SEC 3-55: CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES IN BIOLOGICAL WARFARE INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61-00549R000100190007-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 1999
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 21, 1955
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2000/08AgCgC TRDP61-00549R000100190007-8
Enclosure A to
IAC-D-80/5
21 March 1955
10 March 1955
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee
FROM: Chairman, Scientific Estimates Committee
SUBJECT: SEC 3-55: Critical Deficiencies in
Biological Warfare Intelligence
1. The Scientific Estimates Committee has reviewed deficiencies
in biological warfare intelligence in compliance with the IAC action
directing that "the SEC determine the critical deficiencies in BW
intelligence and recommend to the IAC means of eliminating them"
(IAC-D-80, as approved in IAC-M-138).
2. Production of SEC 2-54, "Estimate of Soviet Biological
Warfare Capabilities through 1960, " demonstrated that there is
sufficient information concerning indirect factors to permit an
acceptable estimate of Soviet Bloc scientific and technological
capabilities to conduct BW activities. However, in regard to direct
information, it was noted that the extent of our knowledge of Soviet
biological warfare activities per se is so meager that it does not
provide positive or conclusive proof of the existence or of the
magnitude of a Soviet biological warfare program. Little progress
has been made toward confirming the existence of a Soviet BW
program since production of SEC 2-54, nor is there reason to
expect that the critical gaps can be soon or easily eliminated.
3, BW intelligence activities in the past have been hampered
primarily by:
a. the lack of emphasis on BW intelligence, which
resulted in inadequate effort in this field. As interpreted by the
SEC, DCID 4/4 in its paragraphs Id, Ile, and Ilf provides the
intelligence community with the requisite priority to conduct
highest and high priority programs in BW intelligence.
Enclosure A to
IAC-D-80/5
21 March 1955
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b. The lack of success in distinguishing between BW
research and normal activities in public health, veterinary medicine,
agriculture, and other related fields of biological science. This
problem of isolating unique features of BW research has impeded
the analytic effort and complicated guidance to the collectors.
4. In determining the specific deficiencies in BW intelligence,
the needs of the following agencies and departments in addition to
the intelligence components of the IAC agencies and departments were
solicited: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research
and Development), Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department
of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), Federal Civil Defense
Administration (FCDA), the Chemical Corps of the Army (CMLC),
and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS).
The critical deficiencies are listed in Tab A. It should be noted that
existing gaps in our intelligence concerning Soviet capabilities for
defense against BW attack are not listed in Tab A because, in the
opinion of the SEC which in part stems from the interpretation of
DCID 4/4, such deficiencies are not so critical to the national
security as those relating to Soviet offensive capabilities in
biological warfare.
5. In order to eliminate the deficiencies in B W intellig ence
and to conduct BW intelligence activities at a scale commensurate
with the priority accorded BW intelligence by DCID 4/4, it is
recommended that:
a. The collection capabilities be enhanced by:
(1) Clarifying within command channels the responsibilities
of BW or BW-CW intelligence officers and placing 25X6
proper emphasis on BW collection activities in conformity with the
concepts of DCID 4/4.
(Z) Establishing research programs to develop
technical aids for BW intelligence collection.
b. Effectiveness of intelligence officers having responsibilities
in the BW intelligence field be improved by:
(1) Allocating increased time in the collector training
programs to BW intelligence.
(2) 'Further educating analysts in biological warfare
research, development and practices.
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(3) Making arrangements for more widespread access
to and providing instruction of BW analysts 25X1 D
25X1 D
c. Guidance and support to collectors be improved ley:
(1) Increasing emphasis on the development and
circulation of current coordinated information requirements.
(2) Preparing detailed background information on
specific targets for their use.
(3) Establishing closer working relations between
those responsible for placing BW requirements and those responsible
for conducting covert operations.
25X1D
/s/
25X1A
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