GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP33-02415A000700050012-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2000
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: September 30, 1966
• Content Type: REGULATION

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Change 1 Project Headquarters Manual
30 September 1966 50-3055-8
1. Project Headquarters Manual, 50-3055-8, dated 15 June 1966,
is changed as follows:
List of Affected Pages
Chapter I
Pages I-5, I-6, I-7, I-8
Chapter II
Pages II-3, II-4, II-5, II-6, II-7, II-8
Chapter III
Pages III-11, III-12, III-23, III-24
Chapter IV
Pages IV-1, IV-2
Chapter V
Pages VI-l, VI-2, VI-3, VI-4, VI-9, VI-10
2. Remove old pages and insert new pages. Old pages will be
destroyed IAW AFM 205-1. Certificate of destruction is required.
3. This sheet may be destroyed after posting changes on "Record
of Revision/Amendments" page of Manual.
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DEFINITIONS:
a. - An electronic monitoring system with
data link from the aircraft to' ground station by means of HF radio.
b. Denied Territo~r -Those geographical areas controlled by
;governments unfriendly to the U. S. , or .are members of the Communist
;Bloc. Any other geographical ares from which photographic or elec-
tronic intelligence must be obtained without permission of the control-
ling government.
c. Departure Route -That portion of the mission beginning at the
:departure base and ending at the end air refueling point, prior to pene-
'tration of denied territory. Departure route will nat be defined for mis-
sions which do not include air refueling prior to penetration of denied
territory.
d. Deployed Task Force (DTF) -Aircraft and required supporting
,equipment and personnel; under command of a Deployed Task Force
Commander (DTFC), capable of performing operational missions from
is forward location as directed by Project Headquarters.
e. Early Warning Line -Aline which depicts the approximate
:maximum distance at which an aircraft comes under active radar sur-
veillance based on the best early warning capability estimate of hostile
'radar systems.
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{1~ High EW Line - The High Early Warning Line is defined as a_
line extending approximately 350 NM from an active radar site for
aircraft flying above 75, Of?0 feet.
(2~ Law EW Line -The Low Early Warning Line is defined as _
a line extending approximately 250 14tH from an active radar site for_
aircraft flying at 35, OUO feet.
{3} Early Warning Capability will vary {i. e. , greater in USSR,
possibly less in other countries), Distances to be used will be
provided by Project Headquarters on a recurring basis.
f. Flight Line -Track designed to allow photographic coverage of
selected target areas without change of course.
g. Friendly Territory -Those geographical areas controlled by
governments friendly to the U. S. from whom diplomatic approval has
been obtained for landing/take-off permission for the A-12 and/or sup-
porting I{C-135 tankers.
h. Fuel Decision Points -Those points along the route at which the
fuel remaining will dictate whether or not the mission can be completed
as planned.
i. Local Defense Area - An area around any target or complex
which. is defended by anti-aircraft weapons and/or surface to air mix-
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j. Neutral Territory -Those geographical areas controlled by
',governments either friendly to the U. S, or not associated with the
`Communist Bloc; but from whom diplomatic clearance has not, or
cannot, be obtained for landing/takeoff permission for the A-12 and/
,or supporting KC-135 tankers.
k. Passive Detection Line (PDL) -Aline located that distance
.from a monitoring ground site at which airborne electronic emissions
may be detected by the enemy and could result in the premature alerting
of the hostile defense net.
1. Penetration Route - That portion of the mission which includes
the overflight of denied territory. The penetration route may start at
ithe departure base or at the end of the refueling prior to the overflight,
;and terminate at either the post-strike base or at the end of the post-
strike refueling. The penetration leg refueling will include route{s) to
missed AR post strike bases.
m. Point of Safe Return {PSR) -That point on the planned route at
:which a turn is initiated (considering fuel used in performing the turn)
that will enable the aircraft to return to missed AR alternate or home
base with planned minimum fuel reserve.
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n. Withdrawal Route -That portion of the mission which com-
menses at the end. of any penetration route and terminates at the planned ._
post-.strike base.
o, Signal Conditioner Data Monitor (SCDM} -Electronic means of
recording, {in digital farm) navigational and SIP data as related to time
along the mission route.
p. ~ecial Intercept Package {SIP} - An airborne electronic system
which records electronic signals received on pre-selected frequencies.
Specifications Check {Spec Gheck} -Method of determining, by
means of a ground fix, whether the Inertial Navigation System is within
operating limits for that particular mission.
r. Sun Angle - {Minimum} -Angle of the sun above the horizon at
which acceptable visual photography may be accomplished. {Minimum
being 15 degrees }.
5. RESPC)NSIBILITIES:
a, Project Headquarters is responsible for:
{1}
Publication/distribution of this manual,
{2} Coordination with - on revisions to this manual.
{3}
Insuring Key Staff {as determined by Darector, Special
Activities) and Flight Planning Personnel maintain intimate knowl-
edge of contents of this manual.
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tanker to reposition at the ARCP. Project Headquarters will determine
I'~the air spare turn-around point, based on minimum fuel required to
;return to launch base.
f. Departure Route: All necessary take-off data will be incorpor-
!ated in the departure route. Current performance data will be utilized
to compute: take-off and climb fuel, speed, distance, and level off alti-
I'tude. Departure routes may be planned either subsonic or supersonic.
Normally, operational departure routes will be pre-planned prior to
mission generation. When feasible, a primary and back-up INS Spec
'Check fix point will be selected and annotated. No portion of the de-
parture route will penetrate the hostile EW Line.
g. Penetration Route: The minimum penetration altitude/speed
;will be determined by Project Headquarters for each mission and will be
disseminated by appropriate mission plan message. If the pilot is un-
able to attain/maintain the specified minimum penetration altitude/speed
prior to the planned penetration point or is unable to attain/maintain the
minimum penetration altitude/speed while over denied area, the mission
will be aborted. (See Chapter VI for abort criteria). Routes will be
'planned to provide for maximum target coverage commensurate with SAM
.voidance and mission requirements. Flight lines will be planned to
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commence a minimum of 30 NM prior to and continue a minimum of
30 NM beyond the designated target complex to insure desired photo-
graphic coverage. Flight lines will be planned a sufficient distance
beyond turning points to insure proper stabilization during the flight
line. IIVS points will be programmed as required to insure stability
during flight line portion of route.
(1 } C?n daylight photo-missions, timing will be predicated upon
a sun angle of 30? aver designated targets. Zf this condition cannot
be met, a minimum sun -angle of 15? will be mandatory for accep-
table photography.
(2) INS Considerations; When Mission Profile permits, a
Spec Check fix will be planned grior to overflight of denied terri-
tory.
Mandatory INS positions are required as follows:
(a~ Denied territory penetration point.
(b} Points as outlined in paragraph g above.
(c~ Air Refueling Control Point.
(dA End Air Refueling Point.
(e~ Primary Missed Air Refueling Alternates.
(f )
Post-Strike Base and as many Emergency Alternates
as IIVS position capability permits.
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(g } Turn Points .
(h) Exit. denied territory.
NOTE; Items (c), (d) and (e) above are only applicable
when air refueling is planned.
h. Withdrawal Route: Withdrawal route(s) will be planned so as not
,o penetrate hostile early warning radar areas.
i. Project Headquarters will identify the following single engine
points for each operational overflight mission;
(1) Single Engine Safe Return (SESR): The farthest point on
penetration route at which aircraft can lose an engine and return to
briefed base with sufficient fuel remaining to complete initial pene-
tration and arrive at missed approach point with 5000 lbs of fuel.
{2} Single Engine Safe to Continue (SESC): That point on the pene-
tration route beyond which the aircraft can continue to briefed base
on one engine with sufficient fuel remaining to complete initial pene-
tration and arrive at missed approach point with 5000 lbs of fuel.
(3} Single Engine Point of No Return (SEPNR): That point along
the penetration route, using single engine performance, beyond
which the aircraft can no longer exit to a point 12 miles outside
denied territory.
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(4} Single Engine .Point to Continue (SEPC}: That point along
the penetration route where the aircraft, using single engine per-
formance can exit to a point 12 miles outside denied territory.
Nt?TE. The portion of the penetration route between points
(3} SEPI'+1R: and (4} SEPC above, is defined as the Single Engine
Area of No Return. Over this portion of the penetration route the
aircraft, using the most direct route, can. no longer exit to a point
12 miles outside denied territory.
3. EXECUTION;
a. Radio Silence; Radio discipline is mandatory on all operational
missions only those communications authorized in specific Operations
Plans will. be made.
b. Systems Operation;
(1 } Cameras: When over denied territory, all cameras will be
operated continuously within the limitations of the film available.
Project Headquarters will furnish specific instructions for each
mission.
(2} S~secial Intercept Package: Point at which SIP will be turned :'
on will be indicated on pilot map and operated continuously within
the limitations of the tape package available.
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25X1A (3)
Electronic Monitoring
System will be used throughout entire operational mission. Pre-
penetration Check will be completed prior to
reaching a point 100 NM from denied territory.
(4) Inertial Navigation System: This system will be used as
the primary means of navigation.
(5) Destruct System: Project Headquarters will direct use of
water soluble maps and destruct systems as required.
c. Escape and Evasion: Specific escape and evasion instructions
will be transmitted by Project Headquarters Intelligence Division for
Operational Missions.
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NOTES
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(7) Air refueling abort point.
(8) Completion point.
{9) Alternate air refueling control paint
(if applicable).
(10) Alternate air refueling track (if applicable)
(11) Number of receivers and tankers.
(12) Tanker and receiver call signs.
(13) Recovery and emergency bases.
(14) Standby tanker requirements.
(15) Cell or individual tactics.
(16) Rendezvous/air refueling frequencies
(UHF and HF).
(17) AN/ARC-50 receiver-transmitter and range address
selector settings.
(18) Fuel transfer requirements.
(19) Air traffic control clearance limits.
{20) Receiver's INS check points (Buddy cruise only).
(22) Receiver's departure heading after refueling completion.
(23) Bingo Fuel.
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f. Before take-off ali tankers and receiver flight crews will be
thoroughly briefed and will receive flimsies on data pertinent to the
rendezvous and air refueling.
5. OPERATIC-NAL PLANS: Appropriate operations plans/orders
will be published to cover all operational missions. The organization
responsible for obtaining required air route traffic control/restricted
area clearances will be designated.
6, WEATHER: Normal minimum visibility for a rendezvous with
automatic DME and relative bearing indicator functioning is one mile
and turbulence not in excess of "moderate" intensity, Normal. minimum
visibility for a rendezvous without a functioning automatic DME or rela-
tive bearing indicator is five miles. Variations from the above minima
will be reflected in the appropriate Project Headquarters C7PLAN5. After
the receiver is in contact position these visibility restrictions no longer
apply. It is imperative that a clos e "met11 watch be maintained through-
out an operation to aid in making recalls, diversions, etc. , if unexpected
weather conditions critical to the ogeration occur.
7, FUEL MINIMUMS: For deployment operations, missions will
be planned so that the receiver will depart the penetration fix X20, 00.0
feet) at the abort or destination base with a minimum of 7500 pounds of
fuel remaining. If an alternate airfield is required, fuel minimums will
be as specified in pertinent directives...
00 ~.a~~4o4
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(15) Receiver joins in the "observation" position and requests
tanker to go "internal and position 2" (Both receiver and tanker
select internal and reduce AN/ARC-50 power to position 2). Re-
ceiver pilot will give the INS read-out in latitude and longitude to
the tanker navigator. This information may be used by tanker
navigator to determine accuracy of ARCP and to assist in accurate
end A/R INS position for receiver. Receiver then moves into the
pre-contact position.
d. Alternate Rendezvous Procedure: (AN/ARC-50 internal func-
tion for UHF homing and voice, TACAN DME, tanker ARA/25 UHF
homer). Except for equipment utilization alternates, rendezvous pro-
cedures are the same as for a normal rendezvous.
(1) If the external mode of the AN/ARC-50 radio is inoperative,
rendezvous can be accomplished using the internal mode for voice
communications and UHF homing, and. the TACAN for DME. When
automatic DME contact has not been made by 400 NM or ARCT
minus 15 minutes, the receiver should attempt voice contact in
external. If unable to establish contact, the receiver should select
internal and attempt contact. If unsuccessful, call the tanker on
the secondary air refueling frequency and request an alternate type
rendezvous.
NOTE: The tanker will be monitoring the primary frequency on the
ARC-50 in the "external" mode and will be unable to receive
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a call on "internal" unless the secondary frequency is used.
Tanker will monitor the secondary refueling frequency on
the backup radio (ANf ARC-34). The HF radio may be used
to establish contact if all attempts at UHF utilization fail.
(2) Receiver compares TACAN DME with INS distance to go.
(3) Receiver requests steady carrier for homing at 150 NM
(4) Tanker replies "Standby for carrier" and depresses mike
button for 15 seconds. The tanker continues to transmit far 15
second periods at one minute intervals to provide homing singals
until visual contact is established, The receiver will be alerted
before each 15 aecond period and each call will be ended with the
tanker call sign. Additional calls may be required.
NOTE: If the receiver's UHF/AI~F function is inoperative, the
procedure may be reversed with the receiver transmit-
ting for steers and the tanker replying With. magnetic bearings.
(5) Receiver will utilize the INS azimuth and DTG as the pri-
many navigation reference until level off 20 NM up stream from
the ARCP, then home on the tanker until visual contact is established.
NOTE: After reaching 100 NM DTG, the receiver will maintain
an AI~F reading on tanker of approximately 5? off center
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PROJ HQS MANUAL
CHAPTER IV
NAVIGATION
(PART I)
1. GENERAL:
a. The inertial navigation system will be the primary means of navi-
gation. In addition, all available equipment and techniques will be used
to supplement this system. Accuracy of the INS should be verified, when-
ever possible, by reference to ground, radio navigation aids, and by
means of tanker reports during refueling; however, information obtained
by these means will not be used to update the INS. Updating will be ac-
cornplished on known visual ground fix points only.
b. -The pilot will make every effort to complete Spec Check prior
to penetration as required; however, if a Spec Check cannot be accom-
plished because of weather or other existing conditions, and the INS is
function'ng properly, the mission will be continued.
c. In the event of failure of the INS, the pilot will use all available
navigation aids, consistant with the maintenance of mission security.
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Penetration of denied territory will not be attempted with INS which is
inoperative or has a malfunction, which in the pilot's judgement would pre-
clude successful completion of the mission.
d. A projector map strip/emergency map will be the primary means
of flight following. Emergency maps will be used as back-up in the event
of failure of the projector.
e. Refer to chapter three for detailed rendezvous and refueling pro-
cedures.
f. All planning is based on a max bank angle of 30?. In the event a
manual turn. is required, the pilot will attempt to maintain a 30? bank
angle.
2. TAKE-t~FF, CLIPyIB AND ENR4UTE CELL.
a. Take-off;. Take-off timing for operational missions will be in
accordance with Project :Headquarters "H" Hour Generation Timing.
Every effort will be rm. de to meet the scheduled take-off time. For
each operational mission Project Headquarters will state the maximum
acceptable times for take-off delay. This interval will be based on exis-
ting and enroute weather, tanker loiter capability, minimum acceptable
target sun angle for visual photography, and any other factors which
may be pertinent to a specific operation.
IV-Z 4~ }~FJ S~~
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PROJ HQS MANUAL
MISSION ABORT FACTORS
1. Purpose: The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance to
aircrews and operation staff personnel regarding the action to be taken
when adverse conditions arise after take-off for an operational mission.
Although the following procedures are intended for operational missions
involving overflight of "sensitive" or "denied areas", applicable por-
tions of these procedures should be observed during simulated opera-
tional missions over friendly territory for training purposes.
2. General: This analysis of abort factors is based on the assump-
tion that mission urgency will not prohibit a 24 to 72 hour delay and that
operational capability will permit substitution of a fully operational. air-
craft within this same 24 to 72 hour period. Accordingly, any failure or
significant malfunction of a major aircraft system before entering the
sensitive area will result in mission abort. After sensitive area pene-
tration, planned route will be maintained unless a condition occurs which
jeopardizes safety of flight or results in a significant increase in vulnera-
bility to opposing defense systems.
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a. Unless specified to the contrary by Project Headquarters
abort criteria before entering sensitive area is mandatory and the
pilot has no option except to abort. Planned recovery bases will
be utilized whenever possible, but the pilot will make the final
decision regarding where to land the aircraft based on the nature of
the discrepancy, existing weather conditions, multiple malfunction,
fuel reserves, etc.
b. Abort criteria for "IP~TSIDE SEI~JSITIVE AREA" establishes
the best course of action under mast circumstances. Variable
weather conditions, multiple malfunctions, opposing defense capa-
bilities or reduced fuel reserves may necessitate other courses of
action. The pilot will mare the final decision based on pre-flight
briefing information and his analysis of the existing situation.
c. This criteria is not intended to deny the pilot the prerogative
of aborting anytime the situation warrants.
d, If the A-i2 is forced to abort a mission, an abort report will
be transmitted if the situation permits.
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The abort report, (whether transmitted via UHF or HFSSB) will
consist of a two digit meaningful number followed by the minutes past
the current ZULU hour. Numbers used indicating reason for abort
will be as follows:
NUMBER MEANING
Aircraft (includes all Systems /
Equipment)
Payload (Camera Sys, Etc. )
Pilot (Physical Cond? suit, Etc. )
Weather
Recalled
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Engine Failure
Afterburner
Failure
Air Inlet
Decrease in speed,
altitude and range.
Increased vulner-
ability to oppasing
defenses.
Decrease in speed,
altitude and range.
Increased vulner-
ability to oppasing
defenses.
Possible decreases
in speed, altitude
range. Increased
vulnerability to
opposing defenses.
INSIDE SENSITIVE AREA
Abort. Depart sensitive area
ASAP by safest withdrawal
route, use best applicable
briefed option.
Abort. Depart sensitive area
by safest withdrawal route,
using best applicable briefed
option.
Continue provided minimum
penetration altitude can be
maintained. Depart by safest
withdrawal route if unable to
maintain safe speed and altitude.
Abort. Land at nearest suitable
alternate except in specifically
denied neutral or unfriendly
countries, In flight refueling
will not be conducted except
for fuel emergency.
Abort, Recover at departure
base or designated recovery
base.
Repeated unstarts are grounds
for abort. Recover at departure
or designated recovery base.
Necessity to operate inlets in
manual is a mandatary abort.
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MALFUNCTION
25X1A
SSB HF Failure
25X1A
25X1A
EWS Failure
Normal Refueling
.System Inoperative
Loss of
and
long range commo.
Loss of ground
monitor .
Increased vulnera-
bility to opposing
defenses.
Abort. Recover at departure
base or designated recovery base.
Inability to maintain
Min Penetration
Altitude/ Speed
Presence of Con-
trails
Abort. Recover at departure
base or designated recovery base.
Abort. Recover at departure
base or designated recovery base.
Refueling passible Continue mission.
only through manual
boom latching.
Increased vulnera-
bility to opposing
defenses.
Increased vulnera-
bility through sight-
ing and tracking by
opposing forces.
Abort. Recover at departure base
or designated recovery base.
Not applicable.
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INSIDE SENSITIVE AREA
Abort. Depart sensitive
area by safest withdrawal
route, using best appli-
cable briefed option.
Continue mission unless
contrails are specified as
an abort item by Project
Headquarters.
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MALFUNCTION
SIGNIFICANCE
O
Single Inverter
Loss of backup
Q
Failure
inverter power
tD
CD
(#3 INS Fails )
F+
Double Inverter
Loss of INS or
Failure
Package will result;
partial loss of SAS.
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OUTSIDE SENSITIVE AREA INSIDE SENSITIVE AREA
Abort. Recover at departure Continue mission.
base or designated recovery base.
Abort. Recover at departure base Abort, Depart Sensitive area
or designated recovery base, by safest withdrawal route,
using best applicable briefed,
option.
OXCART
TOP SECRET
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?Approved iFor Release ~Og1/07/24 : CIA-R 33,02415A0007000~0012-5
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