THE SPANISH SOCIALISTS: SIX MONTHS IN POWER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00555R000200090002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate ~-- ----- -------- Secret
Intelligence l ~ ~' ~ " ~ z :~ ~ ~ _ ~ _ a ~ ~ r, ~ ~ ~
An Intelligence Assessment
State Dept. review
completed ?e~
DIA review
completed.
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Secret
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Spanish Socialists:
Six Months in Power
Secret
EUR 83-10176
June 1983
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The Spanish Socialists:
Six Months in Power
Key Judgments During its first six months in power the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE)
Information available has, in our view, adhered to a cautious and moderate program designed to
as of 27 May 1983 retain the allegiance of the centrist voters who ensured the party's victory.
was used in this report.
At the same time, the government has sought to placate leftist elements
with gestures such as limited legalization of abortion and reform of the
government bureaucracy. Prime Minister Gonzalez remains Spain's .most
popular politician, and the results of the municipal elections in May show
that his government still retains strong support. Gonzalez has effectively
put his stamp on the government's domestic programs, while giving leis
ministers considerable autonomy in policy formulation and implementa-
tion. Meanwhile, his aggressive program to combat Basque terrorism. has
begun to show positive results.
In our view the greatest challenge facing Gonzalez is the economy. Flis
government has chosen to defer the creation of jobs in favor of a program
designed to reduce both inflation and the balance-of-payments deficit. This
program, while necessary to enable Spain to profit fully from the int~~rna-
tional recovery, will increase unemployment-already at 17.8 percent-in
the short term. The Communists and some labor unions have alread~~
protested the government's refusal to reflate, but we believe that Gonzalez
will stick to his policies for at least the next six months to a year.
The government's foreign policy is still in flux. Except for the US bilateral
treaty-which the Socialists accepted with only cosmetic adjustments-
Gonzalez has not moved decisively. He has postponed a decision on Spain's
final status vis-a-vis NATO until 1984 at the earliest. We think the
Socialists in the end will opt to remain within the Alliance because of the
advantages of membership and also out of concern for the impact a break
would have on Spain's relations with the United States and Europe.
Nevertheless, full military integration may not come about within the life
span of the current Parliament. On most other foreign policy issues, the So-
cialist government has kept a relatively low profile. One notable excerption
has been Central America. Here Madrid has been a vocal critic of U:i poli-
cy, asserting that the region's problems have less to do with foreign
meddling than with indigenous social change.
Perhaps Gonzalez's greatest success to date has been in placating thy:
military. The good relations between the Defense Minister and the armed
forces have enabled the government to concentrate on reforming and
iii Secret
EUR 83-10176
June 1983
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modernizing the military rather than worrying about potential coup
plotters. Only an improbable combination of disasters-for example,
widespread social disorder and near economic collapse or resurgent
terrorism and government meddling in internal military affairs~ould, in
our view, generate a successful coup. Less dramatically, a split between
moderates and leftists within the PSOE might, under certain conditions,
cause the government to lose its absolute parliamentary majority. Given
the weakness of the opposition and Gonzalez's strengths, however, the
Socialists are unlikely to fall from power much before elections must be
held again in 1986.
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The Spanish Socialists:
Six Months in Power
In October 1982 Spain elected its first leftist govern-
ment since the 1930s. The Socialist Party (PSOE)
took power with 46 percent of the popular vote and an
absolute parliamentary majority (202 out of 350
seats). No democratically elected Spanish government
during the past 75 years has enjoyed such a comfort-
able margin in Parliament. Reflecting his publicly
stated conviction that the PSOE owed its victory to
three million "borrowed" centrist votes, Prime Minis-
ter Felipe Gonzalez has thus far followed cautious and
moderate domestic and foreign policies. His govern-
ment has made a few dramatic gestures-for exam-
ple, limited legalization of abortion, reform of the
government bureaucracy, and nationalization of
RUMASA, the country's largest private conglomer-
ate-that appeal to the left wing of the PSOE and to
the Communists who supported Gonzalez. These
moves have not, however, had a fundamental impact
on the administration's cautious approach.
We believe that the results of municipal elections last
month amount to a qualified vote of confidence for
the PSOE's moderate policies and a confirmation of
the government's political acumen in courting the
centrist electorate. The Socialists slipped to 43.3
percent of the vote but remained more than 15
percentage points ahead of their nearest competitor,
the rightist Popular Alliance (AP). The PSOE's small
losses were due mostly to the modest recovery by the
Communist Party, which doubled its share of the vote
to 8 percent, still well below its past performance. But
the Socialists showed that they could retain-and
perhaps marginally augment-their share of the cru-
cial centrist vote. After six months in power, the
PSOE has yet to suffer any serious erosion of support
and remains Spain's dominant political party.
Percentage Distribution of Popular Vote
in 1982 Parliamentary and 1983
Municipal Elections
a Party was disbanded after 1982 election.
b Did not contest 1982 election.
Includes null and blank ballots.
In addition to vindicating the PSOE's moderate poli-
cies, the election successes have been personal ~~ic-
tories for Felipe Gonzalez. Polls continue to indicate
that the Prime Minister is Spain's most popular
politician, and his ratings-along with those of the
PSOE government-have risen during the six months
since he took office. Gonzalez has projected an image
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of firmness and authority tempered by moderation.
The Spanish press frequently comments on Gonza-
lez's ability to create a personal aura of morality and
rectitude, while simultaneously representing himself
as a symbol of change and hope for the nation's
modernization. According to polls, the Prime Minister
provokes very few strong negative reactions, even
from those who disagree with his politics. In this he is
unlike his chief adversary on the right, controversial
AP leader Manuel Fraga
Gonzalez has established himself in the public mind
as a concerned statesman in part by dissociating
himself from the partisan aspects of governing. He
has tended to speak in generalities during his infre-
quent but effective television appearances, while his
press interviews are long on ethics and short on
olp itics.
Gonzalez delegates most of the attacks on the
opposition and the maintenance of discipline within
the party to his Vice Prime Minister and close
confidant, Alfonso Guerra.
Gonzalez has consciously decided to remove
himself from the daily chores of administration so as
to do a better job of mediating intragovernmental
disputes and to have more time to ponder the larger
issues of state. The result is a government in which
the Prime Minister sets the general tone of policy but
refrains from giving direct orders; Gonzalez rules by
consensus and suggestion, leaving his ministers con-
siderable autonomy in the formulation and implemen-
tation of policy.
In addition to keeping him popular with the elector-
ate, the Prime Minister's approach has increased his
room for maneuver in policymaking. The high public
profile of key ministers has led the press to associate
them rather than Gonzalez with specific administra-
tion programs.
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this tendency also operates within the party: when
PSOE leftists criticize the government, they generally
complain about the moderate ministers rather than
about Gonzalez personally. We thus believe that
should specific Socialist policies fail or prove highly
unpopular, Gonzalez could so distance himself from
them as to be able to dismiss those responsible and
shift course with most of his personal prestige and
25X1 influence intact.
There are some potential pitfalls in Gonzalez's ap-
proach, however:
? Over the longer term, his penchant for vague pro-
nouncements and ethical discourse might begin to
wear on the public-particularly if voters become
disenchanted by a gap between the Socialists' prom-
ises and their achievements.
? There is a danger, in our view, that Gonzalez's light
touch could eventually encourage dissension and
infighting within the government.
? The current ambiguity and incoherence that in part
characterize Socialist foreign policy could prove to
be a preview of the difficulties created when com-
peting power centers in the PSOE government
attempt to formulate policy without strong direction
from the Prime Minister's office.
? There are substantial personal and policy rivalries
within the PSOE, and as new problems arise and the
government's honeymoon with the electorate ends, it
will become increasingly difficult for Gonzalez's
allies to hold them in check.
Government and party discipline has so far prevented
most of these disputes from becoming public or from
seriously hampering the formulation and implementa-
tion of the administration's economic and social poli-
cies. However, if the economy deteriorates rapidly,
leading to a marked increase in unemployment and
social tensions, Gonzalez might be tempted to placate
leftists in his party by giving them a significant say on
those issues. This in turn could lead to a weakening of
the authority Gonzalez has given his largely moderate
ministers and the adoption of inconsistent and poten-
The Economic Challenge
In one area-the economy-Gonzalez has apparently
decided that the government cannot afford the luxury
of extensive debate among various policymakers. He
made Economics and Finance Minister Miguel Boyer
the government's undisputed economic strategist, and
Boyer established a clear and coherent economic
policy early in the PSOE administration. The ,gravity
of the economic crisis required a quick respon~;e: the
centrist governments that preceded the Socialists had
tially destabilizing policies.
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bequeathed a 16-percent inflation rate, a $5 billion
current account deficit, and a 15-percent level of
25X1 unemployment
The Finance Minister has deferred until 1984 imple-
mentation of the PSOE's stated goal of creating
200,000 jobs per year. He has also scaled down plans
for real economic growth this year from 2.5 to 2.0
percent. Boyer has opted for a conservative economic
package involving reduced monetary growth, an 8-
percent devaluation of the peseta, a reduction in the
rate of growth of government expenditures, and
higher taxes. These measures are designed to reduce
Spain's trade imbalance, marginally cut the budget
deficit, and lower the inflation rate to 12 percent
during 1983. This would in theory enable the govern-
ment to begin tackling unemployment from a compet-
itive international economic position as the interna-
tional recovery takes hold.
We believe that the government has already decided
that its current economic policies will not be sufficient
to achieve its stabilization goals. The press has specu-
lated that to reach its objectives of reducing inflation,
controlling the budget deficit, and strengthening the
balance of payments, the government is preparing to
implement an austerity program. Such aprogram-
probably involving tighter money and more budget
cuts~ould depress domestic investment and further
boost unemployment, which has risen nearly 2 per-
The emergency nationalization in February of
RUMASA has also strengthened Boyer's image as a
decisive Finance Minister. Although initially designed
only to prevent the conglomerate's collapse, the na-
tionalization of RUMASA has, according to the US
Embassy, had the felicitous side effect of making the
government appear to be standing up to the business
community and the right.
On noneconomic questions the Socialists have not
been pressured by circumstances into making quick
decisions. Most of the PSOE's domestic goals-curb-
ing terrorism, revamping the health care system,
reorganizing the state bureaucracy, strengthening
public education, and completing the regional autono-
my process-involve long-term programs, and Madrid
is tackling most of these matters slowly and deliber-
ately. Perhaps calculating that a few highly visible
reforms would reinforce its image as a force for
change, the government nonetheless has taken deci-
sive stands on several key issues and dramatized them
for maximum political effect.
tentage points since Gonzalez took office.
Polls indicate that the majority of the public does not
blame the Socialist government for current economic
hardships, and the limited overt opposition within the
PSOE and the government to Boyer's austere econom-
ic program has yet to become public. The Socialists
can still argue plausibly that the inaction of preceding
governments and the international economic crisis
have produced the current slump. In the meantime,
the government has undertaken some largely cosmetic
reforms-such as reducing the workweek from 42 to
40 hours and requiring 30 days of paid vacation-to
buttress its appeal to the working class. It also has
garnered favorable publicity by requiring civil ser-
vants to abandon second jobs and work full days.
The Socialists have moved most forcefully to contain
the widespread violence in the Basque Country perpe-
trated by the Basque Land and Liberty (ETA) terror-
ist organization. Only four days after the October
1982 election, ETA underlined its latent potential to
generate political instability by assassinating the top
field commander of the Spanish Army. In spite of this
atrocity, the government agreed to talks with ETA's
political front and the Basque autonomous govern-
ment. ETA quashed hopes for a negotiated settle-
ment, however, responding to Madrid's call for a
cease-fire with a string of bombings and murders in
early February. Since then Interior Minister Jose
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Barrionuevo has adopted an unflinchingly tough
stance toward ETA, publicly affirming that terrorism
can be eradicated only by police measures-tempered
by negotiation only when Madrid has a clear advan-
25X1 tage
This stern response to terrorism has, in our view,
already produced some progress. One branch of ETA
has virtually collapsed, and the general level of vio-
lence in the Basque Country has decreased somewhat
in the past few months. Large police operations have
led to the arrest of a number of key ETA terrorists.
Moreover, setbacks suffered in the recent municipal
nationalists are wearying of constant terrorism
elections by Herri Batasuna, ETA's political front, 25X1
may indicate that even the most radical of Basque
The new government also moved expeditiously to
defuse remaining tensions stemming from the regional
autonomy issue. Most of the factors that had contrib-
uted to the political volatility of the regional problem
were slowly being resolved before the PSOE came to
power, but Gonzalez publicly assured regional politi-
cians that pending legislation to restructure the auton-
omy system would not reduce the level of self-
government already granted by the constitutio~i. We
view the Socialists' adroit handling of this issue; as a
significant domestic achievement. The complicated
process of converting one of Europe's most centralized
states into a de facto federal system had created, in
our judgment, enormous tensions that had come close
to threatening Spain's national unity during the
period 1977 to 1981. Disputes between Madrid and
the regions will continue to fuel political conflict in
Spain, but we doubt that these will in the medium
term seriously threaten either the inte rit of the state
or overall political stability. 25X1
The PSOE's chief initiative among the so-called social
issues has been to introduce a bill modifying S~~ain's
absolute prohibition of abortion. This legislation ex-
emplifies how the government has attempted to create
an aura of rapid change and innovation while in fact
moving quite cautiously. The abortion proposal was
first presented as an emergency measure (although it
has since been downgraded to standard parliamentary
channels), thereby attracting extra press attention. In
addition, 25X1
Vice Prime Minister Guerra backed the bill as a way
of diverting the public's attention from the economic
crisis. Guerra reportedly even asked leading feminist
organizations to protest the measure for being insuffi-
ciently radical-thus enabling the administration to
sell its position as the golden mean between pr~~abor-
tion and antiabortion forces. 25X1
The Catholic Church and the rightist oppositien have
decried the abortion proposal, but both have confined
themselves to regular constitutional means of F~rotest.
Press reports reveal that the Church in particular is
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being careful not to let the abortion question sour its
overall relations with the government. According to
opinion polls, a majority of Spaniards favor some sort
of liberalization of the abortion laws; the PSOE's
good showing in the municipal elections last month in
our view confirms center-right ineffectiveness thus far
in using social issues such as abortion to mobilize the
electorate against the Socialists.
The Socialists' foreign policy has been less focused
than their domestic program. This is so primarily
because the government's foreign policy officials,
unlike its economic experts, apparently see a wider
range of plausible policy choices and feel little sense
of urgency in making a selection. Until Gonzalez
settles on a general framework, Socialist foreign
policy is likely to develop slowly and be la ued b
numerous internal contradictions
On one matter, however, the government has moved
decisively: the parliamentary ratification of the US-
Spain bilateral agreement negotiated by the previous
government. Both Gonzalez and Foreign Minister
Moran have publicly and privately stressed that the
government places great importance on maintaining
good relations with the United States. Within a
month of taking office the Socialists accepted the
treaty intact, simply appending a protocol designed to
appease leftist critics of the pact. This represents a
sea-change of sorts in PSOE attitudes: a party that in
the past indulged in a good deal of pro-Third World
and anti-United States rhetoric has accepted a treaty
negotiated by the center right that makes numerous
references to Spain's NATO membership
This more cooperative attitude, however, does not yet
characterize PSOE policy toward Western interests in
general and NATO in particular. Spain joined the
Alliance in June 1982 but has not yet put its troops
under NATO command. One of the new govern-
ment's first foreign policy decisions was to freeze the
integration process pending a review of the NATO
connection and some sort of referendum on the nature
25X1 of Spain's relationship to the Alliance.
The most vocal member of the government on NATO
questions has been Foreign Minister Fernando
Moran. Although Moran sees Spain as a part of the
West, he has publicly declared his intent to increase
Spain's "margin of autonomy" in foreign affairs and
to protect its alleged "special relationships" with
Latin America and the Arab world. He has openly
questioned whether vital Spanish interests-such as
Gibraltar and the exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on
the Moroccan coast-can be fully defended from
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within the Alliance; various reports suggest that he
personally prefers a "French solution" for the NATO
problem-continued political ties but no military inte-
gration. Moran, however, is not the sole or even the
chief decisionmaker on NATO affairs. According to
the US Embassy, Defense Minister Serra, for exam-
ple, is leaning toward strengthening Spain's NATO
ties, and the defense establishment in general supports
complete military participation in the Alliance.
In our view Prime Minister Gonzalez has not yet fully
committed himself on the NATO issue. According to
the Spanish Ambassador in Washington, Gonzalez
personally prefers continued Alliance membership.
His position on the advisability of full military inte-
gration, however, is not so clear.
Gonzalez is above all con-
cerned with ensuring that if Madrid adopts a more
forthcoming stance on NATO, Spain's European in-
terlocutors will show greater flexibility on the ques-
tions of Gibraltar and EC accession.
We believe Gonzalez fears that he would appear
arrogant and opportunistic were he to make a quick
decision on NATO without holding the referendum
promised during the campaign. Polls taken in the last
few years have shown consistently that a majority of
Spaniards oppose Alliance membership. They also
have shown, however, that the public does not feel
strongly about the issue and considers itself poorly
informed on NATO questions. Thus it is possible that
a concerted Socialist campaign in support of NATO
could persuade a majority of the electorate to accept a
PSOE decision to remain in the Alliance or even to
proceed with further military integration. Before put-
ting the question to the voters, however, the govern-
ment must sort out its own position on NATO. The
Prime Minister has already put off a referendum until
at least mid-1984, citing concerns about contributing
to international instability during a period of "height-
ened tensions" between the superpowers. He could
easily find another pretext for delay if by then the
government were still not ready to take a definitive
stand on Spain's status in the Alliance.
While the US relationship and NATO have been the
main foreign policy concerns of Gonzalez and his
advisers, other matters, including relations with Mos-
cow and the situation in Central America, also have
received attention. The Socialists have made cU.ear
their desire for greater trade and aloes-key political
dialogue with Moscow, but concerns about espionage
have led Madrid to restrict the activities of Soviet
officials in Spain. 25X1
Gonzalez has vocally criticized US policy tow