CHARLIES LONG MARCH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP68B00432R000500010013-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: July 1, 1966
• Content Type: OPEN

AT5. 1966
RAMP Approved For Release 200107/26 ? CIA-RDP8B00432R000500010013-
9
11
k' s ioni. Tia f
N "HE battlefield the G-Ps call them "Charlie"; at head-
ua tars in Saigon, the "V.C." In the conservative pars
they're the Viet Con and in the liberal press, the "
M
-' e ? c ~ e
1 ~. e s the a~: ~GG~.he Front17orGGour glorious comrades of the
? a~ ese ~ eratio ~ army." In the West one would prefer not
~ l t e, ;n -1 One f hts the w (~l~ kp
App roved For Release 20017/26: CIA-P68B0043000"10D3"01118 them.
i v Illusfra4inn by fliio~i.i cae.......
 Approved For Release 2001/07/26 : CIA-RDP68B00432R000500010013-6
Seen from Washington they were at first a fiction. Now, It starts in 1961 after the creation of the People's Revolu-
they are merely a faction. In the beginning it was a form tionary Party (PRP), the Communist section inside the
of Rec. banditry, a melange of folkloric agitation and "Front." At the same time there is competition between
fanatical refusal to obey the decent laws of the good Mr. the autonomous "Southern" tendency in the NLF and
Diem. Later one saw them as the advance guard of an the growing influence of Hanoi, due to escalation of the
1 vasie n of free South Vietnam by a North Vietnam war and the increasing numbers of North Vietnamese
likened to Nazi Germany. This assumed a historical re- troops and cadres in the South.
sembh.nce between Ho Chi Minh and Hitler which im- Revolution in South Vietnam is an old story. It is not an
pressed at least Mr. Rusk. import from the North. In fact, political life under French
Today it is a matter of different "groups" manipulated colonial rule is always more violent in the South than in
by the North but only repre,cnting, according to Mr. the North. The avowedly colonial regime imposed on the
Goldberg or Mr. Ball, and according to the time of day, South (the North is a mere protectorate) leaves Saigon
from one half to one and one half per cent of the popula- and its hinterland more open to modern and progressive
tion. A proportion, but so active, it would appear, influences. And while nationalism is developing at Hue
that with at s ..port of Northern elements estimated at and Hanoi, diverse revolutionary tendencies are making
25,00;) men, it hips prompted the shipment to Vietnam of themselves felt in Saigon and the back-country. In the
hundreds of thousands of U.S. soldiers, supporting a sizable French colony, largely composed of working class
"nationalist" army of more than 600,000. Accursed little whites, leftist ideas gain currency, particularly after 1935,
groups, who are not content wit' being tough in combat, with a corresponding influence on the Vietnamese elites.
but who have lived to see themse.v'es acknowledged "the The system of land distribution, much more feudal in the
rnajo- factor on the South Vietnamese political scene" by South, favors the flowering of radical movements, as does
George Carver, a CIA agent and learned spokesman for the growth of a proletariat in the urban-
-area-around-the most conservative circles of the Administration, in a Saigon. The CPI, created at Haiphong in 1930 at the insti-
major article in Foreign Affairs (April 1966). gation of Ho Chi Minh (then known as Nguyen ai Quoc),
ction in the South. And the Trotskyists are
has a strong se
'E CAN UNDERSTAND neither the nature nor strong enough in 1932 to win four or five seats in the Sai-
the present'.:.::'avior of the "Viet Cong" with- gon municipal election.
its historical The Trotskyists owe much of their success to an excep-
i
n
` ' ; out recalling several stages
is not a new tional leader, Ta Thu Tau, a popular figure known for his
ti
l
on
u
V development. For revo
% i
phenomenon in South Vietnam - it is a "long march." fiery oratory. The Communists have a competent leader-
t begins in the early '30s, with the formation of the ship - Dr. Thach, Duong Bach Mai and Tran Van Giau
Communist Party of Indochina (CPI), the appearance of - but they suffer, up to 1941, from the conservative direc-
powerful Trotskyist groups in Saigon, and the growth of tives of their French "brother" party, then hogtied by its
poli:ico-religious sects and the Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang, support of the Popular Front government of Leon Blum.
the Vietnamese Kuomi nta,.g, more active in the North During the war the Communists are persecuted, and sev-
but present also in the South. eral dozen of them are sent to the prison at Poulo-Condors,
A second stage, opening in 1945, is the anticolonial in- an island in the Indian Ocean still considered to be "the
surrection u;ainst France, which ends in 1954 with the university of the revolution."
Geneva compromise. The revolutionaries of the South If the Trotskyists are powerful in Saigon, the Commu-
foo: the bill, for the South is left in the conservative hands nists are doubly so in the countryside. In 1941 a vast
of hr. Diem. The third stage in the history of the move- dragnet operation is launched in the Mytho region, 50
ment is Saigon's refusal to implement the Geneva accords miles south of Saigon in the Plain of Joncs, resulting in
(and to a lesser degree Hanoi's), touching off the formation the arrest of 3,000 Communists - which gives some idea
of a maquis of rebels in places like Quang Ngay, Zone D of the party's strength in the area. The Plain of Jones is to
and the Plain of Jones. During the fourth stage, the North become a stronghold of the Viet Minh, and later of the
becomes aware of the agitation in the South and seeks to Viet Cong. Few rural areas in the world of that time con-
harness this revolutionary force which will serve its objet- tain so many avowed Marxists.
twos of reunification and socialization. And in the fifth
sta gy., Hanoi comes out openly in support of the revolts in ms`s HE ELIMINATION of the French administration by
the, South and gives its sponsorship to what is now officially the Japanese in 1945, followed by the collapse
called the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. of the Japanese, creates a vacuum which gives
r~ inary impetus to the Communists.
ApPr0Meit E0;rel8'e*"4i0#26 ? -F ' 66 X00432 > 0.500 3-6
 Approved For Release 2001/07/26 : CIA-RDP68B00432R000500010013-6
ilo C "Ai Minh marches on Hanoi with the guerrillas he
has peen training for four years in southern China and
seizes power, with a sense of timing and a genius for tac-
tical alliances reminisce, t of Lenin in 1917. But in the
South, the Communist ' command, obsessed by its
rivalry with the Trotskyiss, loses valuable time, devoting
its energies to ill-directed violence and repression (Ta Thu
Tau is assassinated). French units, freed from Japanese
prisons and assisted by the British regiments of General
Gracey, seize the occasion and take power. The responsi-
bility for the ineffectiveness of the Communists can be
laid to Tran Van Giau, whose fanaticism and taste for
violence leave him soon isolated and unpopular.
Defeated, the Communists of the South take to the
maqui!r, applying the strategy of aihanees with the national-
ists so well defined by Ho Chi Minh at the time of the
creation of the Viet Minh Front and the dissolution of the
Communist party. Of the 12 members of the Committee
of Narn-Bo (South), Marxists hold only two posts (in-
terior and economy). Military affairs are directed by a
nationalist, the famed Nguyen Binh, who is to be liqui-
dated in 1952, probably on the orders of the North
Viet Minh high command.
The war against the F ench expeditionary corps is never
as hot in the South as in the North. But the battle in the
South has more political overtones and gives to the Com-
munists, more than to their allies, the oppoi tunity to train
the population. They work the peasants "in depth," initiat-
ing an agrarian reform which succeeds better than in the
North and wins them a grea, prestige among the peasants.
As the war draws to a close in 1954, the Viet Minh con-
trols wide areas of South Vietnam - more than half the
Mekong Delta, the Camau peninsula in the far south and
Quang-Ngay, along the 14th parallel.
Never- less the Geneva powers - including the Rus-
sians, Chinese and Viet Minh - decide to divide Vietnam
at the 17th parallel, which will deprive the revolutionaries
of several millions of their partisans, about a fourth of
the population they formerly controlled. Viet Minh parti-
sans are to be regrouped into five zones, and then move
north. By,:md large the order is obeyed. The Communists
order about 100,000 men north, leaving 5,000 as cadres
for agitation, for the future. In carrying out the Geneva
formulas, the Communists have to put considerable pres-
sure on their nationalist allies, less ready than they to
respect a treaty guaranteed by Messrs. Molotov and Chou
2n Lai. Once again, as in the years 1936-40, the Commu-
nists acquire a : Cation as moderates and opportunists,
a rc ,..ation they will try to live down later.
in ,X54, the revolutionary movement in the South
is c.::vexed to the mercies of Mr. Diem. The Geneva
accords provide that no one may be prosecuted for his
activities during the war. But the Diem regime respects
the rule even less assiduously than the authorities in the
North. Pro-Viet Minh partisans in the South, Commu-
nists and nationalists alike, are soon to be the victims of a
witch hunt. Feeling betrayed, they will not be very good
citizens of South'Vietnam; nor will the survivors of the
sects crushed by Diem in 1955.
The underground begins to take form in 1956, in the
.west, around Chaudoc and Long-Xuyen, and in the north-
western plantation zone, near the Caodaiste center of
Tayninh. The categorical refusal of the Saigon govern-
ment to hold the elections called for in the Geneva docu-
ments and the growing severity of the repression push the
revolutionaries into violent opposition.
Throughout the first phase of the revolt, it remains
purely "Southern." The cadres left behind by the Com-
munists play rather a moderating role, the watchword
from Hanoi being "respect of the Geneva agreements," in
accord with ae then Moscow-and-Peking line. It is only
slowly that Marxists begin to penetrate the anti-Diem
movement. By this time the movement is anti-American
as well, in view of Washington's unequivocal support of
the Saigon government and the reinforcement of the U.S.
military mission. As early as 1959 the revolt has already
assumed sufficient magnitude for Diem to say on receiving
the Gaullist vice-president, Antoine Pinay, in Saigon:
"We, too, have our Algerian war .."
TILL HANOI GUARDS its reserve, but emissaries sent
South report that the rebels are beginning to de-
nounce the cowardice of the Northern regime.
The Central Committee of the Lao-Dong (Com-
munist Party reconstituted in 1952) studies a report
presented by Le Duan, deputy secretary general and vet-
eran of the war in the South. Le Duan recommends that
North Vietnam give its total support to the anti-Diem
movement, arguing that the Geneva accords no longer
have any validity after the violations committed in the
South. About this time Diem pushes through a law per-
mitting the execution of suspects, and nullifies the land-
slide election to parliament of Dr. Dan, an outspoken but
firmly anticommunist opposition leader.
It is only in 1960 that Hanoi clearly assumes its respon-
sibilities. But it is not without considerable soul-searching.
The "Viet Cong" (abbreviation of Vietnam Cong San, or
Vietnamese Communists), as Messrs..Diem and Nhu like
to call them, have at this time only a small minority of
Communists in their ranks. Ho Chi Minh and his advisors
note, however, that the anti-Diem nationalists are re-
doubling their activity - the solemn appeal of 18 leaders
in April calling for a return to democracy; feverish in-
trigue in the Army that will result in the abortive coup of
Approved For Release 2001/07/26 : CIA-RDP68B00432R000500010013-6
 Approved For Release 200107/26 : CIA-RDP68B00432R000500010013-6
Novemb--r 1960. Diem's regime ap;. to be tottering, The injection of the PRP inside the NLF - a spine, so
and the Communists fear being ou"uc-e by the national- to speak - is one of the factors in the radicalization of
is, fear the nationalists will be the beneficiaries of the the Front. But this is not due simply to the calculations of
coming victory over Diem. Hanoi. The realities of the extension of the war inevitably
Then, at the Third Congress of the Lao-Dong, Septem- give priority to elements that are the most battle-trained,
ber 1960 in Hanoi, in the presence of a strong Soviet most experienced in organizing, closest to Hanoi and thus
delegation, Le Duan pushes through a :,gram of ener- most capable of making liaison with Northern units oper-
getic support for the revolutionary movement in South ating on Southern soil. These are estimated at 25,000
Vietnam.. More impor6ant still, he is elected secretary- soldiers and specialists, comprising about 10 per cent of
general Df the party, replacing :o Chi Minh, who retains the revolutionary forces. But more than anything else, it
the pre,:dency. Thus the partisan of intervention in the is the U.S. bombings, North and South, that strengthen
South is at the controls. He circulates to his comrades in the PRP position inside the NLF and give it authority
-:anoi the text of an appeal made the previous March by among the people.
"a group of veterans of the South Vietnamese resistance," Recent reports from "V.C." controlled zones show two
which says the ti..e has come for a general insurrection startling developments:
against the "My Diem" dictatorship ("My" means Amer- 1. That PRP strength has grown in four years from
icaa). Ho Chi Minh and his comrades now intend to act 7,000 to nearly 100,000 partisans.
to take control of this r.1ov ..tent. 2. That PR? cadres are less inclined to use ruses with
swiftly ,.
it is thus with their open support that hie creation of the population, and tend to present themselves more and
the NLF" is announced in December 1960, grouping to- more as Communists.
gather the forces which have struggled against Diem for it is hardly astonishing that from the point of view of
four years. To all appearances, Communists are in the mi- the interests of the Party, a prolonged war is desirable.
nority. An d the ten-point program announced by the NLF What is more astonishing is to see this opinion shared by
might be that of almost any agrarian nationalist party of Dean Rusk.
the T h xd World, except, perhaps, for the denunciation of The long march of the "Viet Cong" is not finished. Ev-
N merican "imperialism" and "monopolies." The insist- erything indicates that as long as the war lasts, the move-
ence o:7 neutralism, on independence for the South, on the ment's orientation will move more and more toward the
necessary alliance with Cambodia and Laos, gives the left. But there is one other reality we must keep firmly in
impression that the movement seeks the help of a variety mind, and that is the profoundly Southern character of
of allies and prefers not to antagonize anyone but Saigon. the movement. None of the fighters of the NLF, certainly,
if Hanoi has surely approved the simple formula of an would deny that their goal is as much the reunification of
organization that will serve as cadre and high command Vietnam as its independence. But the program of the
for the uprising, -i. feels at the same time that this type of Front, and the comments of its spokesmen on the need for
Front (as in the time of Nguyen Binh, in 1950), gives the a long breathing period before reunification, show that
nationalists a unnecessary predominance. These misgiv- the Front is still deeply marked by the original history
ings Irompt the formation, early in 1962, of the People's of the revolutionary movement in South Vietnam. The
Revo:.utionary Party, a resurrection of the Southern sec- sects, the secret societies, the Communists, the national-
tion of the C ."I. This time the language is clearly Marxist, ists are still there, and to believe that they will blindly
and the job of this hard Communist cell is to channel and accept dictation from the North is to falsify their history
control the activity of the Front. and present development.
umous, but we don't find the old chieftains of
the Southern CPI at the head of the PRP,
neither Dr. Thach, who has become minister of
health in Hanoi, nor Duong Bach Mai, nor
ran Van Giau, purged for ultra-left adventurism in 1945
and consigned Lo an honorific post in Hanoi. The key
figures in the PRP seem to be Vo Chi Cong, vice-president
and, it is believed, acting secretary-general of the NLF,
and General Trung, reputed to be a pseudonym for
:Nguyen Son, a top aide of Viet Minh General Giap at the
Jean Lacouture, author of Vietnam - Between Two
Truces (Random House) and of a biography of Ho Chi
Minh, has had long experience both as a diplomat and a
reporter. In 1951 Lacouture joined the staff of Le Monde,
first serving as head of the overseas bureau, and now as a
reporter. He has also been diplomatic editor for Combat
and the Cairo correspondent for France-Soir. In France, he
teaches at L'Institut du Ddveloppement Economique et
Social and is a Fellow for the Near Eastern Program at
Harvard University.
ti prig d RinnMWease 2001/07/26 : CIA-RDP68B00