LETTER TO FRANK C. CARLUCCI FROM WILLIAM H. LUERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001403560051-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2008
• Sequence Number: 51
• Publication Date: June 11, 1981
• Content Type: LETTER

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EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Caracas, Venezuela
June 11, 1981
The Honorable
Frank C. Carlucci
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Department-of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301
Thank you for seeing me and for being so
supportive of this important Venezuelan rela-
tionship.
The speed with which you moved on the F-16
and your follow-through were most helpful. I
hope we can move forward to achieve congressional
backing and actually to sell a substantial F-16
package to Venezuela under FMS. I cannot tell
you how much this would do for our relationship
with this key country. Our efforts here to expand
relations with the Venezuelan military and restore
them to what they once were in the mid-60's have
been frustrated by setbacks and bad policies but-
basically we are on a better footing now than we
have been for perhaps eight years. The Venezuelan
military are looking to.us more for purchases, for
training, for intelligence and for friendship. We
should be responsive.
Your meeting with the Ministers was superb.
The fact that the Secretary was able to drop in
gave just the right touch to the substantive inter-
action you were conducting.
State Dept. review completed
:;EC DEF CONTR No. X 15 074
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I hope that in your new capacity you will
find time to make a round of the Caribbean Basin
to touch some of the key and sensitive security
spots. If you do, Caracas is one of them. Please
keep in touch.
One final thought. I hope somebody in the
Defense Department keeps an eye on this F-16 package.
The policy questions, the public affairs aspects
and the congressional problems are a complicated
set of issues that need to be bird-dogged to make
sure that Defense and State stay together.
Good seeing you again.
Best personal regards,
P.S. I have enclosed a copy of a Memorandum
of Conversation I prepared of your meeting
with the Minister. I have sent copies to
ARA-Tom Enders for distribution. If you
have any problems with it you can have
your staff contact ARA.
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EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Caracas, Venezuela
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Participants: Venezuelan Side
Minister of Interior Montes de Oca
Minister of the Secretariat of the
Presidency Garcia Bustillos
Director of DISIP Remberto Uzcategui
Ambassador Marcial Perez Chiriboga,
Ambassador to the U.S.
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci
Deputy Assistant Secretary of ISA Noel Koch
Ambassador William Luers
Interpreter Stephanie Van Reigersberg
Date: May 19, 1981
Place: Pentagon - Department of Defense
Subject: Meeting with Venezuelan Ministers
Distribution: Amembassy Caracas - Pol and Econ
Department of Defense - Deputy Secretary Carlucci
Deputy Secretary Carlucci recalled his visit to Venezuela two
years before in his capacity as Deputy Director of the CIA. He
recalled the cooperation that evolved with Venezuela. He said
that it is important for the United States to work with a
country like Venezuela for stability in the area and for social
progress. Venezuela has shown itself responsive to the needs of
the area and it was a pleasure for the US to work with such a
country.
Minister Montes de Oca responded that it was important for the
Venezuelan delegation to meet Deputy Secretary Carlucci to
exchange ideas about ways to reach world peace. He said that
the meetings on Monday with the Secretary of State were
"magnificent." Two conclusions were outstanding, he said.
First, there were more areas of agreement than difference and,
second, there was a necessity to create a mechanism to maintain
CC)NFIDF.NTTAT.
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CONFIDENTIAL 2.
an ongoing dialogue with the United States. Montes de Oca
said that there is always present the problem of security
and communist penetration in the area. The mechanisms for
Soviet penetration have been of great concern. He would
like to discuss this problem with Deputy Secretary Carlucci.
Deputy Secretary Carlucci began by examining the essential
approach the U.S. is taking to military strategy:
-- First, this strategy has since World War II been
based on the assumption that the most likely area for war
would be Central Europe.
-- Recent developments have made clear that the Soviet
emerging military capability, their blue water Navy and their
extension through other parts of the world, require a more
flexible military doctrine on the part of the United States.
Therefore, we are going to follow three basic policies:
-- first, we will significantly increase defense
expenditures--15% in the next fiscal year and 7% following
that. We must have a much greater readiness and flexibility.
The size and capability of our navy, for example, will have to
go up to 600 ships, including up to 15 aircraft carriers and
a much greater amphibious capability.
-- second, we must improve the close relations with
nations that share our concerns. We continue to be concerned
a bout human rights and we want to assure the Venezuelans
of that. Yet, our security must govern much of our relations.
We must, for example, have more flexibility in the sale of
arms to our friends and more exchanges with. our friends. At
the same time, we are dependent on congressional approval of
these decisions.
-- third, we want to look at the nature of our relations
with our friends. We need to look at ways to deepen our
security relations with our allies and our friends in the
area.
The Deputy Secretary then moved into a discussion of the
hemisphere, of our support for Duarte, and of our 56 men
training the military in Salvador. We are concerned about
the arms influx into the area. We must work with other
countries to try to find ways to interdict the arms flow
into Central America. -
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Deputy Assistant Secretary Koch then referred to the need
to explore the question of the significant arms flow into
Nicaragua.
Minister. Montes de Oca thanked Deputy Secretary Carlucci for the
information. He was particularly interested in his-remarks
regarding U.S. policy toward arms sales to its friends. He
would return-to that at a later point. The Minister then
said that he had discussed with Secretary Haig and Ambassador
Enders the problems of Salvador and Central America. He
said that Venezuela believes that military assistance to
Salvador is useful and important. It should not, however,
impede
the
political process. Military assistance must be
carried
out
in a way that is not hostile to the Salvadoran
people.
It
must be done in such a way to be completely in
accord
with
the desires of Duarte himself.
The Minister then said that Nicaragua also gives Venezuela
concern. The armaments flow into that country presents a
serious problem and enables the Sandinistas to develop a
security capability to move against their own people, and
provides the arms for export to other areas in the region.
He said he had discussed Nicaragua a great deal at the
Department of State and we share views on the problem. The
Minister said that we need to develop a global policy in
Central America that will enable us to isolate Nicaragua.
We want to help Honduras proceed with elections. We want
generally to develop a centrist solution for the countries of
Central America in such countries as Costa Rica, which is
a strong democracy, and in Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.
He said that Nicaragua could soon find itself isolated by
being the only country in Central America that does not
proceed down the democratic path.
At this point Secretary Caspar Weinberger entered the room
and had pictures taken of him with the Venezuelan ministers.
Secretary Carlucci reviewed for Secretary Weinberger what
had been discussed up until that point. Then Deputy Secretary
Carlucci asked the ministers how they felt we should be
dealing with the situation in Cuba.
Minister I4ontes de Oca said that when Venezuela speaks of
isolating Nicaragua, he is not speaking of breaking off
relations. Venezuela's view is that Nicaragua should be
isolated in the sense that other countries in the area
develop democratic alternatives. Nicaragua will have to
respond either to the realities around them or accept isolation
from their environment. We must maintain pressure on Nicaragua
to move toward elections and continue to support the forces
of pluralism within that country.
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On Cuba the Minister said that naturally this is the
center of Marxist penetration on the continent. Cuba is
developing a policy of infiltration throughout the area which
is of great concern. Venezuela is no longer immune from
this penetration and must concern itself with the potential
of Cuban activities. Venezuela believes the development
of strong democracies is the most effective way to fight
against Cuba. The Minister said, for example, that Jamaica
is a key example of how this fight can be successful. Today
the situation in Jamaica is much different than before the
election.- We have now a political process which works which
we can support. Jamaica is not, in Venezuela's view, an
exception. It must and can be a model for the way in which
the democracies of this hemisphere can promote an effective
strategy against Cuba.
At this point Secretary Weinberger had to excuse himself
from the meeting.
Minister Garcia Bustillos said that the triumph-in Jamaica
was important but Jamaica still needs much-more help and
Venezuela and the United States must work together to bring
about economic well being in Jamaica.
Minister Montes de Oca said that we should discuss much more
the methodology of the Cubans. The Cubans believe that they
can achieve their victories through insurrection and through
misinformation. The fact is, the enemy of the insurrection
is the democratic alternative.
Deputy Secretary Carlucci asked about Cuba's internal problems-
He wondered what should be the attitude of other countries in
the region toward internal developments in Cuba and asked
was this important? The Secretary said that he knows that
in the case of Jamaica that the security problem in that area
was critical and Venezuela is working toward dealing with-it.
What now should we be doing with regard to Cuba itself?
Minister Montes de Oca replied that we know that indeed there
are differences that have developed within Cuba, but there
appear to be no organizations within Cuba and no groups working
against the power structure of the government. The Minister
said that in recent talks on the Caribbean with Torrijos in
Panama they learned that indeed there were possibilities of
high level differences within the Cuban government. Torrijos
had recommended to the Venezuelans that they try to establish-
contact with high level military and intelligence leaders.
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within Cuba. By this route Torrijos believes that they could
learn more about the nature of disagreement at the high level
in the Cuban government. Torrijos believes that there is a real
possibility over the short or long term of serious divisions
within Cuba.
Minister Garcia Bustillos said, looking back over: his two
visits to Cuba, in the first visit he had a six and a half
hour interview with Fidel. During the meeting and following
it in discussing the meeting with Fidel's advisers, he felt
there was complete uniformity on the Cuban side. However,
the second time, which was months later, Garcia Bustillos
said he had an eight and a half hour meeting with Fidel.
What was fascinating to him was in the meetings following the
discussion with Fidel, people were prepared to say how they
disagreed with Fidel. He thought this was an interesting
development.
Minister Montes de Oca then returned to an early aspect of
discussion. He said that he noted the Secretary's comments
about greater flexibility in arms sales to friends. The
Minister said that he was aware discussions were taking place
within the US government now as to the advisability of selling
the F-16 to Venezuela. He said he understood a definitive
request had been sent to President Reagan. The Minister said
he wanted to assure Deputy Secretary Carlucci that the request
is fully supported by the Venezuelan government. The purchases
sought were at the request of the armed forces of Venezuela
to improve the security of their country.
Deputy Secretary Carlucci replied that we were aware that the
Venezuelan government was making this request. He said that,
following his discussions last week with Ambassador Luers, he
had discussed the matter directly with Secretary Haig and that
the matter was on the Secretary's desk right now.
There then ensued. a discussion of how to handle this matter
of the F-16 in public. Minister Montes de Oca said that he
hoped that the fact that this matter was discussed would not
be made a public issue since the subject of the purchase of
the F-16s had already come out in the press in Venezuela.
He did not want it to appear that the purpose of his visit
to Washington had been to seek the purchase of the F-16.
Deputy Secretary Carlucci and others on the US side agreed
that in any public handling of the visit to Washington the
F-16 would not play a prominent role and indeed they would
not discuss specifically that this request had been made
during the visit.
Drafted: A4B:WHL cars:fmc
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