EGYPTIAN POLICY TOWARD LEBANON AND THE US

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001102740007-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2008
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: July 28, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/08/05: CIA-RDP84B00049R001102740007-5
State Dept. review completed
DIA review completed.
National Intelligence Council
DDI 6191-82
28 July 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: A/NIO/NESA
SUBJECT: Egyptian Policy Toward Lebanon and the US
1. The Lebanese crisis is gradually having a chilling effect on US-
Egyptian ties and on Cairo's perception of how to proceed in the Arab-
Israeli peace process. Ambassador Atherton has reported growing
frustrations at both the elite and mass level among Egyptians who resent
Cairo's inability to restrain Israel, influence events in Lebanon or alter
US policy toward the PLO. As a result, the Egyptians have become less and
less helpful:
-- At the UN Egypt continues to work with France to
sponsor a pro-PLO resolution calling for PLO-Israeli talks and
promises of future self-determination. Both Cairo and Paris
are increasingly worried that the US has no long range
Palestinian policy and that Washington is pursuing a West
Beirut settlement as an end in itself, not a step toward a
larger Lebanese or Arab-Israeli settlement.
-- Mubarak has refused to commit Egypt to take in any significant
number of PLO fighters (Habib wants Egypt to take 4000),
although he is on record as willing to take some.
2. To date Egyptian frustrations have been kept within bounds.
Mubarak recognizes the enormous leverage Washington has over Egypt through
military and economic aid, and few Egyptians want to risk provoking
Israel. As a result, Egypt has moved carefully to avoid any fundamental
rupture in ties with Tel Aviv and left open the option of resuming the
autonomy talks after an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon (and if the
Israelis drop their insistence on holding talks in Jerusalem).
3. There is a growing danger, however, that Mubarak's patience will
flag and some more dramatic Egyptian move will ensue. Public pressure is
building for a more visible Egyptian policy to pressure the US. Even the
Approved For Release 2008/08/05: CIA-RDP84B00049R001102740007-5
SECRET Att. to DDI 6195-82
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
25X1
25X1
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SECRET
semi-official newspaper, Al-Ahram, has called for a boycott of US trade and
opposition groups have called for a break in relations with Israel and for
sending volunteers to fight with the PLO. While Mubarak will try to avoid
such controversial moves, an Israeli attack on West Beirut would produce
strong pressure for retaliation against Israel and probably the US:
-- Cairo's Ambassador in Tel Aviv might be recalled or
normalization reversed.
-- The US and Israeli Embassies could be exposed to
demonstrations.
-- Cairo could renounce the autonomy talks.
4. g ,s such a dramatic Egyptian policy shift, the Lebanese
r a w ly and ned Egyptian confidence in the autonomy
if ens. It has reduced the chances Mubarak will make any serious effort
to compromise in the talks, especially if a resumption of the Camp David
process threatened to damage his efforts to improve ties with the Saudis.
Moreover, the Egyptian disillusionment with the US over Lebanon is sure to
have a long term negative impact on US-Egyptian strategic cooperation.
Finally, Mubarak's impotence with regard to Lebanon and Israel inevitably
undermines his prestige at home -- the opposition is increasingly restive
-- probably strengthening the hand of his fundamentalist foes.
5. ? -_ tam m away from Camp David or to reduced ties with
!spark a backlash in Israel. Popular support for the peace
process would suffer and many Israelis would say Jerusalem should not have
evacuated the Sinai. Begin might retaliate by annexing the West Bank and
Gaza, further eroding chances for a settlement.
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CONFIDENTIAL
ISRAEL-LEBANON
Talking Points for the DCI
(As of 1200 EDT, 28 July 1982)
Presidential Elections
-- On 24 July Phalangist leader Bashir Jumayyil declared
himself a candidate in the Lebanese Presidential
election. The announcement has sparked a wave of Sunni
Muslim and leftist criticism, although Shia leaders--
thought to be amenable to some sort of an alliance with
Bashir--have been generally quiet since the beginning of
the formal electoral. process. F__]
The election appears likely to be held between 3 and 10
August, although it can take place as late as 23
September when President Sarkis' term expires. Those
opposed to Bashir will probably try to deadlock the
process by influencing, or intimidating, one third of the
deputies to boycott the election, thus preventing a
quorum. here are 25X1
currently 16 deputies who will definitely boycott the
elctions and that the number could go as high as 36, more
than enough to block the election. F__]
Beirut Situation
Israeli aircraft resumed their attacks on Palestinian
positions this morning, apparently in response to
Palestinian rocket and artillery fire on East Beirut and
on Israeli positions southeast of Beirut. Israeli
targets were again the southern suburbs, with Sabra and
Burj al Barajinah refugee camps receiving the heaviest
attacks. F_~
Muslim leader Saab Salam told Ambassador Dillon today
that the situation in West Beirut is critical. Water and
electricity have been cut off and some hospitals may be
forced to close. He also claimed that the Israelis had
used cluster bombs in yesterday's attacks on Beirut.
US Weapons
The State Department has asked our Embassies in Beirut
and Tel Aviv to inquire about the origin of US M-16's the
Israelis have seized in Lebanon. The Israelis claim the
weapons came to the PLO from Saudi Arabia but an
examination of serial numbers indicates they were
provided by the US to the Lebanese Army. State believes
the M-16's may have been taken from the Lebanese Army by
the Israelis or the PLO.
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Arab League Meeting
-- The Arab League committee on Lebanon is meeting today in
Saudi Arabia. It will apparently discuss the renewal of
the mandate for the Syrian-dominated Arab Deterrent
Force, which expired yesterday.
Cluster Bombs
Ithe Israeli use
of cluster bombs against the Burj al Barajinah refugee
camp. He also noted the precision of Israeli air and
artillery strikes, consistent with a desire to minimize
civilian casualties.
Syrian Control of PLO
-- Lebanese civilians have reported to the US Defense
Attache's office in Damascus that Syrian troops in the
Bekaa have set up roadblocks to prevent Palestinians from
infiltrating Israeli lines. Palestinian
infiltration/attacks on Israeli forces in the Bekaa
Valley, appear to have dwindled followin Israel's
punitive raids on the Syrians last week.
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