ESTIMATE OF SOVIET BLOC HIGH ALTITUDE INTERCEPTION CAPABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62B00844R000200240012-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 1999
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: October 2, 1957
• Content Type: MF

Approved For RQease 20001i269~4~Dr62BQ&44R000200240012-4
DRAFT #3 25X1 A
- :gs
2 October 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the Director for Planning
SUBJECT: Estimate of Soviet Bloc High Altitude Interception
Capabilities
REFERENCE: T.S. 158851, dated 25 February 1957
1. Our previous estimate on this subject was presented in the referenced
memorandum. It is our intention in the present paper to deal primarily with
significant differences in estimates made now as opposed to the early 1957 date
of the earlier estimate.
Early Warning Detection and Tracking
2. As a result of evidence accumulated primarily during 1957, we have
broadened the areas of the USSR in with we feel virtually certain that early
warning detection and tracking will be accomplished. Geographica$r, we
estimate as follows for various regions of the USSR:
a. Certain detection and tracking everywhere in the USSR and
European satellites vest of the Tkals and the Caspian.
b. Almost certain detection and tracking in the Soviet Far East
and Eastern Communist China.
c. Almost certain detection in the northern USSR except between
Novya Zemlya and Wrangel Island where we believe that detection would
be uncertain. However, we believe that detection in the Tiksi area
would be highly likely.
d. In the southern USSR east of the Caspian to Tashkent, we would
expect detection to occur without exception, but east of Tashkent to
the region of about Chita, we believe that detection capabilities are
l 6f&g* ff4 &)&SDe2eft 12 :IGf$.RDP62B00844R000200240012-4
cam; /ell
 . ; wiL I
Approved For lease 206&108/2 L : CIA-RDP62S,QJ0844R000200240012-4
SUBJECT: Estimate of Soviet Bloc High Altitude Interception Capabilities
3. We have not changed our views on Soviet tracking capability in the
area west of Urals and Caspian or in the Soviet Far East. We believe more
strongly than before that anywhere in the USSR in the areas which the U.S.
would designate as target areas Soviet ability to track intruding aircraft
will be high.
4+. In two areas tracking capabilities appear to be relatively low and
worth mentioning. One of these is the region bounded on the west by the
Aral Sea, on the east by Semipalatinsk, and on the north by the Trans-
Siberian railroad. Our assessment is this case is based on radar density and
reaction to overflight. The other area, about which we have almost no
information, lies east of the Urals between the Trans-Siberian railroad
and the Arctic coastal strip. The former of these areas may not long remain
relatively free of radar but the latter, being largely devoid of critical
military installations, may remain relatively free for some time.
Electronic Aspects of Ground Control Intercept (I-1
5. Our previous estimate that the Soviets are fully capable of GCI
was to some extent strengthened as a esult of 1957 activities. Soviet
height finding capabilities appear much improved in many areas of the USSR
with the introduction of ROCK CAKE height finding radars fairly widely
throughout the areas covered. We believe there is no longer any reason for
the Soviets not to know the altitudes at which Project operations have been
conducted. We continue to believe that the Soviets have adequate airborne
intercept (AI) radar for use inlnterception vehicles.
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62B00844R000200240012-4
 ~ a.1 L. 1 1 E'~
Approved For-please 2000)08/26 : CIA-RDP62W844R000200240012-4
SUBJECT: Estimate of Soviet Bloc High Altitude Interception Capabilities
Interceptor Aircraft and Air-to-Air Missiles
6. As in the previous estimate, we have ruled out the possibility
that rocket boosted or high altitude research aircraft might represent a
threat.
7. Considering that the Soviets in July 1956 were given firm warning d
what to expect and found themselves at that time unable to cope with the
situation, we believe it highly likely that they would begin to modify one
or more types of interceptors to obtain one with increased altitude capability.
We have noted for some time Soviet interest in high altitude flights (up to
60-65,000 feet) by military aircraft though no evidence points to a specific
modification program. Combat ceiling capabilities of four advanced Soviet
interceptors are as follows: FIG-17 - 59,000 ft.; MIG-l9 - 61,000 ft.;
FACEPLATE - 61,000 ft.; FITTER - 60,000 ft. Using the MIG-19, for example,
in about a year delivery of a modified version able to reach a combat
ceiling of 68-70,000 feet would be possible. Thus, with July 1956 as a
starting date, delivery of such aircraft would be expected to begin as
early as July 1957. We believe that the threat.from such modified aircraft
using simple armament is increasing rapidly in critical areas of the
USSR and throughout 1958 will represent the principal physical hazard to
operations. We emphasize, however, that this capability is little more than
marginal and, bearing in mind the AI and GCI problems, luck will have to be
on the side of the Soviets to carry out an interception by this means.
8. As lesser possibilities, we have considered (a) use of MIG-17 or
MIG-19 aircraft at 55-60,000 feet as vehicles for launching air-to-air missiles
from a 'pull up" altitude; (b) use of supersonic interceptors "zoomed" to
Approved For Release 2
VVY 8/&-.*DP62B00844R000200240012-4
 Approved ForEIease 200 8/2O . P62O844R000200240012-4
SUBJECT: Estimate of Soviet Bloc High Altitude Interception Capabilities
70,000 feet or more, also for AA missile attack and (c) use of nuclear warheads
in air-to-air rockets. By the "pull up" technique, missiles might be launched
so as to intercept targets up to about 68,000 feet using stockpile missiles
or much higher using specially designed missiles. Primarily because of the
complexities of the GCI, Al and missile guidance problems involved in such an
j7v1 n rt h e9Ji5,,Ut,
attack, however, we believe kill probabilities would be to ^during 1958. The
"Zoom" technique likewise has many inherent difficulties and its use involves
at best a marginal threat. The technique involves essentially accelerating a
supersonic interceptor, such as FACEPLATE or FITTER, to maximum speed at combat
ceiling of about-",,000 feet and in an energy climb going to altitudes of
probably 70,000 feet or more. Despite the fact that the aircraft is committed
and is capable of little or no change in direction once it begins its energy
climb, it is nevertheless a vehicle with some capability for launching
missiles or unguided rockets. Techniques for this purpose are difficult, but
not impossible, to master. For several reasons we consider use of air-to-at
rockets with nuclear warhead.s,though possibly effective, to be unlikely.
Internal political considerations would render their use unlikely over
populated areas, but they could conceivably be effective over such targets
as Kapustin Yar or other test ranges. We have no information of such Soviet
development but it is within their capability although protection of the
pilot for such a high altitude attack might be difficult. We have discussed
these possibilities primarily because we believe that Soviet desire to
accomplish interception might cause them to attempt even marginal methods such
as these.
9. Summarizing the various possible hazards from aircraft and AA
missiles, we believe that time is running out for operations at 70,000 feet
or less, and possibly somewhat above this level. A gradual stiffening of
defe ga-.o`8Vbee0$"ffft-': MAR2 0b8 (3 2'T24ft12-4
likewise believe that we can expect to see Soviet aircraft operating at or
 Approved For i9please 2000/0W ~1&42p844R000200240012-4
SUBJECT: Estimate of Soviet Bloc High Altitude Interception Capabilities
near the altitudes employed by the Project vehicle. We believe, however,
that the chance of successful Soviet interception is low and will continue
to be so throughout 1958.
Burface-to-Air Missiles
10. As we pointed out previously, we believe that the Soviets would
find it difficult to operate the present Moscow surface.-.to-air missile at
70,000 feet and above, and we do not believe such missiles will pose a serious
threat to operations before the middle or close of 1958.
U. Beginning with 1959, however, we believe the Soviets will introduce
a SAM missile with considerably increased altitude and range capabilities.
This missile will appear first in the Moscow region where an extensive SAM
launching complex of about 60 sites exists now and possibly also around
Leningrad where similar launching facilities are under construction. We note
also that one such site exists at Kapustin Yar though any hazard from it can
be eliminated by proper selection of flight course. Advanced SAM systems are
probably now under development at Kapustin Yar and in 1958 might have some
capability against project aircraft.
Areas of Special Consideration
12. We continue to believe that in the environs of Moscow the Soviets
would employ the most advanced techniques of which they are capable and,
accordingly, we consider this to be the most hazardous area for operations.
It is particularly true of this area that the chances of successful operation
increase with increase in altitude.
13. We believe that the region east of Stalingrad (Kapustin Yar -
Vladimirovka), where we know that missile development of many types is
conducted and which is adjacent to experimental aircraft testing
faed- diF R9 @n2 /Q8d, .-IA-RDP62B00I844R000200240012-4
_5-
 Approved For I4Iease 2000/08/26 "GIA-`IkD 844R000200240012-4
SUBJECT: Estimate of Soviet Bloc High Altitude Interceptian Capabilities
intercept capabilities are high. No other areas, with the possible
exception of Leningrad, are known to rank with these two.
Concluding Remarks
14. In summary, we believe that:
a. detection and tracking of the vehicle are virtually assured.
b. specially designed aircraft capable of operating at or near
70,000 feet are now, or shortly will be, available to the Soviets
in limited numbers. These aircraft could possibly conduct successful
interception at or near 70,000 feet.
Cr?t 't a. ,.,
c. the combination of Soviet interceptors and *A missiles now
poses a small but growing threat around a few highly sensitive target
d. SAM. missiles, now deployed around Moscow and possibly
Leningrad, }' $ will have a low kill capability versus the
vy10 ecrq M5Q' 6O
Project Vehicle Ami6- this capability will increase
2B&i'kC~y.?.. G C-~t c c+ 7 C 5'~ r, s A J e. by mid-1958 many of our highest priority targets will have
to be considered defended areas against operations conducted below
70,000 feet.
15. We suggest that operational planning take into account the change
in the picture which we have outlined above. It appears that some sacrifice
of "take" may be necessary to preserve the operation. It may become
necessary to make more frequent changes in course in order to throw~ off
-6-
Approved For Release 2000/08/26: CIA-RC~P62B00844R000200240012-4
 Approved For Release 2000M~6s 62W844R000200240012-4
SUBJECT: Estimate of Soviet Bloc High Altitude Interception Capabilities
interception. More careful selection of routes to and from target areas
may also be required. We believe mome such changes will be necessary if
chances of interception over our most desired targets are to be minimized.
HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.
Assistant Director
Scientific Intelligence
yv R
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62B00844R000200240012-4