forward location. Since six
aircraft had landed, the minimum number required to complete the mission, the
initial presumption was that the mission would continue as scheduled. The
rescue force commander had gone aboard the helicopter flight leader's aircraft
to verify the go status of the mission and was awaiting confirmation.
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Meanwhile, the crew of helicopter number 2, positioned to begin taking
on fuel from their C-130, had for the first time been able to visually assess
the extent of the hydraulic problem. They visually verified that a crack had
occurred topside, causing the loss of the secondary system's hydraulic fluid
.and the failure of the second stage hydraulic pump. It was impossible to
repair this malfunction at the refueling site. Even if a spare pump had been
available, there would not have been sufficient time to repair the source of
the leak, replace and service the pump and still get to the forward location
before daylight.
The co-pilot of the number 2 helicopter moved to the flight leader's
helicopter to report on the condition of his aircraft. Despite the disappoint-
ing implications of the decision, the helicopter force leader confirmed that
this was an aircraft abort item and that he therefore had only five operational
helicopters left at his command.
This fact was discussed among the on-site commander, the rescue force
commander, and the helicopter force commander and they revalidated the
earlier planning agreement that the mission could not continue with fewer
than si?' operational helicopters. After agreement on this point, they
communicated by radio their status to the Joint Task Force Commander, who in
turn relayed to Washington by secure radio the situation and the recommen-
dation to abort. The President concurred in the decision that the mission
could not continue and preparations for withdrawal were begun.
Under this circumstance, the plan called for the operational helicopters
which had refueled'to return to the NIMITZ. After they took off, the C-130s
with the ground rescue force were to return to their departure base. If
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possible, the partially disabled helicopter (number 2) would be moved away
from the refueling area and destroyed. The bus passengers would be released
unharmed.
It was at this point that chance once again intervened in the mission,
this time with tragic results. Since the formation breakup made it impossible
until in fact they stopped arriving, each helicopter had taken a directed
refueling position on one of the C-130s.
In accordance with the plan, all C-130s and all helicopters were refuel-
ing with their engines running, except for the aborted number 2 which had
terminated refueling and shut down its engines for the time being. Three
helicopters (3, 4, and 8) had refueled from the northernmost of the three
refueling C-130s, number 1 helicopter from the middle C-130, and number 2
(initially) and 7 from the C-130 on the south side of the road. All the
operational helicopters had enough fuel to continue the mission or to return
to the NIMITZ except for number 4, which needed more to top off his tanks for
the return flight to the NIMITZ. His assigned C-130 could not give him any
more without cutting into his own fuel reserve and endangering his recovery.
Th-refore, the decision was made to reposition number 4 to the other
C-130 north of the road (which had extra fuel since only one of his assigned
helicopters had arrived). In order to provide room for number 4 to move,
however, one of the flanking helicopters had to reposition. Number 3 was
directed to clear and, as he applied lift, he produced.a cloud of dust.
He was observed to lift off slightly, begin to move to the left, then begin
to drift back to the right. As the helicopter passed over the left wing of
the C-130, it banked about 20 degrees to the right and its rotor blade struck
the C-130. Fire broke out immediately and both aircraft were quickly engulfed
in flames.
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The C-130 was heavily loaded with people and munitions. Accessible
personnel in both aircraft were evacuated in a quick and orderly display of
professional discipline, without which the death toll could have been far
higher. Unfortunately, five Air Force crew members perished in the cockpit
of the C-130 and three Marines perished in the rear of the helicopter. Both
helicopter pilots and several aboard the C-130 were burned to varying degrees.
The fire was too large to be extinguished and was far too intense to
continue attempts to recover the bodies of the trapped crewmembers. Moreover,
munitions began to cook off in the heat and fragments began striking heli-
copters--not only those in the immediate vicinity of the burning C-130, but
those in other positions as well. After the collision, helicopter crews
aboard numbers 4 and 8 immediately shut down engines and evacuated their
aircraft. Number 1 aircraft nearby also shut down after being struck by a
fragment which split an internal fuel cell.
South of the road, (about 250 yards from the accident) number 2 had
already shut down and number 7 requested instructions and received a command
over the radio to shut down and load aboard a C-130. (It had earlier been
decided that if, for some reason, the helicopters could not depart the area
and evidence of their presence would clearly remain behind, the crews were to
evacuate the area aboard the C-130.)
Time and fuel were becoming critical factors. A great deal of `uel had
been consumed and transferred. The C-130 aircraft, which had been sitting on
the ground for a matter of hours with engines running, were getting low on
fuel for the return leg, especially since they would now have to return with
a heavier load than originally planned.
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The on-scene commander decided to not destroy the helicopters. In his
judgment explosive destruction would make an already dangerous situation
unmanageable. It would have greatly jeopardized the C-130s and could have
caused the loss of many more lives. Likewise, retrieval of classified
material aboard the helicopters was determined to be too dangerous, both for
the helicopter crews themselves (especially those whose helicopters were
close to the flaming wreckage) and potentially for the recovery of the entire
force if more time was lost.
There was no possibility of recovering the bodies of eight men who had
perished. The heat was too intense and the fire would burn for hours. All
troops and crew members were ordered aboard the remaining C-130s immediately.
They boarded in a rapid but orderly fashion after a thorough last check for
people and the aircraft departed with on-scene medical personnel caring for
the wounded. The takeoffs of the overburdened C-130s across this desert
track provided another final exceptional feat of airmanship in a mission
marked by tragedy as well as incredible courage.
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