PROVISION FOR THE COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION BY CLANDESTINE METHODS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP64-00658A000100130029-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 25, 1999
• Sequence Number: 29
• Content Type: REPORT

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1-r MAR
M4.
V.A.V14)
ENCLOSURE
DRAFT
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY
PROVISION FOR THE
COLLECTION OF FOI?&GN /NTELLICIENCt INFORUATION
t Yr CLAMSfI'd MiTHODS
Report by the Director of Central Intelligence
mous concurrence of the
1. During the wars the collection of foreign intellicence in-
formation by clandestine methods was accomplished by a number of agen-
cies with varying degrees of success in production and in maintenance
of security. In the continuing emergencyi some of these agencies still
exist and are functioning in whole or in part. Some of the war-time
agencies 'which operated in this field have been curtailed or disbanded;
some are expanding their efforts so as to cover vital areas which at
present arc without adequate, competent ?over. Action at this tin, to
provide the basis for adequate, efficient coverage of vital areas
throughout the vorld for the collection of intelligence information by
clandestine methods, is a necessity in the accomplishment of the national
intelligence mission,
2. After consideration of all e
Central Intelligence concludes t
el
more effi
be establis
The collo
oda,
D'
of
information by
can be
should
(paragrap
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y accon,1jsh
central
e and directed by\t,he D
3. b. c.? of the
d suc9',?se
.r of Central In
ont's letter of 22
lligence
1946).
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2.
AkMaa, F"at 5g44
a. The collection of certain types of foreign intelligence information
by clandestine methods is a service of common con ra which can be more
adt,N)
effi ion ccomplished centrally,
and c., of
hould be es
n a EA,efr 40 ..itigrE,. ,ae,e,c,a.0404(
he -resident s letter of 22 Jangr;;IZ6). z 1 4olath
?? ;.S a
AanA/IW_4/
outat..141Wetimrtmturt. Within this mission, the scope of theabileg, activities
should be determined by the Dire toi; of Central Intelligence with the
A a
concurrence of the I.A.B. The
should perform, upon the request
of a departmental collecting agency, any collecting task within the
authorized scope of its activities. The UM& sho d distribute
glataInformation-iresr-egeney-944hion?a-departmenf,
;III
a ? *gat a. a
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cove
re,e(2-1A5rA4
t provision should be made in the 1943 estimates of
the several departments concerned, to provide the adequate, efficieht,
world-wide coverage which the national security demands. The sum
required for such expanded coverage should be determined by a com-
mittee composed of a fiscal officer representing the Director of
Central Intelligence, the fiscal officer of the Department of
State, the fiscal officer. of the Military Intelligence Division,
and the fiscal officer of the Chief of Naval Intelligence,
rovi
sion should be made to facilitate the use of these funds for the
purpose indicated when and as required by the Director of Central
Intelligence.
d The Fede'ral Bureau of Investigation facilities for and
activities; in the collection of foreign intelligence information
by clandestine methods in the political, economic and financial
fields in Central and South America and the Caribean, should grad-
ually be withdrawn and FBI operations by clandestine methods outside
the United States should be. restricted to the collection of only such
foreign intelligence information as is necessary to perform its ,/
mission pertaining to the internal security of the Nation.
Discussions upon which the foregoing conclusions are based is ?
contained in Enclosure 4B" (Appendix 4B" hereto).
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3. The enclosed draft Directive has been prupared to pro?
vide the means for caring out the rooDmmendations based upon the
above conclusions. It has been unanimously concurred in by the
Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board.
4. It is recommended that the National Intelligence Authority.
approve the draft directive in Enclosure "All (Appendix "A" hereto). /
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- 4 - Enclosure
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APPENDIX "A"
DRAFT
PROPOSED N.I..A. DIRECTIVE
Bort N, I. A. Directive Wo.____
Pursuant to paragraph 1 of the letter from the President, dated 22
January 1946, which designated this Authority as responsible for plafl.
ning, developing and coordinating the Federal foreign intelligence acti
vities so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the
genes mission related to the national security, the following policies
and procedures to provide for the collection of foreign intelligence
information by clandestine methods are announced*
1
used herein, "clandestine" will. refer to those offensive
and defensive secret intelligence operations the detection of
which will embarrass the operators.
12. This Directive
which involve the intercept of electric.comunications*
2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall establish enterzrter
ZfiN
4,4
14440 operations
a central clandestine intelligence information
benefit of the intelligence agencie se
common concern, to the extent that the Director of Central Intelligence,
with theisoq4of the I.A.B., determines the uch ;operations can be no
efficiently performed centrally. Thi7\ ervice shall itself
perform no coordinating functions.
i5ostine collection service so established shall be
such kiloWeelandestine operations as the agencies may
o be necessary in the discharge of their own responsibilities,
ction servi
Al. MOM "milk RON
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4. The Director of Central Intollignce shall coordinate all
c andestine collection? operations? through the means eetablished pureuan
to N.I.A. Directive NO.
5, The Federal Bureau of Investigation will
of foreign intelligence inforeation bearing upon its legal mission re
col
ct
lating to the
t40eafeeem
ecurity of the nation, but will not be
collecting missions.
A
6. Funds will be expended, and services and real tie furnished,
by our departments as required to support the activities directed herein.
Ample provision of secret funds in budget estimates for fiscal year l948
and thereafter, to permit of appropriate development of the effort, will
be wade by State, War and Navy Departments; and the Director of Central
Intelligence will direct the coordination of departmental budget estimates
for this purpose.
7, The State War and Neve.Departments and the Director, FBI, Will
take the necessary steps to implement the foregoing policies and procedures.
8. The Director of Central Intelligence will take the necessary steps
to perform the missions herein assigned to him.
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APPENDIX 170
DISCUSSION
. 1. As used herein, Pclandest net' will refer to those offensive and
defensive secret intelligence operations, the detection of which will erne.
barras the operator,
24 During the war, the collection of foreign intelligence information
necessary to the prosecution of the war, by clandestine methods, was engaged
in by a nuMber of agencies including 0-20 1DGS MI, FBI, and 033, supple-
mented by the activities of certain personnel of the Department of State.
Since the termination of formal hostilities, certain of the agencies oper-
ating during the mar in the clandestine field have curtailed or terminated
their activities.
3. The need for foreign intelligence information which can be collected
only by clandestine methods is an integral and essential part of the continuing
need for complete foreign intelligence to insure the national security.
4 In the course of the survey, the following categories of personnel
have been interviewed and, in some cases, have submitted written reports and
comments t
a. State Department officials having knowledge of the work
and requirements in this field;
b. Representatives of 0-2 concerned in clandestine method3
for collecting foreign intelligence information:
c. Representatives of ONI concerned in this type of work;
d. Representatives of FBI with complete knowledge of their
operations in this field in the areas and center e assigned to
them by Presidential Orders:
Officials of SSU (formerly OSS) and field personnel of
that orgaaisati n who happened to be in Washington
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5. The Department of State, in its visa control, has continuing
need for information on foreign individuals desiring to enter the United
States and on individuals residing abroad who claim right to American
passports. The Department of State, in performing its rission to determine
the policy of the government in relation to international problems, has con-
tinuing need for foreign intelligence information, particularly in political,
economic and financial fields. However, as a matter of policy,the Department
of State prefers not to engage in the collection of foreign intelligence in-
formation by clandestine methods. The Department of State, in order to per-
form its departmental intelligence mission, therefore requires assistance from
other agencies.
6. a. The War Department has a continuing need for foreign military
intelligence information in order that the Secretary, and in turn the
President, ellen have accurate and current military intelligence on
all other countries, any one or more of which may at any time become
a threat to the national security. Some of the information required
in some countries and much of it in others, cannot be obtained by.
overt methods. To supply this deficiency in war-time, the Military
Intelligence Division developed facilities for aollecting essential
information by clandestine methods. In the continuing emergency,
these facilities are still in operation and are being currently ex-
panded in certain. areas. Provision for these facilities and their
operation has been made in budget estimates for fiscal year 1947.
b. The War Department also posseseand operates, under the
direction of the Director of Central Intelligence, certain facilities
formerly under OSS and later SSU. NIA Directives No. 3 and No. 4
provide for the liquidation of these facilities by the and of fiscal
year 1947. Such liquidation, however, can be accomplished in whole
or in part by the transfer to other agencies, or to the Central
Intelligence Group, of such facilities as shall be necessary to
them in performing their parts of the national intelligence mission.
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So far as available information indicates, the operation of certain
facilities formerly under OSS and later SSU, is necessary to the
performance of the national intelligence mission. The 0-2, USFET
and the Military Government in occupied territories in Europe
characterize these facilities as "necessary" to them and would
desire their integration in USFET if no other use for them were
to be determined. .6e-far-est-the- testimony- showei only Sall bas- been
able 'hp-penetrate the Ikaisant- at *te-pr esent tinu dominatioR a-f
tatiats-44?06,4rrerbileteks. The Foreign Activities Correlation Division
of the Department of State, speaking specifically of the X-2
activity of SSU, states that, "The X-2 type of work should not be
cast aside hastily and forgotten. The wer-time4init can well boast
of some valuable talent and certain communication facilities that
should be capitalized upon during peace by an organization of a.
permanent character".
7. During the war, the Navy Department developed a1 operated clandestine
facilities which were essential parts of the mechanism for collecting foreign
intelligence information. Cure entl drastically curtailed funds,
,?
the Navy Department does tmaintain facilities for collecting
essential naval intelligence information on foreign countries by clandestine
methods. The need for such information exists, hooverwitness the TOP
SECRET "Current Intelligence Requirements", dated 15 April 1946, from the
Chief of Naval Intelligence, copy of which is on file in C.I.G. Substantial
portions of these "Current Intelligence nequirements" could not be met, by the
overt meene currently available to the Chief of Naval Intelligence. The Navy
Department possesses the capability of operating by clandestine methods insofar
as available competent personnel is concerned. It does not possess that capa-
bility insofar as essential financial support is concerned. The Navy Depart-
ment at present requires assistance from some other agency to meet the need
which its own available facilities meet.
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8. During the war, by Order of the President the Federal Bureau
of Investigation collected political, economic, financial, industrial
and counter-intelligenee information by clandestine methods in Central
and South America and the Caribbean. The FBI also stationed personnel in
several European centers in order to cover certain activities directed
against the security of the United States from those centers. Certain
security operations of the FBI outside the United States are a necessary
part of its mission pertaining to the internal security of the Nation,
since much foreign activity intended to be detrimental to the United States
is directed from outside the United States. The operation of the FBI in
the political, economic, financial and industrial fields, outside the
United States - while authorized in war-time by Order and
continued currently by Congressional appropriation - is apparently without
legal authority in peace-tine and might not be sustained if competently
challenged.
9, To summarize:
a. State Department has the continuing need for certain foreign
intelligence information which can be collected only by clandestine
methods* but has not developed means for performing such collection
in peace-time.
b. Navy Department has the continuing need for foreign intelli-
gence information which can be collected only by clandestine methods,
but currently does not possess adequate funds to permit such ccllection
activity.
c. War Department has the continuing need for foreign intelligence
information which can be collected only by clandestine methods, and
possesses the means for meeting that need* including certain SSU facil-
ities presently under the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence.
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d. FBI has the continuing need for certain types of foreign
Intelligence information which can be collected only by clandes-
tine methods, and possesses the potential means for meeting that
need. However, FBI is legally restricted in the scope of its
operations.
10. To insure that each of the agencies subject to NIA coordination
has its needs in the field of clandestine intelligence information collec-
tion properly met, four courses of action appear to be Open to considera-
tions as followss-
a. Each department to operate its awn Service to carry out
its own departmental intelligence missions all to be subject to
central coordination,
b. A single department to operate a Service for the benefit
of other departments as well as for itself; this to be subject to
central direction so as to insure that each department receives
full benefit of such service,
go. A central Service to be established and operated by the
Director of Central Intelligence, such central Service to replace
the departmental services.
d. A central Service to be established and erated by the
eieee
Director of Central Intellige 4iiv and coor6inaLed
with such departmental eiices as y require to discharge
? their an eleessmeamcztzlereseonsibilities.
11. Analyzing the foregoing courses of actioa it would appear that*
tech department now operates its own clandestine intelligence
collection
ere': infermationiservice to the extent permitted by the facilities available
ei
to it for such service. Maintenance of ths status saaemuld avoid
interruption of existing services and would maintain the essential
departmental responsibility for praeldine departmental intelligence.
Distribution of this responsibility favors security, both as regards
operating personnel and as regards secret funds. It also insures
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that technical specialists are available to the departmental service
having a specific need. if the operation of the several clandestine
collection services were coordinated centrally, the inadequacies
caused by varying and at times insufficient departmental facilities,
might be compensated. On the other hand, the problem of coordina-
tion will be difficult and there nay be duplications and inefficiency
incident thereto.
b. Operation by a single department for the mutual benefit of
all would not be entirely eatisfactory, for a certain degree of
departmettal bias would be inevitable, even under central direction;
the organization would be necessarily of such size that the security
of the numerous personnel required under one bead would be difficult
to insure and maintain; positive control by a central agency would
be difficult to effect in practice, however attractive it might appear
to be in theory.
C. A/4ntral rlandestineiCollectien iervice, intended to replace
the v,ral departmental services, might not replace them actually,
as testimony brought out in the hearings showed that, even with such
a central service, any departmental intelligence a
sider it necessary to continue its an secret s
head would not have
exclusively resp us
CeeieT,1
formation X would
duals at the working
do A central
any single agency of his own which he could hold
e for providing depar- ntal intelligence in-
be less reseonsive 'Co etelled needs of indivi-
A e444?? eeee
.1
etine c llection serv
4,404
the several departmental services and coordinated with then, would
provide a 3inQe, :Lent ma
Centrellyirkire.eteelo suh a
of purposes unity of control
of meeting the needs of all.
has the advantages of singleness
possible eopnomy of effort in Aloft-
thee,operationsleve
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From the fo
10 d is favcre4 to i,it, a ntralflIandestine
411ectionAryic rate4 y the Direopor pf Ce
SON.L?, LA"
for the bone as a se
nalysiss the course of action outlined in
such Ariklaier elisatztobei-se
4NpsoIMIIWIIIt missions.
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lligence
ormation
necessary to acconnlish
Appendix "B"
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