ALLEN DULLES, CHIEF OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE, SAYS: SOVIET RULERS IN REAL TROUBLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70-00058R000100120066-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 66
• Publication Date: April 27, 1956
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

401INITIVV,St WORT,Ij REPCIRT PR 271956
Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-000
U. S. News & World Report
Allen Dulles,
Chief of U.S. Intelligence, Says:
SOVIET RULERS IN REAL TROUBLE
CPYRGHT
What really is stirring inside Russia?
Was besmirching Stalin a "boner" that got
out of control?
Now that name-calling has started, where
will it end?
This authoritative report by Allen W. Dulles
tells what events in Moscow mean to the U. S.
As hec:d of the U.S. Central Intelligence
Following is full text of an address by Allen W. Dulles,
Director of Central Intelligence, before the Los Angeles
World Affairs Council on April 13, 1956:
There is never a dull moment in my job as Director of
Central Intelligence. Events which seem to defy analysis
happen somewhere in the world every day. Few trends seem
to follow a predictable course.
These last few weeks there have been developments in the
Soviet Union which have puzzled all the experts who general-
ly have ready answers?sometimes more ready than accurate
?to explain Soviet conduct.
just at a time when some are saying that everything is go-
ing wrong with foreign policy in the free-world countries but
that everything in the Soviet Union is progressing according
to some great master design, the Soviet collective leadership,
as they call it, comes forward to beat their collective breasts
and indulge in the most extreme self-criticism.
The men in the Kremlin now tell us that all they said earlier
about events in the U.S.S.R. during the 20 years preced-
ing Stalin's death is quite wrong: that, in fact, this was an era
of infamy, crime and shame. They admit that their past adu-
lation of Stalin was based on fear, not on fact. The man they
themselves used to call the "glorious Stalin, genius of man-
kind" is now being publicly accused of "grave errors" and
privately described as a malicious monster.
The Soviet leaders do not very clearly explain why the new
collective leaders waited for three years after Stalin's death to
tell it to their people. They do not make a very satisfactory
showing as to why they themselves sat acquiescent in the seats
of the mighty during all the period of Stalin's dictatorship,
exercising great powers as members of his inner circle.
Possibly, as Khruslichey is reported to have admitted,
the price of nonconformity was a bullet in the head. This
is a very human excuse but a poor qualification for high
office on the part of those who now assert the rights and
prerogatives of leadership. In the free world, where we
aspire to build on the great traditions of the past, not to
repudiate them, we revere as our heroes and leaders those
who refused to conform, whatever the risks, when the prin-
ciples of liberty were at stake.
ln the U.S.S.R., evidently, acquiescing in crime as the price
of sinapA rialkettldFar RidMis ?rer2 00 la1eS1f0
Agency, Mr. Dulles studies all the confidential
reports that the U. S. gets on Moscow. He also
is familiar with much of the data gathered
by other governments.
Mr. Dulles is one of the best-posted men
in the world on developments in Soviet Russia.
In this address he analyzes the problems now
confronting the top men in the Kremlin.
legitimate conduct. As they put it: "The point was not to save
one's own life; the point was to save the Revolution."
Before going further into the details of this strange develop-
rnent in the Soviet Union, it may be worthwhile to review
briefly what had been taking place there during the years of
Stalin's power. Here we may find clues as to why the men in
the Kremlin now take the serious risks of repudiating their late
hero for having put the individual above party and substituting
a personal dictatorship for a collective one.
Stalin himself ran through a series of revolutionary combina-
tions, somewhat akin to collective leaderships, during the
1920s. For example, in 1924-25 he combined with Zinoviev
and Kamenev against Trotsky. From 1925-27, a new alliance
between Stalin, Rukharin and Rykov was formed and routed
a Trotsky-Zinoviev-Kameney combination. And, finally, from
1927-29, Stalin worked with Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan
and others to crush Stalin's recent' allies, Bukharin and
Rykov.
It was during the 10 years which preceded Russia's entry
into World War II that Stalin completed the consolidation of
his control over the Communist Party machinery. By that time
he had placed his loyal stooges in all important positions of
authority throughout the Soviet Union, and the Army was
brought under political control.
Among the major charges said to have been leveled against
Stalin by Khrushchev is the charge that in the late '30s he de-
liberately liquidated Marshal Tukhachevsky and thousands
of the best officers in the Soviet Army, presumably to insure
his political control of the military apparatus. Certainly today
there is good reason to believe that Marshal Tukhachevsky
was falsely accused of conniving with the Germans. There is
some evidence that there was a clever German plot to dis-
credit Tukhachevsky, which happened to fit in with Stalin's
own plans.
We do know that during and after the war there was burn-
ing resentment among the Soviet professional soldiers at
Stalin's interference in the conduct of the war, his unjust and
capricious belittling of heroes such as Zhukov and his arrogant
claims to. personal credit for Soviet victories. A senior Soviet
general, for example, is recently reported as having privately
branded their so-called documentary film, "The Fall of Ber-
lin," which shows Stalin as the great military mastermind, as
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. . Stalin now blamed for "Greece, Berlin, Korea, Yugoslavia"
Today, the collective dictatorship is assiduously repairing
the injured dignity of the military and incorporating its lead-
ership into Communist Party membership. They must realize
that, following the usual pattern of revolutions, the military
leaders might tire of being the pawn of dictators, whether
individual or collective.
But whatever the faults of Stalin in the prewar decade,
one can hardly ascribe them to his old age or senility. Stalin
was then in his prime. Furthermore, one can hardly believe
that the acts of the dictator in a war from which he emerged
as a hero are the motivating causes for the present attempt
to liquidate his memory. In fact, the most recent Soviet pro-
nouncements are tending to refer to "good" and "bad" Stalin
eras. Naturally, there is no desire to repudiate such measures
as farm collectivization and the rapid industrialization under
the Five-Year Plans, which are so close-
ly associated with his name. The be-
ginning of the "bad" period was in
934 when the great Stalin purges be-
gan. If they denounce his war record,
the purpose here must be to eliminate
him from the hero class and to give the
military some of the credit he had ar-
rogated to himself.
But, to find the real reasons for the
de-Stalinization campaign, we must, I
believe, look to the more recent past,
particularly to the hard autocratic period
during the last six or seven years of
Stalin's life. Here we find two major
motivations for cutting away from Stalin
worship.
Internationally, from about 1947 on-
ward to the time of his death, Stalin's
often bellicose policy in the international
field had been a failure and had tended
to unite the free world against inter-
national Communism. Domestically, dur-
ing this period, his police state was
meeting ever-increasing disfavor, not
only with the helpless people but with
the top politicians, generals and indus-
trial managers who were essential to the working of the So-
viet system. This began to create problems for the regime.
First, let us look at the international picture. In the imme-
diate postwar era, riding the crest of the common victory and
maintaining military strength and power, Soviet policy had
notable successes. It consolidated the grip on the European
satellites and helped the Chinese Communists to victory.
But beginning with about 1947 in Europe, somewhat later in
Asia, the free world at last began to realize the implications of
the forward drive of international Communism and started to
take countermeasures, and the tide began to turn.
What happened in these years? The Marshall Plan, which
Stalin and Molotov indignantly rejected and tried to defeat,
was put into effect and Europe was saved from economic chaos.
In Greece, the Soviet effort to take over by guerrilla tactics was
thwarted.
When the Soviet attempted to take over Berlin and destroy
liis outpost of Western freedom, the Berlin blockade was
rustrated by the airlift, and West Berlin remains a show
window of what the free world can do. Tito survived his
ejection from the Cominform and the wrath of Stalin and
struck back with telling criticisms of Stalinist policy?almost
identical with wkiat Soviet le;ii.d.us are now themselves saying,
Later the NAppnomea MC& Release?21101,/03/02
spite Soviet threats, the way was opened for German rearma-
ment in close union with the West.
Thus frustrated in the European field, Stalin turned to the
Far East and, working with the North Korean and Chinese
Communists, attempted to take over Korea as the first step
towards driving America from the Western Pacific. Again the
Communists were blocked and, most important of all, an
alarmed and awakened American public opinion proceeded
to the defensive rearmament of this country. Our nuclear
power was vastly increased.
It is understandable that Stalin's successors should have
found it convenient to place upon him the blame for Greece,
Berlin, Korea, Yugoslavia, German rearmament and the like,
;tnd, in particular, for the generally hard Soviet line which
has led to the build-up of American defense forces and NATO
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization].
It was these successes which led the
Soviet Union to conclude that a peace
treaty with Austria was necessary to
build up their badly shattered reputa-
tion as "peacemongers" and to prepare
the way for a "summit" conference,
their pilgrimage of penitence to Bel-
grade, and their effort to line the So-
cialist parties into new popular fronts.
But the foreign scene, alone, by no
means explains the urge the present
Kremlin leaders felt to break with the
hard Stalinist past. They were already
making progress in allowing the memory
of Stalin to fade in international recogni-
tion and prestige without going to the
extreme of total destruction of the Stalin
myth with their own people. Thus the
clue to their present policy lies more in
the internal Soviet situation than in the
requirements of their foreign policy.
Domestically they have been caught
in a dilemma. In order to compete with
the Western world in the fields of science
and industry, which was vitally impor-
tant for their economic growth and their
rearmament program, it was essential for the Soviet to speed
up the education of their people, especially in the scientific
and technical field. After Stalin's death the regime encour-
aged more objectivity in scientific inquiry and put on the
shelf some pseudo scientists such as Lysenko. After all, they
had found out early in the game that, in the present nuclear
age, one could not fool around with scientists who tailored
their art to the whims of Marxism.
Obviously, the Soviet leaders could not limit their educa-
tional processes to the scientific fields, and more and more
young men and women are graduating from schools which
correspond to our high schools and colleges and are taking
advanced degrees comparable to our degrees of master of
arts and doctor of philosophy. Even with all the indoctrina-
tion in Communist teachings which they give to their young
students, it is impossible to prevent education from develop-
ing the critical faculties which every thinking human being
possesses.
Furthermore, as part of their new campaign of sweetness and
light, they have found it wise to take down some., of the bars
which have impeded travel between the Soviet Union and the
free countries; and, while the Iron Curtain still remains and
there is a careful selective_mocess as to those who are per-
iCtI,A4RDR71:60110&MG001 G01200.695bvious
ALLEN W. DULLES
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CPYRGHT
. . . Destroying Stalin myth Threatens "cliscipfme of the party"
that today there is far more contact between the people of
the U.S.S.R. and outside countries than at any time in recent
years.
All this has tended to build up pressures upon the Soviet
rulers to create an impression, not only internationally but
also domestically, that a dictatorship of the Stalin type was
dead forever.
Explaining Away "Past Sins"
The Soviet leaders are trying to meet their external and
internal dilemmas by finding a convenient "devil" which they
can use to explain away past Soviet sins to the world abroad
and to their own people, as well as to demonstrate that the
present rulers of the Soviet are different mentally and morally
than they were under Stalin. Thus, they hope that their own
people will accept their protestations that the days of govern-
ment by arbitrary policy making, secret trials, deportations and
prison camps are over. Furthermore, they arc again promising
that they will do something to raise the standard of living so
that the promise of individual freedom will be seasoned with
a greater share of consumers' goods and a more abundant
life.
The extent of the opposition to the Stalinist-type regime must
have been gauged by the Kremlin as far stronger and deeper
among the Russian people than we had dared to hope. None-
theless, the destruction of the Stalin myth carries with it a
very real threat to the internal discipline and unity of the
Soviet Communist Party and the international Communist
movement.
That calculated risk must have been taken deliberately by
men who knew they had to have a scapegoat if they were to
hope to preserve the dictatorship on which their own power
and very survival rested. By attacking the personal symbol of
Stalin and the worst excesses of his rule, they hope to be able
to preserve many of the essentials of the Stalinist system. now
labeling it "Leninism"?the monopoly of all power by a single
party, the complete subordination of the courts and individual
rights to arbitrary party decree. the governmental control of the
press and of all organs of public information.
This basic structure is meant to be preserved intact. Al-
ready the regime ha publicly warned that sonic "rotten ele-
ments" have taken the de-Stalinization campaign too literally
and are "trying to question the correctness of the party's
policy." This, Pravda thundered, is "petty-bourgeois licen-
tioi!sness" of a kind the "party has never tolerated and will
never tolerate." A dead and dishonored Stalin, therefore, is
likely to be merely a device?here possibly a Trojan corpse
rather than a Trojan horse?with which the long-suffering
Russian people are, I fear, to be deceived in their expectation
of a freer and better life.
Obviously the Soviet rulers concluded that it would take
something more than a mere repetition of the old cliches to
have any effect. Apparently the necessity was deemed to be
urgent and impelling. They had tried to do the trick with the
liquidation of Beria, but the secrecy surrounding his execution
was hardly a persuasive bit of evidence of a new dawn of
liberty. It was in the worst tradition of the Stalin era?and
he, after all, generally gave his victims at least a drumhead
public trial.
The degradation of Stalin, if the Soviet program had worked
as the leaders had apparently planned it, was to be under strict
party discipline. But it seems to have got out of hand. When
Khrushchev briefed the party leaders assembled at the Twenti-
eluded, but the party leaders from all parts of the U.S.S.R. were
there. They were to take the gospel by word of mouth to the
local precinct leaders. What was planned, apparently, was a
gradual process of burying the dead leader's memory. Different
medicine was to be reserved for the faithful followers of Stalin
in the satellites, each according to their needs.
Something may have gone wrong with this careful plan-
ning. It is possible that difficult questions were posed by those
party workers who had been taught for decades to worship
Stalin and who knew that Khrushchev, Bulganin and the
whole Politburo owed their positions to him. On the other
hand, Khrushchev may have deliberately planned to give the
party the "shock" treatment to give more conviction to the
new men" and "new times" theory.
At any rate, whatever may have been the plan, the reports
are unanimous, as published in the press of every free coun-
try, without effective denial from Moscow, that Khrushchev
ended up by branding Stalin not only as a heartless dictator
but as a tyrant and murderer, an incompetent military leader
whose bungling in both war and peace had brought the So-
viet Union to the verge of ruin. In the same breath, Stalin,
the leading theoretician of Communism for the past 25 years,
was labeled a heretic and his interpretations of the Marxist-
Leninist philosophy were rejected.
It may be well at this point to consider the position and
character of the men who have now brought these charges_
All of them had been for many long years prominently asso-
ciated with Stalin's policies. Some had been his hatchet
in many of the less savory acts of his checkered career. Cer-
tainly, no leader in history ever took such elaborate precau-
tions as Stalin to insure that the men around him were loyal
beyond the shadow of a doubt. That his henchmen, now that
he is dead, so bitterly repudiated Stalin is a commentary on
the totalitarian system of government itself and the leaders
it breeds.
When Khrushchev Praised Stalin?
The main attack on Stalin's record was made by the Party
Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev. He had held key jobs under
Stalin since 1935 and had organized and carried through, for
Stalin, the purges in the Ukraine. In January of 1938, he was
named as alternate member of the Politburo and has been a
full member of that body since 1939. Without wavering, he
followed the Stalinist lines and on the dictator's 70th birthday,
Dec. 21, 1949, he had this to say:
"Hail to the father, sage teacher and brilliant leader of
the party, the Soviet people and the toilers of all the world.
Comrade Stalin."
The No. 2 man in the anti-Stalin crusade has been Anastas
Mikoyan. In fact, he was the first at the recent Twentieth
Congress to criticize Stalin by name. Mikoyan held key jobs
under Stalin for approximately 30 years. Stahl) installed him
as Commissar of Trade and made him candidate-member of the
Politburo in 1926, when Mikoyan was 31?the youngest person
ever to attain Politburo rank. He has adjusted to every turn of
the Soviet policy line and remained in the front political ranks
ever since.
Others who have been parties to this great debunking exer-
cise were, of course, Bulganin, who had worked with Stalin
since 1931; Kaganovich, who had been at his side since 1924.
Malenkov, who had been a member of his personal secretariat
for some 25 years, whose career was made by Stalin; and,
finally, Molotov, the longest Stalin associate of them all. He had
eth Congress in Moscow at a secret meeting on February 25,
the represApproviedinFier Release /201/1102142- : ciatiAibt1d6WW:Mbia11666e6arly days of
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. . Reversal on Stalin is "too abrupt to invite confidence"
There is good reason to believe that Molotov has joined the
ranks of Stalin detractors with reluctance. Certainly a Stal-
inist at heart, he must have viewed recent events with a heavy
heart and with the knowledge that the recent deviations of
which he has been openly accused are a prelude to his grad-
ual retirement from the duties of his office. I incline to be-
lieve that Molotov's real sentiments are those he expressed at
Stalin's grave and then more recently when, after Malenkov's
demotion in 1954, he exuberantly reaffirmed his faith in
Stalinist principles.
MI of these men, while they now find it convenient to dis-
associate themselves from the dead tyrant, show no intention
of accepting the normal consequences of long association
with a repudiated leader and a discredited policy or of re-
linquishing the benefits they acquired under Stalin and
the power which they are now enjoying as his pupils and
successors.
The leaders of the Soviet Union today are walking a dan-
gerous tightrope. They are trying to discredit Stalin without
discrediting the Communist Party, which he led so long
for the men who worked with him. Human memories are
short and perhaps they may succeed in this maneuver. But
surely, many a Communist will question the good faith
of these leaders. The reversal is too abrupt to invite con-
fidence. After all, it was only a little over three years ago,
on March 9, 1953, that Stalin was buried. At that time these
men who are now castigating him joined in the most lavish
tribute and they brought together in Moscow the Commu-
nist leaders of China and the European satellites to do him
homage.
This is what his short-time heir, Georgi Malenkov, had to
say:
"The policy of Stalin will live for ages and thankful pos-
terity will praise his name just as we do. . . . Comrade
Stalin, a great thinker of our epoch, creatively developed
in new historical conditions the teachings of Marxism-
Leninism. Stalin's name justly stands with the names of
the greatest people in all the history of mankind?Marx?
Engels?Lenin."
The Chinese Communists and the Moscow-designated
rulers of the European satellites who attended Stalin's funeral
!oust now have some question in their minds today as to the
forthrightness of the present Kremlin leaders who induced
them to join in this homage. Recently, the Chinese Commu-
nists spent several weeks before publishing their acceptance
of Moscow views of the late Soviet dictator.
Certainly, it is not for us to defend the Stalinist dictator-
ship, its cruelties and perversions, as against its present de-
tractors. IATe do have a right, however, to question the sin-
cerity of those who today tell us that for 20 years and more
they were a party to foisting on the world a tissue of lies and
deceit.
Their sincerity is basically to be questioned on three
counts. First, they have been willing to criticize and con-
demn only carefully selected faults of the Stalin regime. They
I ave specifically endorsed acts that, both within Russia and
in the world at large, caused the most widespread and terri-
ble human suffering; for example, the deliberate starvation of
the Russian peasantry during the collectivization campaign
of the early '30s; and the exploitation of the captive peoples
of the Eastern European satellites, where proud and inde-
pendent nations were crushed in defiance of solemn inter-
national obligations. Mikoyan at the Twentieth Congress even
had the effrontery to boast of the Czech coup as an example
of how Communist parties can come to power by "peaceful"
and ``parliamentary" means.
Secondly, they have failed to repudiate the arbitrary dicta-
tonal rule that allows life and death issues to be settled by a
handful of men?whether by one or a half dozen matters not
to the Russian peasant.
The Twentieth Congress in its unreal and sheeplike unan-
imity was an example of the fact that the present 4, 5, or 6-man
leadership intends to permit little real debate and criticism of
basic policy. Not one voice was raised to protest the decree
designed to force the peasants on the collective farms to devote
all their efforts to the collective by severely limiting the time
allowed for work on their private plots. The widespread oppo-
sition to this decree that must exist among the Russian farmers
WHEN STALIN DIED, HIS CHIEF MOURNERS INCLUDED TODAY'S LEADERS OF RUSSIA
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? ? ? "Is it not the system itself that breeds tyranny?"
w.int unrepresented and unheard as the last party Congress
p oceeded to rubber-stamp every resolution put before it.
Thirdly, whatever improvements have been made in assur-
irig the personal security and welfare of the individual Russian,
ti at progress is dependent on the whim of the Presidium
(?opularly known as the Politburo). The stick can be used
later if the carrot doesn't work.
What we now have is a kind of "mutual protective associ-
a1ion" among a few men who suffered under Stalin so long
that they are willing to co-operate to keep the full police power
o the state out of the hands of any one man. There is no hint
that any ordinary Russian who tries to dissent against the
regime will escape the wrath of Serov's gunmen any more
than he would have escaped when Beria was alive. If neces-
s iry to preserve their own skins, these men might return to
unrestricted terror like ducks to water. It was their native
e.ement for years.
The final and real test of the intentions of the Soviet
1 iaders will remain their willingness to accept those basic in-
s Rutional changes that can give the Russian people and the
world in general genuine assurance that a 1-man or 3 or 4-
nan dictatorship cannot again plot in secret the massive
omestic or international crimes of the recent past.
New Dictator Coming?
In the end, opposition parties, an independent judiciary
Ind a free press are the only real safeguards against succes-
yive dictators, each with his own power lust and a new "cult
of personality."
The problems which this rightabout-face presents for the
-vorkl-wide Communist movement both within and outside
of the U.S.S.R. are immense. Here are a few of them:
Stalin was not only the dictator of his country for more than
wo decades, he was also hailed as its great military leader
-11 war, its prophet and the interpreter of Marxist-Leninist
loctrine. His writing, particularly the "Problems of Leninism"
ind the "Short History of the Communist Party," are scattered
n tens of millions of copies throughout the Communist world.
It will be years before they can be removed from circulation.
1.11 fact, all Soviet history for the past 30 years must now be
-ewritten. They won't be able to handle this quite as they
lid in the case of Beria. Here they sent to all holders
-if the Soviet "Encyclopedia Britannica" instructions to ex-
:ise the pages praising Beria and insert a puffed-up story
in the Bering Straits (which fitted in in proper alphabetical
order).
Stalin's name is on thousands of streets and squares. Cities
and towns bear his name throughout the Communist world.
For the people of the Soviet Union, Stalingrad stands as the
symbol of their victory over Hitlerism. Will his name remain
here and elsewhere or will the attempt be made to blot it
out?
Stalin's henchmen were put in key positions throughout
the length and breadth of the Soviet Union. They hold key
places in the European satellite regimes. Each and every
one of these appointees must today fear not only for his
future, but for his life.
Already political idols are toppling or, at least, swaying in
the wind from Moscow?in Bulgaria, in Hungary, in Poland.
Names of former leaders who crossed Stalin are coming back
into repute daily, and political circles in the satellites are
plainly in confusion and near-panic trying to figure out where
the line of propriety will be drawn next.
As Alfred Robens, a leader of the British Labor Party, re-
eentivAppeooked0Foir ReleaSet2061763715".131A
shot a man? Do you restore him to the history books or give
him a posthumous reward?"
The problem of justifying past crimes is especially difficult
in the foreign Communist parties, such as those in France and
Italy, where local leaders Clung to Stalin's coattails and did his
bidding without having the excuse of the pistol at their head.
These men could have denounced Stalin's crimes earlier and
lived?unlike the men in Moscow. Why did they not do so?
This is the question we ought to keep asking every Italian
tempted to play ball with Togliatti.
And what about the reputation of Trotsky, a key Stalinist
victim, still on the Soviet blacklist? Here and there, in places
as far distant from each other as Ceylon and Bolivia, his fol-
lowers are meeting to stage a comeback, and the view is be-
ing tolerated, at least, in the satellites that he was not a
traitor hut merely a misguided and erroneous would-be leader.
?Sovfoto
"STALIN'S NAME is on thousands of streets and
squares... . Will the attempt be made to blot it out?"
And what about the numerous violations of those inter-
national agreements signed by Stalin? Was he a "devil" when
he made them, or when he broke them, or both?
The Soviet people well remember that Stalin himself started
as one of a triumvirate not very different from the collective
leadership of which the Soviet leaders now boast. How can
the Soviet people themselves be sure that this small
group of men in the Politburo who exercise complete and ar-
bitrary control over the lives of all the peoples of the U.S.S.R.
will not, in the course of a few years, again lead to a personal
dictatorship with all the vices that they now attribute to
Stalinism? Is it not the system itself, not the "cult of per-
sonality," that breeds tyranny and cruelty and ends in the
revolution devouring its own children?
And, finally, is it not possible that the Soviet people.
with the leaven of education they are receiving, will demand
some decisive share in the selection of their own leadership
and some checks and balances against the danger of tyran-
-RibliiVtdatit'a ktidbei a?cdti erkmality"?
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tims51TFor Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000100120066-5
All Marxists have been trained in the
do#0.,that human beings are the prod-
uets'iif-their environment. Might not So-
vi ''N?larxists begin to think there is
sorpthing wrong with a political environ-
ment in which, over the years, an incredi-
ble percentage of the most influential
leaders?including Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bu-
khatin, ilie,ria, , ,apd now Stalin?have
turCo4 to be criminals? Might n9t
.f.t3
the Soviet people and even Senne of
present or future leaders, ceirThlo' ?F-1
lievethat 'llpower 'Corrupts and: 'absoltitr
power corrupts absolutely"? a !talc-rime
In7Voseewithe,,pictures of Stalin ,,are
graduallydiwwhiig. I am told ,that
the Red Ariny. Theatier has solved the
problem Of ,filliirthe' space formerly oc-
cupied b3i-"int)5eildfinbus portrait in an
ingenious waytkhat may be symbolic. On
the wall where Stalin's picture used to, ;
hang is, now a huge miri:ok Any am-
bitious leader can see himself in Stalin's
place. Melt "this not proVeiqo be the
curse of ?the Stalinist systetfir-4th which
cannot be 'easily escapedobropious Ire-
solves? fyn-i .),,dt
The only, 0,c1T.wilt of pows0p, the
viet Union' which is not directly imgla-
cated in fl' eiceSses and ' atY6Citie of
Stalin, Wifilkl'flie militarYc"1adersli1P,
may have something to ?say'aboutriall
this. While there is nothing concrete to
horseback _AO t fancy Ai him,seit in that ltif74.Are-1,(14.. 41.11lParh
suggest
4116
mirror.
When 'tfiVIVINViit'?dViel AbAilgtS tYablg
the risks titiVtilkiettgin their' present'
icy, they they ,mustdhive carefully, weighed
the consequencesmiThey must?have real-
ized the grave isle it would ,raise; in
the Communist wail& ontsid? Of -the
';'fl?11/151-iitY Mi11 in
every g f1ie0thni,qt-14triginciting .13Wh'
peoples. R36/.14'114 ',00141011 '1110P, 1(1
Abroad, they probably hoped ther,q,,,
woialpojetTcpA.,,e94.00aliffieigyr,4,514A-4,
A ,
tages. .1 b?ring about feeling
of rel P'irth'e free wdrld," cfen-
sivrrMflt and among our
illtinh slqw (down, defensive alli-
ancelengglAs teyditooyeaken,. the possi-
bility Avgape,ta6iel.i.iizfor which
everyone yearns, mig Me more and
more accepted. All this dfli'Ved would
give -them WillRIT'irrIgheir own
strength, economic and military. If we
are naive, then the Soviet Union may get
some intemational, beriefits from their
present tactics, r,
'
"Pressures" *From People -
But there is another, side tog the .pire
which bears pondering. The Soviet lead-,'
ers may _have had no ref.al al.tepiative,94,
took the course, which they felt held out
the best -;Aance c8t keeping 'their own
power. The Kremlin leaders, as I men-
tioned, were under heavy domestic pres-
sures to do something to persuade their
people that a new era was in the making,?
During recent years the leavening prOc;
ess of education has developed the
critical faculties of millions of Russians.
The Kremlin can no longer sell the old
line to all of their people. They must
now rewrite not only the history of
Stalin but rewrite the story they have
theiripeople about the ,out-
side Nvcrld.
leadersLKhrushchey, Bulganin,
Kagairevich?have got over the
hump of Stalin' death .without losing
their grip on his power. They profess a
great deal of confidence in ,their ability
to perpetuate the system of collective
dictatorship they have instituted by bas-
ing it more broadly on the top layer of
Jel*riaarty managers, generals, engineers
,and intellectualsAyho have a stake in the
Soviet regime.
Chante"fOr Freedoms
Only time edill whetheig the present'
leaders witb:thele past close association
with Stalinism really camslo this arid):
make the Soviet dictatorskiA work ,
out going much farther anc.. giving their
peOple son-letting' more "Thairariere ftp84'
service in tile direction of the right to
free speechofree- worship, 4ted protectioia
for the from arbitrary. action.
osn.blyffh,fi,..t we are teeting_will end
UI) ,as a temporary period of attempted
i'lgtraid 'off the kissian people, a cloak to
Self thein ggiE tallective tlietatorShip as
4110101 tifa pcarsorird dictatorihip."Possibly
: lthis a.,,Whhesitglot step tqww'fiLgiying a
,greiater ripwiher of the Riassia4Lpeople a
chance to share in the decisions which
shlipe fheiirdestinies. I am St.tifie Rus-
'"SlaA leader?rthernselves clifgnStlailitv how
,their ,efforti Ito de-Stalirti2ea the Soviet
*Dim a 4-1 vral 1J.gnout. I,' .iobio sure
xypulchibe,di,spayed_iLtinx opught
they were paving theotywItt for the
establishrpent in Russia of witiat we
could call' a' -decent and responsible
government.
The CommuniSts, despite !their self-
confidence, do ni4 and
the fate of rnaplqd. In the fivsboi.-fitrm ,
free world reSiStance to their In
tional barbarlifeM'and ebti
political frands'aild malpractices, ativotiliid
and abroad, land %under Ithk>pailskameadf
ve toward more; Aiptina 1,wodes
their own people, there
ual mo ma4v1Ifi.,p194:
of life aild behavior. If sq, ehlioes
of world' peaeeg be !'Werp
'inttimigeliArNttird,- This lifitiBibility the
free .,.worildint must watch ilprayerfully,
;A*4 tP5v9P139ftlipities p-o-
xidfd,Aktmess in thiAld4eeflop., We
mult loi,teciilglly alert t,44 prer,c,eive and
ilerionnoe tfle d'Ehgers imPlieit in the
fraud of a mere attempt to bury a
shabby past.
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