SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS: MOSCOW`S POLICY AND OPTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00926R000100040006-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Ton Secret
Top Secret
Soviet-Iranian Relations:
Moscow's Policy and Options
SOV R ?_ 1 n 149CX
August 1983
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Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
Soviet-Iranian Relations:
Moscow's Policy and Options
Analysis Division, SOYA
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Policy
This paper was prepared by ~ of the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are
Top Secret
SOV 83-10149CX
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Top Secret
Soviet-Iranian Relations:
Moscow's Policy and Options I 25X1
far, Soviet-Iranian relations have deteriorated steadily since 1982
Key Judgments The Iranian revolution presented the Soviets with both a strategic gain (the
Information available expulsion of the US presence from Iran) and the potential for substantially
as of 11 August 1983 improved relations with Iran. While Moscow's primary objective-the
was used in this report.
continuation of Iran's virulent anti-US orientation-has been satisfied thus
Iran's anti-Soviet proclivities have been reinforced in the past year and a
half by the USSR's growing support for Iraq in its war with Iran, the in-
creasing strength of anti-Communist Islamic clerics, and strong differences
with Moscow over Afghanistan. Iran has demanded an end to Soviet
support to Iraq and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan; it
has expressed its growing hostility in anti-Soviet rhetoric, diplomatic
affronts, and repression of the Communist Tudeh Party. These actions
culminated in the dissolution of Tudeh and the expulsion of 18 Soviet
officers from Iran in May 1983.
Moscow's mounting impatience with Tehran has been expressed in media
commentary, private representations, the expulsion of three Iranian offi-
cials from Moscow, a more pronounced tilt toward Iraq, and military
operations on the Afghan-Iranian border. Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko's unprecedented public criticism of Iran at the Supreme Soviet
session in mid-June 1983 reflected Moscow's pessimism about the state of
relations and conveyed an implied threat to respond in kind to Iranian
actions
So long as Iran maintains its anti-US posture, the Soviets can afford to. be
patient. Tehran's political atmosphere is mercurial, and the potential for
change is always present. The incapacitation or death of Khomeini could
spark intensified discord, and elements more amenable to cooperation with
the USSR might prevail.
The Soviets, therefore, are likely-to continue giving priority to maintaining
correct relations with the Islamic regime in Tehran and trying to prevent
further deterioration in formal relations. Their wish to avoid pushing Iran
toward the West and the lack of attractive alternate options make this
approach their most viable
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At the same time, however, because prospects for improved bilateral
relations are poor, Moscow may put some pressure on Iran to modify its
policies. The Soviets could intensify criticism of Iran, try to rebuild the
Tudeh Party underground, and support other leftist minority elements in
opposition to the regime. They could increase their military capability on
the Iranian border to demonstrate their superiority and will.
Using their current tactics of blandishment and pressure, the Soviets are
unlikely to make gains in Tehran over the near term. The Iranians have
made clear their intolerance of Soviet policies and are unlikely to respond
favorably to Soviet pressure. While i[ehran may see some merit to
stabilizing relations with Moscow, the situation could easily deteriorate
still further as a result of:
? Factional struggle in Iran or the public trials of Tudeh leaders.
? Increased Soviet operations against Afghan insurgents in Iran.
? Incidents on the Soviet-Iranian border.
? A Soviet perception that Iran was moving back toward the United States.
Should relations continue to deteriorate, the Soviets could decide that they
have little to lose. They might then try to build and supply an underground
Tudeh, encouraging it to join the remnants of other antiregime elements to
actively oppose the regime. The Soviets could manipulate the transship-
ment of economic goods and increase their military activities on Iran's
borders in an effort to make their point.
The arguments against such a strategy, however, are substantial: Iranian
opposition elements remain weak; the Khomeini regime is fanatically
resistant to outside pressures, and the prospects of either ousting it or
forcing it into compliance are poor. Most important, such a policy could
undermine Moscow's overriding purpose-the maintenance of Iran's anti-
US posture.
Outright Soviet military intervention in Iran is a remote possibility that
could be triggered by US military action (or its threat), the internal
disintegration of Iran, or the seizure of power by a leftist faction requesting
Soviet assistance. We believe the disincentives to such intervention far
outweigh the incentives.
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Soviet Objectives in Iran: Hopes and Reality
1
The Range of Soviet Tactics
1
Soviet Perceptions of Current Trends
2
Bilateral Relations
2
Political Trends
2
Military Assistance
4
Iran's Foreign Policy
4
The War Between Iran and Iraq
4
Afghanistan
5
Internal Assets
5
Soviet Options and Prospects
7
Maintaining the Current Approach
7
Increasing Pressure
8
Military Intervention
9
Conclusions
10
Treaty of Friendship Between Persia and the Russian Soviet Federated
Socialist Republic, Signed at Moscow, 26 February 1921
11
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Soviet-Iranian Relations:
Moscow's Policy and Options
The fall of the Shah in 1979 presented the USSR with
new opportunities to increase its influence in Iran and
thereby acquire regional leverage in the Persian Gulf
and strategic advantage vis-a-vis the United States.
Moscow's efforts to improve its ties with Tehran thus
far have failed-as evidenced by Iran's recent actions
against the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party and its expulsion
of 18 Soviet diplomats. This paper assesses the state
of Soviet-Iranian relations and the actions that Mos-
cow might take to achieve its objectives in Iran during
the next few years.
Soviet Objectives in Iran: Hopes and Reality
Iran's strategic location adjacent to the USSR, the
Persian Gulf, and Afghanistan as well as its oil
resources make it a country of great importance for
Moscow. Ideally, the Soviets would like to have a
leftist, pro-Soviet regime in Tehran, supportive of
their policies and intrinsically hostile to the West.
They would pursue close economic and military ties
with such a regime, hoping to acquire hard currency
and oil in return for arms and economic development
assistance. They would cooperate with it in encourag-
ing leftist forces in neighboring Gulf states. And they
would seek access to Iranian naval and air facilities on
the Persian Gulf, both to support their own operations
and to monitor and counter US activities.
In our judgment, Moscow's operational, short-term
objectives are far more realistic and less ambitious.
The Iranian revolution, by destroying close US-
Iranian ties and denying the United States a base of
operations against the Soviet Union, presented Mos-
cow with a major strategic gain. Protecting it almost
certainly is the USSR's overriding objective. Moscow
realizes that efforts to improve its own standing with
Tehran are complicated by its military presence in
Afghanistan, which the Khomeini regime vigorously
opposes, by its clear tilt toward Iraq in the latter's war
with Iran, by Iran's internal factionalism, and by
Iran's suspicions of the USSR's ultimate intentions.
The Range of Soviet Tactics
The Soviets generally have pursued a strategy de-
signed to undermine US interests and foster close
Soviet-Iranian ties; they have:
? Moved eagerly to Iran's assistance in countering
Western economic sanctions after the seizure of the
US Embassy in November 1979 and provided tech-
nical assistance in the development of Iran's indus-
trial infrastructure.
? Declared their neutrality at the outset of the Iran-
Iraq war in September 1980, infuriating the Iraqis
with whom they had a Friendship Treaty. (Their
subsequent assistance to Iraq has undermined rela-
tions with Tehran.)
? Stressed repeatedly their desire for close ties and
responded in relatively restrained fashion to fre-
quently abusive Iranian provocations.
? Encouraged the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party to remain
loyal to the regime despite severe repression, appar-
ently hoping that this would improve Soviet-Iranian
relations and protect Tudeh as well.
? Adopted a similar approach toward minority ele-
ments in Iran tempering support for regional auton-
om
they did not want to encourage
antiregime activity so long as Khomeini was pursu
ing an anti-imperialist line.
At the same time-using their diplomatic and adviso-
ry presence, Tudeh assets, and Third World nation-
als-the Soviets have tried to establish contacts,
develop assets, and gain influence in Iran's institu-
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Propaganda and disinformation have
been used to portray the United States as intent on
overthrowing the Khomeini regime, to project the
USSR as Iran's protector, and to discredit various
perceived opponents. While such measures are de-
signed to promote policies and people sympathetic to
Soviet interests, they have provoked negative actions
that have undermined Moscow's efforts to improve
Finally, the Soviets have used their proximity and
military capability both to deter US intervention in
Iran and to demonstrate their capabilities to Tehran.
They have periodically warned against outside inter-
vention in Iran's internal affairs; modestly strength-
ened their military forces on the Soviet-Iranian bor-
der; refused to acknowledge Iran's abrogation of
articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 USSR-Iran Treaty, which
gave them the right to intervene in Iran under certain
circumstances (see appendix for texts of these arti-
cles); and conducted combat operations on the
Afghan-Iranian border, which have led on at least
three occasions to penetrations of Iranian territory by
Soviet forces. although such pressure reminds the
Iranians that their superpower neighbor is powerful
and cannot be ignored, it also irritates them and
increases their suspicions of Soviet motives.
Soviet Perceptions of Current Trends
The Soviets have been disappointed that their basical-
ly supportive policy toward the Iranian regime has
produced no improvement in bilateral relations. In-
stead, over the past 18 months Moscow's commentary
on its relations with Iran and its public assessments of
Iran's foreign policy and domestic evolution have
become increasingly pessimistic.
Bilateral Relations
Political Trends. Since early 1982, Soviet-Iranian
relations have steadily worsened. The USSR's grow-
ing support for Iraq in its war with Iran (reinforced by
Iran's attempted invasion of Iraq in July 1982), the
increasing strength of conservative Islamic clerics,
and continuing tensions over Afghanistan have served
to exacerbate Iran's anti-Soviet proclivities. Iran's
Moscow and the Triumph of Iran's Radical Clerics,
1981-82
By late 1981, several clerics whom the Soviets had
praised publicly were in positions of power in Tehran
(President Khamenei, Prime Minister Musavi, and
Majles Speaker Rafsanjani). These radical clerics
had triumphed over the so-called secularists (Presi-
dent Bani-Sadr and Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh)
who had been strongly anti-Soviet and whom the
Soviets had criticized in press commentary.
Reports of improved bilateral relations and an in-
creased Soviet presence in Iran proliferated during
1981 and early 1982. While some progress was made
in economic relations, no improvement in political
relations developed and, by the spring of 1982, Soviet
disappointment was apparent.
attitude has been reflected in numerous actions, in-
cluding harsh anti-Soviet rhetoric, delaying replace-
ment of the Iranian Ambassador to Moscow for a
year,' the low-level Iranian delegation sent to the
Brezhnev funeral in November, and a demonstration
and assault at the Soviet Embassy in Tehran in
December 1982. In May 1983, after having arrested a
number of Tudeh leaders, the Iranian Government
banned the Tudeh Party, televised confessions of
espionage by Tudeh leaders, arrested large numbers
of Tudeh members, and expelled 18 Soviet officials,
plunging Soviet-Iranian relations to their lowest point
since the revolution.
Moscow's frustration with Iran's anti-Soviet posture
has been reflected in media commentary during the
past year and a half. An article by Pavel Demchenko
in a March 1982 issue of Pravda provided the first
outpouring of Soviet grievances against the Iranian
regime; it listed a long series of complaints, including
closure of the Soviet Consulate, reductions in Embas-
sy staff, and denial of access to Soviet journalists.
This and subsequent articles have warned that right-
wing elements close to Khomeini are trying to whip up
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Passage from Gromyko's Speech to Supreme Soviet
Session, June 1983
We are linked by relations of friendship with Iraq.
We stand for normal relations of friendship with Iran
as well. The Soviet Union would like to continue to
see it an independent state and has always striven for
relations of good neighborliness with it. Regrettably,
actions like those recently taken by the Iranian side
with regard to a group of employees of Soviet mis-
sions in Iran do not at all contribute to the develop-
ment of such contacts between our countries. In short,
the USSR will act with regard to whether Iran wishes
to reciprocate its actions and maintain normal rela-
tions with us or whether it has different intentions.
relations from collapsing completely. This brief hiatus
in Iran's anti-Soviet activities may have resulted from
internal disagreement over the utility of provoking
Moscow. Iran's actions in May against the Soviet
presence and the Tudeh Party, however, suggested
that those urging an anti-Soviet orientation retained
the initiative. These actions led Moscow to expel three
Iranian officials in May and
to pull most Sov
et dependents out of Iran in
Economic Ties. Moscow's dissatisfaction with the
state of Soviet-Iranian economic relations was reflect-
ed in a Pravda article of 5 August 1983 which chided
Tehran for failing to appreciate the value of Soviet
support. Relations did improve in 1980 and 1981 in
response to Iranian needs resulting from Western
anti-Soviet sentiment. Although avoiding criticism of
Khomeini himself, the commentaries indicate that the
Soviets do not believe that significant improvement in
bilateral relations will occur while he remains in
power (see section entitled "Internal Assets").
The Soviets have also expressed their mounting impa-
tience with Tehran through diplomatic channels
The visit to Tehran by the Chief of the Soviet Foreign
Ministry's Middle East Department, the resumption
of Aeroflot service to Tehran, and the arrival of the
Iranian Ambassador in Moscow-all in April-ap-
peared to reflect Tehran's desire to prevent formal
economic sanctions and the war between Iran and
Iraq.' Bilateral trade remained about the same in
1982, although the number of Soviet economic advis-
ers in Iran may have decreased somewhat. No major
new projects were initiated during 1982, and Iran
rejected Soviet proposals to conclude a new economic
agreement in early 1983,
lurgy, and agricultural processing
Iran, moreover, has been pursuing closer
economic ties with Western Europe and Japan, which
can meet its requirements for food,- sophisticated
equipment, and oil technology better than the USSR
and Eastern Europe. For these reasons we believe that
trade between the USSR and Iran will not grow
significantly, although Iran probably will continue to
import from the USSR the raw materials, machinery,
and equipment required for Soviet-sponsored projects.
These projects are in power and electrification, metal-
Soviet foreign economic trade official claimed that there were 1,600
experts in Iran. He indicated that the number was declining
because these advisers were finishing their jobs and being replaced
by Iranians
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Moscow and Tehran have also failed to resolve nu-
merous economic differences. Iran continues to curtail
natural gas exports to the Soviet Union (cut off in
1980) because of differences over pricing. In 1982,
Iranian officials publicly expressed opposition to the
Soviets' insistence that goods transported on the Cas-
pian Sea be carried in Soviet ships.
Military Assistance. Prospects for development of
Soviet-Iranian military ties also appear bleak, at least
as long as the Soviets are delivering large quantities of
arms to Iraq and the war continues. The Soviets have
continued to make modest deliveries of arms to Iran,
but they apparently are reluctant to furnish larger
quantities (and the Iranians may not wish to deal with
Moscow either).
Moscow has been willing, however, to tolerate sales of
Soviet-built and Soviet-designed equipment to Iran by
third countries-North Korea, Syria, and Libya, as
well as several East European nations. Moscow may
see this as a means of mitigating its own refusal to sell
and of creating some Iranian dependence on Soviet
Iran's Foreign Policy
The Soviets have reason to be pleased with Iran's:
? Continuing antipathy for the United States.
? Growing contacts with radical states such as Cuba,
Libya, Syria, and North Korea.
? Condemnation of moderate Arab cooperation with
the United States.
? Opposition to Israel.
Nonetheless, they are opposed to two major aspects of
Iran's foreign. policy-its total rejection of the Soviet
presence in Afghanistan together with its support for
the Afghan insurgents and its stubborn refusal to
make peace with Iraq. And they appear concerned
about Iran's growing contacts with the West-and the
potential for a rapprochement with the United States.
The War Between Iran and Iraq.' The war between
Iran and Iraq has created persistent difficulties in
Soviet relations with Iran. The Soviets initially insti-
tuted an embargo on arms deliveries to both countries
and announced their neutrality; given both their
Friendship Treaty and extensive arms relationship
with Iraq, this action constituted a swing toward Iran.
Soviet ties to [ran did not improve, however, and an
alienated Iraq turned to the West and China for arms.
Probably because they saw little prospect of improved
relations with Iran and did not want to become totally
estranged from Iraq, Moscow moved back toward
Iraq, lifting the embargo in the spring of 1981. In
terms of volume and types of equipment, Soviet
deliveries to Iran were extremely modest compared to
deliveries to Iraq. The Iranians publicly expressed
their displeasure
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By the spring of 1982, the Soviets, convinced that
relations with Iran were stagnant and concerned that
Iran might win the war, signed a new arms agreement
with Iraq. Their tilt toward Baghdad became even
more pronounced when Iran invaded Iraq in July.
Iran has denounced Moscow's endorsement of UN
Security Council resolutions calling for a cease-fire
and withdrawal of forces. In addition, Iran has con-
demned the Soviets for providing weapons to Baghdad
and has frequently charged that the United States
and the USSR are coordinating their positions. There
appears to be little prospect for improved Soviet-
Iranian relations so long as the war continues and
Moscow supplies weapons to Iraq.
Afghanistan. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan has
been a source of growing friction in Soviet-Iranian
relations,' hampering dialogue and feeding mutual
suspicions. The Soviet media frequently criticize
Iran's attitude and argue that the insurgency is a
creature of the United States, which is alleged to be
simultaneously supporting counterrevolution in Iran.
In late May 1983, for the first time, Izvestiya charged
that Iran was allowing insurgents to use its territory
as a base of operations. An Izvestiya article in late
July contained a more detailed indictment of Iranian
support for the insurgents and claimed these activities
Moscow has responded to Iran's increasing support
for the insurgency by accelerating military operations
on the Afghan-Iranian border.
' The Shah opposed the Communist takeover in Kabul in April
1978. The Khomeini regime not only condemned the intervention in
December 1979, but it voices strong support of the insurgents,
permits insurgent groups to operate from Iranian territory, and,
according to Soviet media commentary, trains and equips some
Iran's Ties to the West and Pro- Western Nations.
Other Iranian foreign policy trends concern Mos-
cow-largely because they might portend a turn back
toward the United States:
? Soviet press commentary has criticized Iran for
strengthening ties to Pakistan and Turkey, charging
that these nations depend on the United States,
which uses them as bases for counterrevolutionary
plots aimed at Iran.
? We believe the Soviets are displeased with Iran's
improving relations with many Western states, in-
cluding Japan, Austria, Holland, Sweden, Spain,
New Zealand, Italy, and Great Britain-and with
its growing contact with China, which includes an
exchange of delegations and the signing of a trade
agreement.
ization of relations with Washington?
The USSR-supported radio station, National Voice of
Iran (NVOI), has deplored the reported restoration of
trade relations between Iran and the United States.
And, in a Literaturnaya Gazeta article in June 1983,
the Deputy Chief of the Central Committee's Interna-
tional Department, R. Ulyanovskiy, repeated the rhe-
torical question posed in an article in Le Monde:
Might not Iran's repression of the Communists and
the cold war against Moscow be a prologue to normal-
Internal Assets
Increasingly gloomy commentaries have reflected
Moscow's mounting pessimism about Iran's internal
developments. Demchenko's article in March 1982
was followed in July by Ulyanovskiy's more authorita-
tive essay in Kommunist. He warned that the revolu-
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tion, while still ongoing, had begun to lose its popular 25X1
character and that this could lead to a sharpening of
class warfare. He stressed the weakness of leftist
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forces. Commentator Dmitriy Volskiy's article in New
Times (January 1983) was still more pessimistic. He
argued that the revolution had stopped halfway and
accused Tehran of blocking land reform, prolonging
the war with Iraq, and persecuting leftists. He
charged that the revolution was at a dangerous cross-
road and that its future depended on whether or not
genuinely nationalist forces-including leftwing dem-
ocratic organizations-could find a basis for unity.
Most recently, in June 1983, another Ulyanovskiy
article, this time in Literaturnaya Gazeta, stressed the
growing influence within Iran of the traditionalist
clergy, who were gravitating toward rapprochement
with pro-Western land-owning circles. He decried the
ongoing offensive against progressive, leftist demo-.
cratic forces (particularly Tudeh) and termed this a
blow against the Iranian revolution itself.
These articles reflect the increasing repression of the
Tudeh Party over the past year and a half. Iran's
moves against the party in 1983 were the culminating
blows in a long series of repressive measures that may
be followed by public trials and executions. The party,
already weak and demoralized, probably has little
remaining operating capability. Other leftist ele-
ments-the Mujahedin-e Khalq and Fedayeen-e
Khalq-also have been decimated by repression; how-
ever, they have been unreceptive to Soviet and Tudeh
overtures in any case.
During its four years of relatively
open operation after the revolution, the party appar-
ently gained little strength. It was hampered by its
allegiance to the regime, a position which did not
appeal to young radicals; its image as a tool of the
USSR; its stated opposition to Iran's invasion of Iraq
in July 1982; and recurring repression by the regime.
Moscow has made only minimal efforts to support the
party since the arrests in February 1983. In addition
to Ambassador Boldyrev's representation in late Feb-
ruary, the Soviet central press has played down the
Tudeh and the Iranian Left
During 1979 and 1980, the radio station National
Voice of Iran, broadcasting from Baku and run by the
USSR, urged Tudeh to establish contacts with the
Mujahedin-e Khalq and the Fedayeen-e Khalq. These
two leftist parties had played a major role in the
When both the Mujahedin-e Khalq and Fedayeen-e
Khalq opted for armed opposition to the regime in
1980, Moscow and Tudeh criticized them, arguing
that their actions would provoke repression and the
destruction of all leftist forces. One faction of the
Fedayeen-e Khalq broke with the parent group and
formed a loose alliance with the Tudeh in late 1980.
In all probability, it too has been decimated by the
regime's harshly repressive measures in recent
months.
charges against Tudeh (including that of providing
information to the USSR and asserted that the party
is loyal to the regime.
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 Moscow probably expects, however, that its current
strategy is unlikely to achieve significant positive
gains. The Soviets have little to offer Iran politically
that it has not already rejected. Moscow can continue
to offer transshipment services, participate in develop-
ment projects, and sell Iran technology and equip-
ment-so long as Tehran is able and willing to pay.
Iran appears to have no interest in expanding this
relationship, however, and existing ties have brought
the USSR little political benefit in any case. There is
little prospect for expanded military ties so long as the
war between Iran and Iraq continues. When the war
finally ends, Iran probably will maintain its prefer-
ence for dealing with the Third World and Europe-
although it is possible that it will be tempted by
attractive Soviet and East European arrangements for
barter and rapid acquisition of equipment.
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The Soviets have various options from which to choose
as they pursue their objectives in Iran:
? They can continue their current approach, a mix of
blandishment and pressure, hoping to prevent any
Iranian move back toward the United States and,
eventually, to improve relations with the regime.
? They can reverse this approach, abandoning efforts
to cooperate with the Islamic regime and putting
their emphasis on efforts to destabilize it.
? They can decide that radical action, even direct
military intervention, is warranted and plausible.F
Maintaining the Current Approach
In our judgment, maintaining legitimate bilateral
relations with Tehran while continuing pressure on it
remains Moscow's most attractive option. The Sovi-
ets' principal objective in Iran remains the same: to
maintain the Khomeini regime's strongly anti-US
stance. Continuation of Moscow's current approach
will not jeopardize this gain. Moreover, because Mos-
cow's assets in Iran have been decimated, the chances
for the success of other strategies are poor. While
Moscow clearly is not optimistic about the evolution
of the Khomeini regime, it just as clearly does not
believe that pro-Soviet leftist elements are in a posi-
tion to mount a successful challenge.
Moscow's continuation of attempts to pressure Tehran 25X1
are unlikely to evoke a more responsive policy. Soviet
moves during the past year have had little success,
and, so long as Moscow maintains its desire for
improved relations, such tactics must remain limited.
Moscow could vary or marginally intensify its criti-
cism of Iran, try to rebuild the Tudeh Party under-
ground, and support Tudeh as well as other leftist
elements in preparations for antiregime activities. It
could increase its rhetorical support for minority
rights, encourage minorities to increase criticism of
Tehran, and reestablish ties to the Kurdish Democrat-
ic Party, again in anticipation of eventual cooperative
action against Tehran. NVOI has again raised the
sensitive Kurdish issue; its approach has been to
criticize certain government officials for ignoring
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Over the years, Moscow has tried to exploit Iranian
minorities to gain information and establish influence
near the borders of the USSR. It has voiced sympa-
thy for minority autonomy in its press commentary to
maintain credibility with these groups and, presum-
ably, to place some pressure on the Tehran govern-
Soviet relationships with the Azarbayjan and Kurd-
ish Democratic Parties (ADP and KDP) have been
historically close. Moscow established short-lived
people's republics in Iranian Azarbayjan and Kurdes-
tan in 1945 and 1946. The ADP and KDP were the
vehicles of Soviet influence, and many members of
these groups fled to the USSR in 1946; many of them
or their families still remain in the USSR. In 1980,
when the KDP led by Qasemlu adopted a policy of
armed confrontation with the regime, Moscow and
Tudeh accused it of treason. The ADP, closer to
Tudeh than KDP, has not been as openly hostile to
the regime, but presumably has been severely re-
pressed during the past year.
Finally, the Soviets could increase military pressure
by building up their capability on the Iranian border
and taking action designed to demon
an airspace ;y Soviet aircraft occurred in March and
April 1983. These may have been inadvertent, but the
Iranians protested, warning that they would act
against them. Moscow could intentionally conduct
such overflights to demonstrate its superiority and
increase pressure on the Iranian-Afghan border.
Given Iran's current leadership, Moscow will have to
evaluate these tactics carefully. The leaders' xenopho-
bia, nationalism, and Islamic fundamentalism have
tended to push them toward resistance, not compli-
ance; Moscow certainly wants to avoid replacing the
United States as Iran's prime enemy
even after Khomeini's departure.
For the foreseeable future, advances based on
Moscow's current mix of tactics appear unlikely. But
Iran's political atmosphere is mercurial, and the
potential for change is always present. The incapaci-
tation or death of Khomeini could spark intensified
discord among Iran's clerics, and it is possible that
elements amenable to cooperation with the USSR
would prevail. While this certainly is the course the
Soviets prefer., their commentary indicates their belief
that rightwing, traditional clergy are becoming en-
trenched in the leadership and that prospects for
favorable bilateral developments will remain poor
Increasing Pressure
Moscow could decide that its prospects for gain with
the Iranian regime are so poor that it would be better
served by abandoning its efforts to keep ties stable,
making destabilization and overthrow of the regime
its main priority. It might expect that this approach
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would divert Iran from its war with Iraq, its support
of the Afghan insurgents, and export of the revolu-
tion. This decision could result from:
? Continuing deterioration in relations and a belief
that Iran will retain its anti-US paranoia no matter
what the USSR does.
? A change in Iran's leadership, which would produce
an even more anti-Soviet regime.
? An Iranian military breakthrough in Iraq and a
more aggressive push to export revolution.
? A Soviet perception, that improvement in US-
Iranian relations was occurring.
Moscow could intensify efforts to rebuild an under-
,ground Tudeh and to strengthen other leftist groups
that actively opposed the regime. The probability that
Tudeh members did not turn in their weapons as the
regime demanded in 1979 and 1980 is supported by
Iranian Government charges in May 1983 that Tudeh
had established arms caches. Some contingency plans
for resistance and, possibly, active opposition may
might calculate that a Communist Party actively
opposing the regime would prove attractive to disen-
chanted Iranians and, over the long term, would have
a better chance of building an effective leftist opposi-
tion. Because Tudeh has lost any chance of coming to
power legitimately, the Soviets' adoption of this tactic
seems more likely.
Moscow also might decide to provide material support
to minority elements opposing the regime. It could
reestablish close ties with the Kurdish Democratic
Party, encourage the remnants of the Azarbayjan
Democratic Party to move into opposition, and pro-
vide encouragement to Baluchi separatists. This con-
nection would improve the minorities' capabilities to
harrass the regime
The Soviets also could exert considerable economic
pressure on Iran. They could delay or halt their
economic assistance projects.
The USSR
could also threaten to curtail its services as a major
transshipment point for Iranian goods.
The Soviets could complement these efforts with
increased military pressure. They could issue threat-
ening statements, conduct exercises near Iranian bor-
ders, bring their forces on the border to a greater
degree of readiness, increase their military support for
Iraq, and implement a policy of frequent cross-border
operations from Afghanistan and air penetrations
from their own territory.
Given the popular support for the Khomeini regime,
which fanatically resists outside pressures, such a
policy has little short-term prospect of either ousting
the regime or forcing it into compliance. Even more
important, in our judgment, the risks that the Soviets
would face from implementing this policy are over-
whelming. It could lead to the USSR's replacing the
United States as prime enemy and could bolster any
elements within Iran who believe that some ties to the
United States would be useful in countering the
Soviet threat. Such developments would undermine
the USSR's most important short-term objective.
Military Intervention
Several developments could prompt the Soviets to
consider military intervention in Iran. Various Soviet
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move into Iran, the Soviets might make a counter-
move. In our judgment, it is possible that Moscow
would move preemptively if it thought US action was
imminent. The collapse of the Tehran government,
threatening prolonged chaos or civil war and disrup-
tion in Soviet-Iranian border areas, could lead Mos-
cow to introduce armed force, at least in those areas.
Finally, although it is increasingly unlikely, seizure of
power by a leftist faction that asked assistance from
the USSR could result in Soviet military personnel
entering Iran. Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 treaty
would provide a legal pretext for intervention in any
of these cases (see appendix). While Iran has repudiat-
ed these articles, Moscow has refused to acknowledge
their abrogation.
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Moscow maintains substantial military forces along
Iran's borders, giving it the ability to intervene, as
well as leverage with Iran and influence over US
decisions about policies toward Iran. We believe that
Soviet forces opposite Iran are sufficient, if mobilized,
to invade that country in the face of only Iranian
opposition.' We also believe that the Soviets, since at
least 1980 or 1981, have been developing contingency
plans for countering US ground forces by making a
military drive toward the Persian Gulf. In spite of
such planning, there have been only modest increases
in the readiness status and equipment inventories of
Soviet combat forces in the region since the Iranian
revolution, and the level of activity of these forces
remains routine.
There are substantial incentives for the Soviet mili-
tary to move into Iran. Control of Iran would give
Moscow access to that nation's energy resources and
to the Persian Gulf, a major strategic gain vis-a-vis
the United States, an enhanced ability to put pressure
on the oil-rich Gulf states, and the means to end
Iran's support for the Afghan insurgents. Moscow
might see a more limited move-seizure of northwest
Iran (Azarbayjan)-as a means of ensuring against
potential security problems on its own side of the
border, as well as bolstering its ability to put pressure
on the Tehran government.
The disincentives to military intervention are major,
however, and we believe that they far outweigh the
incentives. Such moves would directly challenge vital
Western interests and could lead to a major confron-
tation with the United States. Moreover, Iran's rug-
ged terrain and poor transportation network would
make a campaign difficult, and the Soviets could
expect severe problems in pacifying the population
and maintaining occupation forces. Iran's strong and
successful response to invasion by Iraq, as well as the
USSR's own problem in Afghanistan, have probably
In addition to the equivalent of about six divisions in Afghanistan,
the Soviets have 24 divisions-only one of which is maintained at
full strength-in the military districts north of Iran. We believe
that a full-scale invasion of Iran would require some 20 Soviet
divisions and at least a month of preparation./An invasion with a
limited objective, such as Azarbayjan, could be launched by about
five to seven divisions after two to three weeks of preparation.F_
strengthened the Soviets' appreciation of the disincen-
tives. A Soviet invasion of Iran presumably would
promote US-West European-Chinese cohesion, could
lead to a major Western military presence in the
Persian Gulf, and would strain Soviet relations in the
Third World, particularly in the Islamic countries of
the Middle East.
So long as Iran's policy toward the USSR remains
within tolerable limits and Iran maintains its anti-US
posture, Moscow almost certainly will continue to
emphasize the pursuit of improved bilateral relations.
The rationale for military intervention is lacking, and
the disincentives to such action are severe. A policy of
subversion or overthrow of the regime is unlikely to
succeed because of inadequate assets. Failure in such
a course, furthermore, would seriously damage exist-
ing and future Soviet relations with Tehran; it might
also push Tehran closer to the West and even toward
better relations with the United States.
At the same time, however, because the Soviets do not
expect significant improvement in bilateral relations,
we believe they will continue to advance their other
interests-support for Iraq and action against Afghan
insurgents operating on Iranian territory-uncon-
cerned about antagonizing Tehran. For its part, Teh-
ran may undertake further anti-Soviet actions, such
as public trials of Tudeh leaders. A continuing down-
ward spiral in Soviet-Iranian relations is likely.
Neither country will gain from continued deteriorat-
ing relations, however, and each would benefit from
stabilization. Iran and the USSR might therefore
arrest this decline and establish a less acrimonious
environment for conducting policy. Even so, mutual
antipathy and suspicion almost certainly will prevent
establishment of close ties for the next few years
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Appendix
Treaty of Friendship Between Persia
and the Russian Soviet Federated
Socialist Republic, Signed at Moscow,
26 February 1921
The two high contracting parties undertake
(1) To prohibit the formation or presence within their
respective territories of any organizations or groups or
persons, irrespective of the name by which they are
known, whose object is to engage in acts of hostility
against Persia or Russia, or against the allies of
Russia. They will likewise prohibit the formation of
armed troops within their respective territories with
the aforementioned object.
(2) Not to allow a third party or any organization,
whatever it be called, which is hostile to the other
contracting party, to import or to convey in transit
across their countries material which can be used
against the other party.
If a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of
usurpation by means of armed intervention in Persia,
or such power should desire to use Persian territory as
a base of operations against Russia, or if a foreign
power should threaten the frontiers of Federal Russia
or those of its allies, and if the Persian Government
should not be able to put a stop to such menace after
having been once called upon to do so by Russia,
Russia shall have the right to advance her troops into
the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out the
military operations necessary for its defense. Russia
undertakes, however, to withdraw her troops from
Persian territory as soon as the danger has been
removed.
(3) To prevent by all means in their power the
presence within their territories or within the territo-
ries of their allies of all armies or forces of a third
party in cases in which the presence of such forces
would be regarded as a menace to the frontiers,
interest, or safety of the other contracting party.
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