US ARMS TRANSFER POLICY TOWARD IRAN (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000400760002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 3, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2009/04/01 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000400760002-8
SEC ar
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WA$MPIOTON. D.C. $0001
JCS review completed.
CM 1041-81
3 Sq?bwber 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. L. PAUL BREMER, III, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE
SECRETARY AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
Subjects US Arms Transfer Policy Toward Iran (U)
1. (S) This memorandum sets forth the rationale for the JCS
opposition to all arms transfers to Iran.
2. (6) The Joint Chiefs of Staff oppose arms transfers to Iran
for two primary reasons:
a. (S) Current US policy opposes all arms transfers
to Iran. Any shift in that policy would be
perceived by the moderate Arab states as an action
directly counter .to their interests. That perception
would complicate efforts to enhance the US presence
.in the region.
b. (S) Improvement in the Iranian arms supply would
intensify the war with Iraq. Improvements for the
Iranian Air Force in particular would raise the
possibility that the war could be carried into other
regional states.
3. (S) The moderate Arab states of Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates
are committed to a policy opposing arms transfers to
Iran. If the United states drops its opposition to
the transfer of arms not of US origin to Iran by
third countries, the moderate Arabs would interpret
that action as directly counter to their interests.
The impact would be especially serious if-Israel
increased its arms deliveries to Iran in the-wake of
a US policy change.
4. (S) The Arab perspective tends to automatically link
Israeli actions and US policy. The Iraqi Government
recently informed the Chief of the US Interest Section
in Baghdad that Iraq considers the United States _
ultimately responsible for arms already transferred
to Iran by Israel since, in Iraq's view, those trabsfers
were possible only because US arms supplia$.to Israel
are more than actually needed for Israel's defense.'
If Israeli deliveries of arms to Iran increase after
a change in US policy, the Iraqi argument may find....
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a sympathetic audience among moderate Arab states.
This would add to the momentum of growing discontent
with US-to-Israel arms policy, which surfaced within
some moderate Arab states after the Israeli air attacks
in Iraq and Lebanon. This, in turn, would jeopardise US
efforts to.secure facility access and host-nation
support in Arab states-vital to US. Southwest Asia
strategy.
5. (S) Implicit in the argument for arms transfers to
Iran is the idea that Iran needs arms to resist
further Iraqi incursions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
believe, however, that the military capability of
Iran is sufficient to meet the current Iraqi threat.
Although Iraq initiated the war, still occupies
Iranian territory, and maintains a numerical advantage
in tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery, it
has shown a reluctance over the past 9 months to pursue
further offensive action. Most activity at the
front is currently initiated by Iran. Iraqi field.
commanders are under strict orders to maintain
position and counterattack only. to this end. The.
morale of the Iraqi forces is low, and, wh?ile.Saddam
Hussein remains in firm control of-the government,
,political' dissidence within Iraq continues. Iraq
has long called for negotiations to end the war and
on several occasions has announced its willingness
to accept a ceasefire.
6. (S) Given this politico-military climate, deliberate
US action to encourage an increase in arms-supply to
Iran is unwarranted at this time. Rather than
adding to the prospects for peace, increased supplies
of arms may encourage Iran to intensify its military actions
and continue to reject the negotiated-settlement option.
As long as hostilities between Iran and Iraq continue,
there is the potential that the fighting could involve
other regional states vital to US interests. Iran has
threatened military-retaliation against any country
aiding Iraq and some Iranian air attacks have already been
made along the Iraq-Kuwait border.
7. (S) Based on the above rationale, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
recommend that the United States continue to oppose all arms
transfers to Iran at this time. -
FAR THE CHAIFMN, JCS :
Assistant to the Chairman, JCS
PAUL F.. GObMAN
Lieutenant General, USA
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Approved For Release 2009/04/01 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000400760002-8